Showing posts with label Popular Sovereignty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Popular Sovereignty. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 29, 2022

Speech of Senator Andrew Butler, March 2, 1854

I wish to say one or two words at this point of the debate, and to bring the attention of the Senate distinctly to the issue made by the senator from Wisconsin, (Mr. WALKER.) I understand, in any point of view in which this subject can be regarded, that if you obliterate or abolish what is called the Missouri Compromise line, you at least place upon an equality Nebraska, Utah, and New Mexico.

Now, northern gentlemen—I do not speak of the senator from Wisconsin particularly, but many gentlemen of the North—were reconciled to vote for the territorial governments given to Utah and New Mexico upon the ground that the Spanish law excluded slavery there. Suppose we ask to have the Missouri line obliterated, and give to the territorial government of Nebraska the right to determine this subject for themselves, and by that obliteration the old French law should be restored; would that not be fair? Gentlemen were willing to restore the old law when it excluded slavery and were willing to trust the territorial legislation under that law. But they are not willing to prohibit this Missouri restriction and confer upon the territorial legislature of Nebraska the power to regulate slavery when the old law, which it's said will be here revived, admits slavery. Congress, as the representative of sovereignty, has all the constitutional power over the subject; and, in parting with it to a territorial legislature, it appoints an administrator to discharge legislative functions, controllable by the constitution.

This, sir, is a fair and practical view of the subject. In Utah and New Mexico, the Mexican law, it was said, excluded slavery, and gentlemen then were willing to give exactly the same provisions to those Territories which are given in the bill under consideration. In Nebraska and Kansas, according to the view of the gentleman—I do not admit it, I do not believe one word of it—the French law is revived, and will establish slavery; and that being so, they are not willing to trust the people of these Territories at all upon the same subject. They are willing to make fish of one and flesh of another. I have not the least idea that the effect would be such as the gentleman supposes; but I am only showing the manner in which these issues are made. So long as the law is one way they are willing to go for one system; and when, in their opinion, it is another way, they are not willing to apply the same system. It is not fair to apply the same provisions in both cases.

Now, sir, I have not the least idea that, under the plenitude of the language of this bill, the territorial legislature may not act. The honorable senator from Connecticut [Mr. TOUCEY] put that in a very clear point of view. The truth is that both the Utah and New Mexico bills, and this bill, as I understand, are designed to make a blank leaf, and to give to the territorial legislature all the authority on the subject, whether there is French or Mexican law intervening. That is the fair meaning of it. Yet, though gentlemen were willing to give this power to a territorial government under Mexican law, they are not willing to give a territorial government the same power under the French law. Gentlemen cannot escape these two positions.

Sir, when I stand here as a southern man, I feel humiliated when I hear threats made that, unless we come to the terms of gentlemen, they will reopen this agitation until they expel us from every Territory of the Union, and even abolish the slave trade between the States. Sir, I am her to legislate to the best of my ability, in good faith, to preserve the institutions of the country; and yet I am threatened that if I do not do so and so the North will abolish slavery in the District of Columbia; and that they will assume a jurisdiction equal to their numerical power and strength; and that northern justice is not to be trusted. I do not believe one word of it.

But, sir, no man can stand up and read what I read in a paper this morning without indignation. It does not emanate, I know, from the gentleman who sits near me, [Mr. WALKER] for he has a heart incapable of it. But sir, I read this morning, what made my blood boil, that if this discussion went on and this bill were passed, the South should not only be prepared to give up all their power and surrender every inch of territory which they might claim for slavery, but that the scenes of San Domingo should be introduced, and their wives and daughters subjected to the lust of the black man. Sir, to such a state of things would the spirit of demonic agitation be reconciled. I read that statement in a New York paper to-day. I say to my neighbor, and senator from Wisconsin, who sits near me and for whom I have great respect, let him not make threats of that kind to me. I am willing to conduct this discussion in harmony, but when I am told that the scenes of San Domingo are to be opened to all the southern States, and our wives and daughters are to be subjected to the lust of the black man—my God! can it be that I sand in the Senate of the United States?

Mr. CASS. Will the honorable senator allow me to ask him if he does not give too much importance to these matters? Did not the very paper to which he refers abuse us all like pickpockets and rascals, over and over again? It does not speak for the North.

Mr. BUTLER.  I believe it.

Mr. CASS.  As a western man, I disavow its authority in toto.

Mr. BUTLER.  I know you do, sir. You are a statesman, and have the sentiments of a Christian, and look to events with the views of an American statesman, and I know that my neighbor from Wisconsin has no such idea. No statesman could utter such sentiments, or dare to carry them out. But when the threat is made, and I am required to legislate under duress, per minas, I do feel that it was unfortunately introduced. I say this in all kindness; for though my manner may be impetuous, I have nothing but a kind feeling towards those who differ from my honestly. I have thus far endeavored to control my language. I have used none except upon general topics, and I have used no language of personal resentment towards any one, believing it would defeat its end. I must say, however that these are not matters which are to be lightly passed over. Whatever may be the fate of this bill—and I do not much care what it may be—my deliberate judgment is, that if this discussion is conducted fairly, the North and South will be reconciled to return to the original principles on which this government was administered; and the sooner their differences are reconciled the better.

Now, what could the North gain by excluding us from these Territories? If two States should ever come into the union from them, it is very certain that not more than one of them could, in any possible event, be a slaveholding state; and I have not the least idea that even one would be. Perhaps some good people will go there, and carry with them their old negroes and a few personal servants. Now, who would go and disturb a poor old negro reposing happily under the government of a hereditary master? Who would disturb the relation existing between a good master and his personal servant, willing to live contented with those whose habits and principles and feelings he understood? None, sir, but a criminal agitator, and one who does not understand the responsibility of his position when he undertakes to agitate matters of this kind.

I shall make no unkind remarks in reference to the senator from Ohio. He has disavowed that he had any knowledge of the resolution which was so justly commented upon by my friend from North Carolina this morning. Sir, this is enough for me. I never ask of a senator on this floor anything but a disavowal. He has said so, and, I believe it; and that is enough. Allow me to say, however, although he may not have the design of putting the torch to the temple of this confederacy, and becoming the incendiary himself, yet there is a crassa negligentia which, in using fire, may burn it down by his agency, though without his consent. How did that document come here? Through his hands. Did he revise it? He has said not; yet a paper of that kind was presented in the Senate of the United States, and an extract from it made and published in an abolition paper. How did that abolition paper get that extract? Not from the senator, of course, for he says not.

Mr. President, these are topics which have always touched me more deeply than anything like sectional power. As far as I am concerned, I must say that I do not expect this bill is to give us of the South anything, but merely to accommodate something like the sentiment of the South. It will, however, I hope, reconcile both the North and the South; and when that desirable end can be effected, why should it not be? The honorable senator from Wisconsin objects to the application of this law to territory acquired from France. Was he not willing to apply it to territory acquired from Mexico? What difference is there, except that the previous law in once case excluded, and in the other admitted slavery? Now, I believe that, under the provisions of this bill, and of the Utah and New Mexico bills, there will be a perfect carté-blanche given to the territorial legislature to legislate as they may think proper. I am willing, as I have said before, to trust discretion, and honestly, and good faith of the people upon whom we devolve this power; but I can never consent that they can take it of themselves, or that it belongs to them without our delegating it; for I think they are our deputies—limited, controllable deputies—not squatter sovereigns.

I am willing to say that the people of the territories of Nebraska and Kansas shall be deputed by Congress to pass such laws as may be within their constitutional competency to pass, and nothing more. Is not that an honorable, fair, liberal trust to an intelligent people? I am willing to trust them. I have been willing to trust them in Utah and New Mexico, where the Mexican law prevailed, and I am willing to trust them in Nebraska and Kansas, where the French law, according to the ideas of the gentleman, may possibly be revived.

But the gentleman said that he would sooner cut off his right arm than allow this institution to be revived in these territories, under the operation of the Spanish law, as I understood him. Now, I am willing to trust the territorial Legislatures to that extent; not, I must say, because I concur in the proposition that that delegation, that deputization, that  lieutenancy of power which we confer on them shall not be controllable. I think that justice to myself requires that I should say that, if their action was flagrantly in violation of the constitution of the United States, I should insist upon its being controlled. I have said, however, as a southern man, that I am willing to make this advance towards restoring something like the harmony which once existed in this glorious republic. I do not believe it is anything but an advance to the sentiment of honor. I do not believe it is going to confer on the South any power. The North have the power, and we cannot take it from them; but if they had magnanimity with it, they would not use the language of reproach and threats and contumely. The belief that a deluded people cannot be informed is a mistake—that a tainted sentiment may not be saved from the putrefaction.

The senator has told us what dire consequences are to come in the future. Let them come. The sooner I know my fate under the threats which are made here the better for me. I shall not live, perhaps, to see the day when they will be fulfilled; but I have those dear to me who may be affected by them; and if I were upon my death-bed, I should inculcate upon them the necessity of standing true to the lessons of self-respect. I would tell every child, I would tell every relations I have, to perish sooner than to submit to the injustice which many seem disposed to heap upon them. But, sir, enough of this. I have not the least idea that the northern people, if fairly appealed to, would confirm the verdict indicated by some of their representatives. I have confidence in the public mind when it is fairly enlightened by intelligence and free discussion. I have read history, sir, and I know that any one who has peculiar notions, and cannot elevate his mind above the prevailing sentiment of the day, is not capable of understanding the distinctions of society. I am not one of those who are so partial as to make an ex parte decision. I had not the least idea of making this speech, Mr. President, but when I thought it fair, after what my neighbor [Mr. WALKER] had said, to say that much.

Mr. WALKER.  Mr. President, I fear that hereafter when this debate shall be read, great injustice will be done to me, unless the senator from South Carolina Corrects his remarks; and I ask him to do it.

Mr. BUTLER.  Not one word, as far as I think now.

Mr. WALKER.  But I will satisfy the senator that, in justice to me, he ought to do it.

Mr. BUTLER.  Certainly, then, I would do so.

Mr. WALKER.  Any one who will read the senator’s remarks as he has delivered them, without reading what I said, would come to the conclusion that I had threatened him and his southern colleagues in the Senate. Now, what did I let fall from my lips which sounded like it? I, in the kindest terms which I knew how to use, spoke in warning to the South. I spoke in warning of what I thought might arise, and what I endeavored to express my great deprecation of, and which, as I said, I would greatly deplore. Yet the senator’s speech will appear as charging me with having stood up here and threatened men that, if they passed this bill, slavery should be abolished in the District of Columbia, the internal slave-trade between the States should be abolished, and the Wilmot proviso set up in the Territories. I never made any such threat, or intimated for an instant that I would be an advocate of any such thing. That, however, will be the construction of the senator’s speech.

Mr. BUTLER.  Then allow me to put that right. I wish to be understood exactly in this way; that I expressly said I did not believe it of him, but that he was one of those who was beating the drum to make others fight.

Mr. WALKER.  No; you did not say that at all, nor intimate it.

Mr. BUTLER.  I said that the gentleman did not undertake to say that he would do the things which he mentioned; for I do not believe he would. I do not undertake to say that the North would do them; but he said that you might introduce such a state of things as would induce the North to do them. Is not that so?

Mr. WALKER.  I said, what I shall continue to say, that I fear the result of this agitation being opened again. I fear it for myself—

Mr. BUTLER.  I am not afraid of it.

Mr. WALKER.  I fear it for those who are disposed to stand by the peace which was made in 1850. Why, sir, what harm was being done to our southern friends at the opening of this session of Congress? What agitation existed? Who was proposing any agitation? I am not threatening the honorable senator; God forbid that I should I never threaten. I know he is the last man to be moved by threats. He need not have posted of that here, for I know it was well as he.

Let me state another fact, however, to show how necessary it is for him to revise his remarks. Who that will read them will not suppose that I, who am his nearest neighbor in the Senate, expressly stated that I was willing to sacrifice my right arm rather than establish slavery, when in fact, I was simply quoting the language of Mr. Clay himself a slaveholder.

Mr. BUTLER.  Did you not adopt it?

Mr. WALKER.  You do not ask it expressly, I know, but you do impliedly.

SOURCES:  The Congressional Globe, Vol. 23 (1854), p. 292-3; The Daily Union, Washington, D. C., Thursday Morning, March 23, 1854, p. 8

Sunday, March 27, 2022

Will Kansas be a Slave State, Published September 28, 1855

The Hon. Theodore G. Hunt, of La., who was one of the few Southern Representatives in Congress that voted against the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, addressed a public meeting of his constituents on the 15th instant in a speech in which, whilst defending his course upon that subject, he conclusively stated the reason that would prevent Kansas from being a slave State:

In addition to the view I presented of good faith, I also urged in my speech on the Nebraska bill that, apart from abstractions, there was no practical advantage to be attained for the South by opening the Territory in question to the admission of slavery. And I still retain that opinion. I believe that Kansas and Nebraska are both destined by nature to be free States. No prudent slaveholder will leave the genial soil and climate of the South, and take his slaves with him, merely to establish the condition of slavery in the less productive and colder region of Kansas or Nebraska. The author of the Nebraska bill himself, and leading Southern gentlemen, who advocated the bill, also entertained the opinion I expressed.

Mr. Douglas said: “I do not believe there is a man in Congress who thinks it could be permanently a slaveholding country. I have no idea that it could.”

Mr. Badger, or North Carolina, said: “I have no more idea of seeing a slave population in either of them I have of seeing it in Massachusetts, not a whit.”

Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, said: “As far as I am concerned, I must say that I do not expect that this bill is to give us of the South anything, but merely to accommodate something like the sentiment of the South.”

Mr. Hunter, of Virginia, said: “Does any man believe that you will have a slaveholding State in Kansas and Nebraska? I confess that for a moment I permitted such an illusion to  rest on my mind.”

Mr. Jones, of Tennessee, said: As I told the honorable chairman of this committee on Territories, and as I have expressed myself everywhere when I have given my opinion on the subject, I was content to let this matter stand as it was, because, in my judgment, there was nothing practical in it.”

There is nothing in the present state of things that shakes my conviction in the destination of Kansas to be a free State. The lawless violence of certain Missourians to control the election and mould the sovereignty of Kansas must fall of its object. The condition of Kansas as to slavery will be determined ultimately by the influence of the law of nature and the principles of human interest, almost as certain in their operation as that law itself. Population, which was flowing rapidly into the Territory, has been checked and greatly obstructed for some time past; but thousands who have settled there opposed to the institution of slavery; and a vast number who, it is believed, will settle there as soon as law and order are established, will join the opposition. Besides, I understand that the number of emigrants going to Missouri bona fide to live there does not exceed the number of emigrants from that state returning to their ancient establishments. Now, if this information be correct, Kansas will in due time, when prepared for admission into the Union, present herself to Congress for admission with a constitution prohibitory of slavery. To her admission under the case supposed there could be no serious objection on the part of the South; for the doctrine is justly avowed by her that when a State is about to be admitted into the Union, that States has a right to decide for itself whether it will or will not have slavery within its limits.

But if I am mistaken in the opinion that Kansas will present herself at the right time to Congress with a constitution prohibitory of slavery, and, on the contrary, by any possibility she should be admitted as a slaveholding Sates, still, I repeat, I am convinced, from the nature of her soil, from the number of foreigners and citizens from the free States who have settled, and who will hereafter settle within her limits, and from the well known aversion of those persons to the institution of slavery, that her career as a slaving State would be a very short one, and that her destiny is fixed by the law of Nature, and the circumstances averted to, as a non-slaveholding State.

Practically, then, the South had nothing to gain by a repeal of the Missouri compromise. Her own fertile lands, suitable for the profitable culture of her great staples, and situated in a climate congenial to the health of her laborers, afforded her, in their immense area, a space far beyond her powers for cultivation for any series of ages yet to come. I condemned the lust for lands which the South did not want, and which honor called upon her not to invade or to acquire by injustice.

SOURCE: “Will Kansas be a Slave State?” Daily American Organ, Washington, D.C., Friday, September 28, 1855, p. 2

Tuesday, March 22, 2022

Speech of Congressman John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, March 23, 1854

Delivered in the House of Representatives, March 23, 1854—the House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on the Nebraska bill.

I propose, now, Mr. Chairman, to address a few observations to the committee upon the merits of the bill. The subject has been thoroughly discussed here and in the Senate, and I do not flatter myself that I shall be able to add new facts or develop new trains of thought. The elements of a correct judgment are already before the country, and the utmost that one now engaging in the discussion can hope, is to present some of them in lights and combinations worthy the attention of the House.

I shall not consume the time of the committee in discussing what I cannot but regard as the subordinate and accidental aspects of the subject; as, for example, the relations of individuals to the bill of the last Congress, the alleged change of position by newspaper presses, and other points which do not touch the heart of the subject, and cannot go into history in the permanent connexion with our action upon it; assuming, also—what I think has been abundantly demonstrated—that the interests of the country demanded the organization of these territories, and that the rights of the few Indians within their borders are protected by the bill, the only remaining question relates to the clauses respecting slavery.

Among the many misrepresentations sent to the country by some of the enemies of this bill, perhaps none is more flagrant than the charge that it proposes to legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas. Sir, if the bill contained such a feature, it could not receive my vote. The right to establish involves the co-relative right to prohibit, and, denying both, I would vote for neither. I go further and express the opinion that a clause legislating slavery into those Territories could not command one Southern vote in this House. It is due to both sections of the country, and the people, to expose this groundless charge. What then, is the present condition of Nebraska and Kansas? Why, sir, there is no government, no slavery, and very little population there, (for your federal laws, exclude your citizens,) but a law remains on the statute-book forever prohibiting slavery in those Territories. It is proposed simply to take off this prohibition, but not to make an enactment in affirmance of slavery there. Now, in the absence of any law establishing slavery in that region previous to the prohibitory act, it is too clear for dispute that the repeal of the prohibitory act, has not the affirmatory effect of fixing slavery in that country. The effect of the repeal, therefore, is neither to establish nor to exclude, but to leave the future condition of the Territories dependent wholly on the action of the inhabitants, subject only to such limitations as the federal constitution may impose. But, to guard fully against hones misconstruction, and even against malicious perversion, the language of the bill is perfectly explicit on this point.

I propose, for the present, to argue the question only upon the compromises of 1820 and 1850. To those who may be called political abolitionists it is useless to address any arguments. They opposed both those settlements; they adhere to neither in good faith, but will appeal to them or reject them as may best promote their incendiary purposes.—But I do not consider this to be the position of the northern people. I believe that, generally, they, and their representatives here, desire to look at this subject calmly, and to do fairly and honestly whatever good faith demands. The American characteristic is well understood by the abolitionists in and out of Congress, and accordingly they clamorously proclaim that “plighted faith” is about to be violated by the breach of a compact which the North, they say, has faithfully kept on her part for more than thirty years. By their orators and presses, and from their pulpits, (for the Church is resolved to engage in the struggle,) the South is held up as a monster of perfidy, and the selectest vials of their wrath are poured on the heads of those northern statemen who always sustained their Missouri Compromise, while it had any remains of vitality, against the assaults of its new defenders.

What, then is the true nature and extent of the compromise of 1850? What of the former? What their relations? Are they consistent with each other? Which of them ought, in good faith, to be applied to the Territories contemplated by this bill? These are the questions to be decided, in good faith, by those who recognize compromises as somewhat more important and durable than ordinary acts of legislation. While for those who opposed them both, and who spurn all settlements touching slavery, the less that is said, either of compromises or of “plighted faith,” the better.

At the risk of treading on ground already occupied by others, let me say something of the origin and history of the Missouri Compromise, and of the relations of sections to it.

I have heard gentlemen here glorify Mr. Clay as the author of the act of 1820, prohibiting slavery north of 36 deg. 30 min., and invoke his memory to resist its violation. They must invoke some other “spirit” than Mr. Clay’s, for he was not its author. My colleague [Mr. EWING] showed this not long ago, but the statement has been persistently repeated since. While again correcting this error, it may be well to notice the treatment this compromise received very soon after its birth.

The people of Missouri having applied for leave to form a State constitution, Congress, by the act of March 6, 1820, provided in the first section:

“That the inhabitants of that portion of the Missouri Territory included within the boundaries hereinafter designated be, and they are hereby, authorized to form for themselves a constitution and State Government, and to assume such name as they shall deem proper; and the said state, when formed, shall be admitted to the Union upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.”

 And in the eight section:

“That in all that territory ceded by France to the United States, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of 36 deg. 30 min. north latitude, not included within the limits of the state contemplated by this act, slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted, shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited.”

This the compromise prohibiting slavery north of the 36 deg. 30 min.—the compromise to which gentlemen say our plighted faith is now due. There were two parties and two stipulations. Missouri was to form a constitution, and was to be admitted “upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.” This was the agreement on the one hand for the benefit of Missouri, and, if you choose, of the South. On the other hand, slavery was to be prohibited north of 36 deg. 30 min., and this was for the benefit of the North.—The terms and conditions on each side were clearly expressed; but with it Mr. Clay had nothing to do. He was a member of the House and the clause prohibiting slavery originated in the Senate, on the motion of Mr. Thomas, of Illinois. Mr. Clay has said publicly that he had no recollection even of voting for it.

Well, sir, in pursuance of this “Missouri Compromise,” the people of that Territory proceeded to form a constitution with which they presented themselves for admission as a State at the next session of Congress. Was the compact executed? The Senate promptly passed a bill for their admission “on an equal footing with the original States;” but in the House it was rejected by a strict sectional vote—the South for it, the North against it. The “compromise” being thus repudiated and rejected by the North, by refusing to Missouri and the South the equivalent (being her admission “on an equal footing with the original States”) for the slavery prohibition, the bargain was broken, and the act of 1820 lost the sacredness of a compromise. The pretest for this repudiation was, that Missouri had put a clause in her constitution prohibiting the immigration of the free negroes to the State. This she had a right to do, unless it was a violation of the federal constitution; and if a violation, it was simply void, and the clause of the latter which declares that:

“The Constitution, and laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution and laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”

And the proper tribunal to settle the fact was the federal judiciary; so that in either aspect there was no ground for breaking the bargain. But the Compromise of 1820 was thus broken, and for a long time there seemed to be no prospect that this State, coming with a republican constitution in her hand, could find admission. The whole question was at sea again, and so remained until Mr. Clay appeared in the House, on the 21st day of February, 1821, having been detained at home by sickness in his family. He soon offered a resolution for the purpose of  raising a joint committee of the two houses to inquire whether Missouri should be remanded to the territorial condition, or admitted into the Union; and if the latter, upon what terms?

The committee asked for was raised, and on the 26th of February Mr. Clay reported from it the following condition of admission, which was adopted by Congress.

“That Missouri shall be admitted into this union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever, upon the fundamental condition that the 4th clause of the 25th section of the 3d article of the constitution submitted on the part of said State to Congress shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any law, and that no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any citizen of either of the States in this Union shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the constitution of the United states; provided, That the legislature of the said State, by a solemn public act, shall declare the assent of the said State to the said fundamental condition, and shall transmit to the President of the United States, on or before the first Monday in November next, an authentic copy of the said act; upon receipt whereof, the President, by proclamation, shall announce the fact; whereupon, and without any further proceedings on the part of Congress, the admission of the said State into the Union shall be considered as complete.”

This was a new condition by which Missouri was to enter the Union; not by the Compromise of 1820, “on an equal footing with the original States,” as an equivalent for the prohibition of slavery north of 36 deg. 30 min., but upon the “fundamental condition” that her legislature should pass an act declaring that the constitution of the State was not above the constitution of the United States! She accepted the condition; and thus, by an act of her legislature, in pursuance of the timely “fundamental condition” of a congressional resolution, happily saved the federal constitution!!

It is due to the memory of the illustrious author of this “fundamental condition” to say that no one could be more sensible than himself of the intense humbuggery of the whole proceeding; and in his celebrated speech of 1850, on his compromise resolutions, he jocularly reviewed and exposed it to the Senate.

This summary of the facts will not be denied here or elsewhere; but they show that the Compromise now invoked was made in 1820; that Missouri complied with her part of it; that it was repudiated by northern votes in 1821; and that the State was finally admitted into the Union, not upon the equivalent provided in the act of 1820, but by the express imposition on her of a new compromise and condition.

So much for the result, on the first occasion that offered, to test “plighted faith.”

Under these circumstances the act of 1820 might well have been regarded as a rejected compact, and the question of slavery might have been fought over again upon the organization of each new Territory. But the hope of having something to be regarded as final on this vexed subject, thought a mere geographical line, and that of doubtful constitutionality, prevailed in the country, and that act, under the name of the “Missouri Compromise,” was accepted as a settlement of the slavery controversy. The basis of the settlement was a division (though very unequal) of all the territory then possessed by the United States. Does any man doubt that if we had possessed more territory the same principle of division would have been applied to it? It was a division of common territory between slaveholding and non slave holding States, or rather it was the exclusive appropriation of all north of 36 deg. 30 min. to free institutions and an implied allowance only of southern institutions below that line. Whatever may be said of this arrangement in its relations to the constitution, or as a measure of statesmanship, it was a clear and simple adjustment. It was capable of easy application in all future time; and as such, the South accepted it in good faith, and struggled to maintain it, until it was finally and forever repudiated by our northern brethren.

Sir, the gentleman from Georgia, [Mr. STEPHENS,] and others, have traced this compromise through our legislative history—they have shown how often it was repudiated, and repudiated by the North, and I do not propose to go over the same ground; but if falls within the line of my thoughts to fix your attention on a period when the Missouri Compromise was ratified; and that occasion is the more important because it carried the Compromise beyond the territory acquired from France, and thus leaves no excuse for denying that it was intended to be a rule of general application. I refer to the joint resolution of 1845 for the annexation of Texas, which contains the following provision:

“New States of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to the said state of Texas, and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the territory thereof, which sall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the federal constitution. And such States as may be formed out of that portion of said territory lying south of 36 deg. 30 min. north latitude, commonly known as the Missouri Compromise line, shall be admitted into the Union, with or without slavery, as the people of each State asking admission may desire. And in such State or States as shall be formed out of said territory north of said Missouri Compromise line, slavery or involuntary servitude (except for crime) shall be prohibited.”

Here the Missouri Compromise was distinctly applied to territory clearly outside of the specific boundaries of the act of 1820, and it is no answer to say that Texas was a part of the Louisiana purchase—first, because this was a matter of dispute and conflicting claims with Spain; and next, because in 1819 we exchanged to Spain our claims to Texas for Florida, by which Texas became foreign territory, and relieved from the constitution and laws of the United States, so  that, upon her return, she came as free from the operation of the Missouri Compromise as Utah, New Mexico, or the British Islands. It follows, that in extending that compromise to the portion of Texas lying north of 36 deg. 30 min., the Congress on that occasion recognized it as a rule upon the question of slavery, as a basis of settlement, to be applied to as well to new territory as to that acquired from France. It will be remembered that the whole of Texas was slaveholding territory, and the effect of the resolution was to make a large part of it free. But this was assented to by the South; and now I ask the fair-minded representatives of the people if the Missouri Compromise meant that it should be recognized and extended when the South was to be excluded, and repudiated, when it might work to her advantage?

This practical construction of the Missouri line obliged the North, by every obligation of honor and good faith, to carry it through all territory afterwards acquired, if any virtue at all was to be conceded to that compromise.

But, while the line was extended as long as it worked out free-soil territory, it was ignored and trampled under foot the moment their fair application of it might have resulted to benefit of both Sections. Witness the result in 1848, you gentlemen who talk of “plighted faith.” We had acquired from Mexico a large territory, lying on both sides of the line of 36 deg. 30 min. Three years before, the line had been extended through Texas, by which a large slaveholding territory had been made free-soil; and yet when, in 1848, on motion of the distinguished senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS,] a resolution passed in the Senate to “extend the Missouri-Compromise line” through the recently-acquired territory, it was rejected in this House by the united northern against the united southern vote.

Sir, how can an honest man get over these facts? How, in the face of them, can an honest man charge the friends of this bill with disregard of “plighted faith” and “solemn compacts?” I need not recur in detail to the occasions, so often referred to in this debate, when the Missouri line was offered by the South during the great struggle which ended in the Compromise of 1850, and was rejected by the North. It is enough to say that the record of those transactions will preserve for history the fact that the Missouri Compromise line of 36 deg. 30 min. was steadily repudiated by northern votes as a basis for the settlement of the slavery controversy. Why was this sir?

The reason is obvious. The anti-slavery feeling at this time ruled the councils of the North, and accordingly she left the ground of compromise, and planted herself on the ground of power. She rejected the principle of division. Glorying in her conscious strength, she came to obliterate geographical lines, and to appropriate to herself the whole of the territory acquired from Mexico. Her rallying cry was no longer “the Missouri Compromise line,” but the “Wilmot proviso.” Old things had passed away; old bargains were rejected, and the question took a new form.

The issue made up was, (and it went back of all divisions and patched-up settlements, and to the very bottom of the subject,) shall slavery be prohibited in all the Territories of the Untied States by act of Congress, or shall it be left to the people who inhabit them, subject only to the federal constitution; and on this was fought the great battle of 1850. The slaveholding States said: We have exhausted every scheme of adjustment; we have offered the old line; it is contemptuously refused; you claim all; very well, then, we united with you in burying the past; we accept the broad issue of intervention or non-intervention; we demand that all the citizens of the United States be allowed to enter the common territory with the constitution alone in their hands. If that instrument protects the title of the master to his slave in this common territory, you cannot complain; and if it does not protect his title, we ask no help from Congress; and the relations of the constitution to the subject we are willing to have decided by the courts of the United States. We do not ask Congress to interfere for us, and we will resist all legislative interference against us.

The whole country saw that here was a great struggle of opposing principles; and the excitement was in proportion to the magnitude of the question. If the result had depended on a purely sectional vote, the “Wilmot proviso” would have triumphed; but a large portion of the North, under the lead of the distinguished senator from Michigan [Mr. Cass] and others, repudiated the “proviso.”—Governments were formed for New Mexico and Utah without that odious restriction, leaving them free to form their own institutions, and enter the Union with or without slavery, as their constitution should prescribe.

Nothing in this discussion has surprised me more than the assertion, in respectable quarters, that the provisions touching slavery in the New Mexico and Utah bills were not intended to establish any principle for the future action of Congress upon that subject. I cannot but regard this as a narrow and unstatesman like view. Such was not the sense in which that great compromise was accepted by the American people. They well knew that it did not abolish slavery; they knew, too, that past territories yet remained within the Union to be settled, and that still vaster regions were to be acquired in the progress of our inevitable expansion. As to all these, the question of slavery, they knew, would present itself at each successive step in the extension of American institutions and laws. If the settlement of 1850 was but an ordinary act of legislation, and contained no principle of agreement of broader application than the strips of territory embraced in those laws, for what had the Union been shaken to its centre? To what end had our most eminent statesmen devoted their highest efforts? What has been gained—a lasting peace? No, sir; but, by this view, only a deceitful truce; a suspension of hostilities; the suppression of a symptom, not the eradication of the disease. It make this compromise not a final adjustment, on principle, of the distracting subject of slavery, but a delusion, an expedient, a catch, a humbug. It brings it down to the level of a mere temporary legislative contrivance; it leaves its great authors shorn of the renown the world supposed it to confer and reduces them to the condition of mere political jobbers. But, by the other construction, it was, indeed, a “final settlement”—a settlement which makes its authors immortal, which removes from the federal theatre the only question that can disturb our domestic tranquility, and leaves Congress in the future nothing to do in connexion with it, except to apply the established principle as the occasions arise. No, sir; whatever some gentlemen by say now, the people were not guilty of the folly imputed to them by the opponents of this bill. Their patriotic acclamations went up to Heaven over an act of healing statesmanship, not over a political job. They accepted those measures, not as a truce to faction, but as a bond of lasting concord.

Mr. Chairman, in great collisions of opinion, especially among an enlightened people, and upon questions of a continuing character, the particular issue usually involves the general principle—and this happens with a certainty proportioned to the magnitude of the questions at stake. History is full of illustrations to the point. When our heroic ancestors threw the British tea into Boston harbor and the whole country rose to sustain the act, it went far deeper than a question of a tax on tea, and involved the great principle that we would submit to no taxation without representation. When John Hampden resisted the illegal imposition of ship money by Charles I, and carried the point up to all the judges of England, though the immediate issue was whether he should pay the paltry sum of twenty shillings, the great question involved was the claim of the King to levy taxes without the consent of Parliament. So, the circumstance connected with the legislation giving governments to Utah and New Mexico must control and explain the effect and principle of those laws. After events so recent, need I say that, in 1850, the manner in which the new Territories should be organized led to a thorough discussion as to the policy to be adopted respecting slavery? Is it not notorious that the Missouri Compromise line was considered and deliberately rejected? Did not the non-slaveholding States (generally) insist that the true policy was the prohibition of slavery in the territories of the Union by act of congress, and, by consequence, insist upon applying this principle to Utah and New Mexico? Did not the slaveholding States, on the contrary, planting themselves on the ground of Federal non-intervention, resist this policy, and, by consequence, its adoption and application to those Territories? And after a long and fearful struggle, did not the latter doctrine prevail, and was it not carried into law (or compact, if you choose) in the New Mexico and Utah acts? Did not the public, the press, conventions, and States, hail the result as a “final settlement, in principle and substance,” of the subject of slavery? And are we to be told now that the Compromise of 1850 was an adjustment to broader than those two territories? Are we to have a new struggle, a new bargain, a new basis of settlement on the organization of each new territory? Who, then, are the agitators?—who are faithful to the Compromise of 1850?

If my conclusions are correct as to the relations of the Compromise of 1820 to that of 1850, and as to the true nature and extent of the latter, it follows that the former has no claim resting on good faith; but that “plighted faith” to the Compromise of 1850 demands the removal of the Missouri prohibition. I do not contend that the eighth section of the act of 1820 was, in terms, repealed by the adjustment of 1850; it yet remains on the statute-book, and if constitutional, is still operative. But if non-intervention by Congress be the principle that underlies the Compromise of 1850, then the prohibition of 1820, being inconsistent with that principle, should be removed, and perfect non-intervention thus be established by law.

Among the many misrepresentations sent to the country by some of the enemies of this bill, perhaps none is more flagrant than the charge that it proposes to legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas. Sir, if the bill contained such a feature, it could not receive my vote. The right to establish involves the co-relative right to prohibit, and denying both, I would vote for neither. So go further, and express the opinion that a clause legislating slavery into those Territories could not command one Southern vote in this House. It is due to both sections of the country, and to the people, to expose this groundless charge. What then, is the present condition of Nebraska and Kansas? Why, sir, there is no government, no slavery, and very little population there, (for your federal laws, exclude your citizens,) but a law remains on the statute-book forever prohibiting slavery in those Territories. It is proposed simply to take of this prohibition, but not to make an enactment in the affirmance of slavery there. Now, in the absence of any law establishing slavery in that region previous to the prohibitory act, it is too clear for dispute that the repeal of the prohibitory act, has not the affirmative effect of fixing slavery in that country. The effect of the repeal, therefore, is neither to establish nor to exclude, but to leave the future condition of the Territories depended wholly on the action of the inhabitants, subject only to such limitations as the federal constitution may impose. But, to guard fully against honest misconstruction, and even against malicious perversion, the language of the bill is perfectly explicit on this point.

“That the constitution, and all laws of the United States, which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory of Nebraska as elsewhere within the United States; except the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March, 1820, which being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories as recognized by the legislation of 1820, (commonly called the compromise measures,) is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to revive or put in force any law or regulation which my have existed prior to the act of March, 1820, either protecting, establishing, prohibiting or abolishing slavery.”

This should be satisfactory to all candid men; but if any one shall persist in attempting to mislead the people, the best answer will be to impale him before them on the very words of the bill.

It will be observed that the right of the people to regulate in their own way all their domestic institutions is left wholly untouched, except whatever is done must be in accordance with the constitution—the supreme law for us all; and the right of property, under the constitution, as well as legislative action, is properly left to the decision of the federal judiciary. This voids a contested issue which it is hardly in the competency of Congress to decide, and refers it to the proper tribunal.

It is contended on one hand, upon the idea of the equality of the States under the constitution and common property in the Territories, that the citizens of the slaveholding States may remove to them with their slaves, (and that the local legislature cannot exclude slavery, while in the territorial condition; but it is to concede that the people may establish or prohibit it when they come to exercise the power of a sovereign State;) on the other hand, it is said that slavery, being in derogation of common right, can exist only by force of positive law; and it is denied that the constitution furnishes this law for the Territories; and it is further claimed that the local legislature my establish or exclude it any time after government is organized. As both parties appeal to the constitution, and base their respective arguments on opposite constructions of that instrument, the bill wisely refuses to make a question for judicial construction the subject of legislative conflict, and properly refers it to the tribunal created by the constitution itself, for the very purpose of deciding “all cases in law and equity” arising under it.

Then, sir, neither the purpose nor effect of the bill is to legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas; but its effect is to sweep away this vestige of Congressional dictation on this subject, to allow the free citizens of this Union to enter the common territory with the constitution and the bill alone in their hands, and to remit the decision of their rights under both to the courts of the country. Who can go before his constituents refusing to stand on the platform of the constitution? Who can make a case to them of refusing to abide the decision of the courts of the Union?

I have argued the subject hitherto chiefly upon the question of “plighted faith;” and have consumed more of my limited time that properly belongs to that aspect of the case, because diligent efforts have been made to excite the northern mind against the friends of this bill representing them as the violators of the public honor. Anxious as I am for its passage, I readily admit that no benefit it could confer upon the country would atone for a deliberate violation of the public faith; but I am for its passage, not only because I believe that it embodies the true principle, but because, also, I sincerely believe that it carries out the true spirit and intent of our last great compromise, which is my judgment, covered the whole subject of slavery.

The clock admonishes me that I must hurry on and omit some views I would like to present, if time allowed. But, Mr. Chairman, apart from the historical argument, this contested feature in the bill is right in itself, for it rests on the foundation principle of American government. Without entering the wilderness of discussion in regard to the relations of the federal government to the territories as political communities, I offer one or two thoughts as to the proper limitations upon the power of Congress, according to the true theory of our government. Political power in the Territories is nowhere expressly granted in the constitution. The existence, therefore, and the extent of its exercise, must be derived by implication; and implied powers are to be exercised with more caution and strictness that express grants. Let it be conceded that political power over the Territories exists in Congress, and it is no matter whether it be implied from the power to acquire territory, or from any other source in the constitution; and the question arises whether it is an uncontrolled and despotic power, or whether it is limited by the nature of the federal government.

The States are supreme as to all subjects not granted to the common government. They establish their own institutions, at their own pleasure; they regulate within themselves all the relations of society; and they are now complete, self-sustaining, political communities; and they created the federal government, not to fix for them and their posterity the relations of society and the various elements that make up a complete social and political community, but to execute for the common good certain specified grants of power. The territories belong to the States in their united character; they are to enter the Union on an equal footing with the original States; and, in the meantime, they are to be settled and occupied by citizens of the existing States. What is the pretest for the act of 1820 “forever” prohibiting American citizens, on American soil, from establishing their own local, social and political condition? You have no express power to do so in constitution, and surely you can find none in the analogies of our political system. Can you dictate a particular from of society and government for them one moment after they become States? If not, why mock reason, and blot the statue book with this prohibition?

The power of Congress over the Territories is either absolute, or it has constitutional limitations. Let me illustrate further my idea of the limitations on the power of Congress over the Territories and districts growing out of the character and objects of the federal system. Congress, by an express provision of the constitution, may exercise “exclusive legislation” in the District of Columbia.—This is a far stronger and broader grant of power than any to be implied from that instrument in relation to the Territories, and yet it does not confer absolute power in this District; for it must be observed that there is wide distinction between “exclusive” and absolute power of legislation. Will any man contend that Congress may establish a free port of entry in this District, while a general tariff law applies to other ports? And yet the language of the constitution is:

“No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.”

So Congress has “exclusive legislation” over “all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful building,” but it will not be said that congress may admit foreign goods duty free at one of these points on the sea-board, while impost laws are in force at other ports. Nor will an advocate be found for the power to discriminate against the people of this District, by taxing articles exported from it, though the limitation of the constitution is: “No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.

Why is this, and what is the limit? At the beginning it was thought best that the seat of government should not be within the limit of any State, and accordingly a separate territory was carved out for it, where the Federal Government might exercise its few and limited powers, and over this territory “exclusive legislation” was granted to Congress, but the reasons and objects of the grant both of the Territory and power, and the nature and purposes of the common Government, must control this exclusive legislation. Accordingly, Congress may not establish a despotism here, nor rob American citizens in regard to their local and domestic affairs, nor deprive them of their property, nor violate uniformity of taxation, nor discriminate for or against their ports. Out of this view, too, grows the argument against the power to abolish slavery in the district without the consent of the people. And though upon this point opposite opinions have been expressed, yet the argument has so far prevailed that no serious attempt has been made to interfere with their rights in this respect.

The argument in regard to the Territories is far stronger. I have already said that the Constitution nowhere expressly grants political power over the Territories. Let us bear in mind, then, that it can only be an implied power—to be exercised by a limited government—over a region the common property of the States which created this limited government; and the inference is irresistible that it must be exercised in the spirit of the political system out of which this limited government springs. It would follow if the power were expressly granted, but follows with greater force since it is only derivative. What, then, is the spirit of the system? I answer, the equality of the States—local sovereignty in all matters of interior and domestic concern, embracing the great mass of powers that belong to government; as if, for example, fixing the relations of parent and child, guardian and ward, master and servant-regulating the general rights of property, the course of inheritance, and the innumerable conditions that grow out of the social and political state. Hence it never has been pretended that Congress may invade them to control their free action on these and other kindred subjects. It is apart from the objects for which the States made the Federal Government, and prescribed the orbit in which it should move. Carry the idea to the Territories. What are they? to whom do they belong? who are to inhabit them? and what are to be their political relations to the rest of the Confederacy? They are regions of country acquired by the common efforts and treasure of all the States; they belong, therefore, to the States for common use and enjoyment; the citizens of the States are to inhabit them; and when the population shall be sufficient, they are to become equal members of the Union.

I might run out of illustrations on this point to an indefinite extent. Could Congress admit foreign goods duty free into the Union through the ports of a Territory, in violation of the general revenue laws, or lay a tax on articles exported from a Territory? The power will not be claimed—certainly its exercise will never be attempted; and yet I have shown that the limitation of the constitution in these and other respects apply in terms only to the States; and the only arguments against the power are, first, that it has not been expressly granted; and, next, that it cannot be fairly deduced from the spirit of the analogies of our political system.—Sir, if the constitutional limitations for which I contend do exist, then congress cannot discriminate against any of the States by depriving them of equal enjoyment of the common territory; but if these limitations do not exist, then the power of legislation is absolute and Congress may as readily set up a monarchy as a republic. Gentlemen my revolt at the conclusion, bit it flows with inevitable certainty from this doctrine of intervention and uncontrolled political powers over the Territories. The germ of congressional despotism is to be found in this Missouri prohibition; for if the question of slavery may be determined for the Territories by Congress, every other social and political question may in like manner be settled for them by the same authority, and this would reduce them to the most abject colonial vassalage. You cannot escape this conclusion by saying that slavery is anti-republican, and congress must exclude it under the obligation to provide a republican form of government, for slavery has already existed in many of the States, and yet the constitution declares that Congress shall secure to each State a republican form of government; hence it is a settled principle of our system that the institution is not inconsistent with republicanism.

Sir, I care not for refined distinctions or the subtleties of verbal criticism. I repeat the above and plain proposition, that if Congress may intervene on this subject, it may intervene on any other; and having thus surrendered the principle, and broken away from constitutional limitations, you are drawn into the very lap of arbitrary power. By this doctrine you may erect a despotism under the American system. The whole theory is a libel on our institutions. It carries us back to the abhorrent principles of British colonial authority, against which we made the issue of independence. I have never acquiesced in this odious claim, nor will I believe that it can abide the test of public scrutiny. The bill on our table repudiates it, and only wants fearless advocates to make it thoroughly odious. The political Abolitionists think they can ride the storm of anti-slavery fanaticism; but I tell them, they have encountered here an element more powerful still. They must obliterate the memory of the principles on which our Government was founded; they must undo the very texture of American mind; they must substitute in the popular heart the dogmas of despotism for the doctrine of American liberty, before they can triumph over the principles of this bill. The South insists on it as embodying the doctrine of State equality, on which her very existence depends; but it should commend itself equally to all sections, because the underlying principle is not Northern or Southern, but American. It is true, that the subject of slavery happens to be the one at issue; but it is there as the representative of every other social and political right. The freedom of these new countries to establish their own institutions ought, therefore, to be as dear to the man from Maine as to the man from Florida.

But again: cannot the North, with her overwhelming numbers, compete with us on these new theaters in the race of settlement and civilization—and must she not only violate the constitution by shutting out half the States, common property-holders with her—but in the name of liberty outrage liberty by erecting a despotism over the Territories Sir, we never will submit to it—we will resist it to the last; and in this struggle of principle against passion, of reason and right against fanaticism, are we defenceless? No, sir; no sir.—It is true, New England, with a few noble exceptions, has arrayed herself against the principle of the bill; yet even there the cause is not lost. Her choicest sons are unmoved by the clamors that surround them, and New Hampshire, the little Switzerland of the North, is unbroken by the frantic rush of the agitators. She has the elements around which to rally her hereditary principles.

But New England is not the Union. Observe what different tokens come from East and West. Did you hear of the infuriated mob that basely hung the author of this bill in effigy, on Boston Common? But did you note soon after the cheering tones of approval the west wind brought from his prairie State? Remember, Gentlemen, in the midst of your exultation, that the political power of this country is now climbing the summits of the Allegany mountains, and before this decade closes will have pursued its unreturning course far into the valley of the Mississippi—that vast region richer than the delta of the Nile, and whose millions and ever-increasing millions are destined to a political unity as lasting as civilization and commerce, bound forever together by the double tie of interest and affection. What, then, if Boston Chooses to betray the principles that made her own origin illustrious—what if New England Chooses to turn her back on the doctrines that marked her early history, and, after winning political liberty for herself, proposes to deny it to others—still we are not defenceless. True spirits in every eastern state will stand by the flag of republican equality until it waves the people back beneath its folds. Pennsylvania, that fine old Commonwealth, too often neglected in the piping times of peace, but always appealed to, and never in vain, in ever crises of the constitution, will stand upon the bill. But even if no support could be found in the scenes of our early civilization, we would gather up this inestimable principle, and turn to the West—the young, and growing, and vigorous West—whose hardy sons, having just laid for themselves the foundations of society, will never aid in robbing their fellow-citizens of the same sacred privilege. Sir, in two years from this time you will not be able, in my opinion, to find a man in the West who will dare to go before the people in opposition to the principle of this bill.

My time is so nearly exhausted that I shall be obliged to omit observations I had intended to offer as to the importance of action on this subject. By keeping it an open question, nobody is to be benefitted except the abolitionists and their sympathizers. Those who take the responsibility of throwing it before the county as an apple of discord may themselves perish in the storm they aid to arouse. The final triumph of the truth would not be doubtful, but the immediate effect would be to furnish food for abolition excitement.

Mr. Davis, of Rhode Island.  If you do pass the bill it will.

Mr. Breckinridge.  That gentleman is an enemy of the bill. He is sincere, no doubt; but deceives himself. As he is a political abolitionist, I remark, with great respect, that he would desire the passage of the bill if he thought it would promote the anti-slavery movement. [Laughter.]

No, sir; if we reject the bill, we open up the waters of bitterness, to be sealed again in time, but not until these agitators shall have rioted awhile in the confusion of the country; we blow high the flames to furnish habitations for these political salamanders, who can exist only in the fires of domestic strife. But, if it passes, the question will be removed forever from the halls of Congress, and deposited with the people, who can settle it in a manner answerable to their own views of interest and happiness. The occupation of federal agitators will be gone, and a barrier will be erected against which the rampant spirit of modern fanaticism may rave in vain, and before which it will receive its signal overthrow.

In the excitement of debates upon this subject heretofore, threats have been made on both sides. I have none to make, sir. I come from a state which is not in the habit of making threats. I believe that once, and only once, she utters a political threat. That was in 1798, when the old federal party struck at the vitals of the constitution. On that occasion, her warning voice and firm attitude contributed to save our political system. If my time allowed I believe I could prove that this Missouri prohibition was a bantling of the same federal party scotched but  not killed in former conflicts.

I believe that the sentiments I have expressed are those of the people I represent. I believe they are the sentiments of the Commonwealth of Kentucky—a State which has never taken an extreme political position; a State which, lying in the centre of the Union, has always extended one hand to the North and the other to the South, to draw them together in bonds of amity, and ever pulsation of those great heart sends the warm life-blood of affection to the remotest extremities of the confederacy.

SOURCES: “Speech of Hon. J. C. Breckenridge of Kentucky,” Nashville Union and American, Nashville, Tennessee, Wednesday, April 5, 1854, p. 2, which was continued the following day in “Speech of Hon. J. C. Breckenridge of Kentucky,” Nashville Union and American, Nashville, Tennessee, Thursday, April 6, 1854, p. 2

Wednesday, March 16, 2022

Speech of Senator John Bell of Tennessee, May 24 & 25, 1854

Mr. President, I did not expect to provoke a personal assault on my course in relation to the measure before the Senate by anything which I said this morning. I trust that I did not touch the honorable gentleman’s [Mr. Toombs] sensibilities when I stated that I supposed his only object was to remove what he considered a violation of the Constitution of the United states from the Statute-book; and that that seemed to be the great to be the great principle which he had in view in giving his support to this bill. I leave it to the Senate to say whether I did not state with sufficient distinctness that I wanted to know from those gentlemen who had expressed themselves so vehemently, so loudly, and so eloquently, if you please, in favor of some great fundamental principle which they wished to establish by this bill, what that great principle really was? Each one said that there was a great principle in it, which they did not risk even by voting for a proposition which their judgments approved. I turned to the honorable Senator from Georgia, I trust in no offensive manner, and asked what principle he wanted to establish by the bill. He said he wished to repeal that odious or infamous restriction called the Missouri compromise.

Mr. Toombs—I did not use the term. I said unconstitutional.

Mr. Atchison—I said infamous.

Mr. Bell.—I know some Senators spoke of it is infamous; but it does not matter in what terms that compromise is denounced. My object was to know what was the great principle to be established by this bill, which was so important that honorable Senators would sacrifice their own opinions and principles upon other questions, in order to effect that object. My honorable friend from Missouri [Mr. Atchison] said that if the bill contained a thousand objectionable features, they would not prevent him from voting to get rid of that infamous Missouri compromise. If such views—if that was the only object—had been avowed at the outset of this proceeding, how many supporters do you think the bill would have had even from the South? I believe, though I am not certain, that the honorable Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Butler] expressed the same sentiments in his remarks upon the Nebraska bill, before it passed the Senate. That honorable Senator, said that to repeal the Missouri compromise would be plucking a thorn from his side which had been a long time rankling there, and that consideration recommended the bill to his favor.

I had no idea of provoking the honorable Senator from Georgia, with whom I have been on relations of friendship, to attack upon me when I called upon him to know what was the great principle which he saw in the bill. I believe he is the only Senator from the South with whom I ever conversed, who thought that this was a good thing in itself. Of all other southern Senators with whom I have ever conversed on the subject, I do not remember a single one besides who did not deprecate the introduction of this measure of repeal. But they thought that they could not go against it, presented, as it seemed to be, from the North; though they believed no practical good would come to the South from it.

Now, it seems that the great subject of the honorable Senator from Georgia in supporting the bill as sent from the House of Representatives, is to get clear of the restriction of 1820—which, by-the-by, I will say, gave the highest renown to the authors of it which a public man in this country can attain—which gave repose to the country and preserved the harmony of the sections for a period of thirty years; and which has been acquiesced in by both sections of the Union from 1820 up to a very recent period. Now it is said to be infamous, and gentlemen say they are quite willing to risk the boiling cauldron at the North alluded to by the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Pettit,] in order to get released from that odious restriction. Sir, did the honorable Senator, when he first gave his adhesion to the repeal of the Missouri compromise, anticipate such a state of things as now exists at the North? I did not believe myself, during the period of the initiation of this measure, that the excitement would be so great at the North. I spoke with northern gentlemen about it. They thought there would be a deep feeling implanted at the North against the measure, but no great excitement would be created, except, perhaps, at the meetings which might be got up in the populous cities. Did any gentleman of the South, however, believe that such a state of things as now appears to exist at the North would arise? It may be that excitement and agitation at the North may subside. The present bubbling of the cauldron may soon evaporate after the passage of the bill; but the cauldron certainly exhibits a very high degree of fermentation and excitement just now.

Now, does the Senator mean to say that, merely to get rid of that statute—the restriction of 1820—as a lover of the Union, he would risk all the mischievious consequences which the honorable Senator from Indiana has held up to our view as likely to arise in the North? Is there no locus poenitentia.1

Mr. Toombs—You have a right to change.

Mr. Bell—But the honorable Senator will not. I suppose that the honorable Senator from Indiana [Mr. Pettit] would be prepared to change his opinion in regard to the importance of establishing what he regards as a great principle of this bill, if he were to find the consequences, which he described to-day as likely to arise before another session of Congress, would follow the repeal of the Missouri compromise. I do not think he would be so stubborn and obstinate as to insist, at all hazards upon getting his great principle established—upon furnishing that white sheet of paper, the tabula rasa,2 upon which the people of the Territory might write what they pleased and thus inaugurate the doctrine of squatter sovereignty, as promulgated by the Senator from Michigan, amended and improved by the admission to the right of suffrage foreigners not Naturalized as well as natives. Would he convulse the country for the sake of establishing such a principle, in violation all our territorial legislation for sixty years? I think he would not be so obstinate as the honorable Senator from Georgia; nor do I think he would have the same vindictive feeling against others for any change of their views on this subject. However I might have thought at first that I should be forced under the circumstances, to support this measure, however much I disapproved it, yet I tho’t better afterwards, and when I became satisfied that the mischiefs were likely to be far greater that I at first supposed they would be.

Now, sir, with regard to the constitution or anything else, which is to be vindicated or established by this bill as it now stands, what is the great principle involved in it? Why, sir, if you should acquire Cuba, what is the first thing you have to do [to] conform to the doctrine proclaimed in this bill? The first step to be taken will be to abolish slavery as a legally established institution. How else can the great principle contended for by the Senator from Indiana be inaugurated or established? [Freedom] in the operation of squatter sovereignty would require that Cuba should first be made a free territory, as you have provided in this bill that Nebraska shall be. I voted for the amendment to which the Senator has referred. I had no idea that such a principle was intended to be established, but still I do not say that that consideration regulated my vote. The principle contended for, when carried out, requires that you shall take the stylus and rub out or eradicate everything that is written on the tablet, and leave the inhabitants free to prescribe what shall be written upon it, untrammeled by any existing institution. That is the great principle, in addition to the repeal of the Missouri compromise, which the South are now so much determined upon; so zealous and united in supporting, that they will sacrifice any other principle, however substantial and important to the grand object. The squatter sovereignty clause is the grand feature in the bill. What has the South to gain by all this? But the honorable Senator from Georgia says he is not merely legislating for the South in the advocacy of this bill.  I know he is not. But this broad principle of squatter sovereignty was not the idea on which the repeal clause of this bill was inserted. I was assured then that the South had some interest in it; that it would secure, practically, a slave territory west of Missouri; that slavery would go into Kansas when the restriction of 1820 was removed. It was not dwelt on in argument; but my honorable friend from Missouri [Mr. Atchison] knows that that view was taken by him, and I differed from him in regard to it. I thought slavery could not go there; the honorable Senator though it could.

Mr. Atchison—And I still think so.

Mr. Bell.—Ay, more; the idea was diffused gradually throughout the south that another slave state might be secured west of Missouri. I said in my speech there would scarcely be a chance for it, as the bill then stood, or in any shape.

It is very well for the honorable Senator from Georgia to proclaim now that he is not legislating for any section; he certainly is not going for the South! I think that no southern man can show that the South has any particular interest in this bill, because it is not like the compromise of 1850; for in New Mexico and Utah you let the territory stand legally restricted or barred against slavery, as it was by public law. When that Territory was brought into the Union, Mr. Calhoun and some other honorable Senators contended that the Constitution would operate as a repeal of the Mexican law, abolishing slavery, and give protection to the slaveholder. Some other Senators doubted on that point.  The honorable Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Brown] can, perhaps, explain the different doctrines which then were held in the South on this subject.  At all events, the compromise acts of 1850 left the Territory as it was when annexed and allowed the people to interdict or establish slavery, as they please, when they should form their state constitution. That was the doctrine of the non-intervention then. What is it in this bill? I am in favor of the principle of non-intervention. Such non-intervention as would have given to the South Cuba as a slave state, should it ever be annexed to the United States; such non-intervention as that, if there had been no compact with regard to the admission of slave States to be carved out of Texas, would have secured to us those slave States, independent of the compact by which the United states are bound to admit them[.] But now, under the state of things now produced—under the feeling of distrust and resentment getting up at the North against the South—I predict—no, I will not predict, because it is too serious a subject—I will state that, if this state of thing shall not change essentially, the time will never come when a slave State can be admitted out of Texas. The non-intervention of 1850, was to let the Territories which come into the Union as slave territory be considered slave territory until the inhabitants determine, when they form a State constitution, that slavery should be abolished; and if it came in as a free territory, then the inhabitants to restrict or adopt slavery, at their discretion, when they form a State constitution. But by this bill you interpose to repeal the Missouri compromise, which would restore the territory to the condition of slave territory, as it was when annexed; but not content with that, you further interfere to make it a free territory. You then provide, without limitation of time or numbers, that the inhabitants shall decide in their Territorial Legislature to establish or prohibit slavery. Well, suppose the first Legislature shall admit slavery may not in the next abolish it, and thus keep up a perpetual struggle; while Congress, at the same time, may be agitated again by questions of further investigation? Yet this is a measure of peace to the country! It is to give quiet; all agitation is to cease under it!

I have further answer to make the honorable Senator from Georgia, though I find myself much exhausted. It was not my intention, when I rose to-day to explain the vote I should give on the amendment of the Senator from Maryland, [Mr. Pearce,] to provoke a debate upon the general merits or demerits of the bill, and still less had I any design to say anything offensive to any Senator; but the Senator from Georgia has thought proper to avail himself of the occasion to review my course in relation to this measure in a manner which calls for more special notice.

Several Senators.  Let us adjourn.

Mr. Bell.  I will not give way for an adjournment.

Mr. Clayton. I hope the Senator will give way.

Mr. Bell.  I cannot give way for an adjournment now. I must answer the honorable Senator. I was inquiring of honorable Senators what the great principle of the bill really was, which they had stated to be of so much importance to the country, but which none of them stated distinctly. I wished to see how far they agreed, or whether they could be reconciled, one with the other. The honorable Senator from Georgia said I ought to know what the principles of the bill were; that I had consultations with the friend of the measure at divers[e] times; that I met with them, heard everything discussed, and concurred with them. I do not know what meeting it was to which the Senator referred, and at which he supposes that I concurred in, authorizing the Senator from North Carolina to make his Statement.

Mr. Toombs.  I said that the southern Senators who were present authorized the Senator from North Carolina to make the statement which he did. I did not say that the Senator from Tennessee expressed any opinion; but he was present at the meeting.

Mr. Bell.  I was invited to attend meetings of the friends of the Nebraska bill. I went with pleasure to hear their discussions, because I had not made up my mind as to what course I could take upon the subject; but all the discussion which I heard at the two meetings which I attended was to the phraseology or form in which the Missouri compromise should be repealed or made inoperative, and the principle of popular sovereignty recognized, or how far it should be recognized or whether it should be recognized at all. The distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. Cass,] the Senator from Mississippi, [Mr. Brown,] and the Senator from Indiana, [Mr. Pettit,] were the principal speakers, and spoke of what they would or would not accept. I do not like to tell tales out of school; but as I have been arraigned, I think I may speak of such facts as may be pertinent to my case. Those points, as I remember, were not settled at the first meeting. I attended a second meeting, at which the differences appeared to be settled. The discussion at the two meetings when I attend did not enlighten me in the least. My mind was on the question whether there was anything in those featured of the bill which I ought to support, or which ought to be supported. I took no part in the discussion. It is true that at the same time I thought I might be forced to go for the measure; but the mere phraseology of the bill was then indifferent to me. Those meetings were held, if I am not mistaken, within a few days after the discussion opened in the Senate, and when the debate between the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Douglas] and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Chase] were having their full effect. In commencing the discussion, the Senator from Illinois displayed admirable tact in pouring such a fire as he did upon the Senators from Ohio, [Mr. Chase] and Massachusetts, [Mr. Sumner] and, as a consequence, exerting from them a response in sentiment so repugnant and offensive to southern Senators as was well calculated to stir the blood of every southern man, and to [diffuse] the impression through the country that the issue presented by the bill was between the advocates of southern rights and the ultra Free Soilers and Abolitionists of the North. I repeat, that I never saw a higher degree of parliamentary tact displayed than by the Senator from Illinois upon that occasion. The honorable Senator knows that I happened to see the inflammatory publication, on which he commented with such severity in his opening speech, before he did, and called his attention to it. It was of such a nature as to strongly incline the feelings and sympathies of southern Senators to the support of the bill, whatever they might think of its wisdom.

Mr. President, honorable Senators will perceive that this obtrusion of any matter personal to myself is not volunteered by me on this occasion. I have generally, heretofore, rested on my character, humble as it may be, to shield me from all imputations of gross impropriety or inconsistency, without troubling myself with attacks aliunde, or not arising directly out of the proceedings in the body to which I belong. The honorable Senator from Georgia has done me the honor, however, to notice me personally on this floor, and to arraign my conduct, as did a colleague of mine, [Mr. Churchwell,] in the other house, a few days ago. I have not the printed speech of that member. I do not know that it has been printed. I do not know whether his attack was so forcible, or eloquent, or so much to the satisfaction of gentlemen who would like to see me writhing under such personal charges, as the attack of the honorable Senator from Georgia; but I understood he was, in his manner, quite as offensive as in the matter of his attack. He produced and read from a paper, as I learn, which purported to be a copy of the proceedings of a meeting of southern Whig Senators, by which it appeared that a resolution was adopted declaring that the course of the National Intelligencer on the Nebraska bill was in opposition to the sentiment and interest of the South, and in opposition to the views of Southern Whig Senators; and that a committee was appointed to remonstrate or confer with the editors upon the subject. The paper also contained a statement of the southern Senators present, and that I was appointed chairman of a committee of three—all certified by the secretary of this meeting. When he was called upon for the name of the person who certified it, he said it would appear in print.

I will state the circumstances of the meeting, so far as I was connected to it. On the adjournment of the Senate, on the day of the meeting, a Senator took me by the arm, and asked me to walk into the ante-room. I asked him the object. He replied that there was to be a meeting of southern Whig Senators, upon some motion of a Senator, (naming him.) I went into the room with the gentlemen, and while standing with my hat in my hand, was surprised at hearing a Senator state that he thought some step should be taken in relation to the course of the Intelligencer, on the Nebraska bill, stating his reasons briefly. Another Senator made a few remarks, and on the suggestion of some one present, a resolution was drawn up, read and adopted. The voices of two or three, perhaps, were heard in assenting to it, but no one openly objected. Two Senators were named to be of the committee, one of whom objected, and named me in his place. On the question put by a senator, “Should the gentlemen named be the committee?” the proposition was acquiesced in. When the question was put on the committee, several Senators were on their feet, and I supposing that the meeting was over left the room. I had not taken my seat during the meeting.

My colleague [Mr. Churchwell] paraded, as I understand, a certified transcript of the resolution adopted at the meeting, and of the order appointing the committee, from which it would seem that all the proceedings were in regular form. I was made prominent on the committee as its chairman. A committee of three was certified. I know that was not true. Whoever gave the certificate of the proceedings, or drew it up, but have been mistaken—I will use no harsher term. I was not present at the meeting more than 10 minutes, or fifteen at the farthest. I regarded the whole proceeding, at the time, as I have treated it since, without feeling, and without and resentment against honorable Senators, as having been gotten up or suggested for some other object than the one I heard avowed. I believed that there were some present who thought they would be doing a very great service if they could get me committed on the Nebraska bill in such a way as to make it impossible for me to retrace my steps; and some of those present knew that I did not consider myself committed to the support of the bill. I suppose there were not more than seven or eight Senators present when I went into the room. I heard no roll called; I heard of the appointment of no secretary, no chairman. I was the last nominated on the committee; but before that, I had made up my mind as to the probable object of the meeting, or, at least of whoever prompted it. I know I should soon ascertain whether I was right or wrong in my conjecture as to the object of that meeting; but the only revenge I meditated was that no one should be the wiser from what they might hear from me in relation to it.

I have to sate further on this point, that although I have been almost daily associating on friendly terms with the gentlemen who attended the meeting in question, yet not one of the number has mentioned to me anything about the meeting since the day it took place. Not even after my colleague in the House arraigned me on the subject, has any honorable Senator, who was present at the meeting referred to, lisped to me anything about it. Nor was any resolution ever put into my hand as one of the committee by a secretary or any one else. No Senator ever inquired of me if I had executed the commission to which I was appointed at the meeting. No one ever asked me whether there was any change to be expected in the course of the National Intelligencer upon the subject.

But, sir, I had sufficient confirmation, a short time after the meeting, of the correctness of my conclusion as to the object of it. I allude to the speech of the honorable Senator from North Carolina, [Mr. Badger.] I am sorry that he is not now in his seat; but I will proceed, for I will not say anything personally offensive to him in his absence. The honorable Senator from North Carolina, who had been in that meeting of southern Whigs, when he came to make his speech, announced, at the close of it, that however southern Whig Senators might differ as to the reasoning on the doctrines which were involved in the discussion, he was authorized to say they were a unit on the main feature of the bill. Now, sir, that Senator could, by asking me, at any stage of the discussion, have ascertained my position. Soon after the commencement of the discussion, I was under the impression that I should be forced to go for the measure, whether I approved it or not, because I did not see how I could separate from my southern Whig friends and the southern delegation in Congress. If the Senator had asked me then what my course would be on the bill, I would have said to him frankly what I said to others, when they made the inquiry, that though I disapproved the measure, yet I did not see how I could separate from the southern delegation. At a later stage of the discussion I would have replied, that I was strongly disposed to oppose the measure; but, that still I would not commit myself to that course. The violation of Indian treaties proposed by the provisions of the bill would, at any time, have made it impossible that I could vote for it. The honorable Senator from Missouri [Mr. Atchison] knows better than any other Senator, that I could not vote for the bill with its present provisions, with any consistency of character or principle, but at the commencement of the discussion, I supposed that that difficulty would be removed by postponing the operation of the bill until the President could have time to make new treaties with the Indian tribes and, at least, qualify the wrong which was proposed to be done to them.

Mr. Atchison.  I will state now, that I understood from the honorable Senator from Tennessee, at the last session, when this question was pending before the Senate, as well as at the present session, that his great objections to the organization of territorial governments in Kansas and Nebraska, were, first, that there was no necessity, there being no white population there; and secondly, that it could not be without greatly disturbing our Indian relations.

Mr. Bell. And then will not the honorable Senator say that I thought the territory of west of Missouri was obliged to become a free state?

Mr. Atchison.  Most assuredly; but I told the honorable Senator that my opinion as to Kansas was different.

Mr. Bell.  I repeat, that I supposed, at one time, that the difficulty on the score of Indian compacts cold be obviated by an amendment postponing the operation of the bill till new treaties could be formed. I consulted the Senator from Missouri on the subject; but he said that no such amendment could be carried; that the people could not be restrained from entering the Indian country. That was when I supposed I should have to yield to the pressure of the storm of feeling which was excited on the question in the Senate; and it required all the nerve I had afterwards to resist its force.

But, sir, I was going on to say that the honorable Senator from North Carolina, standing in the relation of a personal friend to me should have ascertained from my own lips what course I proposed to adopt in relation to the bill, before he made the declaration he did at the close of his speech. He could scarcely have supposed that I was so dull and stupid as not to comprehend the true purpose of the meeting out southern Whigs which I attended, or a test of the bill by anything which took place there. I have said before, that I had no unkind feelings againse the members of that meeting, for some of them told me over and over again, that I would be dead politically, that my standing as a public man would be utterly destroyed, if  I should vote against the bill. I was told again and again, that no southern men could vote with the northern Abolitionists upon this bill without losing the confidence of the South, as it was all-important that the South should present an unbroken front on such a question. That was one reason why I pressed so strongly to-day to know what was the great fundamental principle in the bill so much affecting the southern interests; what was the greater and larger principle which had loomed up to imposingly before the visions of southern gentlemen, that every other principle or consideration of policy should yield to it.

The honorable Senator from North Carolina is now present, and I will repeat what I have said in relation to his statement, at the close of his speech. I thought I had a right to complain of him, as a friend, that he did not inquire of me what course I had determined to pursue, when I could have done it so conveniently, before making the announcement that the southern Whigs were a unit on the Nebraska bill. That senator and myself had occupied seats very near each other during the whole discussion. Our relations, personally and socially, were kind and friendly; notwithstanding, he did not think proper to ask my opinion, but, at the close of his speech, said he was authorized to say every Whig Senator from the south concurred in the conclusion to support the bill.

Mr. Badger.  Will the Senator allow me to explain?

Mr. Bell.  I am willing that the Senator shall explain, but I do not wish any material interruption for I have a great deal more to say.

Mr. Badger.  My dear sir, I do not want a statement of that kind, as to a matter of fact, to go out without having an opportunity of stating what the fact is, as I understand it.

The Presiding Officer. (Mr. Weller is in the chair.)  Unless the honorable Senator from Tennessee yields the floor, the Senator from North Carolina is not entitled to proceed.

Mr. Bell.  I yield the floor.

Mr. Badger.  The statement which I made at the close of the remarks which I submitted to the Senate, on the Nebraska bill, I believe was to this effect that, although I did not hold my southern Whig friends responsible for the course of argument which I had adopted, yet, I thought I was authorized to say, that as to the conclusion at which I had arrived, we all stood as one man; and that I thought I had their authority for saying so. That was the statement which I made. I must say, sir, without going into particulars, that I thought, at that time, I had just the same reason to suppose that my fried from Tennessee was going for the bill, as I had to suppose that I was. In the meeting which has been alluded to by my friend from Georgia, it was suggested that the southern Whig members of this body were liable to this difficulty; that no vote was being taken, it was a matter of doubt in the country, what course they would pursue in regard to this subject, and that inconvenient consequences were resulting from that position. It was understood that I had the floor, to speak either on that day, or the next. I forget which, and I said: “Well, then, gentlemen, I had better take the occasion to say, in the course of my remarks that we are all agreed in the support of this bill.” I heard a general response: “Yes, do so by all means.” Whether my friend from Tennessee joined in this response or not, I do not know; because as witnesses very frequently say, when they are called upon to state particulars, in courts of justice, as all of us know, “I cannot answer that precisely, as I did not expect to be called upon.” [Laughter.] I certainly thought I was requested by the meeting of Whig Senators, then and there present, of whom my friend from Tennessee was one—not only authorized, but requested—in order to anticipate the delay which must take place before they could either vote or speak on the subject, that whatever course of reasoning we might adopt in bringing us to the conclusion, in support of the bill, we were all united.

Mr. Bell.  In consequence of that meeting?

Mr. Badger.  I made that remark in the conclusion of my speech. My honorable fried from Tennessee sat immediately before me. He said nothing by way of dissent, after I had concluded my speech, and passed out—

Mr. Bell.  Passed out where?

Mr. Badger.  Right there, just out of my seat. The Senator came to me and said: “why have you committed me to support this bill.”

Mr. Bell.  I said no such thing.

Mr. Badger.  Something of that sort.

Mr. Bell.  What I said was: “Mr. Badger, you had no right to commit me to support of the bill.”

Mr. Badger.  Probably that was it.

Mr. Clayton.  Let me interfere between my friends?

Mr. Badger.  Not yet.  I am willing to make any statement about the language, because, as I said, I did not expect to be called upon; but only say, a remark of that kind was made by my friend, which attracted my attention, because I had supposed I was speaking, not only by his authority, but at his instance, in making that remark.

Mr. Bell.  On what occasion?

Mr. Badger.  This very occasion now referred to.

Mr. Bell.  That is what I suppose, and I consider it full confirmation of my conjectures in regard to that transaction.

Mr. Clayton.  Will my friend now give me the floor for a moment?

Mr. Bell.  Certainly.

Mr. Clayton.  These are my friends, and I think I understand exactly the state of the case. There is a misapprehension between them, that I am anxious to correct it. There is no reason whatever for any feeling between them, and whom I have made the explanation which I am about to make, I think they will both agree that neither of them has any occasion whatever to complain of the other.

Mr. Badger.  I have no feeling whatever about it.

Mr. Clayton.  The facts were these.  The southern Whigs in this body were unanimous in favor of the repeal of the Missouri compromise. They had consulted with each other, not in a caucus, but we understood from private conversations with each other, that we all thought that the Missouri compromise line ought to be repealed.

Mr. Badger.  That we were all in favor of the provision as it stood in the bill. That is what I understood.

Mr. Clayton.  Then the Intelligencer paper took ground hostile to the position—

Mr. Bell.  I must stop the Senator from Delaware. I cannot admit his statement. We should soon get into a quarrel.

Mr. Clayton.  If that is the case I will give up. I do not wish to get into a quarrel with my friend from Tennessee.

Mr. Bell.  The Senator says we were all agreed that the Missouri compromise shold be repealed. That is the statement of the honorable Senator from Delaware.

Mr. Clayton.  Did not the honorable Senator himself take that ground in his speech?

Mr. Bell.  I never did.

Mr. Clayton.  Then I entirely misunderstood the honorable Senator, and beg his pardon.

Mr. Bell.  I know that the honorable Senator from Delaware did not intend to misrepresent me.

Mr. Clayton.  Not at all.

Mr. Bell.  But the honorable Senator from North Carolina, though it was so easy for him to have ascertained my opinion, spoke of the opinion of all the Southern Whigs. He did not ask me about it.

Mr. Badger.  I thought I had the Senator’s authority already.

Mr. Bell.  From anything I ever said?

Mr. Badger.  I have already said that we had a meeting, at which the Senator from Tennessee was present; and, when I suggested this, there was a general expression of approbation that I should—

Mr. Bell.  Do what?

Mr. Badger.  That I should state we were all agreed in support of the bill.

Mr. Bell.  That all the southern Whigs were agreed upon it?

Mr. Badger.  Yes. That is what I understood. It was a meeting of the southern Whigs.

Mr. Bell.  I could not make such a declaration. Did the honorable Senator from Delaware hear such a proposition?

Mr. Clayton.  I was proceeding to explain, but the Senator would not permit me.

Mr. Bell.  I pronounce that there was no such question put. The honorable Senator from North Carolina is mistaken.

Mr. Badger.  I do not say there was any question put.

Mr. Bell.  Nor was it asked in my hearing.

Mr. Badger.  As we were breaking up, the suggestion was thrown out that it was uncertain in the country, how southern Whig Senators stood on this bill; and I then suggested that, as I was to make a speech, it would perhaps be well for me to take the occasion of saying we were all agreed. I think my friend from Louisiana [Mr. Benjamin,] was at that meeting, and he can say whether I am right or not. There was a general declaration, “By all means do it!”

Mr. Bell.  Then I was not at that meeting.

Mr. Badger.  I will not say the Senator from Tennessee was there but I thought he was.

Mr. Bell. Now, sir, the honorable Senator from North Carolina could easily have ascertained my sentiments at any moment.

Mr. Badger.  I thought I knew these already.

Mr. Bell.  I say that no such question as that stated by the honorable Senator was asked at that meeting when I was present. If it were, it was out of my hearing.  I have before referred to the course of one of my colleagues in the House [Mr. Churchwell] on this subject. My colleagues stated that I was the chairman of the committee appointed at the meeting of the southern Whig Senators, and, as I was present and did not object, he very naturally and rationally inferred that I was in favor of the repeal of the Missouri compromise at that time, so upon no other supposition would I have undertaken such a commission to remonstrate with the editors of an independent journal against their course on the Nebraska bill. I therefore have no feeling against him on that ground; but I have some faults to find with him on the same ground that I found with the honorable Senator from North Carolina.

The honorable gentleman to whom I allude had my confidence, and was well informed as to my views and opinions on the subject of the Nebraska bill from the time of its introduction in the Senate. He professed to be my personal friend during the whole period of the pendency of the bill in the Senate; and conferred with me frequently on the subject before the meeting of the southern Whig Senators, and afterwards. In one of those conferences he was pleased to say that he had more confidence in my judgment, on questions of this description than in that of any other public man he knew; and that he should defer very much to my views, though he did not say he would be guided by them.

Some few days, or a week, after the discussion on the bill commenced, he came to my seat in the Senate, while the debate was going on, and asked me if I had made up my mind on the question. I replied that I had not. He then said that he was going home for his family, and, as the people would be making inquiries of him as to my course on the subject, he wished to know what to say to them and he wished to know on his own account. I then told him that I would not decide on my course until he returned, unless the bill should be brought to a vote before he got back. During his absence, in my conversations with other colleagues of mine in the House, I told them repeatedly that if I took ground in opposition to the measure, I thought I might rely on having our colleague [Mr. Churchwell] with me; and I told them, confidentially, the grounds upon which my confidence was based. After he returned I met him, and told him that I had determined to oppose the bill, and I then asked him what he thought he should do. He said he would reserve his decision as long as he could; perhaps until the close of the debate in the House.

I do not think that I would be mistaken in stating that not more than three or four days or a week elapsed, from that time until he made his speech in the House, without my having some conversation with him, as to the course he proposed to take on the Nebraska bill, and I was left in doubt as to what it would be until the evening before he made his speech when he informed me that he would vote for the bill. I said to him: “You are surely not sincere?” He replied that he was.”

At this point the honorable Senator yielded, at the solicitation of several Senators, and the Senate adjourned.

_______________

1 Place of repentance.

2 Clean slate.

SOURCE:  “Speech of Hon. John Bell of Tennessee,” The Tennessean, Nashville, Tennessee, Tuesday, June 13, 1854, p. 2