After breakfast this morning Mr. Hamilton took leave of me,
and I prepared to go to Fairfax Seminary to visit Butterfield, who, according
to the papers, is sick there. Before starting, however, I thought best to send
Bannister to the War Department to learn if any-thing of importance had
occured. He returned with a note to the effect that nothing important had come
from the army but that an important question was for consideration and
decision, and if I would come up he would send for Genl. Halleck and the
President. Went up immediately. It rained. On arriving at the War Department,
found Genl. Wright, of Penna., there, with a request from Gov. Curtin to call
into active service all the able bodied men of the State. The President, Gen.
Halleck and Mr. Stanton submitted the question, “What answer shall be returned
to Gov. Curtin?” — Gen. H. thought the important thing was to mass all the
force possible on this side the enemy, and defeat him; and that a general arming
of Pennsylvania would not be sufficiently available to warrent the vast
expenses sure to be incurred. — Mr. Stanton expressed no-opinion as to defeat
of the enemy from this side, but thought Gov. Curtins proposal too large to be
entertained, and stated that the arms for a general arming could not be
furnished.
I asked Gen. H., “What force, in your opinion, has the
enemy?” — “From the best evidence I have — not satisfactory, but the best — I
reckon the whole number in Maryland and the vicinity of Washington, at 150,000.”
— “How many in Maryland?” “Two-thirds probably, or 100,000.” — “What in your
judgment as a soldier, are the designs of the enemy?” — “Impossible to judge
with certainty. Suppose he will do what I would do if in his place — rest,
recruit, get supplies, augment force, and obtain all possible information; and
then strike the safest and most effectual blow he can — at Washington,
Baltimore, or Philadelphia. If not strong enough to strike a blow, he will,
after getting all he can, attempt to cross into Virginia.” — “You think, there
is no probability of an advance into Pennsylvania at present.” — “None, unless a raid.” —Upon these
statements, I expressed the opinion, that, considering the situation of our
troops sent out to attack the rebel army, it was not impossible that a raid, at
least, would be attempted into Pennsylvania, and that Gov. Curtin was wise in
making provision for it; that the proposition to arm the whole people was,
however, too broad; and that I thought it would be well to authorize the Governor
to call out as many troops as could be armed with the arms he reported himself
as having — say 30,000. The President said he was averse to giving the order,
on the score of expense; but would think of it till to-morrow.
The President and Secy. Stanton having left the room, I took
occasion to ask Gen. Halleck what, in his judgment, were the causes of the
demoralization of the troops. He replied, there were several causes; first, the
incapacity of officers from inexperience, or want of ability or character; second,
the want of proper discipline; third, — a political cause, the action of the
late Congress in its abolition and confiscation measures, which were very
distasteful to the army of the West, and, as he understood, also to the army of
the Potomac. I expressed my conviction that the influence of the last was
exaggerated, and dropped the subject. I abandoned the idea of visiting
Butterfield and returned to the Department, where I transacted usual routine
business.
In the evening, called to enquire for Mrs. Douglas, taking
some—
SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical
Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 74-5
No comments:
Post a Comment