Executive Mansion,
Washington, August 10,
1863.
My Dear General Rosecrans
Yours of the 1st was received two days ago. I think you must
have inferred more than Gen Halleck has intended, as to any dissatisfaction of
mine with you. I am sure you, as a reasonable man, would not have been wounded,
could you have heard all my words and seen all my thoughts, in regard to you. I
have not abated in my kind feeling for and confidence in you. I have seen most
of your despatches to General Halleck – probably all of them. After Grant
invested Vicksburg, I was very anxious lest Johnston should overwhelm him from
the outside, and when it appeared certain that part of Bragg’s force had gone,
and was going to Johnston, it did seem to me, it was the exactly proper time
for you to attack Bragg with what force he had left. In all kindness, let me
say, it so seems to me yet. Finding from your despatches to General Halleck
that your judgement was different, and being very anxious for Grant, I, on one
occasion told Gen. Halleck, I thought he should direct you to decide at once,
to immediately attack Bragg or to stand on the defensive, and send part of your
force to Grant. He replied he had already so directed, in substance. Soon
after, despatches from Grant abated my anxiety for him, and in proportion
abated my anxiety about any movement of yours. When afterwards, however, I saw
a despatch of yours arguing that the right time for you to attack Bragg was not
before but would be after the fall of Vicksburg, it impressed me very
strangely; and I think I so stated to the Secretary of War and General Halleck.
It seemed no other than the proposition that you could better fight Bragg when Johnston should be at
liberty to return and assist him, than you could before he could so return to his assistance.
Since Grant has been entirely relieved by the fall of
Vicksburg, by which Johnston is also relieved, it has seemed to me that your
chance for a stroke, has been considerably diminished, and I have not been
pressing you directly or indirectly. True, I am very anxious for East Tennessee
to be occupied by us; but I see and appreciate the difficulties you mention.
The question occurs, Can the thing be done at all? Does preparation advance at
all? Do you not consume supplies as fast as you get them forward? Have you more
animals today than you had at the battle of Stone River? and yet have not more
been furnished you since then than your entire present stock? I ask the same
questions as to your mounted force.
Do not misunderstand. I am not casting blame upon you. I rather
think, by great exertion, you can get to East Tennessee. But a very important
question is, “Can you stay there?” I make no order in the case – that I leave
to General Halleck and yourself.
And now, be assured once more, that I think of you in all
kindness and confidence: and that I am not watching you with an evil-eye.
Yours very truly
SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
52, Part 1 (Serial No. 109), p. 433-4; Roy P. Basler, editor, Collected
Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 6, p. 377-8;
A copy of this letter can be found in The
Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress
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