Showing posts with label Middle TN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Middle TN. Show all posts

Sunday, October 20, 2024

Diary of Private W. J. Davidson, July 24, 1863

Nothing of interest doing here. The news is not encouraging. Grant has burned Jackson and evacuated the place, falling back toward Vicksburg. It is also reported that a portion of his army has gone to New Orleans, destined for Mobile. Bragg is at Chattanooga, and the Federal army all over Middle Tennessee and North Alabama. Lee is falling back slowly from Pennsylvania.

SOURCE: Edwin L. Drake, Editor, The Annals of the Army of Tennessee and Early Western History, Vol. 1, p. 281

Wednesday, May 3, 2023

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 252. — Report of Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest, C.S. Army, commanding cavalry, of operations November 16, 1864-January 23, 1865.

No. 252.

Report of Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest, C.S. Army, commanding cavalry,
of operations November 16, 1864-January 23, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS FORREST'S CAVALRY CORPS,        
Verona, Miss., January 24, 1865.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the troops under my command during the recent movements in Middle Tennessee:

While in West Tennessee I received orders from General Beauregard on the 30th of October, to report without delay to General Hood at Florence, Ala. I was then actively operating against Johnsonville, and so soon as I completed the destruction of the enemy's fleet and stores at that place I commenced moving up the Tennessee River. I halted my command at Perryville with a view of crossing the river at that point, but being without facilities, and the river already high and rising rapidly, I found it impossible to cross over. I succeeded, however, in throwing across a portion of Rucker's brigade, while I moved to Corinth with the balance of my command. My men and horses were much jaded, but I moved at once to Florence and crossed the river on the 16th and 17th of November. On my arrival at Florence I was placed in command of the entire cavalry then with the Army of Tennessee, consisting of Brigadier-General Jackson's division and a portion of Dibrell's brigade, under command of Colonel Biffle, amounting to about 2,000 men, together with three brigades of my former command, making in all about 5,000 cavalry. I bivouacked my command at Shoal Creek until the morning of the 21st, when, in obedience to orders from General Hood, I commenced a forward movement. My command consisted of three divisions—Chalmers', Buford's, and Jackson's. I ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers to advance via West Point, Kelly's Forge, Henryville, and Mount Pleasant. Brigadier-Generals Buford and Jackson were ordered to move up the military road to Lawrenceburg, and thence southeastward in the direction of Pulaski. Both these divisions had several engagements with the enemy, and were almost constantly skirmishing with him, but drove him in every encounter.

At Henryville Brigadier-General Chalmers developed the enemy's cavalry and captured forty-five prisoners. At Fouche Springs the enemy made another stand. I ordered General Chalmers to throw forward Rucker's brigade and to keep up a slight skirmish with the enemy until I could gain his rear. I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Kelley to move by the left flank and join me in rear of the enemy. Taking my escort with me I moved rapidly to the rear. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelley being prevented from joining me as I had expected, I made the charge upon the enemy with my escort alone, producing a perfect stampede, capturing about 50 prisoners, 20 horses, and 1 ambulance. It was now near night, and I placed my escort in ambush. Colonel Rucker pressed upon the enemy, and as they rushed into the ambuscade my escort fired into them, producing the wildest confusion. I ordered Colonel Rucker to rest his command until 1 a.m., when the march was renewed toward Mount Pleasant, where he captured 35,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition and the guard left in charge of it. Meantime Brigadier-Generals Buford and Jackson had proceeded from Lawrenceburg toward Pulaski and encountered Hatch's division of cavalry at Campbellsville, and routed him after a short but vigorous engagement, in which he lost about 100 prisoners and several in killed and wounded. Most of my troops having reached Columbia on the evening of the 24th I invested the town from Duck River to the extreme north, which position I held until the arrival of the infantry on the morning of the 27th, when I was relieved.

Columbia having been evacuated on the night of the 28th [27th] I was ordered to move across Duck River on the morning of the 28th. Chalmers' division was ordered to cross at Carr's Mill, seven miles above Columbia, Jackson's, at Holland's Ford, while I crossed at Owen's Ford with a portion of Colonel Biffle's regiment. Before leaving Columbia I sent my escort to Shelbyville for the purpose of ascertaining the movements of the enemy and destroying the railroad, and I regret to announce that Captain Jackson was seriously wounded on this expedition. On the night of the 28th I was joined by Chalmers' division about eight miles from Columbia on the Spring Hill and Carr's Mill road. Jackson's division was ordered to proceed to the vicinity of Hurt's Cross Roads on the Lewisburg pike. At 11 o'clock at night I received a dispatch from General Buford informing me that the enemy had made such's stubborn resistance to his crossing that he could not join the command until the morning of the 29th. I ordered General Jackson to move along the Lewisburg pike toward Franklin until he developed the enemy. Brigadier-General Armstrong notified me that he had struck the enemy, when I ordered him not to press too vigorously until I reached his flank with Chalmers' division. The enemy gradually fell back, making resistance only at favorable positions. After waiting a short time for my troops to close up, I moved rapidly toward Spring Hill with my entire command. Two miles from town the enemy's pickets were encountered and heavy skirmishing ensued. I ordered General Armstrong to form his brigade in line of battle. I also ordered a portion of the Kentucky brigade and the Fourteenth Tennessee Regiment, under Colonel White, to form, which being done I ordered a charge upon the enemy, but he was so strongly posted upon the crest of a hill that my troops were compelled to fall back. I then dismounted my entire command and moved upon the enemy. With a few men I moved to the left on a high hill, where I discovered the enemy hurriedly moving his wagon train up the Franklin pike. I ordered my command to push the enemy's right flank with all possible vigor. At the same time I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to send me a regiment mounted. He sent the Twenty-first Tennessee, Colonel Wilson commanding, which I ordered to charge upon the enemy. Colonel Wilson at the head of his splendid regiment made a gallant charge through an open field. He received three wounds, but refused to leave his command. About this time I received orders from General Hood to hold my position at all hazards, as the advance of his infantry column was only two miles distant and rapidly advancing. I ordered up my command, already dismounted. Colonel Bell's brigade was the first to reach me, when I immediately ordered it to the attack. Major-General Cleburne's division soon arrived, and, after some delay, was formed in line of battle and moved upon the enemy on my left. Colonel Bell reported that he had only four rounds of ammunition to the man when I ordered him to charge the enemy. This order was executed with a promptness and energy and gallantry which I have never seen excelled. The enemy was driven from his rifle-pits, and fled toward Spring Hill. I then ordered Brigadier-General Jackson to move with his division in the direction of Thompson's Station and there intercept the enemy. He struck the road at Fitzgerald's, four miles from Spring Hill, at 11 o'clock, just as the front of the enemy's column had passed. This attack was a complete surprise, producing much panic and confusion. Brigadier-General Jackson had possession of the pike and fought the enemy until near daylight, but receiving no support, he was compelled to retire, after killing a large number of horses and mules and burning several wagons.

Chalmers' and Buford's divisions being out of ammunition, I supplied them from the infantry (my ordnance being still at Columbia), when I ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers to move at daylight on the morning of the 30th to the Carter's Creek turnpike, between Columbia and Spring Hill, and there intercept a column of the enemy reported to be cut off. General Chalmers moved as ordered, but reported to me that the enemy had passed unmolested on the main pike during the night. Buford and Jackson were ordered to move forward with their divisions on the Franklin pike and to attack the enemy. They overtook his rear two miles from where General Jackson had cut his column the night previous and pushed him on to Winstead's Hill, where he was strongly posted. General Stewart's corps arriving upon the ground, I moved with Buford's and Jackson's divisions to the right, my right extending to Harpeth River, and ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers on the left. The enemy retired from Winstead's Hill toward their fortifications at Franklin. I ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers to advance on the left, which he did, charging and dislodging the enemy from every position he had taken. The enemy was posted on a strong hill on the opposite side of Harpeth River, from which position he was firing upon our troops on the Lewisburg pike. I ordered Brigadier-General Jackson to cross over and drive the enemy from this hill and to protect our right. I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to dismount his command and take position in line of battle on the right of Stewart's corps, covering the ground from the Lewisburg pike to Harpeth River. Skirmishing at once commenced, and Buford's division rapidly advancing drove the enemy across Harpeth River, where he joined the cavalry. Brigadier-General Jackson engaged the united forces of both infantry and cavalry, and held him in check until night, when he threw forward his pickets and retired across Harpeth for the purpose of replenishing his ammunition. The enemy held strong position commanding all the fords. I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to remount his command and hold himself in readiness for action at a moment's warning. Brigadier-General Jackson's troops being out of ammunition, and my ordnance still in the rear, Captain Vanderford furnished me with the necessary supply.

At daylight on the 1st of December I moved across Harpeth River and advanced up the Wilson pike, and struck the enemy at Owen's CrossRoads, in strong force. I ordered Captain Morton to open upon him with his battery. Soon afterward I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to charge, which order he executed by dislodging the enemy and capturing several prisoners. I then moved with Jackson's and Buford's divisions to Brentwood, where I was joined by Brigadier-General Chalmers. Ordering Chalmers to proceed with his division up the Franklin and Hillsborough pike, and to cross over and intercept, if possible, the enemy retreating toward Nashville, I moved with Buford's and Jackson's divisions toward the Nashville pike, and, learning the enemy had reached Nashville, I camped for the night.

On the following morning (the 2d) I ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers to move on the left and to guard the Hillsborough and Hardin pikes, while I proceeded to the right with Buford's and Jackson's divisions and took position in sight of the capitol at Nashville. I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to move with his division across to Mill Creek and to form line of battle near the lunatic asylum on the Murfreesborough pike. Jackson's division was ordered into position so as to cover the Nashville and Mill Creek pike. My command being relieved by the infantry I commenced operating upon the railroad, block-houses, and telegraph lines leading from Nashville to Murfreesborough. I ordered Buford's division on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad for the purpose of destroying stockades and block-houses.

On the 3d of December stockade No. 2 surrendered, with 80 prisoners, 10 men killed, and 20 wounded in the attack by Morton's battery. On the day previous, while assaulting stockade No. 2, a train of cars came from Chattanooga loaded with negro troops. The train was captured, but most of the troops made their escape.

On the 4th I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to attack block-house No. 3, but the demand for surrender was complied with, and the garrison of thirty-two men made prisoners. An assault was also ordered on stockade No. I, on Mill Creek, but the garrison unhesitatingly surrendered. I ordered the destruction of the block-house and two stockades, in which were captured 150 prisoners.

On the morning of the 4th I received orders to move with Buford's and Jackson's divisions to Murfreesborough, and to leave 250 men on the right to picket from the Nashville and Murfreesborough pike to the Cumberland River. Colonel Nixon, of Bell's brigade, was left for this purpose.

On the morning of the 5th I moved, as ordered, toward Murfreesborough. At La Vergne I ordered Brigadier-General Jackson to move on the right of town and invest the fort on the hill, while I moved with Buford's division to block-house No. 4. The usual demand for surrender was sent under flag of truce and a surrender made. The garrison on the hill, consisting of 80 men, 2 pieces of artillery, several wagons, and a considerable supply of stores, also surrendered to Brigadier-General Jackson. A large number of houses, built and occupied by the enemy, were ordered to be burned.

Four miles from La Vergne I formed a junction with Major-General Bate, who had been ordered to report to me with his division for the purpose of operating against Murfreesborough. I ordered Brigadier-General Jackson to send a brigade across to the Wilson [Wilkinson] pike, and moving on both pikes the enemy was driven into his works at Murfreesborough. After ordering General Buford to picket from the Nashville and Murfreesborough to the Lebanon pikes on the left and Jackson to picket on the right to the Salem pike, I encamped for the night.

The infantry arrived on the morning of the 6th, when I immediately ordered it in line of battle and to move upon the enemy's works. After skirmishing for two hours the enemy ceased firing, and showed no disposition to give battle. I ordered a regiment from Brigadier-General Armstrong's brigade, with which I made a careful reconnaissance of the enemy's position and works. On the evening of the 6th I was re-enforced by Sears' and Palmer's brigades of infantry. I ordered Colonel Palmer in position on the right upon a hill, and to fortify during the night.

On the morning of the 7th I discovered from the position occupied by Colonel Palmer the enemy moving out in strong force on the Salem pike, with infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Being fully satisfied that his object was to make battle, I withdrew my forces to the Wilkinson pike, and formed a new line on a more favorable position. The enemy moved boldly forward, driving in my pickets, when the infantry, with the exception of Smith's brigade, from some cause which I cannot explain, made a shameful retreat, losing two pieces of artillery. I seized the colors of the retreating troops and endeavored to rally them but they could not be moved by any entreaty or appeal to their patriotism. Major-General Bate did the same thing, but was equally as unsuccessful as myself. I hurriedly sent Major Strange, of my staff, to Brigadier-Generals Armstrong and Ross, of Jackson's division, with orders to say to them that everything depended on their cavalry. They proved themselves equal to the emergency by charging on the enemy, thereby checking his farther advance. I ordered the infantry to retire to Stewart's Creek, while my cavalry encamped during the night at Overall's Creek. The enemy returning to Murfreesborough, I ordered my cavalry to resume its former position.

It is proper to state here that I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to protect my left flank, but he was so remote the order never reached him. While the fight was going on, however, he made a demonstration on Murfreesborough, and succeeded in reaching the center of town, but was soon compelled to retire.

On the 9th General Hood sent to my support Smith's brigade, commanded by Colonel Olmstead, and ordered Bate's division to report back to his headquarters. On the 11th I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to proceed to the Hermitage, and to picket the Cumberland River, so as to prevent any flank movement in that direction. On the 12th I ordered the infantry to destroy the railroad from La Vergne to Murfreesborough, which was most effectually done. Brigadier-General Jackson, who had been previously ordered to operate south of Murfreesborough, captured, on the 13th, a train of seventeen cars and the Sixty-first Illinois Regiment of Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Grass. The train was loaded with supplies of 60,000 rations, sent from Stevenson to Murfreesborough, all of which were consumed by fire, after which the prisoners, about 200 in number, were sent to the rear.

On the 14th I moved with Colonels Olmstead's and Pahner's brigades across Stone's River and east of Murfreesborough, with a view of capturing the enemy's forage train, but on the evening of the 15th I received notice from General Hood that a general engagement was then going on at Nashville, and to hold myself in readiness to move at any moment. Accordingly, on the 16th I moved my entire command to the Wilkinson Cross-Roads, at the terminus of the Wilkinson pike, six miles from Murfreesborough. On the night of the 16th one of General Hood's staff officers arrived, informing me of the disaster at Nashville and ordering me to fall back via Shelbyville and Pulaski. I immediately dispatched orders to Brigadier-General Buford to fall back from the Cumberland River, via La Vergne, to the Nashville pike, and to protect my rear until I could move my artillery and wagon train. From this position General Buford was ordered across to the Nashville and Columbia pike, for the purpose of protecting the rear of General Hood's retreating army. My sick, wounded, and wagon train being at Triune, I did not retreat via Shelbyville, but moved in the direction of Lillard's Mills, on Duck River. I ordered Brigadier-General Armstrong to the Nashville and Columbia pike. Most of the infantry under my command were barefooted and in a disabled condition, and being encumbered with several hundred head of hogs and cattle, my march along the almost impassable roads was unavoidably slow. On reaching Duck River at Lillard's Mills I ordered everything to be hurried across, as the stream was rapidly rising. After putting over a part of my wagon train the stream became unfordable. I was therefore compelled to change my direction to Columbia, which place I reached on the evening of the 18th.

On the morning of the 19th the enemy was reported at Rutherford's Creek in strong force. I immediately commenced disposing of my troops for the purpose of preventing his crossing. Everything being across Duck River I was ordered by General Hood to withdraw my command at 3 o'clock, which I did, and went into camp at Columbia. Chalmers' division having been sent to the right, I am unable to state anything from personal knowledge as to his operations from the 3d to the 19th; but I learn from his official report that his line extended from the Hillsborough pike, on the right, across the Hardin and Charlotte pikes to the river, on the left; that he captured two transports laden with horses and mules; that the transports were recaptured, but leaving on his hands 56 prisoners and 197 horses and mules; that the enemy made several attempts with his monitors and gun-boats to silence his river batteries, all of which were unsuccessful; that he maintained a strict blockade of the river and his position until Ector's brigade of infantry fell back; that he prevented Hatch from gaining the rear of our army; and that he was constantly and severely engaged every day while protecting the rear of General Hood's army until he crossed Rutherford's Creek.

On the 20th General Hood, on leaving Columbia, gave me orders to hold the town as long as possible, and when compelled to retire to move in the direction of Florence, Ala., via Pulaski, protecting and guarding his rear. To aid me in this object he ordered Major-General Walthall to report to me with about 1,900 infantry, 400 of whom were unserviceable for want of shoes. The enemy appeared in front of Columbia on the evening of the 20th and commenced a furious shelling upon the town. Under a flag of truce I proceeded to the river and asked an interview with General Hatch, who I informed by verbal communication across the river that there were no Confederate troops in town, and that his shelling would only result in injury to the women and children and his own wounded, after which interview the shelling was discontinued.

The enemy succeeded in crossing Duck River on the morning of the 22d. I at once ordered my troops to fall back in the direction of Pulaski. Brigadier-General Chalmers was ordered on the right down the Bigbyville pike toward Bigbyville. The infantry moved down the main pike from Columbia to Pulaski, the rear protected by both Buford's and Jackson's divisions of cavalry, while a few scouts were thrown out on the left flank. The enemy made his first demonstration on my rear pickets near Warfield's, three miles south of Columbia. He opened upon us with artillery, which forced us to retire farther down the road in a gap made by two high hills on each side of the road, where he was held in check for some time. On the night of the 23d I halted my command at and near Lynnville, in order to hold the enemy in check and to prevent any pressure upon my wagon train and the stock then being driven out.

On the morning of the 24th I ordered the infantry back toward Columbia on the main pike and my cavalry on the right and left flanks. After advancing about three miles the enemy was met, where a severe engagement occurred and the enemy was held in check for two hours. I retreated two miles, where I took position at Richland Creek. Briga-dier-General Armstrong was thrown forward in front and General Ross on the right flank. Chalmers and Buford formed a junction, and were ordered on the left flank. Brigadier-General Armstrong was ordered to the support of six pieces of my artillery, which were placed in position immediately on the main pike and on a line with Buford's and Chalmer's divisions and Ross' brigade, of Jackson's division. After severe artillery firing on both sides two pieces of the enemy's artillery were dismounted. The enemy then flanked to the right and left and crossed Richland Creek on my right, with the view of gaining my rear. I immediately ordered Armstrong and Ross, of Jackson's division, to cross the bridge on the main pike and move around and engage the enemy, who were crossing the creek. Both Buford and Chalmers were heavily pressed on the left, and after an engagement of two hours I ordered them to fall back across Richland Creek. I lost 1 killed and 6 wounded in this engagement. The enemy lost heavily. Brigadier-General Buford was wounded in this engagement, and I ordered Brigadier-General Chalmers to assume command of Brigadier-General Buford's division together with his own. I reached Pulaski without further molestation.

On the morning of the 25th, after destroying all the ammunition which could not be removed from Pulaski by General Hood and two trains of cars, I ordered General Jackson to remain in town as long as possible and to destroy the bridge at Richland Creek after everything had passed over. The enemy soon pressed General Jackson, but he held him in check for some time, killing and wounding several before retiring. Seven miles from Pulaski I took position on King's Hill, and awaiting the advance of the enemy, repulsed him, with a loss of 150 killed and wounded, besides capturing many prisoners and one piece of artillery. The enemy made no further demonstrations during the day. I halted my command at Sugar Creek, where it encamped during the night.

On the morning of the 26th the enemy commenced advancing, driving back General Ross' pickets. Owing to the dense fog he could not see the temporary fortifications which the infantry had thrown up and behind which they were secreted. The enemy therefore advanced to within fifty paces of these works, when a volley was opened upon him, causing the wildest confusion. Two mounted regiments of Ross' brigade and Ector's and Granbury's brigades* of infantry were ordered to charge upon the discomfited foe, which was done, producing a complete rout. The enemy was pursued for two miles, but showing no disposition to give battle my troops were ordered back. In this engagement he sustained a loss of about 150 in killed and wounded; many prisoners and horses were captured and about 400 horses killed. I held this position for two hours, but the enemy showing no disposition to renew the attack, and fearing he might attempt a flank movement in the dense fog, I resumed the march, after leaving a picket with orders to remain until 4 o'clock. The enemy made no further attack between Sugar Creek and Tennessee River, which stream I crossed on the evening of the 27th of December. The infantry were ordered  to report back to their respective corps, and I moved with my cavalry to Corinth.

The campaign was full of trial and suffering, but the troops under my command, both cavalry and infantry, submitted to every hardship with an uncomplaining patriotism; with a single exception, they behaved with commendable gallantry.

From the day I left Florence, on the 21st of November, to the 27th of December my cavalry were engaged every day with the enemy. My loss in killed and wounded has been heavy. I brought out of the campaign three pieces of artillery more than I strutted with.

My command captured and destroyed 16 block-houses and stockades, 20 bridges, several hundred horses and mules, 20 yoke of oxen, 4 locomotives, and 100 cars and 10 miles of railroad, while I have turned over to the provost-marshal-general about 1,600 prisoners.

To my division commanders--Brigadier-Generals Chalmers, Buford, and Jackson--I take pleasure in acknowledging the promptitude with which they obeyed and executed all orders. If I have failed to do justice in this report it is because they have not furnished me with a detailed report of the operations of their respective commands.

I am also indebted to Major-General Walthall for much valuable service rendered during the retreat from Columbia. He exhibited the highest soldierly qualities. Many of his men were without shoes, but they bore their sufferings without murmur and were ever ready to meet the enemy.

I am again under obligations to my staff for their efficient aid during the campaign.

All of which is respectfully submitted.
N. B. FORREST,        
Major-General.
Lieut. Col. A. P. MASON, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,        
Charlotte, N. C., February 25, 1865.

Respectfully forwarded to the War Department for its information. General Forrest and his command deserve well of the country for the gallantry, energy, and activity displayed during this severe campaign in Middle Tennessee.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,        
General.


ADDENDA.

Address of Maj. Gen. N. B. Forrest to his troops.

SOLDIERS: The old campaign is ended, and your commanding general deems this an appropriate occasion to speak of the steadiness, self-denial, and patriotism with which you have borne the hardships of the past year. The marches and labors you have performed during that period will find no parallel in the history of this war.

On the 24th day of December there were 3,000 of you, unorganized and undisciplined, at Jackson, Tenn., only 400 of whom were armed. You were surrounded by 15,000 of the enemy, who were congratulating themselves on your certain capture. You started out with your artillery, wagon trains, and a large number of cattle, which you succeeded in bringing through, since which time you have fought and won the following battles--battles which will enshrine your names in the hearts of your countrymen, and live in history an imperishable monument to your prowess: Jack's Creek, Estenaula, Somerville, Okolona, Union City, Paducah, Fort Pillow, Bolivar, Tishomingo Creek, Harrisburg, Hurricane Creek, Memphis, Athens, Sulphur Springs, Pulaski, Carter's Creek, Columbia, and Johnsonville are the fields upon which you have won fadeless immortality. In the recent campaign in Middle Tennessee you sustained the reputation so nobly won. For twenty-six days, from the time you left Florence, on the 21st of November to the 26th of December you were constantly engaged with the enemy, and endured the hunger, cold, and labor incident to that arduous campaign without murmur. To sum up, in brief, your triumphs during the past year, you have fought fifty battles, killed and captured 16,000 of the enemy, captured 2,000 horses and mules, 67 pieces of artillery, 4 gun-boats, 14 transports, 20 barges, 300 wagons, 50 ambulances, 10,000 stand of small-arms, 40 block-houses, destroyed 36 railroad bridges, 200 miles of railroad, 6 engines, 100 cars, and $15,000,000 worth of property.

In the accomplishment of this great work you were occasionally sustained by other troops, who joined you in the fight, but your regular number never exceeded 5,000, 2,000 of whom have been killed or wounded, while in prisoners you have lost about 200.

If your course has been marked by the graves of patriotic heroes who have fallen by your side, it has, at the same time, been more plainly marked by the blood of the invader. While you sympathize with the friends of the fallen, your sorrows should be appeased by the knowledge that they fell as brave men battling for all that makes life worth living for.

Soldiers! you now rest for a short time from your labors. During the respite prepare for future action. Your commanding general is ready to lead you again to the defense of the common cause, and he appeals to you, by a remembrance of the glories of your past career; your desolated homes; your insulted women and suffering children; and, above all, by the memory of your dead comrades, to yield a ready obedience to discipline, and to buckle on your armor anew for the fight. Bring with you the soldier's safest armor--a determination to fight while the enemy pollutes your soil; to fight as long as he denies your rights; to fight until independence shall have been achieved; to fight for home, children, liberty, and all you hold dear. Show to the world the superhuman and sublime spirit with which a people may be inspired when fighting, for the inestimable boon of liberty. He not allured by the siren song of peace, for there can be no peace save upon your separate independent nationality. You can never again unite with those who have murdered your sons, outraged your helpless families, and with demoniac malice wantonly destroyed your property, and now seek to make slaves of you. A proposition of reunion with a people who have avowed their purpose to appropriate the property and to subjugate or annihilate the freemen of the South would stamp with infamy the names of your gallant dead and the living heroes of this war. Be patient, obedient, and earnest, and the day is not far distant when you can return to your homes and live in the full fruition of free-men around the old family altar.

N. B. FORREST,        
Major-General, Comdg. District of Mississippi and East Louisiana.
_______________

*According to Walthall’s report (p. 727), it was Reynolds’ and Field’s brigade

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 751-60

Saturday, April 29, 2023

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: November 5, 1864

Clear and cold.

Grant has attempted nothing this week, and it is probably too late for any demonstration to affect the election. I infer that the government is convinced President Lincoln will be re-elected, else some desperate effort would have been made in his behalf by his generals. Will he float on a sea of blood another four years? I doubt it. One side or the other must, I think, give up the contest. He can afford to break with the Abolitionists now. We cannot submit without the loss of everything.

It is thought Grant will continue to "swing to the left,” making a winter campaign on the coasts of North and South Carolina mean time leaving Butler's army here, always menacing Richmond.

Gen. Beauregard writes from Gadsden, Ala., October 24th, that his headquarters will be at Tuscumbia, Ala.; will get supplies from Corinth to Tuscambia. Forrest has been ordered to report to Gen. Hood, in Middle Tennessee. The railroad iron between Corinth and Memphis will be taken to supply wants elsewhere. Gen. Dick Taylor is to guard communications, etc., has directed Gen. Cheatham to issue an address to the people of Tennessee, saying his and Gen. Forrest's command have entered the State for its redemption, etc., and calling upon the people to aid in destroying the enemy's communications, while the main army is between Atlanta and Chattanooga, when the purpose is to precipitate the whole army upon it, etc. Gen. B. doubts not he will soon be able to announce good tidings, etc. etc. This letter to Gen. Cooper is “submitted to the Secretary of War,” by whom it is "submitted for the information of the President,” and sent back by him—“Read and returned, 4th Nov. '64.-J. D.

Gen. B. was to leave that day to join Gen. Hood, in vicinity of Guntersville, on Tennessee River. Sherman's army was between Dalton and Gadsden, 15 miles from Gadsden.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 324-5

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: Sunday, November 6, 1864

Bright and frosty.

All quiet below. Another day, and if it remains quiet, we may know that Lincoln will be re-elected.

It is said news came from the North last night, that gold sold for $260, and that Governor Seymour had ordered the militia of New York to be in readiness for the protection of the polls on Tuesday next.

G. W. Randolph, late Secretary of War, has sailed for Europe, taking his family with him. Other quondam Confederate States functionaries have gone, or are going. Many have realized fortunes, who were poor, and this country has ceased to be the one to enjoy them in.

A parting letter was written by Mr. Randolph to his friend, R. G. H. Kean, Chief of the Bureau of War-appointed by Mr. R., and from whom I derived the information of the sailing of his patron. Such departures, at a crisis like this, spread additional doubts in the community. Mr. R. was not liable to conscription, if averse to fighting more in our cause, being exempted by Governor Smith as a member of the Common Council.

To-morrow is the day fixed for the reassembling of our Congress, but doubts are entertained whether there will be a quorum.

We shall soon have lively news from Beauregard. If I understand his letter of the 24th ult., he is determined to march the army without delay into Middle Tennessee, leaving Sherman on his right flank and rear. It is a desperate conception, and will probably be a brilliant success—or a sad disaster. Napoleon liked such games. If Beauregard really bas great genius, he has now the field on which to display it. If the Tennesseeans and Kentuckians rise, momentous events may follow; if not, it is probably the last opportunity they will have. They have their choice—but blood is the price of independence.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 325

Monday, August 8, 2022

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: September 8, 1864

Bright and cool; subsequently cloudy and warm.

Dispatches from Gen. Hood (Sept 7th) state—1st dispatch: that Sherman still holds his works one and a half miles from Jonesborough. 2d dispatch, same date: “Sherman continues his retreat!” He says, in a 3d dispatch, that Sherman visited the hospitals, and said he would rest awhile at Atlanta, and then march away to Andersonville, where we keep the Federal prisoners. Although Hood attaches no importance to declarations from such a source, yet he deems it a matter of first importance to remove the prisoners, which suggestion Gen. Bragg refers to the Secretary of War without remark. Gen. Hood also urges the reinforcing of his army from the trans-Mississippi Department. He is sending a brigade to Opelika, to await a raid.

Gen. Forrest has been ordered, the President approving, to Middle Tennessee; but, contrary to his desire, he is not allowed to proclaim amnesty to the thousands of deserters expected to join him, so firmly do the President and Gen. Bragg adhere to Gen. Lee's advice never to proclaim pardon in advance to deserters, even at this critical epoch in our affairs.

All of us have been made sick by eating red peas, or rather overeating

Our cause is in danger of being lost for want of horses and mules, and yet I discovered to-day that the government has been lending horses to men who have but recently suffered some of the calamities of war! I discovered it in a letter from the Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, of Essex County, asking in behalf of himself and neighbors to be permitted to retain the borrowed horses beyond the time specified—Oct. 1st. Mr. Hunter borrowed two horses and four mules. He is worth millions, and only suffered (having a mill burned) his first loss by the enemy a few weeks ago! Better, far better, would it be for the Secretary to borrow or impress one hundred thousand horses, and mount our infantry to cut the communications of the enemy, and hover on his flanks like the Cossacks in Russia.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 279

Friday, July 23, 2021

General Joseph E. Johnston to General Braxton Bragg, May 2, 1864

DALTON, May 2, 1864.        
(Received 3d.)
General BRAGG:

Two scouts just returned, who went by Ooltewah and Cleveland, report enemy sending all Southern people and heavy baggage to the rear, stopping rations to inhabitants, collecting large supply trains at Graysville, and bringing their cavalry from Middle Tennessee. An officer just from Columbia reports that 13,000 had been collected there. All scouts report Hooker's troops in position there.

 J. E. JOHNSTON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 38, Part 4 (Serial No. 75), p. 657

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: May 3, 1864

A cold, windy day, with sunshine and clouds.

It is rumored that Grant's army is in motion, and the great battle is eagerly looked for. The collision of mighty armies, upon the issue of which the fate of empire depends, is now imminent.

The following dispatch was received to-day from Gen. Johnston:

DALTON, May 2d, 1864.

 

Two scouts, who went by Outawah and Cleveland, report the enemy sending all Southern people and heavy baggage to the rear, stopping rations to the inhabitants, collecting a large supply of trains at Graysville, and bringing their cavalry from Middle Tennessee.

 

An officer just from Columbia reports 13,000 had been collected there. All scouts report Hooker's troops in position here.

 

J. E. JOHNSTON, General.


SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 197

Friday, April 10, 2020

Major-General William T. Sherman to Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant, November 2, 1864

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,                       
In the Field, Rome, Ga.., November 2, 1864.
Lieut. Gen. U.S. GRANT,
City Point, Va.:

Your dispatch is received.* If I could hope to overhaul Hood I would turn against him with my whole force. Then he retreats to the southwest, drawing him as a decoy from Georgia, which is his chief object. If he ventures north of the Tennessee I may turn in that direction and endeavor to get between him and his line of retreat, but thus far he has not gone above the Tennessee. Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent his reaching any country in which we have an interest, and he has orders if Hood turns to follow me to push for Selma. No single army can catch him, and I am convinced the best results will result from defeating Jeff. Davis' cherished plan of making me leave Georgia by maneuvering. Thus far I have confined my efforts to thwart his plans, and reduced my baggage so that I can pick up and start in any direction, but I would regard a pursuit of Hood as useless; still if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee I will hold Decatur and be prepared to move in that direction, but unless I let go Atlanta my force will not be equal to his.

W. T. SHERMAN,                
Major-General, Commanding.
_______________

* Of November 1, p. [576, the footnote is in error and sited the page number as 676.]

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 39, Part 3 (Serial No. 79), p. 594-5

Saturday, January 12, 2019

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: October 29, 1863

Gen. Lee writes (a few days since), from Brandy Station, that Meade seems determined to advance again; that troops are going up the Potomac to Washington, and that volunteers from New York have been ordered thither. He asks the Secretary to ascertain if there be really any Federal force in the York River; for if the report be correct of hostile troops being there, it may be the enemy's intention to make another raid on the railroad. The general says we have troops enough in Southwestern Virginia; but they are not skillfully commanded.

After all, I fear we shall not get the iron from the Aquia Creek Railroad. In the summer the government was too slow, and now it is probably too slow again, as the enemy are said to be landing there. It might have been removed long ago, if we had had a faster Secretary.

Major S. Hart, San Antonio, Texas, writes that the 10,000 (the number altered again) superior rifles captured by the French off the Rio Grande last summer, were about to fall into the hands of United States cruisers; and he has sent for them, hoping the French will turn them over to us.

Gen. Winder writes the Secretary that the Commissary-General will let him have no meat for the 13,000 prisoners; and he will not be answerable for their safe keeping without it. The Quartermaster-General writes that the duty of providing for them is in dispute between the two bureaus, and he wants the Secretary to decide between them. If the Secretary should be very slow, the prisoners will suffer.

Yesterday a set (six) of cups and saucers, white, and not china, sold at auction for $50.

Mr. Henry, Senator from Tennessee, writes the Secretary that if Ewell were sent into East Tennessee with a corps, and Gen. Johnston were to penetrate into Middle Tennessee, forming a junction north of Chattanooga, it would end the war in three months.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 83-4

Wednesday, February 21, 2018

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: August 20, 1863

A few weeks ago Gen. Cooper wrote to Bragg, suggesting that he advance into Middle Tennessee, reinforced by Gen. Johnston, and attack Rosecrans; Gen. Bragg replied (8th inst.) that with all the reinforcements he could get from Johnston, he would not have more than 40,000 effective men, while Rosecrans has 60,000, and will be reinforced by Burnside with 30,000 more — making 90,000 against 40,000 — and as a true patriot he was opposed to throwing away our armies in enterprises sure to terminate disastrously. He said, moreover, that the enemy could starve him out, if he were to advance to the place designated, and thus destroy his army without a battle. Gen. Cooper sent this response to the President, asking if Bragg should not be ordered to fight under such circumstances. But the President paused, in following the guidance of this Northern man at the head of all our Southern generals — and to-day sent back the paper indorsed that “only a suggestion could be given to a commanding general to fight a battle; but to order him to fight when he predicted a failure in advance, would be unwise.”

A paper from Beauregard intimates that even if batteries Wagner and Gregg should be taken by the enemy, he has constructed another which will render that part of Morris Island untenable. But he relied upon holding Sumter; and there is a vague rumor to-day that Sumter must surrender—if indeed it has not already been reduced.

Hon Wm. Porcher Miles writes another most urgent letter, demanding reinforcements of seasoned troops. He says Charleston was stripped of troops against the remonstrances of Beauregard to send to Mississippi — to no avail — which invited this attack; and now he asks that Jenkins's brigade of South Carolinians be sent to the defense; that South Carolinians are fighting in Virginia, but are not permitted to defend their native soil in the hour of extremity; and that if the enemy, with overwhelming numbers, should take James's Island, they would, from thence, be able to destroy the city. We are looking with anxiety for further news from Charleston.

Gen. Maury writes from Mobile that he has seized, in the hands of Steever (who is he ?), receipts for 4000 bales of cotton — orders for 150 bonds, each £225 sterling, and two bags of coin, $10,000. The President indorses on the paper that the money had better be turned over to the Secretary of the Treasury. What is all this?

The Secretary sent a paper to the President relating to some novel action performed or proposed, asking his “instructions.” The President returned it to-day indorsed, “The Secretary's advice invited.” How in the mischief can such non-committalists ever arrive at a conclusion?

Hon. E. S. Dargan writes that if Pemberton be restored to command (as he understands this to be the government's purpose), our cause is ruined beyond redemption. I say so too. When he made up his mind to surrender, it is unpardonable that he did not destroy the 50,000 stand of arms before he made any overture. I shall never forgive him!

The signal officers report that three large ocean steamers passed down the Potomac day before yesterday, having on board 1000 men each; and that many large steamers are constantly going up —perhaps for more.

Brig.-Gen. Roger A. Pryor, after dancing attendance in the ante-rooms for six months, waiting assignment to a command, has resigned, and his resignation has been accepted. He says he can at least serve in the ranks as a private. The government don't like aspiring political generals. Yet Pryor was first a colonel, and member of Congress — resigned his seat — resigned his brigadier-generalship, and is now a private.

Our cause is dim in Europe, if it be true, as the Northern papers report, that the Confederate loan has sunken from par to 35 per cent, discount since the fall of Vicksburg.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2p. 19-20

Tuesday, December 5, 2017

Major-General William S. Rosecrans to Edwin M. Stanton, July 7, 1863

TULLAHOMA, July 7, 1863.
Hon. E. M. STANTON:

Just received your cheering dispatch announcing the fall of Vicksburg and confirming the defeat of Lee. You do not appear to observe the fact that this noble army has driven the rebels from Middle Tennessee, of which my dispatches advised you. I beg in behalf of this army that the War Department may not overlook so great an event because it is not written in letters of blood. I have now to repeat, that the rebel army has been forced from its strong intrenched positions at Shelbyville and Tullahoma, and driven over the Cumberland Mountains. My infantry advance is within 16 miles and my cavalry advance within 8 miles of the Alabama line. No organized rebel force within 25 miles of there, nor on this side of the Cumberland Mountains.

W. S. ROSECRANS.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 23, Part 2 (Serial No. 35), p. 518

Monday, December 4, 2017

Brigadier-General John A. Garfield to Salmon P. Chase, September 23, 1863 – 10:30 a.m.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,            
September 23, 1863 10.30 a.m.     
(Received War Department 10 p.m.)
Hon. S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury:

I answered you last night that Stanton is wounded and a prisoner. We have inflicted heavy injury on enemy, equal to what we have suffered. He no doubt outnumbers us two to one, but we can stand here ten days if help will then arrive. If we hold this point we shall save the campaign, which will be great gain even if we lose this army. Twenty-five thousand men should be sent to Bridgeport to secure Middle Tennessee in case of disaster to us. Never been such fighting in West. Thomas and Granger stood in their tracks eight hours against whole rebel army. We took about 2,000. Battle not yet recommenced; but expected soon. Where are Sherman and Hurlbut?

 J. A. GARFIELD.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 30, Part 3 (Serial No. 52), p. 792

Saturday, August 15, 2015

General Joseph E. Johnston to Senator Louis T. Wigfall, December 15, 1862

chattanooga, Dec. 15, 1862.
My dear Wigfall:

On my return from Murfreesboro' a day or two ago I had the pleasure to find your letter, and the President. The latter is on a military tour, and has taken immediate command in this country. Unless he is greatly mistaken Mr. Seddon has not carried our point and reinforced Pemberton with Holmes's troops. On the contrary he says that H. has not had orders on the subject — requests or suggestions instead — which he thinks himself unable to comply with and therefore will not comply with. Pemberton must be reinforced. I have no other resource than the troops on this front, and must draw upon them. This has blown away some tall castles in the air. I have been dreaming of crushing Grant with Holmes's and Pemberton's troops, sending the former into Missouri, and with the latter, Bragg and Kirby Smith, marching to the Ohio. Our troops beyond the Mississippi seem to be living in great tranquillity.

Bragg's troops are in fine condition. Healthy looking and well clothed. In fine spirits too. I see no evidence of the want of confidence and dissatisfaction of which we heard so much in Richmond.

A great mistake has been made in the arrangement of my command. Mississippi and Arkansas should have been united to form it. Not this state and Mississippi, which are divided by (to us) an impassable river and impracticable country. The troops in Middle Tennessee could reach Fredericksburg much sooner than Mississippi. Then Genl. Holmes's communications depend upon our possession of the Mississippi. It is certainly his business to at least assist in the maintenance of his communications. The troops in Arkansas, as having a common object, could be naturally united.

You perhaps see no special object on my part in troubling you with this, and in truth I have no other than putting my troubles before one, who has a head to comprehend grand war, and a heart to sympathize with me.

I start, this afternoon, to Pemberton's Army. About 9,000 men are ordered from Bragg's — and I hope to bring back a great many stragglers who are scattered over the country S. W. of us.

A telegram from the War Department to the President gave us information of the fighting at Fredericksburg on Saturday. What luck some people have. Nobody will ever come to attack me in such a place.

Mrs. J. wrote to Mrs. Wigfall a day or two ago. This mild climate is very favorable to her. She is in excellent health and spirits.

I hope that you have good accounts of Halsey — of his health, I mean, for professionally there can be no doubt. Present me cordially to Mrs. Wigfall and the young ladies.

Very truly yours,
J. E. Johnston.

SOURCE: Louise Wigfall Wright, A Southern Girl in ’61, p. 104-6

Sunday, August 10, 2014

General Pierre G. T. Beauregard to General John Bell Hood, November 17, 1864

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
Tuscumbia, Ala., November 17, 1864.
General J. B. HOOD,
Commanding Army of Tennessee, &c.:

GENERAL: General Beauregard directs me to say that he desires you will take the offensive at the earliest practicable moment and deal the enemy rapid and vigorous blows, striking him while thus dispersed, and by this means distract Sherman's advance into Georgia. To relieve you from any embarrassment whilst operating in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, he authorizes you to issue all such orders in General Taylor's department as you may deem necessary to secure the efficient and successful administration and operation of your army, sending General Taylor, or whoever may be in command, copies of all orders. He wishes you to send forthwith to Major-General Wheeler one brigade of cavalry of Jackson's division, and the balance of that division as soon as it can be spared, should Sherman advance into Georgia, and also to advise General Wheeler that in such case Clanton's brigade is subject to his orders. The headquarters of this military division will be removed in the morning from this place to Montgomery, Ala.

1 am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEORGE WM. BRENT,
 Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 1215; John Bell Hood, Advance and Retreat, p. 277

Friday, August 8, 2014

General Pierre G. T. Beauregard to General John Bell Hood, November 15, 1864

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
Tuscumbia, Ala., November 15, 1864.
General J. B. HOOD,
Commanding, &c., Florence, Ala.:

GENERAL: As you seemed yesterday to have misunderstood my verbal communication of the 13th instant through my chief of staff, I deem it of sufficient importance to communicate in writing what I had instructed him to say relative to the movement of the Army of Tennessee. I instructed him to tell you “that in consequence of the information received the night previous, to wit, the apparent confirmation of the concentration of the bulk of Sherman's army in Middle Tennessee – at Pulaski, Huntsville, and Decatur – the arrival of Canby and part of his forces at Memphis, and the condition of Cobb's and Smith's forces at Lovejoy's Station, I desired to confer further with you before you commenced the projected movement into Middle Tennessee, then partly in process of execution – that is, Lee's corps already in advance of Florence, and Cheatham's and Stewart's corps under orders to cross the river.” My purpose was to call again your attention, as I did yesterday:

First. To the necessity of guarding well your right flank and rear in advancing toward Lawrenceburg and Pulaski against a sudden offensive movement of the enemy from Huntsville or Athens across the Elk River.

Second. To securing against the passage of the enemy's gun-boats another point – about Savannah or Clifton – besides Florence, for the army to recross the Tennessee in the event of disaster.

Third. To giving still greater protection to Corinth and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to that point.

I was aware that those points had already been discussed between us, but my anxiety for the safety of the troops under your command made it incumbent on me to call again your attention to those important matters. I wish also to inform you that the third point mentioned may require greater time than was at first supposed necessary. All orders for completing the defenses of Corinth, repairing and prosecuting vigorously the work on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to this place, and for repairing the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Okolona to Bethel, have been given and are being carried out as rapidly as the limited means of the engineer and quartermaster departments will permit. It is at present reported that the railroads referred to will be completed in from fifteen to twenty days, but it is reasonable to suppose that the prevailing unfavorable weather will delay the work one or two weeks longer. General Taylor and myself will always be anxious to aid you in your present campaign with all the means at our control, but these being limited, ample previous notice of what may be required should be given, to enable us to make all necessary preparations. It will also give me pleasure to confer onyou such powers as you may deem necessary to secure your communications, repair roads, and hasten supplies to your army whilst operating in the department of General Taylor.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 913; John Bell Hood, Advance and Retreat, p. 275-6

Monday, August 4, 2014

General John Bell Hood to Jefferson Davis, November 6, 1862

HEADQUARTERS,
Tuscumbia, November 6, 1864.
His Excellency President DAVIS,
Richmond:

General Wheeler reports from Blue Mountain that Sherman is moving one corps to Chattanooga and one corps to Tennessee and three to Marietta. I hope to march for Middle Tennessee by the 8th or 9th instant. Should he move two or three corps south from Atlanta I think it will be the best thing that could happen for our general good. General Beauregard agrees with me as to my plan of operations. Would like to be informed if any forces are sent from Grant or Sheridan to Nashville.

 J. B. HOOD,
General.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 39, Part 3 (Serial No. 79), p. 891; John Bell Hood, Advance and Retreat, p. 272-3

Tuesday, September 3, 2013

Major General William S. Rosecrans to Abraham Lincoln, August 1, 1863

Unofficial

HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Winchester, August 1, 1863.

His Excellency The President:

Major-general [sic] on his return from Washing[ton] told me you would not deem it improper for me to write you unofficially. General Halleck’s dispatches imply that you not only feel solicitude for the advance of this army, but dissatisfaction at its supposed inactivity. It is due to Your Excellency to state a few facts in a condensed form which from time to time [have] been laid before General Halleck and the War Department in my dispatches. First. What first delayed this army after I assumed command of it was that we were at Nashville, 183 miles by rail [from] Louisville, our depot of supplies, and had to bring them over this Louisville and Nashville Railroad, forty-five miles of which had been so destroyed that it took all the force we could work on it night and [day] for twenty days to put it in running order, and then it took twenty-five days more to bring over it our clothing, ammunition, and get thirty days’ rations ahead (the minimum deemed necessary to warrant an advance). Second. What hindered us from occupying the country and using its forage, subsistence, and animals was the want of an adequate cavalry force to beat the enemy's cavalry and cut off all his supplies beyond the reach of his infantry supports. The want of 5,000 more mounted men cost us all these, the battle of Stone’s River, and $50,000,000 by delay. Third. What prevented us from taking an advanced position after the battle of Stone's River was this same want of mounted force. Without one, advance beyond Murfreesborough would have increased our hazards and the wear and tear of our men and teams without countervailing benefit. In the nature of the soil in this part of Tennessee the rains of winter render wagoning on any but turnpikes next to impossible until the ground settles. Fourth. When the ground was settled the contest at Vicksburg was going on, and was deemed inexpedient by moving on Bragg to furnish the pretext for his retiring on Chattanooga, whence he could re-enforce Johnston again with comparative safety. Corps and division commanders with but two or three exceptions opposed the movement. Sixth. While the movement was successful in driving the rebels out of Middle Tennessee, it did not injure them as much as would have been done but for the unprecedented rains – fourteen days in succession – which delayed us nearly ninety hours and prevented us from gaining the rebel rear before he was aware of our intentions. Seventh. Compare the position of this army with that of any other in the United States. What [other] has to draw its supplies a distance of 260 miles inland through a country exposed to hostile cavalry raids? Your Excellency knows also that to move an army and subsist it during a certain [number] of days’ march is a very slight thing from [having] to subsist and supply it with ammunition. Nor is the latter problem to be solved by getting a sufficient number of wagons. You must have roads of such capacity as to enable the trains to pass each other and encamp. Eighth. We have now before [us] sixty miles of barren mountains, traversed by a few poor roads – to cross not the little Shenandoah a few miles from the Potomac. Our bridge material is brought from Louisville by rail and must [be] hauled over the mountains, a total distance of 300 miles, and we must cross a river, not at present fordable for a length of 500 miles, from 800 to 1,800 yards wide, and secure our crossing [in] the face of a strong opposing force. This problem is also one of the first magnitude. We have [no] gun-boats to aid us, and if our communications are interrupted no broad Mississippi, covered with transports, to supply us. Ninth. If we cross the Tennessee we must do so with expectation of maintaining ourselves, not only against the present, but any prospective opposing. The political moral injury to our cause of retrograde movements is such that it would be better for us to go a mile a day and make sure. You will not be surprised if in face of these difficulties it takes time [to] organize the means of success. Our roads must be opened, stores brought forward and put in places of security, bridging trains got ready, and the enemy must be kept in ignorance of our plans. We must learn the country, which appears very differently in reality from what is shown on map.

Asking pardon for the length of this letter, I remain, very respectfully,

 W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.


SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 52, Part 1 (Serial No. 109), p. 427-8; This letter, though faded and hard to read, can be found in The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress

Monday, September 2, 2013

Major General William S. Rosecrans to Abraham Lincoln, August 22, 1863

HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Stevenson, August 22, 1863.

To His Excellency The President.

I thank you for your kind reply [to] my unofficial letter of the 1st instant.

Permit me to assure you that I am not, and have not been, touched with any of that official pride which desires to have its own way. It has been a principle and a characteristic of my life to take advice and learn both from superiors and inferiors. When great interests are confided to my care this principle becomes even more imperative.

On the question of moving against Bragg, every division and corps commander gave his written opinion adversely to an immediate or early move at the time it was imminent.

I waited only to make due preparation of the force I had to win a victory and reap its fruits. I was satisfied that, while it did not increase Bragg's strength, it diminished the danger of his further reinforcing Johnston, as he could readily have done, with the Cumberland Mountains, the Tennessee River, and bridges destroyed and roads obstructed between us. If, as you put it, we could better fight Bragg with his diminished numbers, what harm to wait till we were ready to win and pursue the victory?

You think Johnston was freed by the fall of Vicksburg. Was not Bragg set free by the evacuation of Middle Tennessee?

You think we ought to have prevented Bragg from re-enforcing Johnston. Why cannot Grant keep Johnston from re-enforcing Bragg? Has he not a nearer base of supplies and more favorable country; a better railroad and more rolling-stock than we have here?

But I am sure when you consider we have but a single line of railroad from Louisville; that we are 300 miles from that base; that we have crossed by three days’ march the formidable barrier of the Cumberland Mountains; that we have in front a swift river from 500 to 800 yards wide, and seventy miles of mountains in front of us to reach the fertile regions of Northern Georgia, you see that few armies have been called upon to attempt a more arduous campaign.

Thanking you for your kindness, may I ask you, when impulsive men suppose me querulous, to believe I am only straightforward and in earnest, and that you may always rely upon my using my utmost efforts to do what is best for our country and the lives and honor of the soldiers of my command.  I remain, very respectfully,
W. S. ROSECRANS,
Maj Genl

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 52, Part 1 (Serial No. 109), p. 439; This letter can be found in The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress