Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, August 1, 1864

We yesterday had word that our forces had mined and blown up a fortification in front of Petersburg. All sorts of stories were current, some of them absurdly wild and ridiculous. Petersburg was said to be in flames. Our army were reported to have undermined & large portion of the city. Men of sense gave credit to the absurdity. I went over to the War Department, and Stanton showed me a telegram from Grant, stating the mine had been sprung, but the result is inconclusive, and evidently, I think, a disappointment. Stanton seemed uncertain and confused.

Exciting and silly stories prevailed about the raid into Pennsylvania. Street rumors put the Rebels at 40,000, and the press states that number, but reports are contradictory. Am still of the opinion that the force is small and the scare great. Governor Curtin and all Harrisburg are doubtless in a ferment. Was told the bells in Harrisburg were all ringing an alarm. I asked if it included the dinnerbell of Governor Curtin, for he would be frantic to stir up the people, and never disbelieved the largest fib that was sent abroad.

Had a letter from Tom this A.M., dated at Headquarters of the 18th Army Corps, at midnight of the 29th, stating an assault was to be made in the morning. Could not give details. There would be a sharp conflict, and he would do his duty. Bidding good-bye and sending love to all. This evening we hear from him after the fight, that he was well but tired and exhausted.

The President went yesterday to Fortress Monroe to meet General Grant, by prior arrangement, which made me distrust final operations at Petersburg, for if such were the fact, he could not well be absent. The President tells me the movement was well planned and well executed up to the closing struggle, when our men failed to do their duty. There must, I apprehend, have been fault in the officers also, not Grant, who originates nothing, is dull and heavy, but persistent.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 89-90

Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott to Major-General Robert Patterson, April 29, 1861

Headquarters of the Army, WASHINGTON, April 29th, 1861

Maj. Gen. PATTERSON

SIR: I wrote to you by Major Porter on the 27th, and also sent by him certain verbal messages. In that letter I gave you the outline of my plan for taking and strongly occupying Baltimore, and I asked for your views on the subject. At present, I suppose a column from this place of three thousand men, and another from York of three thousand men, a third from Perryville or Elkton by land or water, or both, of three thousand, & a fourth from Annapolis, by water, of three thousand, might suffice. But it may be, and many persons think it probable, that Baltimore, before we can get ready, will reopen the communication through that city, and beyond, each way, for troops, army supplies, and travellers, voluntarily. When can we be ready for the movement upon Baltimore on this side? Col. Mansfield has satisfied me that we want at least 10,000 (ten thousand) additional troops here to give security to this Capital, and as yet, we have less than 10,000, including some very indifferent militia of the District. With that addition we will be able, I think, to make the detachment for Baltimore. The Secretary tells me that he has sent a party, not military, to repair the bridges and relay the Maryland part of the Harrisburg & Baltimore railroad, to a point near the City. This, I am sure cannot be done without the protection of a Military force. I wish you to look to this. I am not sure that either you or Brig. Gen’l. Butler has re-inforced Ft. McHenry. I suppose 250 or 500 men will be wanted, if it be not already reinforced. If he is with you send Major W. W. Morris there to command. I shall ask General Butler to send up the men that may be yet needed. I desired Major Porter, A. A. G., to obtain from you or the Gov. of Pennsylvania the means of building two bridges on the Balt. & Ohio R.R. somewhere below Frederick; but pause a few days for further instructions, as we may want to use that road in taking possession of Harper's Ferry. We are in great want of Camp equipage and accoutrements at Annapolis, I believe, & certainly here; & we have occupied all the shelter for troops to be found here. Therefore please send no more troops this way without Camp equipage. The cabinet have under consideration, a plan for Volunteers of a long period of service. Please therefore to withdraw your request addressed to the Governor of Pennsylvania to increase his quota of three-months men. Tell me what you can do, and when, toward seizing and occupying Baltimore. The Quarter Master in Philadelphia has two hundred wagons, and thinks he can obtain as many more in ten or fifteen days. Four locomotives and ten passenger cars have been ordered from New York for service on this side of Annapolis. With high respect,

Yours very trully,

WINFIELD SCOTT

P.S. Occupy Havre de Grace at your discretion. I think well of the proposition.

WINFIELD SCOTT

SOURCE: Jessie Ames Marshall, Editor, Private and Official Correspondence of Gen. Benjamin F. Butler During the Period of the Civil War, Volume 1: April 1860 – June 1862, p. 55-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, October 13, 1863

No news from the front. President read this noon a dispatch from Meade, written last night, in which he says if the Rebels do not attack him to-day, he will attack them. I doubt it. He cannot do much on the offensive except under orders. As second in command or in any capacity under an intelligent superior, I think Meade would do well. He will never have another such opportunity to do the Rebels harm as when he supinely let Lee and his army cross the Potomac and escape unmolested.

The elections in Ohio and Pennsylvania absorb attention. The President says he feels nervous. No doubts have troubled me. An electioneering letter of McClellan in favor of Woodward for Governor of Pennsylvania, written yesterday, is published. It surprises me that one so cautious and intelligent as McC. should have been so indiscreet and unwise. The letter can do him no good, nor can it aid Woodward, who is a party secessionist. It is a great mistake, and must have been extorted from McClellan by injudicious partisan friends, under the mistaken idea that his personal influence might control the election. What errors prevail in regard to personal influence among party men! A good and wise man can do but little on the day of election, particularly in a bad cause. He can often aid in a good one by confirming the rightminded who are timid and may hesitate and doubt. McClellan lost balance when he wrote this letter.

Preston King spent the evening with me. Young Ulric Dahlgren called. The gallant fellow lost a leg at Gettysburg and is just recovering, so that he gets around on crutches. It is the first of his calls, and King was wonderfully interested in him — affected to tears — and listened to his modest accounts with the earnestness of a child.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 469-70

Edwin M. Stanton to Governor Andrew G. Curtin, May 25, 1862

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., May 25, 1862.

Governor CURTIN,

Harrisburg:

Send all the troops forward that you can immediately. Banks is completely routed. The enemy are in large force advancing upon Harper's Ferry.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary.

(Same to Governor Andrew, Boston, and to Governor Sprague, Providence.)

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 2 (Serial No. 123), p. 70

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: June 20, 1863

It has got out that the President intends to dispense with the services of Mr. Myers, the Jew Quartermaster-General, and Mr. Miles, member of Congress from South Carolina, who happens to be his friend, is characteristically doing the part of friend for his retention. But he gives the President some severe raps for alleged contempt of the wishes of Congress, that body having passed a bill (vetoed by the President) conferring on Col M. the rank and pay of brigadier-general.

The operations of Gen. Lee have relieved the depot here, which was nearly empty. Since the capture of Winchester and Martinsburg, only about 1500 bushels of corn are sent to the army daily whereas 5000 were sent before, and there were rarely more than day's supply on hand.

To-day, about one o'clock, the city was thrown into a state of joyful excitement, by the reception of news from the North. From this source it was ascertained, what had hitherto been only a matter of conjecture, that a portion of our forces, the same that captured Winchester and Martinsburg, were in Pennsylvania! Gen. Jenkins, with his cavalry, had taken Chambersburg on the 16th inst — and the North, from the line of Pennsylvania to the lakes, am from the seaboard to the western prairies, was stricken with consternation. These are some of the dispatches, as copied from Northern papers:

“The Governor of Ohio calls for 30,000 troops. The Governor of Pennsylvania calls for 50,000, to prevent the invasion of each State.

“Washington, June 15th.—Lincoln has issued a proclamation for 100,000 men, to repel the invasion of Maryland, Northern Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.

“Harrisburg, June 15th.—Dispatches from Chambersburg and Hagerstown state that the rebel cavalry are at Berryville and Martinsburg. A dispatch dated 14th, says that hard fighting is going on. The rebels had driven Reynolds from Berryville, and were advancing on the capital. The towns and cities throughout Pennsylvania are in danger.

“later. — Private dispatches state that on the 16th the rebels were at Chambersburg in force. .The Federals were removing the railroad machinery, stock, and stores. Great excitement and alarm pervaded the entire country.”

In the “hard fighting,” Gen. Lee reports our loss as “one killed and two wounded.” Here's the second dispatch:

“Shelbyville, Tenn., June 18th.—Nashville papers of the 17th inst. have been received here. They contain Lincoln's proclamation, calling for 100,000 militia, for six months' service, and the following highly interesting telegrams:

“loudon, Pa., June 16th.—The rebels are in heavy force in the Cumberland Valley.

“bedford, Pa., June 16th. — Scouts report 6000 rebels at Cumberland, Maryland. The inhabitants are flying for safety from Harper's Ferry.

“Harrisburg, June 16th. — Business is suspended here. All the important documents have been removed from the capital.

“Milroy telegraphs officially his repulse from the fortifications at Winchester by 15,000 rebels, with the loss of 2900 men.

“Governor Curtin calls upon the people of Pennsylvania to defend the State, saying that Philadelphia has not responded, while the enemy are in Chambersburg. He reproaches Pennsylvania for sniffling about the length of service when the exigency exists.

“Dispatches state that everything looks gloomy, and there is no saving the country south of the Susquehanna.

“baltimore, June 16th. — Governor Bradford calls on the people to rally to the defense of Maryland.

“Providence, R. I., June 16th.—Governor Smith convenes the Legislature on Thursday for the purpose of raising troops.

“philadelphia, June 16th.—The Mayor has issued a proclamation closing the stores in order that the occupants may join military organizations to defend the city.

“new York, June 16th. — All the regiments are getting ready under arms. The Brooklyn bells were rung at midnight, summoning the men to the regiments, which were to leave immediately for Philadelphia.

“Governor Andrews, of Massachusetts, tenders Lincoln all the available force of militia from that State.”

Milroy's statement in relation to the number of prisoners taken by us is pretty fair, when compared with Hooker's official statements on similar occasions. Some of the prisoners will probably arrive in Richmond to-day—and the Agent of Exchange has been notified that 7000 would be sent on. So Gen. Milroy told nearly half the truth.

Again:

THIRD DISPATCH.

“Shelbyville, June 19th. — Other dispatches in the Nashville papers say that the rebels advanced six miles beyond Chambersburg. On the 16th Gen. Taylor telegraphs officially his retreat, and the capture of the Federal forces at Winchester.”

Later in the day the New York Herald of the 17th inst. was received by the flag of truce boat. I now quote from it:

“Fortifications are being rapidly erected all along the north bank of the Susquehanna, and Gen. McClellan or Gen. Franklin has been called for to head the State troops.

REPORTS FROM HARRISBURG.

“harrisburg, Pa., June 16th. — Midnight. — Rebel cavalry today occupied Littletown, eleven miles from Gettysburg, but at last accounts had not advanced beyond that point.

“The rebel officers at Chambersburg stated that they were only waiting for infantry to move forward. The authorities are inclined to believe, however, that they will not move farther North.

“The farmers in the valley are sending their horses and cattle into the mountains.

“The rebels are gathering up all the negroes that can be found.

“Private property has been respected.

“They burned the railroad bridge across Scotland Creek, six miles this side of Chambersburg. Harper's Ferry Invested.

“baltimore, June 16th. — Fugitives from Hagerstown report the rebels picketing all the roads and not permitting any one to pass.

“The force that passed through were all cavalry, under Jenkins and Imboden, and did not exceed 2500.

“All was quiet at Frederick up to five o'clock this evening, though the people were greatly excited and hundreds were leaving.

“Harrisburg, June 17th. — The aspect of affairs, so far as can be judged by the reports from the border, seems to be this:

“The rebel force occupy Hagerstown and such other points as leave them free to operate either against Harrisburg or Baltimore.

“Apprehensions are entertained by the people of Altoona and other points on the line of the Pennsylvania Railroad, that the rebels will strike for the West, and then go back to their own soil by way of Pittsburg and Wheeling.

“The fortifications constructed on the hills opposite Harrisburg are considered sufficient protection for the city, and an offensive movement on our part is not unlikely."

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 354-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, July 4, 1863

I was called up at midnight precisely by a messenger with telegram from Byington, dated at Hanover Station, stating that the most terrific battle of the War was being fought at or near Gettysburg, that he left the field at half-past 6 P.M. with tidings, and that everything looked hopeful. The President was at the War Department, where this dispatch, which is addressed to me, was received. It was the first word of the great conflict. Nothing had come to the War Department. There seems to have been no system, no arrangement, for prompt, constant, and speedy intelligence. I had remained at the War Department for news until about eleven. Some half an hour later the dispatch from Byington to me came over the wires, but nothing from any one to Stanton or Halleek. The operator in the War Department gave the dispatch to the President, who remained. He asked, “Who is Byington?” None in the Department knew anything of him, and the President telegraphed to Hanover Station, asking, “Who is Byington?” The operator replied, “Ask the Secretary of the Navy.” I informed the President that the telegram was reliable. Byington is the editor and proprietor of a weekly paper in Norwalk, Connecticut, active and stirring; is sometimes employed by the New York Tribune, and is doubtless so employed now.

The information this morning and dispatches from General Meade confirm Byington's telegram. There is much confusion in the intelligence received. The information is not explicit. A great and bloody battle was fought, and our army has the best of it, but the end is not yet. Everything, however, looks encouraging.

Later in the day dispatches from Haupt and others state that Lee with his army commenced a retreat this A.M. at three o'clock. Our army is waiting for supplies to come up before following, — a little of the old lagging infirmity. Couch is said to be dilatory; has not left Harrisburg; his force has not pushed forward with alacrity. Meade sent him word, “The sound of my guns should have prompted your movement.” Lee and the Rebels may escape in consequence. If they are driven back, Halleck will be satisfied. That has been his great anxiety, and too many of our officers think it sufficient if the Rebels quit and go off, — that it is unnecessary to capture, disperse, and annihilate them.

Extreme partisans fear that the success of our arms will be success to the Administration. Governor Curtin is in trepidation, lest, if our troops leave Harrisburg to join Meade, the Rebels will rush in behind them and seize the Pennsylvania capital. On the other hand, Stanton and Halleck ridicule the sensitiveness of the Governor, and are indifferent to his wishes and responsibilities. Of course, matters do not work well.

Received this evening a dispatch from Admiral Lee, stating he had a communication from A. H. Stephens,¹ who wishes to go to Washington with a companion as military commissioner from Jefferson Davis, Commanding General of Confederate forces, to Abraham Lincoln, President and Commanding General of the Army and Navy of the United States, and desires permission to pass the blockade in the steamer Torpedo on this mission, with Mr. Olds, his private secretary. Showed the dispatch to Blair, whom I met. He made no comment. Saw Stanton directly after, who swore and growled indignantly. The President was at the Soldiers' Home and not expected for an hour or two. Consulted Seward, who was emphatic against having anything to do with Stephens or Davis. Did not see the President till late. In the mean time Stanton and others had seen him, and made known their feelings and views. The President treats the subject as not very serious nor very important, and proposes to take it up to-morrow. My own impression is that not much good is intended in this proposition, yet it is to be met and considered. It is not necessary that the vessel should pass the blockade, or that Stephens should come here, but I would not repel advances, or refuse to receive Davis's communication.

I learn from Admiral Lee that General Keyes with 12,000 men has moved forward from the “White House” towards Richmond, and other demonstrations are being made.

Two intercepted dispatches were received, captured by Captain Dahlgren. One was from Jeff Davis, the other from Adjutant-General Cooper, both addressed to General Lee. They disclose trouble and differences among the Rebel leaders. Lee, it seems, had an understanding with Cooper that Beauregard should concentrate a force of 40,000 at Culpeper for a demonstration, or something more, on Washington, when the place became uncovered by the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac in pursuit of Lee. Davis appears not to have been informed of this military arrangement, nor satisfied with the programme when informed of it. Lee is told of the difficulty of defending Richmond and other places, and that he must defend his own lines, instead of relying upon its being done from Richmond.

_______________

¹ Vice-President of the Confederacy.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 357-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, June 30, 1863

The President did not join us to-day in Cabinet. He was with the Secretary of War and General Halleck, and sent word there would be no meeting. This is wrong, but I know no remedy. At such a time as this, it would seem there should be free and constant intercourse and interchange of views, and a combined effort. The Government should not be carried on in the War or State Departments exclusively, nor ought there to be an attempt of that kind.

I understand from Chase that the President and Stanton are anxious that Dix should make a demonstration on Richmond, but Halleck does not respond favorably, — whether because he has not confidence in Dix, or himself, or from any cause, I do not know. This move on Richmond is cherished by Chase, and with a bold, dashing, energetic, and able general might be effective, but I agree with the President that Dix is not the man for such a movement. Probably the best thing that can now be done, is to bring all who can be spared from garrison duty to the assistance of General Meade.

Lee and his army are well advanced into Pennsylvania, and they should not be permitted to fall back and recross the Potomac. Halleck is bent on driving them back, not on intercepting their retreat; is full of zeal to drive them out of Pennsylvania. I don't want them to leave the State, except as prisoners. Meade will, I trust, keep closer to them than some others have done. I understand his first order was for the troops at Harper's Ferry to join him, which was granted. Hooker asked this, but it was denied him by the War Department and General Halleck.

Blair is much dissatisfied. He came from the Executive Mansion with me to the Navy Department and wrote a letter to the President, urging that Dix's command should be immediately brought up. Says Halleck is good for nothing and knows nothing. I proposed that we should both walk over to the War Department, but he declined; said he would not go where Stanton could insult him, that he disliked at all times to go to the War Department, had not been there for a long period, although the Government of which he is a member is in these days carried on, almost, in the War Department.

We have no positive information that the Rebels have crossed the Susquehanna, though we have rumors to that effect. There is no doubt the bridge at Columbia, one and a half miles long, has been burnt, and, it seems, by our own people. The officer who ordered it must have been imbued with Halleck's tactics. I wish the Rebel army had got across before the bridge was burnt. But Halleck's prayers and efforts, especially his prayers, are to keep the Rebels back, — drive them back across the “frontiers” instead of intercepting, capturing, and annihilating them. This movement of Lee and the Rebel forces into Pennsylvania is to me incomprehensible, nor do I get any light from military men or others in regard to it. Should they cross the Susquehanna, as our General-in-Chief and Governor Curtin fear, they will never recross it without being first captured. This they know, unless deceived by their sympathizing friends in the North, as in 1861; therefore I do not believe they will attempt it.

I have talked over this campaign with Stanton this evening, but I get nothing from him definite or satisfactory of fact or speculation, and I come to the conclusion that he is bewildered, that he gets no light from his military subordinates and advisers, and that he really has no information or opinion as to the Rebel destination or purpose.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 351-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, June 16, 1863

We hear this morning that Milroy has cut his way through the Rebels and arrived at Harper's Ferry, where he joins Tyler. I cannot learn from the War Department how early Milroy was warned from here that the Rebels were approaching him and that it would be necessary for him to fall back. Halleck scolds and swears about him as a stupid, worthless fellow. This seems his way to escape censure himself and cover his stupidity in higher position.

The President yesterday issued a proclamation calling for 100,000 volunteers to be raised in Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia. This call is made from outside pressure, and intelligence received chiefly from Pennsylvania and not from the War Department or Headquarters. Tom A. Scott, late Assistant Secretary of War, came on expressly from Pennsylvania, sent by Curtin, and initiated the proceeding.

Halleck sits, and smokes, and swears, and scratches his arm and [indecipherable], but exhibits little military capacity or intelligence; is obfusticated, muddy, uncertain, stupid as to what is doing or to be done.

Neither Seward nor Stanton nor Blair nor Usher was at the Cabinet-meeting. The two last are not in Washington. At such a time all should be here and the meeting full and frequent for general consultation and general purposes.

Scarcely a word on army movements. Chase attempted to make inquiries; asked whether a demonstration could not be made on Richmond, but the President gave it no countenance. No suggestions ever come from Halleck.

Young Ulric Dahlgren, who is on Hooker's staff, came in to-day. He is intelligent and gallant. I asked where the army was. He says between Fairfax and Centerville, or most of it was there; that Lee and the Rebel army are on the opposite side of the mountain, fronting Hooker. He knows little or nothing of the reported Rebel advances into Pennsylvania, and thinks Hooker does not know it. This is extraordinary, but it accounts for the confusion and bewilderment at the War Office.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 331-2

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, June 15, 1863

Met Blair at the depot. Told him of the conversation I had last evening with the President and the appearance of things at the War Department. It affected him greatly. He has never had confidence in either Stanton, Halleck, or Hooker. He fairly groaned that the President should continue to trust them and defer to them, when the magnitude of the questions is considered. “Strange, strange,” he exclaimed, “that the President, who has sterling ability, should give himself over so completely to Stanton and Seward.”

Something of a panic pervades the city. Singular rumors reach us of Rebel advances into Maryland. It is said they have reached Hagerstown, and some of them have penetrated as far as Chambersburg in Pennsylvania. These reports are doubtless exaggerations, but I can get nothing satisfactory from the War Department of the Rebel movements, or of our own. There is trouble, confusion, uncertainty, where there should be calm intelligence.

I have a panic telegraph from Governor Curtin, who is excitable and easily alarmed, entreating that guns and gunners may be sent from the navy yard at Philadelphia to Harrisburg without delay. We have not a gunner that we can spare. Commodore Stribling can spare men, temporarily, from the navy yard. I went again, at a late hour, to the War Department, but could get no facts or intelligence from the Secretary, who either does not know or dislikes to disclose the position and condition of the army. He did not know that the Rebels had reached Hagerstown; did not know but some of them had; quite as likely to be in Philadelphia as Harrisburg. Ridiculed Curtin's fears. Thought it would be well, however, to send such guns and men as could be spared to allay his apprehension. I could not get a word concerning General Milroy and his command, — whether safe or captured, retreating or maintaining his position. All was vague, opaque, thick darkness. I really think Stanton is no better posted than myself, and from what Stanton says am afraid Hooker does not comprehend Lee's intentions nor know how to counteract them. Halleck has no activity; never exhibits sagacity or foresight, though he can record and criticize the past. It looks to me as if Lee was putting forth his whole energy and force in one great and desperate struggle which shall be decisive; that he means to strike a blow that will be severely felt, and of serious consequences, and thus bring the War to a close. But all is conjecture.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 329-30

Governor Thomas H. Hicks to Brigadier-General Benjamin F. Butler, April 24, 1861

State of Maryland, Executive Chamber, ANNAPOLIS, April 24th, 1861

 Brig. Gen’l. B. F. BUTLER

SIR: A despatch signed by you, addressed to Governor A. Curtin, has been received by me, with a verbal request that I countersign it, and have it forwarded to its address.

In reference to the Arsenal at Pikesville I have no official information. I do not know who is in the possession of it. I am cut off from all communication with other parts of the State, and have no means to forward. your despatch, if I were willing to countersign it. I am compelled therefore, to decline to accede to your request.

Very Respectfully, Yr. Obdt. Servi.,

THos. H. HICKs

SOURCE: Jessie Ames Marshall, Editor, Private and Official Correspondence of Gen. Benjamin F. Butler During the Period of the Civil War, Volume 1: April 1860 – June 1862, p. 36

Brigadier-General Benjamin F. Butler to Major-General Robert Patterson, April 24rd, 1861

HEADQUARTERS,

Annapolis, April 24, 1861.

Major-General PATTERSON:

DEAR SIR: After leaving you with Mr. Felton at Philadelphia, I proceeded with the remnant of my command, one regiment having been sent through Baltimore, of whose sad mishaps you have heard, and two others being at Fortress Monroe, leaving with me but an imperfectly armed regiment of 800 men to execute the suggestions so happily made by you to Governor Curtin – to occupy and hold Annapolis and open a communication from thence to Washington via the Junction.

Upon my arrival I found Captain Blake, the superintendent of the Naval School, considerably alarmed for the safety of the frigate Constitution, moored off the Academy as a practice ship, and having a crew of but thirty men. Appreciating at once the necessity of having the ship to cover our connections, as well as a strong desire to keep Old Ironsides out of the hands of those who would be but too happy to raise their Confederate flag upon the Constitution as the first ship of their hoped-for navy, I at once came alongside, and giving the assistance of my whole command as well to guard the ship as to hoist out her guns, I was happy to see her afloat outside the bar ready to do good service. I put on board of her to guard her from an attempt at surprise, 125 of my best men, and 25 more men to work her guns, upon which service they are still absent. Sunday afternoon, in towing out the frigate, one of her men fell overboard, and while drifting to pick him up the steamer Maryland, a steam ferry-boat upon which was my command, ran aground, where she lay till Monday night at 12 o'clock, in spite of the most persevering efforts to move her. Monday morning about 8 o'clock the Seventh Regiment (New York) came up and I joined them, and landed at the Navy School, against the protest of Governor Hicks, copy of which I inclose.¹ I had an interview with the Governor of Maryland and the city authorities of Annapolis, in which I learned that the company of the Annapolis and Elk Cliff [Ridge] Railroad had taken up the rails upon their roads for the purpose of preventing passage of the troops to Washington; and further, that no possible means of transport could be had here. I immediately determined to seize upon the rolling-stock of the railroad and to march on Washington, repairing the track as we marched. I found in my regiment a number of persons competent as well to build a railroad as to run it, and with the engines and cars, means of subsistence could be brought along without any danger of fatiguing the men who were marching.  I communicated this plan to Colonel Lefferts, of the Seventh Regiment (New York), and directed him to detail two companies to take and hold the depot and property in it, so that the engines might not be disabled by detaching parts of them indispensable for use, during the night. I detailed a sufficient force of engine men to put the train in order to start at an early hour on Tuesday morning, believing the whole matter arranged, and left with a steam-tug to get off my troops in the middle of the night at high tide and bring them up to the wharf This was successfully done, and on landing in the morning about 6 o'clock I found that my order to Colonel Lefferts had not been executed, and received from him a communication marked A, and forwarded herewith.²

Of the reasons for and propriety of this action on the part of the council of officers of the Seventh Regiment I have no opinions to express. The result of it was that we lost a day in opening communication with Washington. Upon landing I immediately detailed two companies of Eighth Massachusetts Regiment and took possession of the depot, giving a certified inventory of the property taken. These companies, assisted by the road-men that I had detailed, proceeded up the track and repaired [it] for about four miles, when they encamped for the night. In the morning, after a consultation, Colonel Lefferts marched with his regiment, together with the remainder of Colonel Munroe's regiment, along the railroad toward Washington, making the track as they went, and I have the honor to report that full communication is open between Annapolis and the Junction, and I believe through to Washington, but of that fact I hope to assure you before closing this report. I should have gone forward myself with this to see it through, but the troops after [I] returned arrived, and it seemed more necessary that I should remain to move the troops forward, as I have done. Please find list of troops that have arrived and left Annapolis up to the present time. They are all unprovided with camp equipage and small stores, which will be necessary for their health. I was somewhat surprised to hear from Captain Stedman that you had appointed General Kline [Keim] to take my place here without any intimation to me of such appointment. It would be personally agreeable to me to be sent forward after I have so arranged the matters of detail that the post which Massachusetts men have won shall be retained. My attention was early called to the state of the defenses of this post, and I found them so defective against an interior enemy that a point which  entirely commands Fort Madison and the town can be held upon the opposite side of the river; and indeed the mobs were actually to bring a battery there to annoy the Constitution on the day on which we took her out.  Professor Lockwood has therefore made a survey of the place, and in accordance with his suggestions I have caused the hill to be occupied by 600 men from the Sixth New York Regiment, with two howitzers. I have also retained the battalion of rifles, Captain Devens, to aid holding the Academy, all the young gentlemen being withdrawn from this place. These, I believe, will be sufficient for the defense of the place until some guns for sea-coast defense shall be brought here. I have not thought best to hurry the troops forward on the instant, as they might not be able to stand the march, as the weather is very warm. They will, however, be sent forward without delay. We are without intelligence from Washington for three days, but I have an arrangement with the telegraph company which I hope will [restore] communication. Colonel Keyes, Captain Blake, and [Professor] Lockwood all agree in the propriety of this movement, considering the great importance of this post. I have the honor further to report the Harriet Lane lying below the bar, and the steamer Maryland, with two guns, also plying in the bay; I think a sufficient force to preserve our water passage. I have also the honor to inclose a memoranda* of some points betwixt Annapolis and Washington, being a duplicate of one which I propose to furnish to General Scott.

Trusting that my conduct may meet your approbation, I am, very respectfully, your servant,

 B. F. B[UTLER].

______________

¹ See Vol. II, p. 586.

² See p. 1272.

3 Not found.

SOURCE: Jessie Ames Marshall, Editor, Private and Official Correspondence of Gen. Benjamin F. Butler During the Period of the Civil War, Volume 1: April 1860 – June 1862, p. 32-5; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 51, Part 1 (Serial No.107 ), p. 1273-5

Governor Andrew J. Curtin to Abraham Lincoln, August 21, 1861

EXECUTIVE CHAMBER,

Harrisburg, Pa., August 21, 1861.

To the PRESIDENT:

SIR: The government of Pennsylvania is and has been earnestly desirous of doing its full duty to the Commonwealth and the country. It has done and will continue to do everything in its power to fulfill the requisitions and facilitate the operations of the Government of the United States, without presuming to criticise or find fault, even when they may appear to be irregular or indiscreet. What I am about to say will therefore not be understood as said in the way of complaint, but merely for the purpose of calling attention to some arrangements, the effect of which has probably been overlooked by the authorities at Washington.

It appears clearly from the acts of Congress of 22d and 25th of July last that the President has power to accept volunteers otherwise than through the State authorities only in cases where those authorities refuse or omit to furnish volunteers at his call or on his proclamation. The act of Assembly of Pennsylvania of 15th of May last contains, among others, a provision, “That it shall not be lawful for any volunteer soldier to leave this Commonwealth as such unless he shall have been first accepted by the Governor of this State upon a call, under a requisition of the President of the United States, made upon the Governor direct, for troops for the service of the United States.” Thus Congress and the State Legislature appear to be agreed upon the inexpediency of attempting the formation of volunteer organizations simultaneously under the control of different heads and on the propriety of leaving such organizations to be formed under the requisitions of the President by the State authorities.

Notwithstanding this common action of Congress and the State Legislature, a course has been pursued by the Government of the United States which is not in accordance with it, and which has already produced much embarrassment and must tend to greatly retard the fulfillment of the objects of the Government. On the 26th day of July last a requisition was made on the Executive of this State for ten regiments of infantry in addition to the forty-four regiments already furnished, twenty-five of which had been called for three months’ service and had been discharged at the expiration of their time. Active measures were immediately taken to comply with the requisition, but unfortunately the Government of the United States went on to authorize individuals to raise regiments of volunteers in this State. Fifty-eight individuals received authority for this purpose in Pennsylvania. The direct authority of the Government of the United States having been thus set in competition with that of the State, acting under its requisition, the consequence has been much embarrassment, delay, and confusion. It has happened in one instance that more than twenty men in one company, brought here as volunteers under the State call for the United States, have been induced to abandon that service and join one of the regiments directly authorized by the United States. In other cases companies ready to march, and whose transportation had been provided, were successfully interfered with in like manner. The inclosed letter is but a sample of the many of like character that have been received.*

As the call of the State is for the service of the United States, no military obligation can be imposed on the men until they are mustered into the service of the United States, and there are therefore no means of preventing them from joining independent regiments or even deserting their colors entirely. The few mustering officers that can be found have refused to muster in less than a whole regiment of infantry. Part of these evils, it is understood from a telegraphic dispatch received to day, will be alleviated by a general order from the War Department, which was suggested by me yesterday. Still there remains the great evil of the unavoidable clashing of two authorities attempting at the same time to effect the same object among the same people through different and competing agencies. The result is what might have been expected – that after the lapse of twenty-six days not one entire regiment has been raised in Pennsylvania since the last requisition. There are fragments of some seventy regiments, but not one complete; yet men enough have been raised to form near thirty complete regiments, and if the State had been left to fulfill its duties in accordance with the acts of Congress and of Assembly referred to, it is confidently believed that the ten regiments called for on the 26th of July would by this time have been fully raised.

That the course thus pursued is in violation of the law, both of the United States and of Pennsylvania, is a consideration not unworthy of notice. At the same time the Executive of this State will leave the authorities of the United States to construe their own law, and so far as regards the law of Pennsylvania, will take the responsibility of disobeying it rather than fail in any effort that may be required to array her military force in the present emergency in such manner as the Government of the United States may point out; and the Executive, in so doing, will rely on the Legislature to ratify his acts, dictated as they are by an earnest desire to aid the Government of the United States promptly and efficiently, without stopping to discuss the legality of any form in which that aid may be demanded. But where the law is so clearly in accordance with true policy and expediency, it is hoped that the Government of the United States will adhere to it. At all events it is earnestly suggested that the double system which has been adopted can lead to nothing but continued embarrassment and confusion, and that it would be better to rely exclusively either on requisitions on the State government, or on the authority given to individuals. It is also suggested that it would be expedient to make requisitions on the State for companies and not for regiments. Under the act of Congress of 22d of July last the President has authority to form them into regiments, and the field officers could then be appointed by the Governor, in accordance with the same act. Some of the advantages to be derived from this course are—

First. That men enlist more readily when they know that they are to enter on active service without delay.

Second. That they would have the benefit of drill by officers of the United States and in their camps, in direct contact with troops already drilled, instead of being kept in temporary camps during the time requisite for filling a whole regiment.

Third. That company officers could be examined as they come in, and the incompetent ones replaced during the same interval, and thus time be saved and the effectiveness of the troops enhanced.

There are other reasons which will readily occur to you.

With great esteem, your obedient servant,

 A. G. CURTIN.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 1 (Serial No. 122), p. 439-41

Governor Andrew G. Curtin to Simon Cameron, May 6, 1861

HARRISBURG, PA., May 6, 1861.

Hon. SIMON CAMERON,

Secretary of War:

I received your dispatch.* General Patterson anticipated you by the countermand of his order for twenty-five additional regiments. It would be well for me to understand how authority is divided, so that we can move with certainty, and the ardor of the people of this State should not be again cooled by changes. I will be guided by my powers under the constitution, and as thus directed will obey the orders of the Federal Government. Pennsylvania will answer to any requisition made on her.

 A. G. CURTIN,

 Governor of Pennsylvania.

_______________

* See May 6, p. 161

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 1 (Serial No. 122), p. 167

James E. Harvey to Abraham Lincoln, June 5, 1860

Private

Washington City,

June 5. 1860.

My dear Sir,

Your note of the 31st May, reached me a day or two since. I think your reserve in regard to private correspondence, eminently proper under present circumstances, and no personal or political friend ought to except to it.

My information from the interior of Pennsylvania is encouraging, and in Philadelphia we have silenced the Fillmore organ of '56, through the influence of which we were then betrayed. Consequently, the third ticket has now but one paper there, – the Evening Journal – of limited influence & character, & not of American antecedents, which is really the important point in our local politics. You are aware of Course, that the political organization of Pennsylvania supporting You, is not strictly Republican. To bring in the Americans, disaffected Democrats, & general elements of Opposition, we called it the People's Party, & in that name all our victories have been achieved & the State redeemed. The largest infusion is Republican in character, & that spring from our old Whig party. Of late, there has been an attempt in Philadelphia, to get a distinctive Republican organization, in anticipation of future results. Certain patriots suppose that prominence in this way now, may be serviceable hereafter. The only effect of that movement is to embarrass us with those, who hold the balance of power, & to a great extent the result in their hands. You will at once see the hazard of such an experiment, as introducing an element of discord among men, who have hitherto acted in concert & harmoniously. Our friends have however judiciously yielded, all that good policy might concede to these parties, and it now looks, as if we would work smoothly together.

There is a pause in Pennsylvania & New Jersey, which will continue until after the Baltimore nominations. Douglass has a strong hold on his party in both. But I am persuaded not only from observation, but from close contact with all the factions at Charleston, that nothing can now happen at Baltimore, which will seriously damage us. In the first place, I cannot see how Douglass is to obtain two thirds. That will depend upon the admission of bogus delegates from the South, which the New York vote will decide, & New York put the knife to his throat at Charleston. If nominated, the Cotton States will certainly run a separate ticket, which of itself would demoralize the party. If not nominated & an obnoxious platform be adopted, such as is now proposed & intended with the aid of New York, his friends assured me at Charleston – I mean the men authorized to speak – that they would quietly retire from the Convention. In either Contingency therefore, our prospect is not impaired.

Pennsylvania after all is to be the battle ground of this Contest. New Jersey breathes the same atmosphere & sympathizes with us. In order to reach the Commercial Classes, the North American has been obliged to address their reason & intelligence gradually, commending & illustrating Your Conservative Whig character & antecedents. This will serve to explain why we have not shouted as loudly as some others. Had we done so, our influence for good, would have been much neutralized. The state of the Tariff here is likely to aid us materially. Hunter & the controlling spirits of the Senate are disinclined to touch the House bill, & intend to adjourn if possible, after passing the appropriations – say about the 25. If they do, we will raise a storm about their ears, which will echo across your prairies. Our man Cameron, has not done all that we desired, but he will be constrained to do the rest. Let me say just here, there is a rivalry springing up between him & Curtin, our Candidate for Governor, which you would do well to ignore entirely. It will be bad enough by & by when we win. Let us know neither now. Seward is much cut down & has good sense enough to avoid Chase's bad taste & folly. The real & upright men who sustained him, are in grave earnest – I mean such as Spaulding who represents Buffalo. Greely writes me, that his quarrel is about ended, which ought never to have been begun, & that henceforth Webb & Co, will be allowed to splurge in peace. Laus Deo.

Very Truly

James E. Harvey

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

David Davis to Abraham Lincoln, Sunday Evening, August 5, 1860

Harrisburg, Pa

=Sunday Evening—

Augt 5, 1860

Dear Lincoln

— I reached Fort Wayne about 12 oclk Thursday night, & met Mr Williams at the Depot having previously Telegraphed him to meet me there– He went on with me to the next station & we talked over Indiana politics pretty thoroughly= The Breckenridge movement headed by Bright & Fitch he says, is in Earnest, & the State will go for you, no matter what the result of the October Election may be– He thinks Col. Lane will be elected, but of this he is not so entirely hopeful– The Breckenridge men have not put up a State Ticket, as you know in Indiana-- Mr Williams thinks that the naming of the Breckenridge Electoral Ticket in Indiana (a movement more formidable than in Illinios) will so far demoralize the party – as to increase greatly our chances for carrying the State in October–

Friday at 3 oclk reached Pittsburg, and remained over until 9 at night – I saw Mr Erret & Mr Williams of the Gazette– Genl Purviance not at home– Everything in Pittsburg and that region of the State, is just as we could desire it.—

The Republican vote will be immensely increased, in the West & Northwest—

– I found the opinion there as to the Central Committee pretty much as we had received it from others– I also ascertained that a meeting was appointed of some 18, or 20 of our friends – to meet in Phild. Tuesday Evening. Which I intend to attend– I expected to go to Baltimore tonight, but finding that Col Curtin will be in an adjoining County to night-morrow, I have concluded to stay & go & see him– This deranges my plans somewhat– I spent the entire day of yesterday – with Genl Cameron, & my interview has been pleasant & eminently satisfactory– He is certainly a genial, pleasant, and kind hearted man, & many prejudices that I have heretofore entertained have been removed—

– I found him, exceedingly anxious to have your views on the subject of the tariff, & that he wanted them so as to be able to assure the people of the State that they were Satisfactory to him.

Pennsylvania has been deceived so often on the subject of the Tariff, that it is not surprising that they are fearful & sensitive about it—

I explained to him, that what your views had been all your life, & that if you had entertained other views when you embarked in life that you would have had Douglas's position in the State & that the reason your speeches were not published, was, that there were no reporters in those days

I then took out your notes, and commenced reading them, stating that you wished me to present them to him– He requested me to leave them with him, & he would hand them to me at Phild– I have seen him to day, & he says he has read the notes carefully and they are abundantly satisfactory to him– Genl Cameron, says, that there is not a shadow of doubt of your carrying Pennsylvania – that you will carry it by a large majority – that Curtin will be elected – that the Bell movement amounts to nothing in the State, and that outside of Philadelphia it is literally nothing– He says that there is a lack of confidence with McClure, but that they will get along with that harmoniously

Genl Cameron also says that they do not want any money in the state – that they can raise all they need – but that if money is furnished that the amount will be magnified, & parties in the State will be jealous if they dont get some

He has also a pride not to receive money – thinks it humiliating that Pa. should receive money from NY. & Boston– He advised agt our receiving any in Illinois from abroad– more hereafter

yr frd

D Davis —

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

Governor Andrew G. Curtin to Brigadier-General John F. Reynolds, September 26, 1862

Pennsylvania Executive Chamber,

Harbisburg, 26th September, 1862.

General,—Having relieved you from duty as commander of the Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia, recently called out for the defense of the State, I deem it proper to express my strong sense of the gratitude which Pennsylvania owes for the zeal, spirit, and ability which you brought to her service at a period when her honor and safety were threatened. That for her security you left the command of your brave division, the Pennsylvania Reserves, thus losing the opportunity of leading this gallant corps at South Mountain and Antietam, is a just demonstration of the true affection you bear for your native State, which, be assured, her freemen reciprocate, and for which, in their behalf, I am happy to make you this acknowledgment.

A. G. Curtin.

To Brigadier-general John F. Reynolds, U.S.A.

SOURCE: United Service: A Monthly Review of Military and Naval Affairs, Volume 2, May 1880, p. 621

Diary of Salmon P. Chase, Saturday, September 13, 1862

Breakfasted alone. What has become of Mr. Skinner? Went to Department and attended to some matters of routine.

Went to Navy Department with Gov. Seward, according to appointment, about expedition to Charleston. Examined chart with Secretary Welles and Asst. Secy. Fox. Learned that the “Ironsides and Passaic” will be ready for sea by the 1st. October; which is more than two weeks longer than Mr. Welles gave me to understand ten days ago. Fox thinks that James Island ought to have been held and that Hunter was wrong in withdrawing our force from it; but it is now commanded by our gunboats, so that a landing upon it is easy, and a force of 10,000 or 15,000 men would suffice for the reduction of Charleston. A land force, however, would have to act mainly independently of the naval, — and no naval force but ironclads could act with any efficiency because, the harbor being a cul de sac, wooden vessels entering it to bombard the town, would be exposed to fire from all sides, and could not pass and repass the enemy's batteries, as at Port Royal, and, by motion, make the enemy's fire comparatively ineffectual. Ironclads, however, such as the “Passaic” and the “Ironsides” could go right into the harbor, with little or no risks, and destroy the Forts, batteries and the town itself, if not surrendered. After all, it seemed to me that it would contribute greatly to the certainty of the result if a land force should be organized, and I determined to confer with the Secretary of War on the subject, as soon as possible. No time should be lost in making every arrangement for such overwhelming blows, just as soon as the ironclads are ready, as will effectually annihilate the possibility of rebel success.

From the Navy Department, we went to Head Quarters where we found Genl. [Cullom¹] who said: “We have got whipped again. We have just received a telegram that the rebels have defeated our people in Fayette County, Va., and are driving them down the Kanawha. The trouble is that our men won't fight.” The style of remark did not suit me, but it is too common among our generals. In my opinion, the soldiers are better than the officers. — Genl. Halleck came in, and we asked the situation. There was nothing new, he said, except confirmation that Burnside drove the rebels out of Frederick yesterday, and had renewed the fight to-day. Heavy firing had been heard from the direction of Harpers Ferry and the Frederick and Hagerstown roads. We left Head Quarters, and I returned to the Department.

Gave O'Harra and Pitt Cooke letter of introduction to Genl. Mitchell. Visited Mr. Clarke's sealing and trimming machine for the ones and twos and found them a perfect success; and the ones and twos are sealed and trimmed by machinery, attended by the most part by women, with such prodigious advantage to the Government, that it seems difficult to imagine that coining, except in large masses, can be of much utility hereafter.

Jay Cooke writes that he has visited New-York and conversed with Bankers; and thinks that $10,000,000 in Gold will be gladly deposited at 4%. I think that, in this way, all the Gold needed can be obtained at very small cost and without affecting the market in any way. If it succeeds, it will form not the least remarkable chapter in the history of the financial success which has attended me thus far.

Wrote to Katie and Nettie, and to Horton — to Katie, advising her not to return immediately, — to Horton about Pope.

In the evening, went to Willard's to call on Genl. Schenck, but did not see him. Met Weed, and went to his room and talked of sundry matters. He says I have done as well in the New York appointments as was possible, and advises care as to the securities taken; which advice I think very good. He thinks the time has come for vigorous measures South; and is for freeing the slaves, and arming them as far as useful, without noise or excitement. He saw Hunter in New-York; who says that if he had been sustained, he would have emasculated the rebellion in South Carolina before now — which he seemed to believe and which I believe absolutely.

Went to War Department. Telegraph men told me that telegraph was built to Point of Rocks and several miles beyond the Monocacy towards Frederick, and that heavy continuous firing was heard, by the operator of the former place, from the direction of Harpers Ferry, till between three and four this afternoon; and that firing, though not so heavy, was also heard from the direction of Middleton, between Frederick and Hagerstown. There was also a rumor that we had captured a large wagon-train, with considerable number of prisoners. The inference from the firing heard is that an attack has been made on Harpers Ferry by a large rebel force, and a stout defense with unknown result; and that a less important conflict has taken place between the advance under Burnside and the rebel rear falling back towards Hagerstown on Harpers Ferry, (probably the former) and that the rebels have been worsted.

Telegram from Gov. Curtin yesterday states that a reliable gentleman of Maryland who had opportunities to converse freely with officers of the rebel army, says that the rebel force in Maryland is 190,000, and the other side of the Potomac 250,000—in all 440,000. This is a specimen of information collected and believed!

Came home and Cooke called with Mr. Davis, General Birney's partner, who wants him made a Major General with command of Kearney's corps. I think this should be done. We must advance all our Republican officers who have real merit, so as to counterpoise the too great weight already given to Democratic officers, without much merit. They have been more pushed than the Republicans and we have been more than just — more than generous even — we have been lavish towards them. It is time to change the policy.

_______________

1 Name inserted from Warden's excerpt, 473.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 78-80

Diary of Salmon P. Chase, Thursday, September 11, 1862

Two weeks since Hooker drove Ewell at Bristow Station — and what weeks! Ten days of battle, and then such changes, — changes in which it is difficult to see the public good! How singularly all our worst defeats have followed Administrative co—no, blunders! McDowell defeated at Bull Run, because the Administration would not supercede Patterson by a General of more capacity, vigor and devotion to the cause. McClellan defeated at Richmond, because the Administration recalled Shields and forced Fremont to retire from the pursuit of Jackson, in order that McDowell's force might be concentrated at Manassas to be sent to McClellan before Richmond. Pope defeated at Bull Run because the Administration persisted in keeping McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac, after full warning that, under his lead and influence, that army would not cooperate effectively with Pope.

After breakfast this morning Mr. Hamilton took leave of me, and I prepared to go to Fairfax Seminary to visit Butterfield, who, according to the papers, is sick there. Before starting, however, I thought best to send Bannister to the War Department to learn if any-thing of importance had occured. He returned with a note to the effect that nothing important had come from the army but that an important question was for consideration and decision, and if I would come up he would send for Genl. Halleck and the President. Went up immediately. It rained. On arriving at the War Department, found Genl. Wright, of Penna., there, with a request from Gov. Curtin to call into active service all the able bodied men of the State. The President, Gen. Halleck and Mr. Stanton submitted the question, “What answer shall be returned to Gov. Curtin?” — Gen. H. thought the important thing was to mass all the force possible on this side the enemy, and defeat him; and that a general arming of Pennsylvania would not be sufficiently available to warrent the vast expenses sure to be incurred. — Mr. Stanton expressed no-opinion as to defeat of the enemy from this side, but thought Gov. Curtins proposal too large to be entertained, and stated that the arms for a general arming could not be furnished.

I asked Gen. H., “What force, in your opinion, has the enemy?” — “From the best evidence I have — not satisfactory, but the best — I reckon the whole number in Maryland and the vicinity of Washington, at 150,000.” — “How many in Maryland?” “Two-thirds probably, or 100,000.” — “What in your judgment as a soldier, are the designs of the enemy?” — “Impossible to judge with certainty. Suppose he will do what I would do if in his place — rest, recruit, get supplies, augment force, and obtain all possible information; and then strike the safest and most effectual blow he can — at Washington, Baltimore, or Philadelphia. If not strong enough to strike a blow, he will, after getting all he can, attempt to cross into Virginia.” — “You think, there is no probability of an advance into Pennsylvania at present.” —  “None, unless a raid.” —Upon these statements, I expressed the opinion, that, considering the situation of our troops sent out to attack the rebel army, it was not impossible that a raid, at least, would be attempted into Pennsylvania, and that Gov. Curtin was wise in making provision for it; that the proposition to arm the whole people was, however, too broad; and that I thought it would be well to authorize the Governor to call out as many troops as could be armed with the arms he reported himself as having — say 30,000. The President said he was averse to giving the order, on the score of expense; but would think of it till to-morrow.

The President and Secy. Stanton having left the room, I took occasion to ask Gen. Halleck what, in his judgment, were the causes of the demoralization of the troops. He replied, there were several causes; first, the incapacity of officers from inexperience, or want of ability or character; second, the want of proper discipline; third, — a political cause, the action of the late Congress in its abolition and confiscation measures, which were very distasteful to the army of the West, and, as he understood, also to the army of the Potomac. I expressed my conviction that the influence of the last was exaggerated, and dropped the subject. I abandoned the idea of visiting Butterfield and returned to the Department, where I transacted usual routine business.

In the evening, called to enquire for Mrs. Douglas, taking some—

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 74-5

Governor Andrew G. Curtin to the Legislature of Pennsylvania, April 30, 1861

Executive Chamber,

Harrisburg. April 30, 1861.

Gentlemen: —

THE PRESENT UNPARALLELED EXIGENCY in the affairs of our country, has induced me to call you together at his time. With an actual and armed rebellion in some of the States of the Union, momentous questions have been thrust upon us which call for your deliberation, and that you should devise means by legislation for the maintenance of the authority of the General Government, the honor and dignity of our State, the protection of our citizens, and the early establishment of peace and order throughout the land.

On the day of my induction into the Executive office, I took occasion to utter the following sentiments:

“No one who knows the history of Pennsylvania, and understands the opinions and feelings of her people, can justly Charge us with hostility to our brethren of other States. We regard them as friends and fellow-countrymen, in whose welfare we feel a kindred interest; and we recognize, in their broadest extent, all our constitutional obligations to them. These we are ready and willing to observe, generously and fraternally in their letter and spirit, with unswerving fidelity.

“Ours is a National Government. It has within the sphere of its action all the attributes of sovereignty, and among these are the right and duty of self preservation. It is based upon a compact to which all the people of the United States are parties. It is the result of mutual concessions, which were made for the purpose of securing reciprocal benefits. It acts directly on the people, and they owe it a personal allegiance. No part of the people, no State nor combination of States, can voluntarily secede from the Union, nor absolve themselves from their obligations to it. To permit a Slate to withdraw at pleasure from the Union, without the consent of the rest, is to confess that our Government is a failure. Pennsylvania can never acquiesce in such a conspiracy, nor assent to a doctrine which involves the destruction of the Government. If the Government is to exist, all the requirements of the Constitution must be obeyed; and it must have power adequate to the enforcement of the supreme law of the land in every State. It is the first duty of the national authorities to stay the progress of anarchy and enforce the laws, and Pennsylvania, with a united People, will give them an honest, faithful and active support. The people mean to preserve the integrity of the national Union, at every hazzard.”

It could scarcely have been anticipated at that time, that we should so soon be called upon for the practical application of these truths in connection with their support and defence by the strong arm of military power.

The unexampled promptness and enthusiasm with which Pennsylvania and the other loyal States have responded to the call of the President, and the entire unanimity with which our people demand that the integrity of the Government shall be preserved, illustrate the duty of the Several State and National Governments with a distinctness that cannot be disregarded. The slaughter of Northern troops in the city of Baltimore, for the pretended offence of marching, at the call of the Federal Government, peaceably, over soil admittedly in the Union, and with the ultimate object of defending our common Capital against an armed and rebellious invasion, together with the obstruction of our Pennsylvania troops when dispatched on the same patriotic mission, imposes new duties and responsibilities upon our State administration. At last advices the General Government had military possession of the route to Washington through Annapolis; but the transit of troops had been greatly endangered and delayed, and the safety of Washington itself imminently threatened. This cannot be submitted to. Whether Maryland may profess to be loyal to the Union or otherwise, there can be permitted no hostile soil, no obstructed thoroughfare, between the States that undoubtedly are loyal and their National seat of government. There is reason to hope that the route through Baltimore may be no longer closed against the peaceable passage of our people armed and in the service of the Federal Government. But we must be fully assured of this, and have the uninterrupted enjoyment of a passage to the Capital by any and every route essential to the purposes of the Government. This must be attained, peaceably if possible, but by force of arms if not accorded.

The time is past for temporizing or forbearing with this rebellion; the most causeless in history. The North has not invaded, nor has she sought to invade a single guarantied right of the South. On the contrary, all political parties, and all administrations, have fully recognized the binding force of every provision of the great compact between the States, and regardless of our views of State policy, our people have respected them. To predicate a rebellion, therefore, upon any alleged wrong, inflicted or sought to be inflicted upon the South, is to offer falsehood as an apology for treason. So will the civilized world and history judge this mad effort to overthrow the most beneficent structure of human government ever devised by man.

The leaders of the rebellion in the Cotton States, which has resulted in the establishment of a provisional organization, assuming to discharge all the functions of governmental power, have mistaken the forbearance of the General Government; they have accepted a fraternal indulgence as an evidence of weakness, and have insanely looked to a united South, and a divided North to give success to the wild ambition that has led to the seizure of our national arsenal and arms, the investment and bombardment of our forts, the plundering of our mints, has invited piracy upon our commerce, and now aims at the possession of the National Capital. The insurrection must now be met by force of arms; and to re-establish the Government upon an enduring basis, by asserting its entire supremacy, to re-possess the forts and other Government property so unlawfully seized and held; to ensure personal freedom and safety to the people and commerce of the Union in every section, the people of the loyal States demand, as with one voice, and will contend for, as with one heart; and a quarter of a million of Pennsylvania's sons will answer the call to arms, if need be, to wrest us from a reign of anarchy and plunder, and secure for themselves and their children, for ages to come, the perpetuity of this Government and its beneficent institutions.

Entertaining these views, and anticipating that more troops would be required than the number originally called for, I continued to receive companies until we had raised twenty-three regiments in Pennsylvania, all of which have been mustered into the service of the United States. In this anticipation I was not mistaken. On Saturday last an additional requisition was made upon me for twenty-five regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry; and there have been already more companies tendered than will make up the entire complement.

Before the regiments could be clothed, three of them were ordered by the National Government to proceed from this point to Philadelphia. I cannot too highly commend the patriotism and devotion of the men who, at a moment's warning, and without any preparation, obeyed the order. Three of the regiments, under similar circumstances, by direction of, and accompanied by officers of the United States army, were transported to Cockeysville, near Baltimore, at which point they remained for two days, and until by directions of the General Government they were ordered back and went into camp at York, where there are now five regiments. Three regiments mustered into service are now encamped at Chambersburg, under orders from the General Government; and five regiments are now in camp at this place, and seven have been organized and mustered into service at Philadelphia.

The regiments at this place are still supplied by the Commissary Department of the State. Their quarters are as comfortable as could be expected, their supply of provisions abundant, and, under the instruction of competent officers, they are rapidly improving in military knowledge and skill. I have made arrangements to clothe all our regiments with the utmost dispatch consistent with a proper economy, and am most happy to say that before the close of the present week all our people now under arms will be abundantly supplied with good and appropriate uniforms, blankets and other clothing.

Four hundred and sixty of our volunteers, the first to reach Washington from any of the States, are now at that city; these are now provided for by the General Government; but I design to send them clothing at the earliest possible opportunity. I am glad to be able to state that these men, in their progress to the National Capital, received no bodily injury, although they were subjected to insult in the city of Baltimore, such as should not have been offered to any law-abiding citizen, much less to loyal men, who, at the call of the President, had promptly left their own State in the performance of the highest duty, and in the service of their country.

A large body of unarmed men, who were not at the time organized as a portion of the militia of this Commonwealth, under the command of officers without commissions, attempted under the call of the National Government, as I understand, to reach Washington, and were assaulted by armed men in the city of Baltimore, many of their number were seriously wounded, and four were killed. The larger part of this body returned directly to Philadelphia; but many of them were forcibly detained in Baltimore; some of them were thrust into prison, and others have not yet reached their homes.

I have the honor to say that the officers and men behaved with the utmost gallantry. This body is now organized into a regiment, and the officers are commissioned; they have been accepted into the service, and will go to Washington by any route indicated by the Federal Government.

I have established a camp at Pittsburg, at which the troops from Western Pennsylvania will be mustered into service, and organized and disciplined by skillful and experienced officers.

I communicate to you with great satisfaction, the fact that the banks of the Commonwealth have voluntarily tendered any amount of money that may be necessary for the common defence and general welfare of the State and the nation in this emergency; and the temporary loan of five hundred thousand dollars authorized by the act of the General Assembly of the 17th April, 1861, was promptly taken at par. The money is not yet exhausted; as it has been impossible to have the accounts properly audited and settled with the accounting and paying officers of the Government as required by law, an account of this expenditure can not now be furnished. The Auditor General and State Treasurer have established a system of settlement and payment, of which I entirely approve, that provides amply for the protection of the State, and to which all parties having claims will be obliged to conform.

A much larger sum will be required than has been distinctively appropriated; but I could not receive nor make engagements for money without authority of law, and I have called you together, not only to provide for a complete re-organization of the militia of the State, but also that you may give me authority to pledge the faith of the Commonwealth to borrow such sums of money as you may, in your discretion, deem necessary for these extraordinary requirements.

It is impossible to predict the lengths to which “the madness that rules the hour” in the rebellious States shall lead us, or when the calamities which threaten our hitherto happy country shall terminate. We know that many of our people have already left the State in the service of the General Government, and that many more must follow. We have a long line of border on States seriously disaffected, which should be protected. To furnish ready support to those who have gone out, and to protect our borders, we should have a well regulated military force.

I, therefore recommend the immediate organization, disciplining and arming of at least fifteen regiments of cavalry and infantry, exclusive of those called into the service of the United States; as we have already ample warning of the necessity of being prepared for any sudden exigency that may arise, I cannot too much impress this upon you.

I cannot refrain from alluding to the generous manner in which the people of all parts of the State have, from their private means, provided for the families of those of our citizens who are now under arms. In many parts of the Commonwealth, grand juries, and courts and municipal corporations have recommended the appropriations of moneys from their public funds, for the same commendable purpose. I would recommend the passage of an act legalizing and authorizing such appropriations and expenditures.

It may be expected that, in the present derangement of trade and commerce, and the withdrawal of so much industry from its ordinary and productive channels, the selling value of property generally will be depreciated, and a large portion of our citizens deprived of the ordinary means of meeting engagements. Although much forbearance may be expected from a generous and magnanimous people, yet I feel it my duty to recommend the passage of a judicious law to prevent the sacrifice of property by forced sales in the collection of debts.

You meet together at this special session, surrounded by circumstances involving the most solemn responsibilities; the recollections of the glories of the past, the reflections of the gloomy present, and the uncertainty of the future, all alike call upon you to discharge your duty in a spirit of patriotic courage, comprehensive wisdom and firm resolution. Never in the history of our peace-loving Commonwealth have the hearts of our people been so stirred in their depths as at the present moment. And, I feel, that I need hardly say to you, that in the performance of your duties on this occasion, and in providing the ways and means for the maintenance of our country's glory and our integrity as a nation, you should be inspired by feelings of self-sacrifice, kindred to those which animate the brave men who have devoted their lives to the perils of the battle-field, in defence of our nation's flag.

Gentlemen, I place the honor of the State in your hands. And I pray that the Almighty God who protected our fathers in their efforts to establish this our great constitutional liberty — who has controlled the growth of civilization and Christianity in our midst, may not now forsake us; that He may watch over your counsels, and may, in His providence, lead those who have left path of duty, and are acting in open rebellion to the Government, back again to perfect loyalty, and restore peace, harmony and fraternity to our distracted country.

A. G. CURT1N.

SOURCE: George Edward Reed, Editor, Pennsylvania Archives, Fourth Series, Papers of the Governors, Volume 8, p. 371-9