The President did not join us to-day in Cabinet. He was with
the Secretary of War and General Halleck, and sent word there would be no
meeting. This is wrong, but I know no remedy. At such a time as this, it would
seem there should be free and constant intercourse and interchange of views,
and a combined effort. The Government should not be carried on in the War or
State Departments exclusively, nor ought there to be an attempt of that kind.
I understand from Chase that the President and Stanton are
anxious that Dix should make a demonstration on Richmond, but Halleck does not
respond favorably, — whether because he has not confidence in Dix, or himself,
or from any cause, I do not know. This move on Richmond is cherished by Chase,
and with a bold, dashing, energetic, and able general might be effective, but I
agree with the President that Dix is not the man for such a movement. Probably
the best thing that can now be done, is to bring all who can be spared from
garrison duty to the assistance of General Meade.
Lee and his army are well advanced into Pennsylvania, and
they should not be permitted to fall back and recross the Potomac. Halleck is
bent on driving them back, not on intercepting their retreat; is full of zeal
to drive them out of Pennsylvania. I don't want them to leave the State, except
as prisoners. Meade will, I trust, keep closer to them than some others have
done. I understand his first order was for the troops at Harper's Ferry to join
him, which was granted. Hooker asked this, but it was denied him by the War
Department and General Halleck.
Blair is much dissatisfied. He came from the Executive
Mansion with me to the Navy Department and wrote a letter to the President,
urging that Dix's command should be immediately brought up. Says Halleck is
good for nothing and knows nothing. I proposed that we should both walk over to
the War Department, but he declined; said he would not go where Stanton could
insult him, that he disliked at all times to go to the War Department, had not
been there for a long period, although the Government of which he is a member
is in these days carried on, almost, in the War Department.
We have no positive information that the Rebels have crossed
the Susquehanna, though we have rumors to that effect. There is no doubt the
bridge at Columbia, one and a half miles long, has been burnt, and, it seems,
by our own people. The officer who ordered it must have been imbued with
Halleck's tactics. I wish the Rebel army had got across before the bridge was
burnt. But Halleck's prayers and efforts, especially his prayers, are to keep
the Rebels back, — drive them back across the “frontiers” instead of
intercepting, capturing, and annihilating them. This movement of Lee and the
Rebel forces into Pennsylvania is to me incomprehensible, nor do I get any light
from military men or others in regard to it. Should they cross the Susquehanna,
as our General-in-Chief and Governor Curtin fear, they will never recross it
without being first captured. This they know, unless deceived by their
sympathizing friends in the North, as in 1861; therefore I do not believe they
will attempt it.
I have talked over this campaign with Stanton this evening,
but I get nothing from him definite or satisfactory of fact or speculation, and
I come to the conclusion that he is bewildered, that he gets no light from his
military subordinates and advisers, and that he really has no information or
opinion as to the Rebel destination or purpose.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30,
1864, p. 351-3
No comments:
Post a Comment