HEADQUARTERS MILITARY
DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field,
Savannah, Ga., January 21, 1865.
Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Commanding Army in the Field,
North Alabama, via Nashville:
GENERAL: Before I again dive into the interior and disappear
from view, I must give you, in general terms, such instructions as fall within
my province as commander of the division. I take it for granted that you now
reoccupy in strength the line of the Tennessee from Chattanooga to Eastport. I
suppose Hood to be down about Tuscaloosa and Selma, and that Forrest is again
scattered to get horses and men and to divert attention. You should have a
small cavalry force of, say, 2,000 men to operate from Knoxville through the
mountain pass along the French Broad into North Carolina, to keep up the belief
that it is to be followed by a considerable force of infantry. Stoneman could
do this, whilst Gillem merely watches up the Holston. At Chattanooga should be
held a good reserve of provisions and forage, and in addition to its garrison a
small force that could at short notice relay the railroad to Resaca, prepared
to throw provisions down to Rome, on the Coosa. You remember I left the
railroad track from Resaca to Kingston and Rome with such a view. Then with an
army of 25,000 infantry and all the cavalry you can get, under Wilson, you
should move from Decatur and Eastport to some point of concentration about
Columbus, Miss., and thence march to Tuscaloosa and Selma, destroying former,
gathering horses, mules (wagons to be burned), and doing all the damage
possible; burning up Selma, that is the navy-yard, the railroad back toward the
Tombigbee, and all iron foundries, mills, and factories. If no considerable
army opposes you, you might reach Montgomery and deal with it in like manner,
and then at leisure work back along the Selma and Rome road, via Talladega and
Blue Mountain, to the Valley of Chattooga, to Rome or La Fayette. I believe
such a raid perfectly practicable and easy, and that it will have an excellent
effect. It is nonsense to suppose that the people of the South are enraged or
united by such movements. They reason very differently. They see in them the
sure and inevitable destruction of all their property. They realize that the
Confederate armies cannot protect them, and they see in the repetition of such
raids the inevitable result of starvation and misery. You should not go south
of Selma and Montgomery, because south of that line the country is barren and
unproductive. I would like to have Forrest hunted down and killed, but doubt if
we can do that yet. Whilst you are thus employed I expect to pass through the
center of South and North Carolina, and I suppose Canby will also keep all his
forces active and busy. I have already secured Pocotaligo and Grahamville, from
which I have firm roads into the interior. We are all well.
Yours, truly,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General, Commanding.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
45, Part 2 (Serial No. 94), p. 621-2
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