Charles Francis Adams Jr. to Abigail Brown Brooks Adams, August 27, 1864

H.Q. Cav'y Escort, A. of P.                

Before Petersburg, August 27, 1864

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I got back from Washington last evening, but have nothing later from London than the letters which I acknowledged a week ago today. In my mission to Washington I was quite successful in spite of the authorities of that place, for, most fortunately for me I went there strongly armed. Before going up I went to General Meade and stated to him my errand and scheme, and the General not only approved it himself but gave me a letter of introduction to General Grant, with which I next day went down and presented myself to the Lieutenant General. I found him sitting in front of his tent under a large fly talking with a couple of his staff. I stated my business and presented my letter. He told me to be seated, read my letter, thought an instant puffing at his eternal cigar and stroking his beard as he listened to what I had to say and then replied in a short decided way: "I will approve your plan and request the Secretary to issue you the horses and have an order made out for you to go to Washington to attend to it yourself.” This was three times what I had expected to get from him, as I had no idea he would send me to Washington or request the issue of the horses, and accordingly I at once became a violent Grant man. He immediately went into his tent and wrote the order on the back of Meade's letter and then came out and talked about matters in general, the weather, Colonel Buchanan and the campaign, past, present and future, while my order to go to Washington was being made out. I had never talked with Grant before and was glad of this small chance. He certainly has all the simplicity of a very great man, of one whose head has in no way been turned by a rapid rise. A very approachable man, with easy, unaffected manners, neither stern nor vulgar, he talked to me much as he would had he been another Captain of Cavalry whom I was visiting on business. Just at that time Hancock was operating up the James, towards Richmond, and he gave me the last reports of what was doing there, and then discussed the campaign and the failure of Burnside's mine, unequivocally attributing the last to the bad behavior of the men who constituted the storming party. He said that he ought to have routed Lee at Spottsylvania and would have done so but for his own misapprehension as to the enemy's weak place, and when he found it out his reserve Corps (the 5th and 6th) were too deeply engaged to be available. So he went on discussing the enemy and their tenacity, talking in his calm, open, cheerful but dignified way, until my order came, when I got up and went off very well pleased with my interview. I have long known that Grant was a man of wonderful courage and composure – self-poise - but he must also be a man of remarkably kindly disposition and cheerful temper. He can't, however, I imagine, be on very good terms with the authorities at Washington, for he spoke with the greatest contempt of the whole manner in which the Maryland invasion had been managed there.

The next morning I started for Washington and got there Thursday, finding John, as I told you. Then, and for the next week, I went through all the disgusting routine of one who waits upon those in power, dangling my heels in ante-rooms, on the walls of which I patiently studied maps and photographs, and those in high places shoved me from one to another as is their wont in such cases. All my success and good treatment was over. My business in Washington was to try and get the government, as they would not mount the 5th Cavalry on new horses, to give them enough old horses unfit for present service, owing to severe work in the present campaign, and to let them build them up while doing their present work at Point Lookout. The officials by no means approved of me or my scheme, or, I thought, of General Grant. To Major Williams I went first, he suggested Colonel Hardie; Colonel Hardie suggested Dana, Assistant Secretary of War; Dana suggested Colonel This or General That, but distinctly disapproved of my scheme. So, somewhat discouraged, I drifted back to Colonel Hardie and froze to his office until I could get admission to Mr. Stanton's presence — the holy of holies. Seeing me resolved and getting weary of seeing me always there, Hardie suggested to me that General Halleck was my man, he being the chief of cavalry; and, in an evil moment, I allowed myself to be beguiled into stating my business to General Halleck. Here I caught fits. Halleck is certainly “a crusty cuss” and one, I should say, after Stanton's own heart. In about one minute he signified an emphatic disapproval of me and of my plan, and of General Grant and of everything else, and concluded an emphatic statement that he would n't give me a horse, if he had his own way, or without a positive order, by slamming his door in my face. I returned to Colonel Hardie somewhat depressed in spirit, but resolved now to grapple with old Stanton and have it over. As for my prospects, they had suddenly fallen in my own eyes and I would have sold out very cheap; and yet I was by no means disgusted with old Halleck individually. It isn't pleasant to be roughed out of a man's office and it's decidedly unpleasant to have one's pet scheme trampled under foot before one's eyes, and then kicked out of doors; but I do like to see a man who can say “no” and say it with an emphasis, and for old Halleck's capacity in this respect I can vouch. I have seen so much rascality round our departments and such bloody rascals innocently prosecuting their little pet schemes and grinding their harmless little axes, that I long ago came to the conclusion that the suaviter in modo would by no means always do in public officers, and that it was generally necessary with the men such have to deal with to knock them down so that they can't get up. Accordingly I derived a grim satisfaction from the reflection that if such was my reception by General Halleck, what must be the fate of the harpies and vultures who flock round the War Department. Anyhow I went back and resumed my dreary watch and ward in Hardie's office.

Now Hardie is Stanton's Chief of Staff and a nervous, gentlemanly man withal, and soon my silent, reproachful presence, even though but one of a silent, reproachful throng which crowded his office and from which one individual disappeared only that two more might struggle to enter, my presence began to haunt him, so he dashed at me, possessed himself of my papers and flung himself into the Secretary's rooms. I grimly waited, hopeless and well-nigh indifferent. Presently Stanton himself scuffed into the office and after him came Hardie. Now for it, said I to myself; but the American Carnot took no notice of me, but scuffed off through the room and Hardie gave me my paper with an endorsement from the Secretary upon it. Well, I had succeeded. Grant's endorsement was too strong to be overlooked and I had gotten my horses, so, after being duly bandied through a score more officials, and this time being lucky enough to hit on a polite streak of these cattle, I finished my business in Washington and, Thursday noon, took boat for City Point.

This, of course, settled my fate as to what regiment I was to belong to, and I came back only to leave my old regiment and company. ... I can't say that I leave my old regiment with any feeling of regret. In it, as a whole, there are few who know or care for me and my whole life in the regiment was embittered and poisoned. ... As for my squadron, however, my feelings are very different. Here all my association has been pleasant. We have never had any family quarrels or bickerings and with them, at least, my career has been a success. Still it's high time I went. Here I have done my work as well as I know how to do it, and I am getting nervous and restless and discontented. For a time the 5th will serve me as a new object of interest and in working over that I shall hope for a time to keep myself contented and quiet in the service and when that plays out, I must look for something new; but I am very tired of the war.

The brilliant military criticisms in my recent letters have come ludicrously to nought. Here we are, in spite of my announcement that military operations had evidently come to a close in these parts until autumn, pounding again fiercely away at each other. Grant certainly deceives friends as well as foes in regard to his movements. So far we seem this time to have the inside track, and Lee has spilt a good deal of blood, which he could ill spare, in trying to get it away from us. It is a great point gained for us when he is forced to take the offensive, and if this kind of thing goes on, this steady fighting all summer long, Lee won't have much left to winter in Richmond....

SOURCE: Charles Francis Adams, A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865, Volume 2, 184-9

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, July 31, 1863

I met at the President's, and was introduced by him to, Colonel Rawlins of General Grant's staff. He arrived yesterday with the official report of the taking of Vicksburg and capture of Pemberton's army. Was much pleased with him, his frank, intelligent, and interesting description of men and account of army operations. His interview with the President and Cabinet was of nearly two hours' duration, and all, I think, were entertained by him. His honest, unpretending, and unassuming manners pleased me; the absence of pretension, and I may say the unpolished and unrefined deportment, of this earnest and sincere man, patriot, and soldier pleased me more than that of almost any officer whom I have met. He was never at West Point and has had few educational advantages, yet he is a soldier, and has a mind which has served his general and his country well. He is a sincere and earnest friend of Grant, who has evidently sent him here for a purpose.

It was the intention of the President last fall that General McClernand, an old neighbor and friend of his, should have been associated with Admiral Porter in active operations before Vicksburg. It was the expressed and earnest wish of Porter to have a citizen general, and he made it a special point to be relieved from associations with a West-Pointer; all West-Pointers, he said, were egotistical and assuming and never willing to consider and treat naval officers as equals. The President thought the opportunity a good one to bring forward his friend McClernand, in whom he has confidence and who is a volunteer officer of ability, and possesses, moreover, a good deal of political influence in Illinois. Stanton and Halleck entered into his views, for Grant was not a special favorite with either. He had also, like Hooker, the reputation of indulging too freely in whiskey to be always safe and reliable.

Rawlins now comes from Vicksburg with statements in regard to McClernand which show him an impracticable and unfit man, — that he has not been subordinate and intelligent, but has been an embarrassment, and, instead of directing or assisting in, has been really an obstruction to, army movements and operations. In Rawlins's statements there is undoubtedly prejudice, but with such appearance of candor, and earnest and intelligent conviction, that there can be hardly a doubt McClernand is in fault, and Rawlins has been sent here by Grant in order to enlist the President rather than bring dispatches. In this, I think, he has succeeded, though the President feels kindly towards McClernand. Grant evidently hates him, and Rawlins is imbued with the feelings of his chief.

Seward wished me to meet him and the President at the War Department to consider the subject of the immediate occupation of some portion of Texas. My letters of the 9th and 23d ult. and conversation since have awakened attention to the necessity of some decisive action. [These letters follow.]

• Gideon Welles to William H. Seward, June 9, 1863
• Gideon Welles to William H. Seward, June 23, 1863

The European combination, or concerted understanding, against us begins to be developed and appreciated. The use of the Rio Grande to evade the blockade, and the establishment of regular lines of steamers to Matamoras did not disturb some of our people, but certain movements and recent givings-out of the French have alarmed Seward, who says Louis Napoleon is making an effort to get Texas; he therefore urges the immediate occupation of Galveston and also some other point. At the Cabinet meeting to-day, he took Stanton aside and had ten minutes' private conversation with him in a low tone. I was then invited to the conversation and received the above information. I agreed to call as requested at the appointed time, but why this partial, ex-parte, half-and-half way of doing these things? Why are not these matters unfolded to the whole Cabinet? Why a special meeting of only three with General Halleck? It is as important that the Secretary of the Treasury, who is granting clearances from New York to Matamoras and thereby sanctions the illicit trade of the English and French, should be advised if any of us. The question which Mr. Seward raises is political, national, and so important to the whole country that the Administration should be fully advised, but for some reason is restricted. The Secretary of State likes to be exclusive; does not want all the Cabinet in consultation, but is particular himself to attend all meetings. It exhibits early bad training and party management, not good administration.

Soon after two I went to the War Department. Seward, Stanton, and Halleck were there, and the Texas subject was being discussed. Halleck, as usual, was heavy, sluggish, not prepared to express an opinion. Did not know whether General Banks would think it best to move on Mobile or Galveston, and if on Galveston whether he would prefer transportation by water or would take an interior route. Had just written Banks. Wanted his reply. I turned to Seward, and, alluding to his morning conversation, I inquired what a demonstration on Mobile had to do with foreign designs in another section. How far Halleck had been let into a knowledge of measures which were withheld from a majority of the Cabinet I was uninformed, though I doubt not Halleck was more fully posted than myself. Halleck, apprehending the purport of my inquiry, said he mentioned Mobile because there had been some information from Banks concerning operations in that direction before the new question came up. I then asked, if a demonstration was to be made on Texas to protect and guard our western frontier, whether Indianola was not a better point than Galveston. Halleck said he did not know, — had not thought of that. “Where,” said he, “is Indianola? What are its advantages?” I replied, in western Texas, where the people had been more loyal than in eastern Texas. It was much nearer the Rio Grande and the Mexican border, consequently was better situated to check advances from the other side of the Rio Grande; the harbor had deeper water than Galveston; the place was but slightly fortified, was nearer Austin, etc., etc. Halleck was totally ignorant on these matters; knew nothing of Indianola,¹ was hardly aware there was such a place; settled down very stolidly; would decide nothing for the present, but must wait to hear from General Banks. The Secretary of State was profoundly deferential to the General-in-Chief, hoped he would hear something from General Banks soon, requested to be immediately informed when word was received; and we withdrew as General Halleck lighted another cigar.

This is a specimen of the management of affairs. A majority of the members of the Cabinet are not permitted to know what is doing. Mr. Seward has something in regard to the schemes and designs of Louis Napoleon; he cannot avoid communicating with the Secretaries of War and the Navy, hence the door is partially open to them. Others are excluded. Great man Halleck is consulted, but is not ready, — has received nothing from others, who he intends shall have the responsibility. Therefore we must wait a few weeks and not improbably lose a favorable opportunity.

The truth is that Halleck, who has been smuggled into position here by Stanton, aided by Pope and General Scott, is unfit for the place. He has some scholastic attainments but is no general. I can pass that judgment upon him, though I do not profess to be a military man. He has failed to acquit himself to advantage as yet, and the country needs other talents to be successful.

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¹ Indianola, Texas, is no longer to be found on the map. It was situated on the western shore of Matagorda Bay on the site now occupied by Port Lavaca, about 125 miles west-southwest of Galveston, but was destroyed by cyclones in 1885 and 1886.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 386-92

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, July 28, 1863

The Secretary of War promises that he will reinforce General Gillmore with 5000 men. I thought it should be 10,000 if we intended thorough work, but am glad of even this assurance. General Halleck excuses his non-action by saying Gillmore had not applied for more men. Vigilance is not one of Halleck's qualifications.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 385

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, July 7, 1863

The President said this morning, with a countenance indicating sadness and despondency, that Meade still lingered at Gettysburg, when he should have been at Hagerstown or near the Potomac, to cut off the retreating army of Lee. While unwilling to complain and willing and anxious to give all praise to the general and army for the great battle and victory, he feared the old idea of driving the Rebels out of Pennsylvania and Maryland, instead of capturing them, was still prevalent among the officers. He hoped this was not so, said he had spoken to Halleck and urged that the right tone and spirit should be infused into officers and men, and that General Meade especially should be reminded of his (the President's) wishes and expectations. But General Halleck gave him a short and curt reply, showing that he did not participate and sympathize in this feeling, and, said the President, “I drop the subject.”

This is the President's error. His own convictions and conclusions are infinitely superior to Halleck's, — even in military operations more sensible and more correct always, — but yet he says, “It being strictly a military question, it is proper I should defer to Halleck, whom I have called here to counsel, advise, and direct in these matters, where he is an expert.” I question whether he should be considered an expert. I look upon Halleck as a pretty good scholarly critic of other men's deeds and acts, but as incapable of originating or directing military operations.

When I returned from the Cabinet council I found a delegation from Maine at the Department, consisting of Vice-President Hamlin, the two Senators from that State, and Senator Wilson of Massachusetts. These gentlemen had first waited on the President in regard to the coast defenses and protection of the fishermen, and were referred by him to me instead of the army, which claims to defend the harbors. At the moment of receiving this delegation I was handed a dispatch from Admiral Porter, communicating the fall of Vicksburg on the fourth of July. Excusing myself to the delegation, I immediately returned to the Executive Mansion. The President was detailing certain points relative to Grant's movements on the map to Chase and two or three others, when I gave him the tidings. Putting down the map, he rose at once, said we would drop these topics, and “I myself will telegraph this news to General Meade.” He seized his hat, but suddenly stopped, his countenance beaming with joy; he caught my hand, and, throwing his arm around me, exclaimed: “What can we do for the Secretary of the Navy for this glorious intelligence? He is always giving us good news. I cannot, in words, tell you my joy over this result. It is great, Mr. Welles, it is great!”

We walked across the lawn together. “This,” said he, “will relieve Banks. It will inspire me.” The opportunity I thought a good one to request him to insist upon his own views, to enforce them, not only on Meade but on Halleck.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 363-5

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, June 2, 1863

Chase, Blair, Bates, and myself were at the Cabinet-meeting. Seward was absent, but his son was present. So also was Judge Otto, Assistant Secretary of the Interior. Stanton, though absent, sent no representative. He condemns the practice of allowing assistants to be present in Cabinet council, a practice which was introduced by Seward, and says he will never submit or discuss any important question, when an assistant is present. I think this is the general feeling and the practice of all.

There was some discussion of affairs at Vicksburg. The importance of capturing that stronghold and opening the navigation of the river is appreciated by all, and confidence is expressed in Grant, but it seems that not enough was doing. The President said Halleck declares he can furnish no additional troops. As yet I have seen nothing to admire in the military management of General Halleck, whose mind is heavy and, if employed at all, is apparently engaged on something else than the public matter in hand. At this time when the resources of the nation should be called out and activity pervade all military operations, he sits back in his chair, doing comparatively nothing. It worries the President, yet he relies upon Halleck and apparently no one else in the War Department. No one more fully realizes the magnitude of the occasion, and the vast consequences involved, than the President; he wishes all to be done that can be done, but yet in army operations will not move or do except by the consent of the dull, stolid, inefficient, and incompetent General-in-Chief.

Stanton does not attend one half of the Cabinet-meetings. When he comes, he communicates little of importance. Not unfrequently he has a private conference with the President in the corner of the room, or with Seward in the library. Chase, Blair, and Bates have each expressed their mortification and chagrin that things were so conducted. To-day, as we came away, Blair joined me, and said he knew not what we were coming to; that he had tried to have things different.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 319-20