Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, May 29, 1865

[W]e took a morning ride, Mrs. Welles being able to go with us, and drove about the place. Returning to the wharf, we took a tug, visited the Pawnee, and then went to Sumter, Moultrie, Fort Johnston, etc. The day was beautiful and all enjoyed it.

There was both sadness and gratification in witnessing the devastation of the city and the deplorable condition of this seat of the Rebellion. No place has suffered more or deserved to have suffered more. Here was the seat of Southern aristocracy. The better blood — the superior class, as they considered themselves — here held sway and dictated the policy, not only of Charleston but of South Carolina, and ultimately of the whole South. The power of association and of exclusiveness has here been exemplified and the consequences that follow from the beginning of evil. Not that the aristocracy had more vigorous intellects, greater ability, for they had not, yet their wealth, their ancestry, the usage of the community gave them control.

Mr. Calhoun, the leading genius and master mind of the State, was not one of the élite, the first families, but was used, nursed, and favored by them, and they by him. He acknowledged their supremacy and deferred to them; they recognized his talents and gave him position. He pandered to their pride; they fostered his ambition.

Rhett, one of the proudest of the nobility, had the ambition of Calhoun without his ability, yet he was not destitute of a certain degree of smartness, which stimulated his aspirations. More than any one else, perhaps, has he contributed to precipitating this Rebellion and brought these terrible calamities on his State and country. The gentlemanly, elegant, but brilliantly feeble intellects of his class had the vanity to believe they could rule, or establish a Southern empire. Their young men had read Scott's novels, and considered themselves to be knights and barons bold, sons of chivalry and romance, born to fight and to rule. Cotton they knew to be king, and slavery created cotton. They used these to combine other weak minds at the South, and had weak and willing tools to pander to them in certain partisans at the North.

The results of their theory and the fruits of their labors are to be seen in this ruined city and this distressed people. Luxury, refinement, happiness have fled from Charleston; poverty is enthroned there. Having sown error, she has reaped sorrow. She has been, and is, punished. I rejoice that it is so.

On Monday evening we left for Savannah, but, a storm coming on, the Santiago put into Port Royal, having lost sight of our consort. It had been our intention to stop at this place on our return, but, being here, we concluded to finish our work, and accordingly went up to Beaufort. Returning, we visited Hilton Head and Fort Welles on invitation from General Gillmore.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 312-3

Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to Major-General George G. Meade, April 9, 1864

CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA.,                       

April 9, 1864.

Maj. Gen. G. G. MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac:

For information, and as instructions to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially, for your own perusal alone:

So far as practicable, all the armies are to move together and toward one common center. Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and to the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can—not less than 25,000 men—to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to any other movements. From the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if so soon.

Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Joe Johnston's army being his objective point and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim. If successful, he will secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile, with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to re-enforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. Two columns of his command will move south at the same time with the general move, one from Beverly, from 10,000 to 12,000 strong, under Major-General Ord; the other from Charleston, W. Va., principally cavalry, under Brigadier-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley or join you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try to force a passage southward; if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting Richmond with all the South and Southwest.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. The force will be commanded by Maj. Gen. W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous with yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on a raid: but if we take this route all we do must be done while the rations we start with hold out; we separate from Butler, so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other route, Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James River. These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more fully than I can write them.

Burnside, with a force of probably 25,000 men, will re-enforce you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th instant, I will give him the defense of the road from Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front.

There will be naval co-operations on the James River, and transports and ferries will be provided, so that should Lee fall back into his intrenchments at Richmond Butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.

What I would direct, then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a regiment of 500 men is the greatest number that should be allowed for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient, and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White House, on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere.

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of 500 rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the amount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,                       

Lieutenant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 33 (Serial No. 60), p. 827-9

Captain Quincy A. Gillmore to Brigadier-General Thomas W. Sherman, December 30, 1861

[Copy]

Confidential

Office of Chief Engineer Ex Corps

Hilton Head S.C. Dec. 30" 1861

Brig, Genl" T. W. Sherman

Commanding Ex Corps

Hilton Head S.C.

Sir,

I have the honor to communicate some information obtained from the colored man Brutus who accompanied me from Tybee this morning. He is the most intelligent slave I have met here, and is quite familiar with the rivers and creeks between Savannah City and Tybee Island. He made his escape from Wilmington Island last week in a canoe.

He says the enemy's pickets are thrown forward every day to the eastern extremity of Wilmington Island; that the Skiddaway battery is about three miles above the position abandoned at Wassaw and mounts 6 guns; that the Thunderbolt battery is six miles higher up still and mounts 6 guns — (possibly 8 by this time) and that the road from the Skiddaway battery to Savannah, passes within half a mile of the Thunderbolt battery and is commanded.

He also communicates the very important piece of information, that boats of not over 10 ft dft", can pass from Wassaw Sound to Savannah River at high tide, through Wilmington Narrows and St. Augustine Creek, leaving Wilmington Island on the left and thus turning the Skiddaway and Thunderbolt batteries. There were no guns on Wilmington Narrows when Brutus came from there. By this route St. Augustine Creek is entered about three miles to the Northward of the Thunderbolt battery.

The Steamer St Mary one of those observed to be in attendance on Fort Walker before its capture — has been plying on this route for the last two or three summers.

In entering Savannah River from St. Augustine Creek, it is necessary to pass within about two or two and a quarter miles of Fort Jackson. Elba Island, in Savannah River just below Fort Jackson, and opposite the entrance to St. Augustine Creek, is several miles in length and contains some fine ground. There is a ship channel on both sides of it. Savannah River has no tributary on the South side, between St. Augustine Creek, and Fort Pulaski. Oyster Creek makes in so near the Savannah River, about 3 miles above Fort Pulaski, that a vessel in it, would appear to an observer on Tybee Light House, to be directly beyond the Fort. Oyster Creek, some miles above the point where the passage leads from it to Wilmington Narrows, loses itself in the marsh, or as the negro says, “runs out to nothing.”

I must say that I place great reliance on Brutus' statement, for everything he said of Big Tybee Inlet, was verified with remarkable accuracy by my examination. What he says is moreover confirmed by other slaves at Tybee Island. I recommend a gun boat reconnaisance up Wilmington Narrows, and solicit the privilege of accompanying it.

If we can get into Savannah River, by a line of communication that we can retain and control, it seems to me a far better policy to reduce Pulaski by cutting off its supplies, than by the very doubtful and very expensive operation of bombardment from Tybee Island.

I estimate, that after the armament applied for arrives, it will require at least one month of hazardous labor to get the pieces in position ready for opening on the Fort. A preliminary work of three or four weeks, will certainly be necessary to prepare the platforms, embrasures, bomb-proofs and service and store magazines. The landing of the ordnance stores will be an immense operation of itself. If we suppose all the mortars to be 13 in, and all the solid shot to be thrown from 8in Columbiads, we will require storage room and land transportation for about,

300	Tons of	powder
1900	"      "	shells
470	"      "	shot

The powder will require an immense magazine. I disclaim any wish to shrink from this labor, but as there seems to be at least two ways of accomplishing the reduction of Pulaski, we ought to select the one offering the greatest advantages as regards rapidity and economy.

The reduction by bombardment and cannonade I deem practicable, on the supposition of exhaustless means. Whether it is expedient to make the attempt, and incur the risk of failure is another matter. Fort Pulaski is fully as strong a work as Fort Pickens, and we are informed that the interior arrangements to protect the garrisons are extensive.

We cannot reach the casemate blindage except by fragments of shells, which would do them very little injury. My chief reliance would be, as I have already intimated to you, in heavy rifled guns, to be used in breaching the walls and dismounting the guns. I respectfully ask the Commanding Generals cordial attention to this subject, in all its bearings.

Appended to this is a tracing which gives a general idea of Big Tybee inlet, as developed by my examination of it, and also of the Islands and waters between Tybee Island and Wilmington River, as I understand them from the statements of Brutus and other negroes, claiming to be familiar with that neighborhood.

Very Respectfully

Your most Obdt Servt

Q. A. GlLLMORE

Capt" & Chf" Eng Ex Corps  

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 90-3

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, April 4, 1864

Heard an excellent discourse yesterday from Bishop Whipple.

Called on Stanton, respecting the letters of General Gillmore from June 12 to July 6, 1863.

Had a call from J. P. Hale respecting appointments. This man, so long a Senator, has no comprehensive or statesmanlike views. Would set aside legislative action and law because he thinks it operates hard on a lieutenant whom he knows.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, March 26, 1864

I went early this A.M. to the President on the subject of procuring a transfer of seamen from the Army to the Navy. After reading the papers he said he would take the matter in hand, and before I left the room he rang for his man Edward and told him to go for the Secretary of War, but, stopping him before he got to the door, directed him to call the Secretary of State first. In this whole matter of procuring seamen for the Navy there has been a sorry display of the prejudices of some of the military authorities. Halleck appears to dislike the Navy more than he loves his country.

Olcott, the detective, is here. Has been called to W. by the War Department. He, like those of his employment, is full of mystery, discussed fraud, overwhelming villainy, etc.; but much of it is mere suspicion, or matter susceptible of explanation. Not but that there is great rascality, — sufficient without exaggerating or aggravating it. I did not care to see him and cautioned Fox not to let his judgment be biased by O. The whole of these harsh proceedings are repugnant to my feelings.

Had a conversation with Admiral Dahlgren concerning operations at Charleston, ironclads, army matters, etc. Gillmore has high qualities as an engineer, but very little as a general in command. Lacks administrative ability, powers of organization, and has not that talent which relies on itself and keeps its own counsel. From what D. says, I think Gillmore must have acquiesced at least in the newspaper assaults on D. and the Navy, which if so, is greatly to his discredit. Dahlgren would never have assented to or permitted such assaults on Gillmore.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 546-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, October 24, 1863

General Terry and Colonel Hawley from Morris Island, before Charleston, called on me. Both are prejudiced against Dahlgren, and the two are acting in concert. They come from Gillmore and have a mission to perform, which they at once proceeded to execute by denouncing Dahlgren as incompetent, imbecile, and insane. They represent him to be totally unfit for his position, and have many severe censures, some of which I think are unmerited and undeserved. They submit the correspondence between Gillmore and Dahlgren. I am satisfied they are, at least in some respects, in error, and Dahlgren has been feeble from illness. He is proud and very sensitive and the strictures of the press he would feel keenly. Those of his subordinates who belonged to the Du Pont clique do not love him, nor do some of his professional brethren become reconciled to his advancement. His honors, as I anticipated they would, beget disaffection and have brought him many unpleasant responsibilities. His cold, selfish, and ambitious nature has been wounded, but he is neither a fool nor insane as those military gentlemen represent and believe. Both Dahlgren and Gillmore are out of place; they are both intelligent, but they can better acquit themselves as ordnance officers than in active command.

After maturely considering the subject of the proposed purchase of a naval vessel by the Venezuelan Government or the unaccredited Minister, I wrote Mr. Seward my doubts, informed him that the whole responsibility must rest with him, and inclosed a letter to Stribling, stating it was written at the special request of the Secretary of State, which letter he may or may not use.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 474-5

Edwin M. Stanton to Mayor George Opdyke, July 14, 1863 – 6:55 p.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT,         

Washington, July 14, 1863 — 6.55 p.m.

Hon. GEORGE OPDYKE,

Mayor of New York:

SIR: Five regiments are under orders to return to New York. The retreat of Lee having now become a rout, with his army broken and much heavier loss of killed and wounded than was supposed, will relieve a larger force for the restoration of order in New York.

Intelligence has just reached here of the auspicious commencement of General Gillmore's operations against Charleston. All but one fort on Morris Island have been captured, and that will be speedily reduced, after which Sumter must follow.

EDWIN M. STANTON,       

Secretary of War.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 2 (Serial No. 44), p. 916

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, October 1, 1863

Complaints of slow progress at Charleston reach us. Censure is thrown upon Dahlgren which is not altogether just. His undue promotion requires extraordinary ability and effort to lift him above the rivalries and jealousies of his contemporaries in the profession. He has prudence, caution, intelligence, but not the dash and fearless daring to distinguish himself which would reconcile them to the favoritism he has experienced. Then, worse than this, the Navy, and he as commander in a conjoint movement, encounter the army jealousy. All failures, or any want of success, is imputed to the Navy, though entirely blameless, and though the fault, if any, is with the military. Without the Navy, Morris Island could not be retained by the army, and all proceedings would terminate, yet the Navy gets no credit. Its services are not properly appreciated, and General Gillmore, though a good engineer, is, I apprehend, not adapted to full command, — cannot manage men, and has the infirmities which belong to engineers and those who are trained to secondary and scientific positions. They can criticize, and blame others without the faculty of accomplishing great results themselves.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 449

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, September 17, 1863

Unpleasant rumors of a disagreement between Dahlgren and Gillmore and that the latter had requested to be relieved of his present command. This, I think, must be a mischievous rumor, — perhaps a speculative one.

A new panic is rising respecting the ironclads in England, and some of our sensation journals fan the excitement. It does not surprise me that the New York Times, Raymond's paper, controlled by Thurlow Weed, and all papers influenced by Seward should be alarmed. The latter knows those vessels are to be detained, yet will not come out and state the fact, but is not unwilling to have apprehension excited. It will glorify him if it is said they are detained through protest from our minister. If he does not prompt the Times, he could check its loud apprehensions. I am under restrictions which prevent me from making known facts that would dissipate this alarm. The Evening Post, I am sorry to see, falls in with the Times and its managers, and unwittingly assists those whom it does not admire. Both these journals are importunate, and insist that the Roanoke shall be returned to New York. But the Navy Department is not under newspaper control, though they have the cooperation of distinguished men. To station a steam frigate in New York would involve the necessity of stationing one also in the Delaware, and another at Boston. There would be no limit to the demand for naval defenses, yet it is claimed the coast defenses belong exclusively to the military.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 434-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, July 28, 1863

The Secretary of War promises that he will reinforce General Gillmore with 5000 men. I thought it should be 10,000 if we intended thorough work, but am glad of even this assurance. General Halleck excuses his non-action by saying Gillmore had not applied for more men. Vigilance is not one of Halleck's qualifications.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 385

Diary of Gideon Welles: Sunday, July 26, 1863

Dispatches from Admiral Dahlgren under date of the 21st were received in the second mail. He says Gillmore had but 8000 men when he commenced operations, that of these he has lost by casualties — killed, wounded, and prisoners — about 1200, and a like number are useless by illness, the result of overexertion, etc., so that he has actually less than 6000 effective men. The War Department does not propose to strengthen him. Dahlgren three or four times has said the force was inadequate, and expressed a hope for reinforcements. I sent Assistant Fox with these dispatches to Halleck, who rebuffed him, — said General Gillmore had called for no more troops, and if we would take care of the Navy, he would take care of the Army.

I went this noon (Sunday) to the President with Dahlgren's dispatches; told him the force under Gillmore was insufficient for the work assigned him; that it ought not now to fail; that it ought not to have been begun unless it was understood his force was to have been increased; that such was his expectation, and I wished to know if it could not be done. It would be unwise to wait until Gillmore was crushed and repelled, and to then try and regain lost ground, which seemed to be the policy of General Halleck; instead of remaining inactive till Gillmore, exhausted, cried for help, his wants should be anticipated.

The President agreed with me fully, but said he knew not where the troops could come from, unless from the Army of the Potomac, but if they were going to fight they would want all their men. I asked if he really believed Meade was going to have a battle. He looked at me earnestly for a moment and said: “Well, to be candid, I have no faith that Meade will attack Lee; nothing looks like it to me. I believe he can never have another as good opportunity as that which he trifled away. Everything since has dragged with him. No, I don't believe he is going to fight.”

“Why, then,” I asked, “not send a few regiments to Charleston? Gillmore ought to be reinforced with ten thousand men. We intend to send additional seamen and marines.” “Well,” said the President, “I will see Halleck. I think we should strain a point. May I say to him that you are going to strengthen Dahlgren?” “Yes,” I replied. “But it would be better that you should say you ordered it, and that you also ordered the necessary army increase. Let us all do our best.”

Our interview was in the library, and was earnest and cordial. If, following the dictates of his own good judgment, instead of deferring to Halleck, who lacks power, sagacity, ability, comprehension, and foresight to devise, propose, plan, and direct great operations, and who is reported to be engaged on some literary work at this important period, the President were to order and direct measures, the army would be inspired and the country benefited. A delicacy on the part of Gillmore to ask for aid is made the excuse of the inert General-in-Chief for not sending the troops which are wanted, and when he learns from a reliable source of the weak condition of the command, he will not strengthen it, or move, till calamity overtakes it, or he is himself ordered to do his duty. Halleck originates nothing, anticipates nothing, to assist others; takes no responsibility, plans nothing, suggests nothing, is good for nothing. His being at Headquarters is a national misfortune.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 382-4

Diary of Gideon Welles: Thursday, July 23, 1863

I had a call on Monday morning from Senator Morgan and Sam J. Tilden of New York in relation to the draft. General Cochrane was present during the interview and took part in it. The gentlemen seemed to believe a draft cannot be enforced in New York.

Am feeling anxious respecting movements in Charleston Harbor. It is assumed on all hands by the people and the press that we shall be successful. I am less sanguine, though not without hopes. Fort Wagner should have been captured in the first assault. The Rebels were weaker then than they will be again, and we should have been as strong at the first attack as we can expect to be. Gillmore may have been a little premature, and had not the necessary force for the work.

Whiting, Solicitor of the War Department, has gone to Europe. Is sent out by Seward, I suppose, for there is much sounding of gongs over the mission instituted by the State Department to help Mr. Adams and our consuls in the matter of fitting, or of preventing the fitting out of naval vessels from England. This Solicitor Whiting has for several months been an important personage here. I have been assured from high authority he is a remarkable man. The Secretary of War uses him, and I am inclined to believe he uses the Secretary of War. This fraternity has made the little man much conceited. Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase, and even the President have each of them spoken to me of him, as capable, patriotic, and a volunteer in the civil service to help the Government and particularly the War Department.

I have found him affable, anxious to be useful, with some smartness; vain, egotistical, and friendly; voluble, ready, sharp, not always profound, nor wise, nor correct; cunning, assuming, presuming, and not very fastidious; such a man as Stanton would select and Seward use. Chase, finding him high in the good graces of the President and the Secretary of War, has taken frequent occasion to speak highly of Solicitor Whiting. My admiration is not as exalted as it should be, if he is all that those who ought to know represent him.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 380-1

Diary of John Hay: May 22, 1864

. . . . Butler is turning out much as I thought he would — perfectly useless and incapable for campaigning. He quarrels with Gillmore and Smith, and makes rather a nuisance of himself.

I said to the President to-day that I thought Butler was the only man in the army in whom power would be dangerous. McClellan was too timid and vacillating to usurp; Grant was too sound and coolheaded and too unselfish; Banks also; Fremont would be dangerous if he had more ability and energy.

“Yes,” says the Ancient; “He is like Jim Jett’s brother. Jim used to say that his brother was the damnedest scoundrel that ever lived, but in the infinite mercy of Providence he was also the damnedest fool.”

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 195-6 which dates this entry as May 21; see Michael Burlingame & John R. Turner Ettlinger, Editors, Inside Lincoln’s White House: The Complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, p. 197-8 for the full diary entry and dates it as May 22.

Diary of John Hay: April 25, 1864

This morning Burnside came in with Foster, a fine handsome fellow who looks like a soldier at least. . . .  If I can get away during this campaign I think I will go either with Burnside or Gillmore.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 183; Michael Burlingame and John R. Turner Ettlinger, Editors, Inside Lincoln’s White House,: the complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, p. 189.

Diary of John Hay: March 24, 1864

I arrived at Washington this morning, finding Nicolay in bed at 7 o'clock in the morning. We talked over matters for a little while and I got some ideas of the situation from him.

After breakfast I talked with the President. There was no special necessity of presenting my papers, as I found he thoroughly understood the state of affairs in Florida, and did not seem in the least annoyed by the newspaper falsehoods about the matter. Gen. Halleck, I learn, has continually given out that the expedition was the President's and not his (Halleck’s),—so Fox tells me. The President said he has not seen Gillmore’s letters to Halleck, but said he had learned from Stanton that they had nothing to bear out Halleck’s assertion. I suppose Halleck is badly bilious about Grant. Grant, the President says, is Commander-in-Chief, and Halleck is now nothing but a staff officer. In fact, says the President, “when McClellan seemed incompetent to the work of handling an army and we sent for Halleck to take command, he stipulated that it should be with the full power and responsibility of Commander-in-Chief. He ran it on that basis till Pope’s defeat; but ever since that event he has shrunk from responsibility whenever it was possible."

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 179-80. See Michael Burlingame & John R. Turner Ettlinger, Editors, Inside Lincoln's White House: The Complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, p. 183 for the full diary entry.

Diary of John Hay: March 19, 1864

The General tells me he intends to ask of the War Department permission to take the 10th Army Corps away from here and lead it in the field himself. Halleck has asked him how many troops he can spare, reserving enough for purely defensive operations. He says he can spare eight or nine thousand. Now, the effective force of the 10th Corps is eleven thousand men, and the troops composing it are such as have been longest in the Department, and the medical director advises that they be moved first. Gen. Gillmore will make this application by to-day's steamer.

We got on board at about four o'clock and soon after weighed anchor. We lay in the stream until

Gen Gillmore boarded us in a tug, and gave me despatches for Halleck and Cullum of the tenor aforesaid.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 178-9. See Michael Burlingame & John R. Turner Ettlinger, Editors, Inside Lincoln's White House: The Complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, p. 181 for the full diary entry.

Diary of John Hay: February 29, 1864

This morning, as we neared Fernandina, I persuaded the General to go on to Jacksonville and send boat back here for us. We landed. . . .

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 170; Michael Burlingame, Editor, Inside Lincoln's White House: The Complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, p. 172.

Diary of John Hay: Sunday, February 28, 1864

The Arago came in this morning. The papers of the 23d and 24th attack my coming here as a political trick. Q. A. G. is much troubled at it. I had some talk with Turner. He thinks I had better stay. . . . We got on the Dictator at midnight. . . .

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 169-70; Tyler Dennett, Editor, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and letters of John Hay, p. 165; Michael Burlingame, Editor, Inside Lincoln's White House: The Complete Civil War Diary of John Hay, p. 171-2.

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, May 29, 1863

We have accounts of farther and extensive depredations by the Alabama. These depredations were near the Line, where the Department, in anticipation of her appearance, had ordered the Vanderbilt. She was specially ordered to Fernando de Noronha, whither the Alabama was expected to go, — where she did go, and where she would have been captured, had instructions been obeyed, and not interfered with. But Admiral Wilkes, having fallen in with that vessel and finding her a commodious ship with extensive and comfortable accommodations, deliberately annexed her to his squadron and detained her in the West Indies as his flagship, hunting prizes, too long for the service on which she was specially sent. I, of course, shall be abused for the escape of the Alabama and her destruction of property by those who know nothing of the misconduct of Wilkes. The propriety of recalling that officer is more apparent than ever. He has accomplished nothing, but has sadly interrupted and defeated the plans of the Department. The country, ignorant of these facts and faults, will disapprove his removal, and assail the Department for the mischief of the Alabama, whereas, had he been earlier removed, the latter would not have happened.

I this morning sent for Admiral Foote and had a free and full talk with him in regard to the command of the South Atlantic Squadron. I am satisfied he would be pleased with the position, and really desired it when he knew Du Pont was to be relieved. I then introduced him to General Gillmore, and with the charts and maps before us took a rapid survey of the harbor and plan of operations. Before doing this, I said to Foote that I thought it would be well for the country, the service, and himself, were Admiral Dahlgren associated with him. He expressed the pleasure it would give him, but doubted if D. would consent to serve as second.

I requested Mr. Fox to call on D. and inform him that I had given Foote the squadron, that I should be glad to have him embark with Foote, and take an active part against Charleston. If he responded favorably, I wished him to come with Fox to the conference. Fox returned with an answer that not only was D. unwilling to go as second, but that he wished to decline entirely, unless he could have command of both naval and land forces. This precludes farther thought of him. I regret it for his own sake. It is one of the errors of a lifetime. He has not seen the sea service he ought for his rank, and there is a feeling towards him, on account of his advancement, among naval men which he had now an opportunity to remove. No one questions his abilities as a skillful and scientific ordnance officer, but some of his best friends in his profession doubt his capability as a naval officer on such duty as is here proposed. It is doubtful if he ever will have another so good an opportunity.

Foote says he will himself see D., and has a conviction that he can induce him to go with him. I doubt it. Dahlgren is very proud and aspiring, and will injure himself and his professional standing in consequence. With undoubted talents of a certain kind he has intense selfishness, and I am sorry to see him on this occasion, as I have seen him on others, regardless of the feelings and rights of officers of greater experience, who have seen vastly more sea service and who possess high naval qualities and undoubted merit. In a matter of duty, such as this, he shows what is charged upon him, — that he is less devoted to the country than to himself, that he never acts on any principle of self-sacrifice. While friendly to him, as I have shown on repeated occasions, I am friendly to others also, and must respect their feelings and protect their rights.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 316-8

Diary of John Hay: February 22, 1864

. . . There was a ball to-night at Beaufort, gotten up by young officers there in honor of the 22d. Gen'l Gillmore went up for a few moments to lend his influence to counteract the gloom which was overspreading the camp. We got there early and loafed about till the dancing began. The room was exquisitely decorated; several very clever pictures, eagles, etc., were done on the walls with magnolia leaves; flags of all nations, from the Navy, etc.

I left with Gen'l Gillmore and went on board the Hospital Ship, filled with wounded; went through hold and up-stairs where the artillery boys were. Saw many desperately wounded; Col. R—— mortally, clutching at his bed-clothes and passing garments; picked up, bed and all, and carried away, picking out his clothes from a pile by shoulder-straps — “Major?” “No! Lieutenant-Colonel.” H——, M——, D—— and E——, all very chipper and jolly; M—— shot in toes and hat (like a parenthesis) and sabre; H—— between seat and saddle, and in fore-arm. M proposed to H—— "to go to party; I'll do dancing, and you hugging.”

Suddenly Gen'l S——, who had been much moved by R——’s appearance, started off up to the ball. He arrived during a moment's pause in the Lanciers. He stamped his foot: “Let the music stop!” and it did. “The ball cannot go on. Lights to be out in half an hour.” A friend of the General asked: — “Can we eat supper?” “Anyone who has the heart to eat at such a time.” All had a heart of that peculiar construction, for all ate. He came back glowing with the triumph of a generous action performed, and asked us up to his room, where we drank champagne and whiskey, and ate cake. Coming out found the grumbling feasters and went to Hilton Head after two o'clock.

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 168-9.