CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
April 9, 1864.
Maj. Gen. G. G. MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:
For information, and as instructions to govern your
preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated
confidentially, for your own perusal alone:
So far as practicable, all the armies are to move together
and toward one common center. Banks has been instructed to turn over the
guarding of the Red River to General Steele and to the navy, to abandon Texas
with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can—not
less than 25,000 men—to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to
any other movements. From the scattered condition of his command, however, he
cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if
so soon.
Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three
days in advance, Joe Johnston's army being his objective point and the heart of
Georgia his ultimate aim. If successful, he will secure the line from
Chattanooga to Mobile, with the aid of Banks.
Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to re-enforce either
of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. This
he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. Two columns
of his command will move south at the same time with the general move, one from
Beverly, from 10,000 to 12,000 strong, under Major-General Ord; the other from
Charleston, W. Va., principally cavalry, under Brigadier-General Crook. The
former of these will endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad
about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to
Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley or join you.
The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward to join Ord. The
cavalry from Ord's command will try to force a passage southward; if they are
successful in reaching the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main
lines of the road connecting Richmond with all the South and Southwest.
Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South
Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the
field directly to his front. The force will be commanded by Maj. Gen. W. F.
Smith. With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point and operate
against Richmond from the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous
with yours.
Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes,
there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is whether
it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents
great advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing
above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on a
raid: but if we take this route all we do must be done while the rations we
start with hold out; we separate from Butler, so that he cannot be directed how
to co-operate. By the other route, Brandy Station can be used as a base of
supplies until another is secured on the York or James River. These advantages
and objections I will talk over with you more fully than I can write them.
Burnside, with a force of probably 25,000 men, will
re-enforce you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the
20th instant, I will give him the defense of the road from Bull Run as far
south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to collect all your strength
about Brandy Station and to the front.
There will be naval co-operations on the James River, and
transports and ferries will be provided, so that should Lee fall back into his
intrenchments at Richmond Butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least
can be made to act as such.
What I would direct, then, is that you commence at once
reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a regiment
of 500 men is the greatest number that should be allowed for all baggage,
exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and
one to division headquarters is sufficient, and about two to corps
headquarters.
Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to
make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White
House, on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contingency should be made at
once. If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on
the James River or elsewhere.
If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be
made for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of 500 rounds of infantry
ammunition would do. By the other, half the amount would be sufficient.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
33 (Serial No. 60), p. 827-9
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