HEAD-QUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Winchester, August 1,
1863.
His Excellency The President:
Major-general [sic]
on his return from Washing[ton] told me you would not deem it
improper for me to write you unofficially. General Halleck’s dispatches imply
that you not only feel solicitude for the advance of this army, but
dissatisfaction at its supposed inactivity. It is due to Your Excellency to
state a few facts in a condensed form which from time to time [have] been laid
before General Halleck and the War Department in my dispatches. First. What
first delayed this army after I assumed command of it was that we were at
Nashville, 183 miles by rail [from] Louisville, our depot of supplies, and had
to bring them over this Louisville and Nashville Railroad, forty-five miles of
which had been so destroyed that it took all the force we could work on it
night and [day] for twenty days to put it in running order, and then it took
twenty-five days more to bring over it our clothing, ammunition, and get thirty
days’ rations ahead (the minimum deemed necessary to warrant an advance).
Second. What hindered us from occupying the country and using its forage,
subsistence, and animals was the want of an adequate cavalry force to beat the
enemy's cavalry and cut off all his supplies beyond the reach of his infantry
supports. The want of 5,000 more mounted men cost us all these, the battle of
Stone’s River, and $50,000,000 by delay. Third. What prevented us from taking
an advanced position after the battle of Stone's River was this same want of
mounted force. Without one, advance beyond Murfreesborough would have increased
our hazards and the wear and tear of our men and teams without countervailing
benefit. In the nature of the soil in this part of Tennessee the rains of
winter render wagoning on any but turnpikes next to impossible until the ground
settles. Fourth. When the ground was settled the contest at Vicksburg was going
on, and was deemed inexpedient by moving on Bragg to furnish the pretext for
his retiring on Chattanooga, whence he could re-enforce Johnston again with
comparative safety. Corps and division commanders with but two or three
exceptions opposed the movement. Sixth. While the movement was successful in
driving the rebels out of Middle Tennessee, it did not injure them as much as
would have been done but for the unprecedented rains – fourteen days in
succession – which delayed us nearly ninety hours and prevented us from gaining
the rebel rear before he was aware of our intentions. Seventh. Compare the
position of this army with that of any other in the United States. What [other]
has to draw its supplies a distance of 260 miles inland through a country
exposed to hostile cavalry raids? Your Excellency knows also that to move an
army and subsist it during a certain [number] of days’ march is a very slight
thing from [having] to subsist and supply it with ammunition. Nor is the latter
problem to be solved by getting a sufficient number of wagons. You must have
roads of such capacity as to enable the trains to pass each other and encamp.
Eighth. We have now before [us] sixty miles of barren mountains, traversed by a
few poor roads – to cross not the little Shenandoah a few miles from the
Potomac. Our bridge material is brought from Louisville by rail and must [be]
hauled over the mountains, a total distance of 300 miles, and we must cross a
river, not at present fordable for a length of 500 miles, from 800 to 1,800
yards wide, and secure our crossing [in] the face of a strong opposing force.
This problem is also one of the first magnitude. We have [no] gun-boats to aid
us, and if our communications are interrupted no broad Mississippi, covered
with transports, to supply us. Ninth. If we cross the Tennessee we must do so with
expectation of maintaining ourselves, not only against the present, but any
prospective opposing. The political moral injury to our cause of retrograde
movements is such that it would be better for us to go a mile a day and make
sure. You will not be surprised if in face of these difficulties it takes time
[to] organize the means of success. Our roads must be opened, stores brought
forward and put in places of security, bridging trains got ready, and the enemy
must be kept in ignorance of our plans. We must learn the country, which
appears very differently in reality from what is shown on map.
Asking pardon for the length of this letter, I remain, very
respectfully,
W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.
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