Saturday, June 27, 2020

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General William T. Sherman, July 16, 1864

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,                     
Washington, July 16, 1864.
General SHERMAN,
Georgia, via Chattanooga:

MY DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 9th is just received. If I have written you no “encouragement or advice” it has been mainly because you have not wanted either. Your operations thus far have been the admiration of all military men; and they prove what energy and skill combined can accomplish, while either without the other may utterly fail. In the second place, I must be exceedingly cautious about making military suggestions not through General Grant. While the general himself is free from petty jealousies, he has men about him who would gladly make difficulties between us. I know that they have tried it several times, but I do not think they will succeed. Nevertheless, I think it well to act with caution. I therefore make all suggestions to him and receive his orders. In my present position I cannot assume responsibility except in matters of mere administration or in way of advice. The position is not an agreeable one, but I am willing to serve wherever the Government thinks I can be most useful.

As you will learn from the newspapers, we have just escaped another formidable raid on Baltimore and Washington. As soon as Hunter retreated southwest from Lynchburg the road to Washington was open to the rebels, and I predicted to General Grant that a raid would be made. But he would not believe that Ewell's corps had left his front till it had been gone more than two weeks and had already reached Maryland. He was deceived by the fact that prisoners captured about Petersburg represented themselves as belonging to Ewell's old corps, being so ordered no doubt by their officers. We had nothing left for the defense of Washington and Baltimore but militia, invalids, and convalescents, re-enforced by armed clerks and quartermaster's employes. As the lines about Washington alone are thirty-seven and a half miles in length, laid out by McClellan for an army of 150,000, you may judge that with 15,000 such defenders we were in no little danger of losing the capital or Baltimore, attacked by a veteran force of 30,000. Fortunately the Sixth Corps, under Wright, arrived just in the nick of time, and the enemy did not attempt an assault.

Entre nous. I fear Grant has made a fatal mistake in putting himself south of James River. He cannot now reach Richmond without taking Petersburg, which in strongly fortified, crossing the Appomattox and recrossing the James. Moreover, by placing his army south of Richmond he opens the capital and the whole North to rebel raids. Lee can at any time detach 30,000 or 40,000 men without our knowing it till we are actually threatened. I hope we may yet have full success, but I find that many of Grant's general officers think the campaign already a failure. Perseverance, however, may compensate for all errors and overcome all obstacles. So mote it be.

Be assured, general, that all your friends here feel greatly gratified with your operations, and I have not heard the usual growling and fault-finding by outsiders. I have twice presented in writing your name for major-general regular army, but for some reason the matter still hangs fire.
Best regards to Thomas and McPherson.

Yours, truly,
H. W. HALLECK.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 38, Part 5 (Serial No.76 ), p. 150-1

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