HEADQUARTERS OF THE
ARMY,
Washington, July 16,
1864.
General SHERMAN,
Georgia, via Chattanooga:
MY DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 9th is just received. If I
have written you no “encouragement or advice” it has been mainly because you
have not wanted either. Your operations thus far have been the admiration of
all military men; and they prove what energy and skill combined can accomplish,
while either without the other may utterly fail. In the second place, I must be
exceedingly cautious about making military suggestions not through General
Grant. While the general himself is free from petty jealousies, he has men
about him who would gladly make difficulties between us. I know that they have
tried it several times, but I do not think they will succeed. Nevertheless, I
think it well to act with caution. I therefore make all suggestions to him and
receive his orders. In my present position I cannot assume responsibility
except in matters of mere administration or in way of advice. The position is
not an agreeable one, but I am willing to serve wherever the Government thinks
I can be most useful.
As you will learn from the newspapers, we have just escaped
another formidable raid on Baltimore and Washington. As soon as Hunter
retreated southwest from Lynchburg the road to Washington was open to the
rebels, and I predicted to General Grant that a raid would be made. But he
would not believe that Ewell's corps had left his front till it had been gone
more than two weeks and had already reached Maryland. He was deceived by the
fact that prisoners captured about Petersburg represented themselves as
belonging to Ewell's old corps, being so ordered no doubt by their officers. We
had nothing left for the defense of Washington and Baltimore but militia,
invalids, and convalescents, re-enforced by armed clerks and quartermaster's
employes. As the lines about Washington alone are thirty-seven and a half miles
in length, laid out by McClellan for an army of 150,000, you may judge that
with 15,000 such defenders we were in no little danger of losing the capital or
Baltimore, attacked by a veteran force of 30,000. Fortunately the Sixth Corps,
under Wright, arrived just in the nick of time, and the enemy did not attempt
an assault.
Entre nous. I fear Grant has made a fatal mistake in
putting himself south of James River. He cannot now reach Richmond without
taking Petersburg, which in strongly fortified, crossing the Appomattox and
recrossing the James. Moreover, by placing his army south of Richmond he opens
the capital and the whole North to rebel raids. Lee can at any time detach
30,000 or 40,000 men without our knowing it till we are actually threatened. I
hope we may yet have full success, but I find that many of Grant's general
officers think the campaign already a failure. Perseverance, however, may
compensate for all errors and overcome all obstacles. So mote it be.
Be assured, general, that all your friends here feel greatly
gratified with your operations, and I have not heard the usual growling and
fault-finding by outsiders. I have twice presented in writing your name for
major-general regular army, but for some reason the matter still hangs fire.
Best regards to Thomas and McPherson.
Yours, truly,
H. W. HALLECK.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
38, Part 5 (Serial No.76 ), p. 150-1
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