Major-General Philip H. Sheridan to Brevet Major-General Wesley Merritt, November 2, 1864

HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,               

November 27, 1864.

Bvt. Maj. Gen. WESLEY MERRITT,

Commanding First Cavalry Division:

GENERAL: You are hereby directed to proceed to-morrow morning at 7 o'clock with the two brigades of your division now in camp to the east side of the Blue Ridge, via Ashby's Gap, and operate against the guerrillas in the district of country bounded on the south by the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad as far east as White Plains, on the east by the Bull Run range, on the west by the Shenandoah River, and on the north by the Potomac. This section has been the hotbed of lawless bands, who have, from time to time, depredated upon small parties on the line of army communications, on safe guards left at houses, and on all small parties of our troops. Their real object is plunder and highway robbery. To clear the country of these parties that are bringing destruction upon the innocent as well as their guilty supporters by their cowardly acts, you will consume and destroy all forage and subsistence, burn all barns and mills and their contents, and drive off all stock in the region the boundaries of which are above described. This order must be literally executed, bearing in mind, however, that no dwellings are to be burned and that no personal violence be offered to the citizens. The ultimate results of the guerrilla system of warfare is the total destruction of all private rights in the country occupied by such parties. This destruction may as well commence at once, and the responsibility of it must rest upon the authorities at Richmond, who have acknowledged the legitimacy of guerrilla bands. The injury done this army by them is very slight. The injury they have indirectly inflicted upon the people and upon the rebel army may be counted by millions. The Reserve Brigade of your division will move to Snickersville on the 29th. Snickersville should be your point of concentration, and the point from which you should operate in destroying toward the Potomac. Four days' subsistence will be taken by the command. Forage can be gathered from the country through which you pass. You will return to your present camp, via Snicker's Gap, on the fifth day.

By command of Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan:

JAS. W. FORSYTH,             

Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 43, Part 1 (Serial No. 91), p. 679

Major-General Philip H. Sheridan to Lieutenant-General Ulysses. S. Grant, August 17, 1864—9 p.m.

BERRYVILLE, VA., August 17, 1864—9 p.m.

Lieut. Gen. U.S. GRANT,

Commanding Armies of the United States:

All your dispatches have been received. Kershaw's division is here, and Wickham's and Lomax's brigades, of Fitz Lee's cavalry division, also another brigade from Reams' Station. The First Cavalry Division captured 300 prisoners yesterday; most of them belonged to Kershaw's division. One division of A. P. Hill's corps is reported here, but no prisoners taken. The position that I held in front of Strasburg was a very bad one, from which I could be forced at any time precipitately. Winchester is untenable except as a provisioned garrison. I have, therefore, taken a position near Berryville, which will enable me to get in their rear if they should get strong enough to push north. Winchester is now held by the cavalry, with one brigade of infantry of the Sixth Corps to act with it. The cavalry engagement in front of Front Royal was splendid; it was on open ground; the saber was freely used by our men. Great credit is due to Generals Merritt and Custer and Colonel Devin. My impression is that troops are still arriving.

Kershaw's and Fitz Lee's divisions came through Culpeper. Mosby has annoyed me and captured a few wagons. We hung one and shot six of his men yesterday. I have burned all wheat and hay, and brought off all stock, sheep, cattle, horses, &c., south of Winchester. The prisoners captured belong to Kershaw's division, and Wickham's and Lomax's brigades, of Fitz Lee's cavalry division.

P. H. SHERIDAN,                

Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 43, Part 1 (Serial No. 90), p. 822

Diary of 1st Lieutenant Lemuel A. Abbott: Monday, September 19, 1864 – Part 8

The Tenth Vermont, Fourteenth New Jersey and the rest of our brigade as usual, not only proudly led the Division at first by a good deal in the advance through the woods but in this instance the whole army. It was therefore not only the most aggressive and conspicuous part of — being on high ground where I could see our line of battle each way — but the most important point in the line; was first seen when through the wood and the most dreaded by the enemy being on the pike, and in consequence its artillery fire within reach was concentrated on us, and it was a hot place. But soon, after recovering from the collapse of the Second Brigade on my right which wholly disappeared and nothing more was seen of it by me, with the valor of the old-time “Green Mountain Boys” on we went undaunted until, after we had advanced about seventy-five yards beyond the woods now extinct behind which we had formed in the open field where I was, being then on a high point where I could see the whole battlefield, I glanced to my right and left and was appalled to see that the troops on both flanks of my Brigade were obliquing rapidly away from us, the whole Nineteenth Corps in perfect lines of battle by an oblique movement to the right having pulled away from the right of our Division until there was a gap big enough including that made by the Second Brigade, to more than admit a Brigade line of battle although it is said that Corps had been directed to guide on our Division and that a similar state of affairs existed on our left flank where the Vermont brigade was.* (See No. 3 through opening in woods showing No. 7; also see No. 5 where I was in the foreground). With a feeling of dismay I slackened my pace and nearly halted for I saw that through the gap in the very center and most vital point in our line on my right towards the Nineteenth Corps opposite which point was a strong force of the enemy's infantry awaiting us behind its works on the near edge of a little valley which protected it from our fire until right on it, it would throw its force so situated opposite the gap on our right and left flanks caused by the gap and have us completely at its mercy; but glancing almost immediately again to my right and rear, hearing loud military commands there, my spirits rose as I saw the gallant Russell leading his splendid Division en masse through the opening in the timber in his front, magnificently forward as though at drill to fill the gap. The appearance of his column greatly relieved us, as it drew the concentrated artillery fire from our column by the enemy largely to his. The whole battle scene at this moment at this point was one of appalling grandeur, one which no beholders could ever forget, provided they could keep their nerve well enough to preserve their presence of mind sufficiently to take in the situation midst the screeching shells and appalling musketry fire. The splendid appearance of General Russell’s Division elicited a cry of admiration from all who saw it. It was the supreme moment or turning point in the great tide of battle, and as Russell’s men rapidly deployed latterly under a galling fire on the march either way in perfect order enough to fill the gap, it was magnificent — beyond description — the grandest, best and most welcome sight I ever saw in a tight place in battle, and so inspired me — seeing the danger of a flank movement had passed — I again pushed forward to be in front and was there when the intrepid General Russell, one of the best fighters in the army, was twice shot and soon died a short distance to my right rear just about the time I was also twice hit; (see Nos. 5 and 6 illustrations) but when the enemy in my front and all along the little valley caught sight of our reserve coming at them so majestically and in such solid phalanx and splendid order, it seemed to me the rebs couldn’t run fast enough apparently to get away. It was the most sudden transformation on a battlefield I ever saw, as well as the most perfect stampede and rout; and it was the enemy’s last volley when it saw our reserve coming at them so determinedly that put a stop to my fighting for several months; and but for our reserve coming on the field just as it did I would have been worse riddled than I was by the enemy and killed even lying on the ground wounded, as I was wholly exposed where I lay close on their works not a rod away, the ground sloping towards them.

No. 8. – View from near the head of the ravine occupied by the enemy's infantry looking southerly towards the pike running along the edge of the distant forest. This is now (1908) a fine farm: its building on the left and those dimly seen in the edge of the distant wood along which the sunken pike runs have been built since the Civil War. Observe the perfect cover next to the pike for the enemy: it was here the Tenth Vermont assaulted, and the Second Brigade, this side as far north as the figure (Mai. Abbott), while the enemy's infantry behind rail breast-works and its artillery several hundred yards in rear to the right on higher ground swept the flat open field over which we charged in their front. It was almost a forlorn hope. Who would wish to criticise troops unfairly under such circumstances? The divide running east and west was about a hundred yards to Mai. Abbott's right. On its opposite or north side the Nineteenth Corps charged.

General Sheridan’s plan of battle was perfect and I shall never cease to admire him as the greatest military genius I have ever seen on a battlefield, for by this and his pluck and dash, I see the secret of his great successes. The plan of battle was fully developed by the time I fell twice badly wounded — at first I supposed mortally — only a few feet in front of the enemy’s works, and as I arose partially recovered from the shock of being twice hit, quivering and bleeding profusely, one of the first things my eye caught was Sheridan all alone without a staff officer or even an orderly near him, about forty yards in my rear, sitting his splendid thoroughbred horse like a centaur looking — all animation his very pose suggesting it — intently through his field glass toward the fleeing routed enemy and later after the third and last assault of the day all in a jumble with our undaunted dashing cavalry in perfect order sweeping across the great comparatively level plain bordering Winchester, like a tornado, with banners, arms, brasses, etc., brightly gleaming in the blazing autumn sunlight — a battle scene, as badly as I was wounded, the forepart of which held me entranced. As I again soon turned after the first assault, Sheridan put spurs to his horse and off he dashed all animation to another part of the field to reform his line and so on, going finally like the wind into the very midst of the great congested jumble, the enemy trying like a frightened flock of sheep to force itself through the streets of Winchester all at one time, the men literally piling themselves at the main street entrances on top of each other in order to do so. No battle scene will remain photographed so vividly on my memory as the first part of this for I could see nearly the whole field from where I long remained.

The fatal wounding in my sight near enough to hear his cry of anguish of my old Captain — Major Dillingham — and the killing of Major Vredenburg of the Fourteenth New Jersey from his horse by having his heart torn out, and others; General Russell’s brilliant debouch with his dauntless division marching proudly on the battlefield en masse with all its enchanting glitter and precision to take a hand at the sacrifice of his life — unfortunate, gallant, dashing Russell — Merritt, Averill and Custer’s brilliant spirited final charges on the fleeing enemy, its disorder and worst possible rout all beggar description, our retreat at the battle of Monocacy, July 9, 1864, being one of order and dignity comparatively speaking. I felt revenged for my wound and at having to run so in retreat at the Monocacy, and for my two wounds that day even if I did totteringly tarry, maimed and speechless with paralyzed tongue, chin and blanched face to look at such a brilliant battle scene until I became so faint from loss of blood, shock and partial reaction, I could hardly go steadily and finally did accept help, having declined at first, from two faithful men of my Company who, when I fell instead of stampeding stayed by me in one of the hottest places I have ever been in on a battlefield, one of whom was Corporal Joel Walker of Pownal, Vt. My first wound was from the butt end of an exploding shell in the breast which maimed and knocked me down and simultaneously as I fell a minie ball fired but a rod away in my front just grazed my forehead, torn through my upper lip crushing both jaws and carrying away eleven teeth, the most painless dentistry I ever had done; but, Oh! The shock it gave my system and the misery I suffered that night!

_______________

* It is alleged by one or more writers that this gap was partly caused by a turn in the pike to the left, and as the Tenth Vermont had been ordered to guide on the pike its colors being on it, this alleged turn in the pike caused the regiment to oblique to the left. This is incorrect. The turn in the pike when this dangerous gap was caused partially by the obliquing of the Nineteenth Corps to its right, which General Russell's Division filled, was about six hundred yards behind the rebel line of battle, a little beyond the enemy's battery close to the right of the pike, an exploding shell from which knocked me down, and this turn in the road at this time was within the enemy's lines in the rear of this battery, and it was then shelling us. The pike was perfectly straight from us to this turn, about a quarter of a mile away, or about a half mile from where we formed line of battle, the road being virtually straight, as can be seen from Nos. 2 and 9 illustrations. Our line of battle wasn't formed at right angles with the pike, hence the obliquing alleged.

SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 163-8

Diary of 1st Lieutenant Lemuel A. Abbott: Monday, September 19, 1864 – Part 6

The distance locally from where we crossed the Opequan to Winchester is called five miles; and to where we formed line of battle three miles, and from thence to Winchester two miles. The local distance from Winchester to Stephenson's Station by the railroad is six miles and to Summit Station twelve miles. There is no map in existence known to me giving the correct position of the enemy's infantry in the ravine in front of the Third Division, Sixth Corps; it is placed nearly a half mile too far back or west, and nearer where the second assault of the day was. The illustrations which of course must be correct herein place the enemy right in front of the Third Division and I can make oath to it, in the first assault when I was twice wounded. But I will now return a little and endeavor to describe this brilliant battle.

We were drawn up as before stated, in two lines of battle at the west entrance of the canyon facing west on an open field about midway between Abraham Creek on the south and Red Bud Creek on the north just in rear of a long narrow strip of woods which served as a great curtain to a grand, broad, slightly rolling plain several miles in extent in every direction in our front, which was to be the stage that day with the city of Winchester in the background, of one of the most dashing, picturesque battles probably ever fought in ancient or modern times at first with beautiful, silent nature about the only witness. The Third Division, Sixth Corps, was in the left and most important center of the line in two lines, the Tenth Vermont on the Berryville-Winchester pike, the most important, dangerous and stubbornly contested point in the whole line; the Nineteenth Corps was on our right in two lines; the intrepid Second Division, Sixth Corps in which was the gallant First Vermont Brigade, was on our left, one of the easiest places in the line; General Russell's valiant First Division, Sixth Corps, as reserve was stationed en masse a short distance in rear of where the right flank of the Third Division, Sixth Corps, and the left flank of the Nineteenth Corps joined, which was within a short distance and in plain sight of where I was, and our three Divisions of dashing, picturesque cavalry — including Wilson on our left along Abraham Creek running south of Winchester and Senseny Road, and Merritt and Averill on our right along the railroad and the Martinsburg pike— was massed on either flank for assault at the right moment on the enemy's flanks or as occasion might demand, while Crook's Eighth Corps was about a quarter of a mile en masse about in rear of the right flank of the Nineteenth Corps.

No. 6 – View of the ravine occupied by the enemy's infantry looking north from the pike where it crosses the ravine. Maj. Abbott was twice wounded at the top of the hill looking under the long limb of the first tree where the horizon shows so plainly. On the brow of the hill was a line of rebel rail breast-works. The ravine was alive with the enemy, to its head confronted by the Third Division, Sixth Corps. The enemy's artillery stationed on higher ground in rear of its infantry, firing over it together with its rapid firing literally swept, singed and scalped, the flat ground over which we charged: it was practically untenable. The continuation of this ravine south is shown in No. 7 illustration. 

SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 160-2

Diary of 1st Lieutenant Lemuel A. Abbott: Sunday, September 18, 1864

It's cloudy with a gentle south breeze. We had company inspection at 9 o'clock this forenoon and monthly at 4 o'clock this afternoon. The supply train came at 8 o'clock a. m. with four days' rations. We got orders at 3 o'clock p. m. to strike tents which we did, and march at once, but the order was countermanded. We shall probably move early in the morning. There's a high south wind this evening, but it doesn't look like rain. Sheridan's army now consists of three infantry corps, three divisions of cavalry and the usual complement of artillery, in all about 30,000 men, as follows; The Sixth Corps, Major General H. G. Wright, U. S. V. commanding; the Eighth Corps, Major-General George Crook, U. S. V. commanding; the Nineteenth Corps, Brevet Major-General W. H. Emery commanding; Brevet Major-General A. T. A. Torbert, U. S. V., Chief of Cavalry; the First Division of Cavalry, Brigadier-General Wesley Merritt, U. S. V. commanding; the Second Division of Cavalry, Brigadier-General W. W. Averell, U. S. A. commanding; and of the Third Division of Cavalry, Brigadier-General James H. Wilson, U. S. V. commanding. Lieutenant-General Jubal A. Early commands the Confederate army with about the same force.

SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 149-50

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to John M. Forbes, October 17, 1864

Cedar Creek, Oct. 17, '64.

There's really nothing to tell here; I never have anything to tell even to E. We are in a glorious country, with fine air to breathe and fine views to enjoy; we are kept very active, and have done a good deal of good work; I have done my share, I think, — but there's nothing to make a letter of.

We hear to-day that Pennsylvania and Indiana are all right. Poor Grant seems to have a hard task at Richmond: he hasn't the same army now that he started with in May, and I shall not be surprised if he is obliged to go into winter-quarters soon and re-organize, or at least drill. If so, people must be patient; we are going quite fast enough. I only write this to make you write to me. Isn't it lucky that I keep always well and hearty? My friends never feel any anxiety on that account and I never have to write letters to tell them how I am.¹

_______________

¹ General Sheridan had travelled by night, reached Washington on the morning of the 17th, had his interview with the powers there, and left at noon, reaching Martinsburg at night by rail. On the 18th, he rode twenty-eight miles to Winchester, where, hearing by courier from General Wright that all was quiet at his camp, he spent the night. Next morning, he planned to make some examinations with regard to repairing the Manassas Gap Railroad, with two engineer officers sent with him from Washington.

Meantime, let us see what was going on at Cedar Creek. From the abrupt mountain Three Top, close by Early's army, the camp of Sheridan's army, the division of the forces and guns, the river and creek, the fords and roads, could be plainly seen in bird's-eye view. Early saw that the Union left flank was less strongly guarded, as the country was more difficult than on their right, and yet was accessible to his infantry. He determined to flank it, and take the camp there in reverse by surprise before daylight, and sent Gordon on that errand, while his cavalry was to demonstrate on the left, and he, with Kershaw and Wharton and his artillery, attack simultaneously in front. He even hoped the master-stroke of capturing Sheridan (of whose absence he did not know), by the rush of his flanking party around his headquarters. I am permitted to quote the striking description of the scene before the battle, from Mr. George E. Pond's book, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864, in Scribner's "Campaigns of the Civil War."

“Stealthily, an hour after midnight, the Confederate columns moved forward. Since silence was essential to success, swords and canteens were left in camp, lest their clinking should betray the march; while the artillery was massed on the pike at Fisher's Hill, there to wait until the hour set for the infantry attack, when it was to move at a gallop through the town [Strasburg] to Hupp's Hill; for an earlier advance might betray the secret by the rumbling of the heavy wheels, in the dead of night, over the macadamized road. Early accompanied Kershaw, his centre column, and ‘came in sight of the Union fires at 3.30 o'clock; the moon,’ he adds, ‘was now shining, and we could see the camps.’ Kershaw was halted under cover, and while his men shivered in the chill night air, Early, during the hour that followed, pointed out precisely how and when this part of the attack should be made. Kershaw was to ‘cross his division over the creek as quietly as possible, and to form it into column of brigades as he did so, and advance in that manner against the enemy's left breastwork.’ The scene was memorable. The Union camps, on the hills beyond the creek, wrapped in slumber; a corps of infantry, Jackson's old corps, and a brigade of cavalry, stealing along the base of Massanutten [Mountain], to gain the rear of its unsuspecting foes; in the background, forty guns and more awaiting the signal to rush down the pike; an infantry division creeping over Hupps, and another crouching yonder nearer the creek. Before five o'clock Early ordered Kershaw forward again, and after a time came the welcome sound of a light crackle of musketry on the Confederate right, where Union picket-stations had been set, near the fords at which Gordon was crossing. This petty sound did not disturb the dreaming camps, but to the attent ears of Kershaw and Wharton it was the signal of attack. Kershaw quickly moved down to the creek; and meanwhile, as if Nature had enlisted to aid this enterprise, the moon had vanished and a thick fog, clouding the landscape, now hid from sight the Confederate march.”

Sheridan, at Winchester, was considering the questions of the Manassas Gap Railroad with the engineers, when, at seven o'clock, it was reported that some artillery firing could be heard in the direction of Cedar Creek. This was supposed to be from a reconnoissance, but later the sound grew nearer, and the General, mounting with his staff and escort, rode rapidly towards his camp. The heavy cannonade of a battle became unmistakable, and before long he met wagons and stragglers in great numbers. Mr. Pond continues: “Hastily giving orders to park the retreating trains, and to use the spare brigade at Winchester to form a cordon across the pike and fields, so as to stop the stragglers, Sheridan dashed up the pike with an escort of twenty men. He called to the fugitives to turn about and face the enemy, and, as he well phrases it, ‘hundreds of men, who, on reflection, found they had not done themselves justice, came back with cheers.’ On reaching the army, then eleven and a half miles from Winchester, he was received with a tempest of joy.”

In the text of Colonel Lowell's Life, some account of the part played by his brigade in the action has been given. Below, I give extracts from General Sheridan's official report of the battle to General Grant, and also from the reports, to their respective superiors, of Generals Torbert, Merritt, and Devin, in which they pay tribute to the memory of Colonel Lowell.

General Sheridan, at ten o'clock on the night of the battle, wrote: —

“I have the honour to report that my army at Cedar Creek was attacked this morning before daylight, and my left was turned and driven in confusion: in fact, most of the line was driven in confusion, with the loss of twenty pieces of artillery. I hastened from Winchester, where I was, on my return from Washington, and joined the army between Middletown and Newtown, [it] having been driven back about four miles. Here I took the affair in hand, and quickly united the corps; formed a compact line of battle just in time to repulse an attack of the enemy's, which was handsomely done, about I P. M. At 3 P. M., after some changes of the cavalry from the left to the right flank, I attacked with great vigour, driving and routing the enemy, capturing, according to last reports, forty-three pieces of artillery and very many prisoners. Wagon trains, ambulances, and caissons in large numbers are in our possession.

"Affairs at times looked badly, but by the gallantry of our brave officers and men, disaster has been converted into a splendid victory. Darkness again intervened, to shut off greater results.”

And in his second report from the battlefield, written the next day, he speaks of “a great victory — a victory won from disaster.  . . . The attack on the enemy was made about 3 P. M. by a left half-wheel of the whole line, with a division of cavalry turning each flank of the enemy, the whole line advancing. The enemy, after a stubborn resistance, broke and fled, and were pushed with vigour.  . . . At least 1600 prisoners have been brought in, also wagons and ambulances in large numbers.  . . . I have to regret the loss of many valuable officers killed and wounded, among them  . . . Colonel C. R. Lowell, commanding Reserve Cavalry Brigade, killed.”

General Torbert, Chief of Cavalry, reports :—

“As soon as the cavalry was in position on the left, they attacked the enemy. Colonel Lowell, commanding the Reserve Brigade, First Division, dismounted a part of his little band, and they advanced to a strong position behind a stone wall, from which the enemy's infantry failed to drive them after repeated attempts. About 12 M. the cavalry was moved to the left about 300 yards, thus bringing it to the left of the pike. Thus matters stood with the cavalry until 3 P. M., holding on to this ground with more than their usual dogged persistence, displaying gallantry which has never been surpassed, while most of the infantry was reforming several miles to their right and rear.  . . . About 2 P. M. Major-General Sheridan arrived on the ground. . . . On the left, the battle was going well for us; in fact, it could not be otherwise, with the cool and invincible Merritt on the ground, supported by such soldiers as Devin and Lowell."

[Sheridan had come on the field, and communicated with Lowell and the Sixth Corps commanders before noon, but probably General Torbert had not seen him personally. In his report he also makes a mistake as to the circumstances of Colonel Lowell's first wounding, so I omit that part.] He goes on : —

“About 4.15 o'clock a general advance of the army was made, and it was truly grand to see the manner in which the cavalry did their part. In this general advance Colonel Lowell,  . . . while charging at the head of his brigade, received a second wound, which proved to be mortal. Thus the service lost one of its most gallant and accomplished officers. He was the beau ideal of a cavalry commander, and his memory will never die in the command. . . . The cavalry advanced on both flanks, side by side with the infantry, charging the enemy's lines with an impetuosity which they could not stand. The rebel army was soon routed, and driven across Cedar Creek in confusion; the cavalry, sweeping on both flanks, crossed Cedar Creek about the same time, charged, and broke the last line the enemy attempted to form (it was now after dark), and put out at full speed for their artillery and trains.”

General Wesley Merritt, Lowell's immediate commander, said in his report: —

“No one in the field appreciated his worth more than his division commander. He was wounded painfully in the early part of the day, soon after which I met him; he was suffering acutely from his wound, but to ask him to leave the field was to insult him almost. A more gallant soldier never buckled sabre. His coolness and judgment in the field were unequalled. An educated and accomplished gentleman, his modest, amiable yet independent demeanour endeared him to all his superiors in rank. His inflexible justice, temperate yet unflinching conduct of discipline, made him respected and loved by his subordinates. He was upright as a man, pure as a patriot, and eminently free from the finesse of the politician. Young in years, he died too early for his country.”

Lastly, Brigadier-General Thomas C. Devin, who commanded the Second Brigade of Merritt's Division, ends his report thus: —

“During the early part of the engagement at Cedar Creek, when all seemed lost, I did not see a single cavalry straggler, and the men stood up nobly under a most withering fire. When obliged to retire, the movement was effected in perfect order and new lines formed, as if on parade.

“I respectfully trust that it may not be considered out of place here to mention the hearty and brave cooperation that was at all times extended to me by the brave and lamented Colonel Lowell, commanding the Reserve Brigade. In him the service lost an estimable gentleman and gallant soldier, whose future was bright with promise.”

It has been remarked of Lowell that, in each new place or kind of work to which his path of life led him, his new acquaintances believed that in him they had discovered a remarkable man, made for just that place. Yet all soon saw the performance of the work in hand was but a low power of a force dimly seen behind.

Many years after the war, General Sheridan wrote the following letter to his friend, Mr. John M. Forbes : —

Chicago, Ill., Dec. 31, 1881.

My Dear Mr. Forbes, — Your letter in reference to the late General Lowell is received. Among those who fell in my Shenandoah Valley Campaign there was no better soldier or brighter man than young Charles Lowell. Youthful in appearance and only twenty-three [sic] years of age,² he united the rare judgment and good eye of a leader to the unflinching courage which marked so many others. Commanding one of the best brigades of the army, comprised of three regiments of Regulars and his own, — the 2d Mass. Cavalry, raised by himself, — he was always found at the front in the advance. He had three horses killed under him in the first battle of Winchester (Opequan, Sept. 19, 1864), and in the morning of Oct. 19th, Cedar Creek, same year, he was mortally wounded while holding an advance position with his brigade on the left of the retreating army in the village of Middletown. On my arrival on the field, my first order was sent to Gen. Lowell through an aide-decamp to hold the position he then occupied, if it was possible. His reply was that he would. And when the final charge was made by the whole line in the evening, he was lifted on his horse, but could only whisper his last order for his men to mount and advance against the enemy. I watched him closely during the campaign and, had he survived that day at Cedar Creek, it was my intention to have more fully recognized his gallantry and genius by obtaining for him promotion in rank, and a command which would have enlarged his usefulness and have given more scope to his remarkable abilities as a leader of men. I am, my dear Mr. Forbes,

Sincerely and truly your friend,

P. H. Sheridan,

Lt. -General.

Perhaps a fitting close is this extract from a letter written by Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Forbes, returning to his regiment after imprisonment in the South: —

“Oh, you don't know how I missed Colonel Lowell as soon as I rejoined the regiment! Every time the bugles sounded in the morning, I half looked to see his light figure in the saddle leading the column; and each night when, the day's hard marching done, we gathered round the camp fires, whose charm used to be doubled by his presence and conversation, and listened to the band playing the tunes we used to listen to with him, the choking feeling would come, and it always will with me, whenever I think of him. Every one else is a dead weight in comparison."

² His age was twenty-nine.

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 364-5, 475-83

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw Lowell, October 14, 1864

CEDAR CREEK, Oct. 14, 1864.

You’re an innocent. Go on with the shoulder-straps, you needn’t be expecting any change, — those eagles will flourish a good while yet. I'm perfectly satisfied too, now that I have this Brigade; it has only been commanded before by Buford and Merritt, Colonel Gibbs had it for a few weeks at a time temporarily.¹

Our movements here are so entirely dependent on Grant's success before Richmond, that I can't form the faintest idea of the prospect of a speedy rest here.

_______________

¹ Perhaps Mrs. Lowell thought that before her shoulder-straps — the silver eagles on yellow ground of a cavalry colonel — were finished, her husband would be entitled to the single star of a brigadier-general. For more than a year he had borne the responsibility and done the work of one.

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 359-60, 473

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw Lowell, Sunday, October 10, 1864 – 12 p.m.

Near Strasburg, Monday, Oct. 10.

It's just noon, and we have gone into camp for the day in a lovely green field with plenty of forage, and lots of rails to burn, — and I've just had a bath, soaped from head to heel. It's still cold (frost and ice this A. M. and I had to lie out with nothing but my overcoat) and I have two or three slight colds in the head, — but it's splendid October and very exhilarating.

Enos found Sergeant Wakefield's horse yesterday and I rode him all day, and he didn't get hit, though his saddle did, and our Brigade chased two Rebel brigades more than ten miles, and took a battle-flag and four guns and caissons and wagons, &c., &c, so my disinclination for “fight” yesterday morning was a presentiment that came to naught.¹

*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *

I've said (to the Doctor and others) again and again that, if I was taken, I didn't want any special exchange, and wanted that understood, and I guess that's the way you feel too, in spite of your “concluding” that you did approve of special exchanges. It would be very hard, but I don't believe that I should be ill there, or should suffer even my share, and you would know just what the risk was. There's not one chance in a great many, however, that I shall be taken, — that's consoling.

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¹ Sheridan, who witnessed the spectacle from a hill, thus describes the Battle of Tom's Brook, nicknamed “Woodstock Races”: —

“Oct. 9th. About 7 in the morning, Custer's division encountered Rosser himself with three brigades, and while the stirring sounds of the resulting artillery duel were reverberating through the valley, Merritt moved briskly to the front, and fell upon Generals Lomax and Johnson on the Valley pike. . . . The two divisions moved forward together, under Torbert's direction. . . . The engagement soon became general across the Valley, both- sides fighting mainly mounted. For about two hours the contending lines struggled with each other along Tom's Brook, the charges and countercharges at many points being plainly visible from . . . Round Top, where I had my headquarters. The open country permitting a sabre fight, both sides seemed bent on using that arm. In the centre, the Confederates maintained their position with much stubbornness, . . . but at last they began to give way on both flanks, and, as these receded, Merritt and Custer went at the wavering ranks in a charge along their whole front. The result was a general smash-up of the entire Confederate line, the retreat quickly degenerating into a rout. . . . For twenty-six miles this wild stampede kept up, with our troopers close to the enemy's heels.”

In a report to General Grant next day, Sheridan wrote: —

“The number of prisoners captured will be about 330. The enemy, after being charged by our gallant cavalry, were broken, and ran. They were followed by our men on the jump twenty-six miles, through Mount Jackson and across the North Fork of the Shenandoah.”

And on the 11th of October he wrote again, from Cedar Creek: —

“I have seen no signs of the enemy since the brilliant engagement of the 9th instant. It was a square cavalry fight, in which the enemy was routed beyond my power to describe. He lost everything carried on wheels, except one piece of artillery; and when last seen, it was passing over Rude's Hill, near New Market, on the keen run, twenty-six miles from the battlefield, to which point the pursuit was kept up.”

General Torbert, in his report, spoke of this cavalry fight and victory as “the most decisive the country has ever witnessed. Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer, and Colonels Lowell and Pennington, commanding brigades, particularly distinguished themselves; in fact, no men could have rendered more valuable services and deserve higher honour from the hands of 'the Government. My losses will not exceed 60 killed and wounded, which is astonishing, compared with the results.”

General Early, who had not failed in courage or persistency, reported to Lee his new defeat: —

“This is very distressing to me, and God knows I have done all in my power to avert the disasters which have befallen this command; but the fact is, that the enemy's cavalry is so much superior to ours, both in numbers and equipment, and the country is so favourable to the operations of cavalry, that it is impossible for ours to compete with his. Lomax's cavalry is armed entirely with rifles, and has no sabres; and the consequence is, that they cannot fight on horseback, and, in this open country, they cannot successfully fight on foot against large bodies of cavalry: besides, the command has been demoralized all the time. It would be better if they could be all put in the infantry; but, if that were tried, I am afraid they would all run off.”

The Southerners, as a rule, did not believe in the sabre. Mosby ridicules it; and, indeed, for his kind of work, the revolver and carbine sufficed. But in the Valley, the furious combined rush of horses ridden by men, with three feet of bright steel, at close quarters, seems often to have been very effective.

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 355-6, 470-2

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw Lowell, Tuesday Evening, September 20, 1864

Tuesday evening (September 20).

We had a very successful action yesterday, and the cavalry did well. Both the other brigades of the division got battle-flags, — one two, the other four; we got none, but did well and took a couple of guns. Poor Billy was shot in three places and is dead. I had not an orderly near at the time, or I should have changed him. During the afternoon, I had one horse killed and two wounded, — all taken from orderlies. I couldn't get the gray to go anywhere: I have not a scratch. We have two officers of the Second Massachusetts wounded, the Doctor fears, mortally,— Lieutenants Baldwin and Thompson; Lieutenant Home prisoner: but the Second Massachusetts was not in the real fight, for some unaccountable reason it stayed behind, — so that I had not over 150 men in the command at Winchester, — otherwise I think we should have done even better. I feel very badly about it, but it can't be helped.¹ We are now in front of Strasburg, and the infantry will attack if they come up in time: I fear that the enemy will make off in the night, if we do not press them.

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¹ Lowell, with his three Regular regiments and a battalion of the Second Massachusetts, did admirable service, however. On hearing certain news of the withdrawal of Kershaw's force from the Valley, Sheridan, given carte blanche by Grant, moved instantly on Early's somewhat scattered command, and the Battle of the Opequan resulted. Torbert reported that Merritt's division, on the right, fording that creek at daylight, “was opposed by the rebel infantry; but the cavalry gallantly charged across the creek and drove them . . . about a mile and a half . . . where the infantry held the cavalry in check for some time, they being posted behind stone walls and rail breastworks; but General Averell, farther to the right turned the flank of this infantry and caused them to fall back.” Merritt advanced again, and these two commands drove the infantry and cavalry before them (part of Breckenridge's command) towards Winchester. They endeavoured to make a stand. What followed is thus described by General Sheridan: —

“The ground which Breckenridge was holding was open, and offered an opportunity such as seldom has been presented during the war for a mounted attack, and Torbert was not slow to take advantage of it. The instant Merritt's division could be formed for the charge, it went at Breckenridge's infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, with such momentum as to break the Confederate left just as Averell was passing around it. Merritt's brigades, led by Custer, Lowell, and Devin, met from the start with pronounced success, and, with sabre and pistol in hand, literally rode down a battery of five guns and took about 1200 prisoners." At the same time, Crook and Wright forced the rebel infantry so hard, that the whole Confederate Army fell back to breastworks formerly thrown up before Winchester. Here Early strove hard to stem the tide, but soon Torbert's cavalry began to pass around his left flank, and the infantry made a front attack. A panic ensued. The result was that Sheridan, after the supplementary routing of Early's army two days later at Fisher's Hill (in which Torbert's cavalry had no part), regained the Valley from the Potomac to Strasburg.

The unhappy General Early wrote as follows, to General Lee, after this defeat: —

"The enemy's immense superiority in cavalry, and the inefficiency of the greater part of mine, has been the cause of all my disasters. In the affair at Fisher's Hill the cavalry gave way, but it was flanked. This would have been remedied if the troops had remained steady, but a panic seized them at the idea of being flanked, and without being defeated they broke, many of them fleeing shamefully. . . . My troops are very much shattered, the men very much exhausted, and many of them without shoes."

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 347-8, 463-5

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw Lowell, September 8, 1864 – 9 p.m.

Near Summit, 9 P. M., Sept. 8, 1864.

To-day has quite changed the face of things, — the Third Brigade (my brigade) has been broken up: the Second Massachusetts is transferred to the “Reserve Brigade,” and I take command thereof, Colonel Gibbs being transferred to command of Second Brigade: the change looks like making the Second Massachusetts a permanent member of the Army of the Potomac, or that portion of it which is here.¹

I am now where, if there is anything to be done for Mr. Linkum² in the way of fighting, I may have a chance to do it. Good-night, — it's dark and rainy and windy enough to make a move to-morrow certain, — it's just the night to injure forage and rations, and very naturally they have arrived.

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¹ The reorganization of General Merritt's Division was as follows: First Brigade, Brigadier-General Custer; Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Devin; Reserve Brigade, Colonel Lowell. The Reserve Brigade consisted of the First, Second, and Fifth United States Cavalry and the Second Massachusetts Cavalry; also Battery D (horse artillery) of the Second United States Artillery.

² The negro “contrabands” called their far-off benefactor “Massa Linkum,” and the Union Army the “Linkum soldiers.”

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 337, 460-1

Colonel Charles Russell Lowell to Josephine Shaw Lowell, August 9, 1864

Halltown, Aug. 9, 1864.

I've been ever so busy lately; I've hardly had time to sleep or think, except Sunday, when I slept all day, having been up all the night before. I am to have the 3d Brigade, — 1st Division in the New Cavalry Corps, — nothing very stunning, I fear, but good enough for a beginner. General Merritt has the Division. Everything is chaos here, but under Sheridan is rapidly assuming shape. It was a lucky inspiration of Grant's or Lincoln's to make a Middle Military Division and put him in command of it; it redeems Lincoln's character and secures him my vote, if I have one.

It is exhilarating to see so many cavalry about and to see things going right again.¹

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¹ July 26. Colonel Lowell was now released from his service against guerrillas, by an order to report with his regiment to General Wright in the Shenandoah Valley. They did duty with the Sixth Corps until August 9th, when General Sheridan was given command of the new department, and gave Lowell the “Provisional Brigade.”

After the regiment took the field, of course Mrs. Lowell could no longer , stay with her husband, so returned to her parents in Staten Island, and never saw him in life again.

SOURCE: Edward Waldo Emerson, Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell, p. 323, 457

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, April 5, 1865

April 5, 1865

Last night, at 9.30, came a note from Sheridan, dated at Jetersville, saying that he was there, entrenched, with the 5th Corps and a part of the cavalry; that the whole Rebel army was in his front trying to get off its trains; that he expected to be attacked, but, if the remaining infantry could be hurried up, there was a chance of taking the whole of the enemy. Although the 2d Corps had only gone into bivouac at eight in the morning, and had no rations at that moment, General Meade issued orders for them to move at one at night and push on for Jetersville, followed by the 6th Corps, which lay just behind. The distance was fifteen or sixteen miles. I was sleeping on the floor, in the same room with the General, to look out for him in case he needed anything; for he had a distressing cough and a high fever, but would not give in, for he has a tremendous nervous system that holds him up through everything. General Webb was worn out with want of sleep, so I was up most of the night, writing and copying and receiving the despatches. The General talked a great deal and was very excited in his thoughts, though his head was perfectly clear. General Humphreys had slept, I don't know when — but there he was, as sturdy as ever, issuing orders for the advance, with his eyes wide open, as much as to say; “Sleep — don't mention it!” At one in the morning, sure enough, he moved; but had not got a mile, when, behold the whole of Merritt's division of cavalry, filing in from a side road, and completely closing the way! That's the way with those cavalry bucks: they bother and howl about infantry not being up to support them, and they are precisely the people who always are blocking up the way; it was so at Todd's Tavern, and here again, a year after. They are arrant boasters, and, to hear Sheridan's Staff talk, you would suppose his ten thousand mounted carbineers had crushed the entire Rebellion. Whereas they are immediately cleaned out, the moment they strike a good force of foot-men, and then they cry wolf merrily. The plain truth is, they are useful and energetic fellows, but commit the error of thinking they can do everything and that no one else does do anything. Well, Humphreys could not stir a step till seven next morning, but, meantime, his men got rest by the roadside and his rations were, with incredible exertions, gotten up to him, over fearful roads. At about nine o'clock we put the General in his four-horse waggon, wherein he can lie down, and followed the column, first along the main Namozine road, and then, striking off to the right, across the fields to Jetersville. At ten, we got word that the enemy were still near Amelia Court House, and the infantry were continually ordered to press on, the General stirring up the halting brigades, as he rode past. Some four miles this side of Childer's house (where Sheridan was) we came upon General Humphreys, at a large house of one Perkinson. Near by were several hundred Rebel prisoners, looking pretty gaunt, for we had nothing to give, and but little food for our own troops. I think that we have been obliged to give mule meat to some of our prisoners, during this campaign, to keep them alive till they could get to supplies; and some of our own men have gone very hungry, because, in the haste of pursuit, they marched straight away from the waggons.  . . . At 1.30 we found General Sheridan at the house, which was perhaps a mile south of Jetersville. Along the front was the 5th Corps, strongly entrenched, while the cavalry covered the flanks. A little before three, Sheridan rode off to the left, to help in Davies whom the enemy's infantry was trying to cut off. Before this, at two, the head of the 2d Corps was up and the troops went rapidly into position; for, a couple of hours later, Mr. Sheridan (and still more his officers) had a stampede that Lee was coming on top of us. For once in my life I will say I knew better than that, and laughed the cavalry Staff to scorn; for I was dead certain it was only a demonstration, to protect their trains and find our strength. In truth they never came even in sight of our infantry pickets. Though he was not fit for the saddle, General Meade insisted on riding out beyond the lines to talk with Sheridan. He treated him very handsomely and did not avail of his rank to take command over his cavalry, but merely resumed the 5th Corps — a generosity that General Sheridan has hardly reciprocated!

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 345-8

Special Orders, Headquarters Armies of the United States, April 9, 1865

SPECIAL ORDERS.]

HDQRS. ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

In the Field, April 9, 1865.

Maj. Gen. John Gibbon, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Charles Griffin, and Bvt. Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt are hereby designated to carry into effect the stipulations this day entered into between General R. E. Lee, commanding C. S. Armies, and Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding Armies of the United States, in which General Lee surrenders to General Grant the Army of Northern Virginia.

Bvt. Brig. Gen. George H. Sharpe, assistant provost-marshal-general, will receive and take charge of the rolls called for by the above-mentioned stipulations.

By command of Lieutenant-General Grant:

 E. S. PARKER,

 Lieutenant-Colonel and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: Arthur Caswell Parker, The Life of General Ely S. Parker, p. 134; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 46, Part 3 (Serial No. 97), p. 666

Lieutenant-Colonel Ely S. Parker to Brigadier-General John A. Rawlins, March 30, 1865

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

March 30, 1865 — 12.10 p.m.

Brig. Gen. JOHN A. RAWLINS:

GENERAL: A messenger just in from General Merritt says that the reconnaissance sent out from near Boisseau's encountered the enemy in considerable force. They went to about two miles of the Five Forks, and found the enemy occupying the road. Those going north proceeded to about a mile of the White Oak road, and found the road also occupied by the enemy. Nearly all the forces met were cavalry. All the roads leading toward the White Oak road are covered by the enemy. No engagement reported.

 E. S. PARKER,

 Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: Arthur Caswell Parker, The Life of General Ely S. Parker, p. 122; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 46, Part 3 (Serial No. 97), p. 281

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, February 5, 1864

February 5, 1864.

General Humphreys sent for me and showed me a cipher correspondence between Butler and Halleck, and Halleck and Sedgwick. B. telegraphed that large reinforcements had been sent from the Rapid Ann to North Carolina, and that he wished a demonstration to “draw their forces from Richmond.” S. replied that, with the exception of some two or three brigades, nobody had been sent to that place from the army in our front. B. then said he was going to move on Richmond, or something of the sort, and would like a demonstration not later than Saturday (to-morrow). S. said it was too short a time to make any great show and that it would spoil our chances for a surprise on their works, in future. H. then telegraphed to do, at any rate, what we could. So Kilpatrick has been sent to their right via Mine Ford, and Merritt is to threaten Barnett's Ford; and to threaten Raccoon Ford, while the 2d will make a stronger demonstration at Morton's Ford. Old Sedgwick and General Humphreys are cross at the whole thing, looking on it as childish.

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 68

Major General William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, May 10, 1865

CAMP OPPOSITE RICHMOND, May 10, 1865.

I wrote you on arrival from Savannah at Old Point. I got here yesterday and found my Army all in. Have seen Charley,¹ who is very well. We march tomorrow for Alexandria, whither I have sent my office papers. We will march slowly and leisurely and should reach Alexandria in ten or twelve days. I may have chance to write you meantime. I want you to go and attend your Fair, and say little of me, save that I regard my presence with my Army so important that I will not leave it till it is discharged or sent on new duties. I shall surely spend the summer with you, preferably at Lancaster, but will come to Chicago or wherever you may be when I can leave with propriety. This Army has stood by me in public and private dangers, and I must maintain my hold on it till it ceases to exist. All the officers and men have been to see me in camp to-day and they received with shouts my public denial of a review for Halleck.²  He had ordered Slocum's wing to pass him in review to-day. I forbade it. Tomorrow I march through Richmond with colors flying and drums beating as a matter of right and not by Halleck's favor, and no notice will be taken of him personally or officially. I dare him to oppose my march. He will think twice before he again undertakes to stand between me and my subordinates. Unless Grant interposes from his yielding and good nature I shall get some equally good opportunity to insult Stanton. . . .

Stanton wants to kill me because I do not favor the scheme of declaring the negroes of the South, now free, to be loyal voters, whereby politicians may manufacture just so much more pliable electioneering material. The Negroes don't want to vote. They want to work and enjoy property, and they are no friends of the Negro who seek to complicate him with new prejudices. As to the people of the South they are subjugated, but of course do not love us any more than the Irish or Scotch love the English, but that is no reason why we should assume all the expenses of their state governments. Our power is now so firmly established that we need not fear again their internal disturbances. I have papers and statistics which I will show your father in time. I showed some to Charley to-day and he perfectly agreed with me; so do all my officers. . . .

We cannot kill disarmed men. All this clamor after Jeff Davis, Thompson and others is all bosh. Any young man with a musket is now a more dangerous object than Jeff Davis. He is old, infirm, a fugitive hunted by his own people, and none so poor as do him reverence. It will be well in June before I can expect to leave my army. Don't attempt to come to Alexandria for I will be in a common tent, and overwhelmed with papers and business. Ord, Merritt, Crook, and all the big men of Halleck's army have been to see me, and share with me the disgust occasioned by their base betrayal of my confidence. . . .

__________

¹ General Charles Ewing.

² See Memoirs, II, 374. Sherman's refusal to accept Halleck's hospitality in Richmond is recorded on the same page

SOURCES: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Editor, Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 352-4.  A full copy of this letter can be found in the William T Sherman Family papers (SHR), University of Notre Dame Archives (UNDA), Notre Dame, IN 46556, Folder CSHR 2/24

Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg: No. 337 Report of Brig. Gen. John Buford, U.S. Army, commanding First Division.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,

August 27, 1863.

COLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the First Cavalry Division, from its crossing the Potomac at Edwards Ferry, on June 27, to its crossing of the Rappahannock on August 1:

After passing the Potomac on the upper pontoon bridge, the division marched over almost impassable roads, crossing the Monocacy near its mouth by a wretched ford, and bivouacked on the east side of the mountains, 3 miles from Jefferson, being halted there by the whole train of General Stahel's division blockading the road through the mountains.

June 28, the division moved through Jefferson, and went into camp near Middletown, for the purpose of shoeing and refitting.

June 29, the Reserve Brigade was detached and moved to Mechanicstown. The First and Second Brigades moved through Boonsborough, Cavetown, and Monterey Springs, and encamped near Fairfield, within a short distance of a considerable force of the enemy's infantry. The inhabitants knew of my arrival and the position of the enemy's camp, yet not one of them gave me a particle of information, nor even mentioned the fact of the enemy's presence. The whole community seemed stampeded, and afraid to speak or to act, often offering as excuses for not showing some little enterprise, “The rebels will destroy our houses if we tell anything.” Had any one given me timely information, and acted as guide that night, I could have surprised and captured or destroyed this force, which proved next day to be two Mississippi regiments of infantry and two guns.

June 30, the two brigades moved out very early to go to Gettysburg, via Fairfield. At the latter place my advance ran upon the force referred to. I determined to feel it and drive it, if possible, but, after a little skirmishing, found that artillery would have to be necessarily used.  Resolved not to disturb them, for fear cannonading from that quarter might disarrange the plans of the general commanding. Fairfield was 4 or 5 miles west of the route assigned me, and I did not wish to bring on an engagement so far from the road I was expected to be following. I immediately turned my column toward Emmitsburg without serious molestation, and was soon on my proper road and moving on Gettysburg, where I had reason to suppose I should find some of General Stahel's [Kilpatrick's] cavalry. We entered Gettysburg in the afternoon, just in time to meet the enemy entering the town, and in good season to drive him back before his getting a foothold. He withdrew toward Cashtown, leaving his pickets about 4½ miles from Gettysburg.

The night of the 30th was a busy night for the division. No reliable information of value could be obtained from the inhabitants, and but for the untiring exertions of many different scouting parties, information of the enemy's whereabouts and movements could not have been gained in time to prevent him from getting the town before our army could get up.

By daylight on July 1, I had gained positive information of the enemy's position and movements, and my arrangements were made for entertaining him until General Reynolds could reach the scene.

On July 1, between 8 and 9 a.m., reports came in from the First Brigade (Colonel Gamble's) that the enemy was coming down from toward Cashtown in force. Colonel Gamble made an admirable line of battle, and moved off proudly to meet him. The two lines soon became hotly engaged, we having the advantage of position, he of numbers. The First Brigade held its own for more than two hours, and had to be literally dragged back a few hundred yards to a position more secure and better sheltered. Tidball's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Calef, Second U.S. Artillery, fought on this occasion as is seldom witnessed. At one time the enemy had a concentric fire upon this battery from twelve guns, all at short range. Calef held his own gloriously, worked his guns deliberately with great judgment and skill, and with wonderful effect upon the enemy. The First Brigade maintained this unequal contest until the leading division of General Reynolds' corps came up to its assistance, and then most reluctantly did it give up the front. A portion of the Third Indiana found horse-holders, borrowed muskets, and fought with the Wisconsin regiment that came to relieve them. While this left of my line was engaged, Devin's brigade, on the right, had its hands full.  The enemy advanced upon Devin by four roads, and on each was checked and held until the leading division of the Eleventh Corps came to his relief.

After the fall of General Reynolds, whose advance troops partially drove back the enemy and made heavy captures of prisoners, the enemy brought up fresh troops, and engaged General Doubleday's command, which fought bravely, but was greatly outnumbered and forced to fall back. Seeing our troops retiring, and their need of assistance, I immediately rushed Gamble's brigade to Doubleday's left, and dismounted it in time to render great assistance to our infantry, and to check and break the enemy's line. My troops at this place had partial shelter behind a low stone fence, and were in short carbine range. Their fire was perfectly terrific, causing the enemy to break and rally on their second line, which made no farther advance toward my position.

Shortly after this, I placed my command on our extreme left, to watch and fight the enemy should he make another attack, and went to Cemetery Hill for observation. While there, General Hancock arrived, and in a few moments he made superb disposition to resist any attack that might be made.

My division bivouacked that night on the left of our position, with pickets extending almost to Fairfield.

The zeal, bravery, and good behavior of the officers and men on the night of June 30, and during July 1, was commendable in the extreme. A heavy task was before us; we were equal to it, and shall all remember with pride that at Gettysburg we did our country much service.

July 2, the division became engaged with the enemy's sharpshooters on our left, and held its own until relieved by General Sickles' corps, after which it moved to Taneytown, and bivouacked for the night.

The next day, July 3, it moved to Westminster, to guard the trains of the army at that point.

July 4, the division marched toward Frederick, en route to Williamsport.

July 5, reached Frederick, drew supplies, and remained all night.

July 6, the whole division (the Reserve Brigade having joined the night before) marched at 4 a.m. toward Williamsport, to destroy the enemy's trains, which were reported to be crossing the Potomac into Virginia.

At about 5 p.m., when near Saint James' College, the enemy's pickets were discovered, driven in, and preparations made to capture the town. The enemy was driven handsomely to within half a mile of his trains, at the town, when he came out strong enough to prevent our farther progress. General Merritt's brigade, with Graham's battery, was on the right, Colonel Gamble's (First) brigade on the left, and Colonel Devin's (Second) brigade on the left rear as reserves. The enemy made an attack upon Gamble, who had posted his men under shelter, and who held his fire until the rebel line came within short carbine range, when he opened upon it, doing terrible execution, and driving it back into its stronghold. This was repeated with similar success. In Merritt's front the enemy made no direct attack, but were so obstinate that General Merritt could not dislodge them without too much sacrifice. The enemy, however, attempted to turn our right with a brigade of infantry. This attempt was most admirably foiled by General Merritt.

While our hottest contest was in progress, General Kilpatrick's guns were heard in the direction of Hagerstown, and as they grew nearer, I sent word to him to connect with my right for mutual support. The connection was made, but was of no consequence to either of us. Just before dark, Kilpatrick's troops gave way, passing to my rear by the right, and were closely followed by the enemy.

It now being dark, outnumbered, and the First and Reserve Brigades being out of ammunition, Devin was ordered to relieve Gamble and a portion of Merritt's troops. This being done, I ordered the command to fall back, Devin to hold his ground until the entire road to the Antietam was clear. Devin handsomely carried out his instructions, and the division bivouacked on the road to Boonsborough.

The expedition had for its object the destruction of the enemy's trains, supposed to be at Williamsport. This, I regret to say, was not accomplished. The enemy was too strong for me, but he was severely punished for his obstinacy. His casualties were more than quadruple mine.

Colonel Chapman, with his regiment, dashed off to the road leading from Falling Waters to Williamsport, and destroyed a small train of grain, and returned with about 40 mules and their harness.

At Williamsport, Captain Graham fought his battery with marked ability, and to the admiration of all witnesses. The officers and men behaved with their usual courage, displaying great unwillingness to fall back, and requiring repeated orders before they did so.

July 7, the division moved to Boonsborough, the Reserve Brigade camping well in advance on the Hagerstown road, after having a successful cavalry brush with the enemy's advance, of which I have as yet received no report.

July 8, the enemy attacked at 5 a.m., and the fighting lasted until about 5 p.m. He was driven back about 4 miles, when the division then bivouacked for the night.

July 9, attacked the enemy at 4 p.m. and drove him handsomely about 2 miles.

July 10, attacked the enemy at 8 a.m. and drove him through Funkstown to his intrenchments beyond Antietam, when he came out with a heavy force of infantry and artillery and gave battle. The division held the crest on our side of the town like veterans until its ammunition was exhausted. Howe's division, of the Sixth Corps, was in easy supporting distance, but had no orders to aid me. At 3 p.m. I could no longer reply with carbines, for want of cartridges, and consequently ordered the division to fall back. A brigade of the Sixth Corps then began to advance, but did not occupy the position that I held when I left the field.

There was splendid fighting on the part of the division on the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th. There was no faltering or hesitation. Each man went to work determined to carry anything in reason. For the particulars I refer you to the reports of the brigade commanders.

July 11, the First and Second Brigades moved in the afternoon to the vicinity of Bakersville. The Reserve Brigade was detached.

July 12 and 13, remained at Bakersville, and pushed pickets to within 800 yards of the enemy's intrenchments at Downsville.

July 14, at 7 a.m., the division was ordered to advance, and at 7.30 o'clock it was discovered that the enemy had evacuated during the night. The few remaining scouts were run into the rear guard of Lee's army, which was soon seen in front of Kilpatrick, who had advanced from the north. Kilpatrick was engaged. I sent word to him that I would put my whole force in on the enemy's rear and flank, and get possession of the road and bridge in their rear. The division succeeded in getting the road, and attacked the enemy in flank and rear, doing him great damage, and scattering him in confusion through the woods and ravines. Our spoils on this occasion were one 10-pounder Parrott gun, one caisson, over 500 prisoners, and about 300 muskets. General Merritt came up in time to take the advance before the enemy had entirely crossed, and made many captures. The enemy's bridge was protected by over a dozen guns in position and sharpshooters on the Virginia side. As our troops neared the bridge, the enemy cut the Maryland side loose, and the bridge swung to the Virginia side.

July 15, the division moved to Berlin.

July 16, moved camp to Petersville.

July 17, remained at Petersville.

July 18, crossed during the afternoon, and encamped near Purcellville.

July 19, marched through Philomont, and encamped on Goose Creek, near Rector's Cross-Roads.

July 20, marched to Rectortown. Detached General Merritt with his brigade to hold Manassas Gap, Gamble to hold Chester Gap, and Devin, with all the train, moved to Salem.

July 21, Merritt in Manassas, Gamble near Chester Gap, finding it already in possession of a superior force of the enemy. General Merritt and Colonel Gamble each had a fight and made captures, for particulars of which see their reports.

July 22, wagon train sent to Warrenton in charge of Sixth New York Cavalry. Devin moved toward Barbee's Cross-Roads.

July 23, whole division concentrated at Barbee's Cross-Roads, and remained until the 26th, when the division took position at Warrenton and Fayetteville, picketing the Rappahannock River from Sulphur Springs to Kelly's Ford.

During the whole campaign, from June 27 to July 31, there has been no shirking or hesitation, no tiring on the part of a single man so far as I have seen; the brigade commanders report none.

To General Merritt and Colonels Gamble and Devin, brigade commanders, I give my heartfelt thanks for their zeal and hearty support. Neither of them ever doubted the feasibility of an order, but on its reception obeyed its dictates to the letter.

My staff – Captains [Charles E.] Norris, Keogh, [Craig W.] Wadsworth, and Bacon, and Lieutenants Mix, P. Penn Gaskill, Dean, [Albert P.] Morrow, [Malcomb H.] Wing, and [George M.] Gilchrist – were always on hand, and gave me much valuable information from where the fire was hottest, and were of immense assistance in conveying orders on the field of battle, and seeing that they were obeyed. During the campaign they were all under heavy fire on different occasions, and for coolness and gallantry cannot be excelled in this army.

Lieutenant [Aaron B.] Jerome, signal corps, was ever on the alert, and through his intrepidity and fine glasses on more than one occasion kept me advised of the enemy's movements when no other means were available. Surgeon Hard, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, surgeon-in-chief to the division, deserve great credit for his zealous and untiring attention and labors with the sick and wounded. Through his exertions their sufferings have been greatly alleviated, their wants supplied, and many lives saved. Many wounded soldiers are indebted to him for his timely aid on the battle-field, who, but for his energy, would have shared the fate of many poor fellows who had less attentive surgeons.

I transmit with this the reports of the brigade commanders.

The First Brigade captured 854 head of beef-cattle and 602 sheep at Chester Gap, which were turned over to the subsistence department at Markham, July 24.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

 JNO. BUFORD,

 Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding.

Lieut. Col. C. Ross SMITH,

Chief of Staff, Cavalry Corps.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43),  p. 926-30