Showing posts with label Herman Haupt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Herman Haupt. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 10, 2018

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, January 18, 1864

A batch of letters has been sent us from the provost marshal, disclosing a mass of fraud and intrigue on the part of a set of assuming men that is as amusing as reckless. General Haupt, Naval Constructor Griffiths, Gwyn[?] of the Treasury, Hamilton Norris, and others figure in the affair. About a year since General H. published a series of questions for the improvement and progress of the Navy Department, which he and his associates appeared inclined to take into their keeping. This correspondence brings to light the secret intrigues of these scoundrels.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 511

Wednesday, June 14, 2017

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, July 4, 1863

I was called up at midnight precisely by a messenger with telegram from Byington, dated at Hanover Station, stating that the most terrific battle of the War was being fought at or near Gettysburg, that he left the field at half-past 6 P.M. with tidings, and that everything looked hopeful. The President was at the War Department, where this dispatch, which is addressed to me, was received. It was the first word of the great conflict. Nothing had come to the War Department. There seems to have been no system, no arrangement, for prompt, constant, and speedy intelligence. I had remained at the War Department for news until about eleven. Some half an hour later the dispatch from Byington to me came over the wires, but nothing from any one to Stanton or Halleek. The operator in the War Department gave the dispatch to the President, who remained. He asked, “Who is Byington?” None in the Department knew anything of him, and the President telegraphed to Hanover Station, asking, “Who is Byington?” The operator replied, “Ask the Secretary of the Navy.” I informed the President that the telegram was reliable. Byington is the editor and proprietor of a weekly paper in Norwalk, Connecticut, active and stirring; is sometimes employed by the New York Tribune, and is doubtless so employed now.

The information this morning and dispatches from General Meade confirm Byington's telegram. There is much confusion in the intelligence received. The information is not explicit. A great and bloody battle was fought, and our army has the best of it, but the end is not yet. Everything, however, looks encouraging.

Later in the day dispatches from Haupt and others state that Lee with his army commenced a retreat this A.M. at three o'clock. Our army is waiting for supplies to come up before following, — a little of the old lagging infirmity. Couch is said to be dilatory; has not left Harrisburg; his force has not pushed forward with alacrity. Meade sent him word, “The sound of my guns should have prompted your movement.” Lee and the Rebels may escape in consequence. If they are driven back, Halleck will be satisfied. That has been his great anxiety, and too many of our officers think it sufficient if the Rebels quit and go off, — that it is unnecessary to capture, disperse, and annihilate them.

Extreme partisans fear that the success of our arms will be success to the Administration. Governor Curtin is in trepidation, lest, if our troops leave Harrisburg to join Meade, the Rebels will rush in behind them and seize the Pennsylvania capital. On the other hand, Stanton and Halleck ridicule the sensitiveness of the Governor, and are indifferent to his wishes and responsibilities. Of course, matters do not work well.

Received this evening a dispatch from Admiral Lee, stating he had a communication from A. H. Stephens,1 who wishes to go to Washington with a companion as military commissioner from Jefferson Davis, Commanding General of Confederate forces, to Abraham Lincoln, President and Commanding General of the Army and Navy of the United States, and desires permission to pass the blockade in the steamer Torpedo on this mission, with Mr. Olds, his private secretary. Showed the dispatch to Blair, whom I met. He made no comment. Saw Stanton directly after, who swore and growled indignantly. The President was at the Soldiers' Home and not expected for an hour or two. Consulted Seward, who was emphatic against having anything to do with Stephens or Davis. Did not see the President till late. In the mean time Stanton and others had seen him, and made known their feelings and views. The President treats the subject as not very serious nor very important, and proposes to take it up to-morrow. My own impression is that not much good is intended in this proposition, yet it is to be met and considered. It is not necessary that the vessel should pass the blockade, or that Stephens should come here, but I would not repel advances, or refuse to receive Davis's communication.

I learn from Admiral Lee that General Keyes with 12,000 men has moved forward from the “White House” towards Richmond, and other demonstrations are being made.

Two intercepted dispatches were received, captured by Captain Dahlgren. One was from Jeff Davis, the other from Adjutant-General Cooper, both addressed to General Lee. They disclose trouble and differences among the Rebel leaders. Lee, it seems, had an understanding with Cooper that Beauregard should concentrate a force of 40,000 at Culpeper for a demonstration, or something more, on Washington, when the place became uncovered by the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac in pursuit of Lee. Davis appears not to have been informed of this military arrangement, nor satisfied with the programme when informed of it. Lee is told of the difficulty of defending Richmond and other places, and that he must defend his own lines, instead of relying upon its being done from Richmond.
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1 Vice-President of the Confederacy.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 357-9

Saturday, December 31, 2016

Diary of John Hay: September 1, 1862

Saturday morning, the 30th of August, I rode out into the country and turned in at the Soldiers' Home. The President’s horse was standing by the door, and in a moment the President appeared, and we rode into town together.

We talked about the state of things by Bull Run and Pope’s prospect. The President was very outspoken in regard to McClellan’s present conduct. He said that it really seemed to him McC. wanted Pope defeated. He mentioned to me a despatch of McC.s in which he proposed, as one plan of action, to “leave Pope to get out of his own scrape and devote ourselves to securing Washington.” He spoke also of McC’s dreadful panic in the matter of Chain Bridge, which he had ordered blown up the night before, but which order had been countermanded; and also of his incomprehensible interference with Franklin’s Corps which he recalled once, and then, when they had been sent ahead by Halleck’s order, begged permission to recall them again; and only desisted after Halleck’s sharp injunction to push them ahead till they whipped something, or got whipped themselves. The President seemed to think him a little crazy. Envy, jealousy and spite are probably a better explanation of his present conduct. He is constantly sending despatches to the President and Halleck asking what is his real position and command. He acts as chief alarmist and grand marplot of the army.

The President, on my asking if Halleck had any prejudices, rejoined: — “No! Halleck is wholly for the service. He does not care who succeeds or who fails, so the service is benefited.”

Later in the day we were in Halleck’s room. Halleck was at dinner and Stanton came in while we were waiting for him, and carried us off to dinner. A pleasant little dinner and a pretty wife as white and cold and motionless as marble, whose rare smiles seemed to pain her. Stanton was loud about the McC. business. He was unqualifiedly severe upon McClellan. He said that after these battles there should be one court-martial, if never any more. He said that nothing but foul play could lose us this battle, and that it rested with McC. and his friends. Stanton seemed to believe very strongly in Pope. So did the President, for that matter. We went back to the Headquarters and found General Halleck. He seemed quiet and somewhat confident. He said the greatest battle of the century was now being fought. He said he had sent every man that could go to the field. At the War Department we found that Mr Stanton had sent a vast army of volunteer nurses out to the field, probably utterly useless, over which he gave Genl Wadsworth command.

Everything seemed to be going well and hilarious on Saturday, and we went to bed expecting glad tidings at sunrise. But about eight o'clock the President came to my room as I was dressing, and calling me out, said: — “Well, John, we are whipped again, I am afraid. The enemy reinforced on Pope and drove back his left wing, and he has retired to Centreville where he says he will be able to hold his men. I don't like that expression. I don't like to hear him admit that his men need holding.”

After awhile, however, things began to look better, and, people's spirits rose as the heavens cleared. The President was in a singularly defiant tone of mind. He often repeated, “We must hurt this enemy before it gets away.” And this morning, Monday, (September 1), he said to me, when I made a remark in regard to the bad look of things: — “No, Mr. Hay, we must whip these people now. Pope must fight them; if they are too strong for him he can gradually retire to these fortifications. If this be not so, — if we are really whipped, and to be whipped, we may as well stop fighting.”

It is due in great measure to his indomitable will that army movements have been characterized by such energy and celerity for the last few days. There is one man who seems thoroughly to reflect and satisfy him in everything he undertakes. This is Haupt, the Railroad man at Alexandria. He has, as Chase says, a Major General's head on his shoulders. The President is particularly struck with the business-like character of his despatch, telling in the fewest words the information most sought for, which contrasted so strongly with the weak, whining, and incorrect despatches of the whilom General-in-Chief. If heads or shoulder straps could be exchanged, it would be a good thing, in either case, here. A good railroader would be spoiled, but the General gained would compensate. The corps of Haupt starting from Alexandria, have acted as pioneers, advance-guard, voltigeurs, and every other light infantry arm of the service.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 60-4;  Tyler Dennett, Editor, Lincoln and the Civil War: in the Diaries and letters of John Hay, p. 44-7.

Sunday, January 12, 2014

Diary of John Hay, August 30 – September 1, 1862

Saturday morning, the 30th of August, I rode out into the country and turned in at the Soldiers' Home. The President's horse was standing by the door, and in a moment the President appeared, and we rode into town together.

We talked about the state of things by Bull Run and P[ope] 's prospect. The President was very outspoken in regard to McC 's present conduct. He said that it really seemed to him McC wanted P defeated. He mentioned to me a despatch of McC[lellan] 's in which he proposed, as one plan of action, to "leave P[ope] to get out of his own scrape and devote ourselves to securing Washington." He spoke also of Mc[Clellan] 's dreadful panic in the matter of Chain Bridge, which he had ordered blown up the night before, but which order had been countermanded; and also of his incomprehensible interference with Franklin's Corps which he recalled once, and then, when they had been sent ahead by H[alleck]'s order, begged permission to recall them again; and only desisted after H[alleck]'s sharp injunction to push them ahead till they whipped something, or got whipped themselves. The President seemed to think him a little crazy. Envy, jealousy and spite are probably a better explanation of his present conduct. He is constantly sending despatches to the President and H asking what is his real position and command. He acts as chief alarmist and grand marplot of the army.

The President, on my asking if H[alleck] had any prejudices, rejoined : — "No! H[alleck] is wholly for the service. He does not care who succeeds or who fails, so the service is benefited."

Later in the day we were in H[alleck]'s room. H[alleck] was at dinner and S[tanton] came in while we were waiting for him, and carried us off to dinner. A pleasant little dinner and a pretty wife as white and cold and motionless as marble, whose rare smiles seemed to pain her. S[tanton] was loud about the McC[lellan] business. He was unqualifiedly severe upon McC[lellan] . He said that after these battles there should be one court-martial, if never any more. He said that nothing but foul play could lose us this battle, and that it rested with McC[lellan] and his friends. S[tanton] seemed to believe very strongly in P[ope]. So did the President, for that matter.

We went back to the Headquarters and found Gen'l H[alleck] . He seemed quiet and somewhat confident. He said the greatest battle of the century was now being fought. He said he had sent every man that could go to the field. At the War Department we found that Mr. S[tanton] had sent a vast army of volunteer nurses out to the field, probably utterly useless, over which he gave Gen'l W___ command.

Everything seemed to be going well and hilarious on Saturday, and we went to bed expecting glad tidings at sunrise. But about eight o'clock the President came to my room as I was dressing, and calling me out, said: — “Well, John, we are whipped again, I am afraid. The enemy reinforced on P[ope] and drove back his left wing, and he has retired to Centreville where he says he will be able to hold his men. I don't like that expression. I don't like to hear him admit that his men need holding."

After awhile, however, things began to look better, and, people's spirits rose as the heavens cleared. The President was in a singularly defiant tone of mind. He often repeated, "We must hurt this enemy before it gets away." And this morning, Monday, (September 1), he said to me, when I made a remark in regard to the bad look of things: —  “No, Mr. Hay, we must whip these people now. P[ope] must fight them; if they are too strong for him he can gradually retire to these fortifications. If this be not so, — if we are really whipped, and to be whipped, we may as well stop fighting."

It is due in great measure to his indomitable will that army movements have been characterized by such energy and celerity for the last few days. There is one man who seems thoroughly to reflect and satisfy him in everything he undertakes. This is H[aupt], the Railroad man at Alexandria. He has, as C___ says, a Major General's head on his shoulders. The President is particularly struck with the business-like character of his despatch, telling in the fewest words the information most sought for, which contrasted so strongly with the weak, whining, and incorrect despatches of the whilom General-in-Chief. If heads or shoulder straps could be exchanged, it would be a good thing, in either case, here. A good railroader would be spoiled, but the General gained would compensate. The corps of H[aupt] starting from Alexandria, have acted as pioneers, advance-guard, voltigeurs, and every other light infantry arm of the service.

SOURCES: John Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts From Diary, Volume 1, p. 60-4; Haper’s Monthly Magazine, Vol. 130, No.775, December 1914, p. 95.