Showing posts with label The Buchanan Administration. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The Buchanan Administration. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 16, 2018

Governor Salmon P. Chase to Senator Charles Sumner, December 13, 1856

State Of Ohio, Executive Department,                       
Columbus, Dec 13, 1856.

Dear Sumner, I long to hear of you at the Capitol, but I long infinitely more to hear of your perfect restoration. At the present moment you are not greatly needed at Washington. Nothing can be done now but to announce principles, & make test questions. A year hence it will be important to have our strongest men in the field. Mr. Buchanan's Administration will then be fairly under way. For that time you should be prepared, &, if need be, reserved. I write this because I see it stated that you propose going to Washington about the first of January. Let me beg you to risk nothing; but to lay aside every care except that of your own restoration. You will of course be reelected. Why not let the present session go, & take a trip somewhere out of sight and as far as possible out of recollection, of disturbing & exciting causes. If your friends think it well, you might resign that your place this session be filled by somebody else. Then be whole for the next session.

My intelligence from Kansas is encouraging. The reasons for believing it will be a free state preponderate more & more. I expect next week the return of a gentleman whom I sent to the territory to ascertain the precise condition & to bear to Gov Geary a letter in behalf of the prisoners, & to them some little relief. I hope the best. But for our cause — we must make a deeper issue; believe that right is expedient; be consistent & trust the people. Then I believe will come the day when the Republic, restored to its original policy, will renew her strength & move forward in the fulfilment of her sublime mission, with the applause of all the patriotic & all the good. Talia sӕcla, cunite.

Affectionately yours,
[SALMON P. CHASE.]

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. ChaseAnnual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 274-5

Wednesday, September 20, 2017

Joseph Holt to Abraham Lincoln, January 15, 1862

St Louis Jan 15th 1862
Dear Sir.

I cannot repress the desire that I feel as an American citizen to thank you — which I do from my heart — for the appointment of the present Secretary of War. In him you will find a friend true as steel, & a support, which no pressure from within or from without, will ever shake. It was my fortune to know him during the darkest days of the late administration & I think I know him well. With his great talents, he is the soul of honor, of courage, & of loyalty. In the progress of the terrible events inseperable from the struggle for the life of our country, in which you are heroically engaged, you can assign to Edwin M. Stanton no duty however stern, or solemn or self-sacrificing, which he will not nobly & efficiently perform.

Very Sincerely
Yours
J Holt.

Monday, September 19, 2016

Salmon P. Chase to Alphonso Taft, April 28, 1861

washington, April 28, 1861.

My Dear Sir: To correct misapprehensions, except by acts, is an almost vain endeavor. You may say, however, to all whom it may concern, that there is no ground for the ascription to me by Major Brown of the sentiment to which you allude.

True it is that before the assault on Fort Sumter, in anticipation of an attempt to provision famishing soldiers of the Union, I was decidedly in favor of a positive policy and against the notion of drifting — the Micawber policy of “waiting for something to turn up.”

As a positive policy, two alternatives were plainly before us. (1) That of enforcing the laws of the Union by its whole power and through its whole extent; or (2) that of recognizing the organization of actual government by the seven seceded States as an accomplished revolution — accomplished through the complicity of the late administration and letting the Confederacy try its experiment of separation; but maintaining the authority of the Union and treating secession as treason everywhere else.

Knowing that the former of these alternatives involved destructive war, and vast expenditure, and oppressive debt, and thinking it possible that through the latter these great evils might  be avoided, the union of the other States preserved unbroken, the return even of the seceded States, after an unsatisfactory experiment of separation, secured, and the great cause of freedom and constitutional government peacefully vindicated — thinking, I say, these things possible, I preferred the latter alternative.

The attack on Fort Sumter, however, and the precipitation of Virginia into hostility to the National Government, made this latter alternative impracticable, and I had then no hesitation about recurring to the former. Of course, I insist on the most vigorous measures, not merely for the preservation of the Union and the defense of the Government, but for the constitutional re-establishment of the full authority of both throughout the land.

In laboring for these objects I know hardly the least cessation, and begin to feel the wear as well as the strain of them. When my criticizers equal me in labor and zeal, I shall most cheerfully listen to their criticisms.

All is safe here now. Baltimore is repenting, and by repentance may be saved, if she adds works meet for repentance. Soon something else will be heard of.

Yours truly,
S. P. Chase.
Hon. Alphonso Taft.

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 366-7

Wednesday, September 7, 2016

Montgomery Blair to Abraham Lincoln, March 15, 1861

Post Office Department
Washington March 15th 1861.
Sir

In reply to your interrogatory whether in my opinion it is wise to provision Fort Sumpter under present circumstances, I submit the following considerations in favor of provisioning that Fort—

The ambitious leaders of the late Democratic party have availed themselves of the disappointment attendant upon defeat in the late Presidential election to found a Military Government in the Seceding States. To the connivance of the late administration it is due alone that this Rebellion has been enabled to attain its present proportions– It has grown by this complicity into the form of an organized Government in Seven States and up to this moment nothing has been done to check its progress or prevent its being regarded either at home or abroad as a successful revolution– Every hour of acquiescence in this condition of things and especially every new conquest made by the rebels strengthens their hands at home and their claim to recognition as an independent people abroad. It has from the beginning and still is treated practically as a lawful proceeding and the honest and Union loving people in those States must by a continuance of this policy become reconciled to the new Government and though founded in wrong come to be regard it as rightful Government.

I in common with all my associates in your council agree that we must look to the people of these States for the overthrow of this rebellion and that it is proper to exercise the powers of the Federal Government only so far as to maintain its authority to collect the revenue and maintain possession of the public property in the states and that this should be done with as little blood-shed as possible. How is this to be carried into effect? That it is by measures which will inspire respect for the power of the Government and the firmness of those who administer it does not admit of debate.

It is equally obvious that rebellion was checked in 1833 by the promptitude of the President in taking measures which made it manifest that it could not be attempted with impunity and that it has grown to its present formidable proportions only because similar measures were not taken.

The action of the President in 1833 inspired respect whilst in 1860 the rebels were encouraged by the contempt they felt for the incumbent of the Presidency.

But it was not alone upon Mr. Buchanans weakness the rebels relied for success. They for the most part believe that the Northern men are deficient in the courage necessary to maintain the Government. It is this prevalent error in the South which induces so large a portion of the people there to suspect the good faith of the people of the North and enables the demagogues so successfully to inculcate the notion that the object of the Northern people is to abolish Slavery and make the Negroes the equals of the whites. Doubting the manhood of northern men they discredit their disclaimers of a this purpose to humiliate and injure them—

Nothing would so surely gain credit for such disclaimers as the manifestation of resolution on the part of the President to maintain the lawful authority of the nation – no men or people have so many difficulties as those whose firmness is doubted.

The evacuation of Fort Sumpter when it is known that it can be provisioned and manned will convince the rebels that the administration lacks firmness and will therefore tend more than any event that has happened to embolden them and so far therefore from tending to prevent collision will, ensure it unless all the other forts are evacuated and all attempts are given up to maintain the authority of the United States.

Mr. Buchanans policy has I think re-rendered collision almost inevitable & a continuance of that policy will not only bring it about but will go far to produce a permanent division of the Union.

This is manifestly the public Judgment which is much more to be relied on than that of any individual: I believe that Fort Sumpter may be provisioned and relieved by Captn Fox with little risk and Genl. Scotts opinion that with its war compliment there is no force in South Carolina which can take it – renders it almost certain that it will not then be attempted. This would completely demoralize the Rebellion. The impotent rage of the Rebels and the outburst of patriotic feeling which would follow this achievement would initiate a reactionary movement throughout the South which would speedily overwhelm the traitors. No expense or care should therefore be spared to achieve this success—

The appreciation of our stocks will pay for the most lavish outlay to make it one. Nor will the result be materially different to the nation if the attempt fails and its gallant leader and followers are lost. It will in any event vindicate the hardy courage of the North and the determination of the people and their President to maintain the authority of the Government, & this is all that is wanting in my judgment to restore it.

You should give no thought for the Commander and his comrades in this enterprize– They willingly take the hazards for the sake of the country and the honor which, successful or not, they will receive from you and the lovers of free Government in all lands.

I am Sir very respectfully
Yr obt sevt
M. Blair
To the President

William H. Seward to Abraham Lincoln, March 15, 1861

Department of State
Washington, 15th March, 1861.

The President submits to me the following question, namely, “Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances, is it wise to attempt it?”

If it were possible to peacefully provision Fort Sumter, of course I should answer that it would be both unwise and inhuman not to attempt it. But the facts of the case are known to be, that the attempt must be made with the employment of a military and marine force, which would provoke combat, and probably initiate a civil war, which the Government of the United States would be committed to maintain through all changes to some definite conclusion.

History must record that a sectional party practically constituting a majority of the people of the fifteen Slave States, excited to a high state of jealous apprehension for the safety of life and property, by impassioned, though groundless appeals, went into the late election with a predetermined purpose, if unsuccessful at the polls, to raise the standard of secession immediately afterwards, and to separate the Slave States, or so many of them as could be detached from the Union, and to organize them in a new, distinct, and independent confederacy: that party was unsuccessful at the polls. In the frenzy which followed the announcement of their defeat, they put the machinery of the State Legislatures and conventions into motion, and within the period of three months, they have succeeded in obtaining ordinances of secession by which seven of the Slave States have seceded and organized a new Confederacy under the name of the Confederated States of America. These States finding a large number of the mints, customhouses, forts and arsenals of the United States situate within their limits, unoccupied, undefended, and virtually abandoned by the late Administration, have seized and appropriated them to their own use, and under the same circumstances have seized and appropriated to their own use, large amounts of money and other public property of the United States, found within their limits. The people of the other Slave States, divided and balancing between sympathy with the seceding slave States and loyalty to the Union, have been intensely excited, but, at the present moment, indicate a disposition to adhere to the Union, if nothing extraordinary shall occur to renew excitement and produce popular exasperation. This is the stage in this premeditated revolution, at which we now stand.

The opening of this painful controversy, at once raised the question whether it would be for the interest of the country to admit the projected dismemberment, with its consequent evils, or whether patriotism and humanity require that it shall be prevented. As a citizen, my own decision on this subject was promptly made, namely, that the Union is inestimable and even indispensable to the welfare and happiness of the whole country, and to the best interests of mankind. As a statesman in the public service, I have not hesitated to assume that the Federal government is committed to maintain preserve and defend the Union, peaceably if it can, forcibly if it must, to every extremity. Next to Disunion itself, I regard civil war as the most disastrous and deplorable of national calamities, and as the most uncertain and fearful of all remedies for political disorders. I have therefore made it the study and labor of the hour, how to save the Union from dismemberment by peaceful policy and without civil war.

Influenced by these sentiments, I have felt that it is exceedingly fortunate that, to a great extent, the Federal government occupies, thus far, not an aggressive attitude, but, practically, a defensive one, while the necessity for action, if civil war is to be initiated, falls on those who seek to dismember and subvert this Union.

It has seemed to me equally fortunate that the Disunionists are absolutely without any justification for their rash and desperate designs. The administration of the Government had been for a long time virtually in their own hands, and controlled and directed by themselves, when they began the work of revolution. They had therefore no other excuse than apprehension of oppression from the new and adverse administration which was about to come into power

It seemed to me farther, to be a matter of good fortune that the new and adverse administration must come in with both Houses of Congress containing majorities opposed to its policy, so that, even if it would, it could commit no wrong or injustice against the States which were being madly goaded into revolution. Under the circumstances, Disunion could have no better basis to stand upon than a blind unreasoning popular excitement, arising out of a simple and harmless disappointment in a Presidential election – that excitement, if it should find no new aliment, must soon subside and leave Disunion without any real support. On the other hand, I have believed firmly that every where, even in South Carolina, devotion to the Union is a profound and permanent national sentiment which, although it may be suppressed and silenced by terror for a time, could, if encouraged, be ultimately relied upon to rally the people of the seceding States to reverse, upon due deliberation, all the popular acts of legislatures and Conventions by which they were hastily and violently committed to Disunion.

The policy of the time, therefore, has seemed to me to consist in conciliation, which should deny to the Disunionists any new provocation or apparent offence, while it would enable the Unionists in the slave states to maintain, with truth and with effect, that the claims and apprehensions put forth by the Disunionists, are groundless and false.

I have not been ignorant of the objection that the Administration was elected through the activity of the Republican party, that it must continue to deserve and retain the confidence of that party while conciliation towards the Slave States tends to demoralize the Republican party itself, on which party the main responsibility of maintaining the Union must rest.

But it has seemed to me a sufficient answer first, that the Administration could not demoralize the Republican party without making some sacrifice of its essential principles when no such sacrifice is necessary or is any where authoritatively proposed; and secondly, if it be indeed true that pacification is necessary to prevent dismemberment of the Union and civil war, or either of them, no patriot and lover of humanity could hesitate to surrender party for the higher interests of country and humanity.

Partly by design, partly by chance, this policy has been hitherto pursued by the last Administration of the Federal government and by the Republican party in its corporate action. It is by this policy thus pursued, I think, that the progress of dismemberment has been arrested after the seven Gulf States had seceded, and the Border States yet remain, although they do so uneasily, in the Union.

It is to a perseverance in this policy for a short time longer that I look as the only peaceful means of assuring the continuance of Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri and Arkansas, or most of those States, in the Union. It is through their good and patriotic offices that I look to see the Union sentiment revived and brought once more into activity in the seceding States, and through this agency those states themselves returning into the Union.

I am not unaware that I am conceding more than can reasonably be demanded by the people of the Border States. They could, speaking justly, demand nothing. They are bound by the federal obligation to adhere to the Union without concession or conciliation just as much as the people of the Free States are. But in administration we must deal with men, facts and circumstances not as they ought to be, but as they are.

The fact then is that while the people of the Border States desire to be loyal, they are at the same time sadly though temporarily demoralized by a sympathy for the Slave States which makes them forget their loyalty whenever there are any grounds for apprehending that the Federal Government will resort to military coercion against the seceding States, even though such coercion should be necessary to maintain the authority or even the integrity of the Union. This sympathy is unreasonable, unwise and dangerous, and therefore cannot, if left undisturbed, be permanent. It can be banished, however, only in one way, and that is by giving time for it to wear out and for reason to resume its sway. Time will do this, if it be not hindered by new alarms and provocations.

South Carolina opened the revolution Apprehending chastisement by the military arm of the United States, she seized all the Forts of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, except Fort Sumter, which, garrisoned by less than one hundred men, stands practically in a state of siege, but at the same time defying South Carolina and, as the seceding States imagine, menacing her with conquest. Every one knows, first, that even if Sumter were adequately reinforced, it would still be practically useless to the Government, because the administration in no case could attempt to subjugate Charleston or the State of South Carolina.

It is held now only because it is the property of the United States and is a monument of their authority and sovereignty. I would so continue to hold it so long as it can be done without involving some danger or evil greater than the advantage of continued possession. The highest military authority tells us that without supplies the garrison must yield in a few days to starvation, that its numbers are so small that it must yield in a few days to attack by the assailants lying around it, and that the case in this respect would remain the same even if it were supplied but not reinforced. All the military and naval authorities tell us, that any attempt at supplies would be unavailing without the employment of armed military and naval force. If we employ armed force for the purpose of supplying the fort, we give all the provocation that could be offered by combining reinforcement with supply.

The question submitted to me then, practically, is, Supposing it to be possible to reinforce and supply Fort Sumter, is it wise now to attempt it, instead of withdrawing the garrison. The most that could be done by any means now in our hands, would be to throw 250 to 400 men into the garrison with provisions for supplying it for six months. In this active and enlightened country, in this season of excitement with a daily press, daily mails and incessantly operating telegraph, the design to reinforce and supply the garrison must become known to the opposite party at Charleston as soon, at least, as preparation for it should begin. The garrison would then almost certainly fall by assault before the expedition could reach the harbor of Charleston. But supposing the secret kept, the expedition must engage in conflict on entering the harbor of Charleston, suppose it to be overpowered and destroyed, is that new outrage to be avenged or are we then to return to our attitude of immobility? Shall we be allowed to do so? Moreover, in that event, what becomes of the garrison?

Suppose the expedition successful– We have then a garrison in Fort Sumter that can defy assault for six months. What is it to do then? Is it to make war by opening its batteries and attempting to demolish the defences of the Carolinians? Can it demolish them if it tries? If it cannot, what is the advantage we shall have gained? If it can, how will it serve to check or prevent Disunion? In either case, it seems to me that we will have inaugurated a civil war by our own act, without an adequate object, after which reunion will be hopeless, at least under this administration, or in any other way than by a popular disavowal, both of the war and of the administration which unnecessarily commenced it. Fraternity is the element of Union. War the very element of disunion. Fraternity, if practiced by this administration, will rescue the Union from all its dangers. If this administration, on the other hand, take up the sword, then an opposition party will offer the olive branch and will, as it ought, profit by the restoration of peace and Union.

I may be asked, whether I would in no case and at no time, advise force – whether I propose to give up everything. I reply, no, I would not initiate a war to regain a useless and unnecessary position on the soil of the seceding States. I would not provoke war in any way now. I would resort to force to protect the collection of the revenue, because this is a necessary as well as a legitimate union object. Even then, it should be only a naval force that I would employ, for that necessary purpose– While I would defer military action on land until a case should arise when we would hold the defence. In that case, we should have the spirit of the country and the approval of mankind on our side. In the other, we should peril peace and Union, because we had not the courage to practice prudence and moderation at the cost of temporary misapprehension. If this counsel seems to be impassive and even unpatriotic, I console myself by the reflection that it is such as Chatham gave to his country under circumstances not widely different.

William H. Seward

Tuesday, November 24, 2015

Diary of William Howard Russell: April 27, 1861

Mrs. Trescot, it seems, spent part of her night in attendance on a young gentleman of color, who was introduced into the world in a state of servitude by his poor chattel of a mother. Such kindly acts as these are more common than we may suppose; and it would be unfair to put a strict or unfair construction on the motives of slave owners in paying such attention to their property. Indeed, as Mrs. Trescot says, “When people talk of my having so many slaves, I always tell them it is the slaves who own me. Morning, noon, and night, I'm obliged to look after them, to doctor them, and attend to them in every way.” Property has its duties, you see, madam, as well as its rights.

The planter's house is quite new, and was built by himself; the principal material being wood, and most of the work being done by his own negroes. Such work as window-sashes and panellings, however, was executed in Charleston. A pretty garden runs at the back, and from the windows there are wide stretches of cotton-fields visible, and glimpses of the river to be seen.

After breakfast our little party repaired to the river side, and sat under the shade of some noble trees waiting for the boat which was to bear us to the fishing grounds. The wind blew up stream, running with the tide, and we strained our eyes in vain for the boat. The river is here nearly a mile across, — a noble estuary rather, — with low banks lined with forests, into which the axe has made deep forays and clearings for cotton-fields.

It would have astonished a stray English traveller, if, penetrating the shade, he heard in such an out-of-the-way place familiar names and things spoken of by the three lazy persons who were stretched out — cigar in mouth — on the ant-haunted trunks which lay prostrate by the seashore. Mr. Trescot spent some time in London as attaché to the United States Legation, was a club man, and had a large circle of acquaintance among the young men about town, of whom he remembered many anecdotes and peculiarities, and little adventures. Since that time he was Under-Secretary of State in Mr. Buchanan's administration, and went out with Secession. He is the author of a very agreeable book on a dry subject, “The History of American Diplomacy,” which is curious enough as an unconscious exposition of the anti-British jealousies, and even antipathies, which have animated American statesmen since they were created. In fact, much of American diplomacy means hostility to England, and the skilful employment of the anti-British sentiment at their disposal in their own country and elsewhere. Now he was talking pleasantly of people he had met — many of them mutual friends.”Here is the boat at last!” I had been sweeping the broad river with my glass occasionally, and at length detected a speck on its broad surface moving down towards us, with a white dot marking the foam at its bows. Spite of wind and tideway, it came rapidly, and soon approached us, pulled by six powerful negroes, attired in red-flannel jackets and white straw hats with broad ribbons. The craft itself — a kind of monster canoe, some forty-five feet long, narrow, wall-sided, with high bow and raised stern — lay deep in the water, for there were extra negroes for the fishing, servants, baskets of provisions, water buckets, stone jars of less innocent drinking, and abaft there was a knot of great strong planters, — Elliots all — cousins, uncles, and brothers. A friendly hail as they swept up along-side, — an exchange of salutations.

“Well, Trescot, have you got plenty of Crabs?"

A groan burst forth at his insouciant reply. He had been charged to find bait, and he had told the negroes to do so, and the negroes had not done so. The fishermen looked grievously at each other, and fiercely at Trescot, who assumed an air of recklessness, and threw doubts on the existence of fish in the river, and resorted to similar miserable subterfuges; indeed, it was subsequently discovered that he was an utter infidel in regard to the delights of piscicapture.

“Now, all aboard! Over, you fellows, and take these gentlemen in!" The negroes were over in a moment, waist deep, and, each taking one on his back, deposited us dry in the boat. I only mention this to record the fact, that I was much impressed by a practical demonstration from my bearer respecting the strong odor of the skin of a heated African. I have been wedged up in a column of infantry on a hot day, and have marched to leeward of Ghoorkhas in India, but the overpowering pungent smell of the negro exceeds everything of the kind I have been unfortunate enough to experience.

The vessel was soon moving again, against a ripple, caused by the wind, which blew dead against us; and, notwithstanding the praises bestowed on the boat, it was easy to perceive [t]hat the labor of pulling such a dead-log-like thing through the water told severely on the rowers, who had already come some twelve miles, I think. Nevertheless, they were told to sing, and they began accordingly one of those wild Baptist chants about the Jordan in which they delight, — not destitute of music, but utterly unlike what is called an Ethiopian melody.

The banks of the river on both sides are low; on the left covered with wood, through which, here and there, at intervals, one could see a planter's or overseer's cottage. The course of this great combination of salt and fresh water sometimes changes, so that houses are swept away and plantations submerged; but the land is much valued nevertheless, on account of the fineness of the cotton grown among the islands. “Cotton at twelve cents a pound, and we don't fear the world.”

As the boat was going to the fishing ground, which lay towards the mouth of the river at Hilton Head, our friends talked politics and sporting combined, — the first of the usual character, the second quite new.

I heard much of the mighty devil-fish which frequents these waters. One of our party, Mr. Elliot, sen., a tall, knotty, gnarled sort of man, with a mellow eye and a hearty voice, was a famous hand at the sport, and had had some hair-breadth escapes in pursuit of it. The fish is described as of enormous size and strength, a monster ray, which possesses formidable antennae-like horns, and a pair of huge fins, or flappers, one of which rises above the water as the creature moves below the surface. The hunters, as they may be called, go out in parties, — three or four boats, or more, with good store of sharp harpoons and tow-lines, and lances. When they perceive the creature, one boat takes the lead, and moves down towards it, the others following, each with a, harpooner standing in the bow. The devil-fish sometimes is wary, and dives, when it sees a boat, taking such a long spell below that it is never seen again. At other times, however, it backs, and lets the boat come so near as to allow of the harpooner striking it, or it dives for a short way and comes up near the boats again. The moment the harpoon is fixed, the line is paid out by the rush of the creature, which is made with tremendous force, and all the boats at once hurry up, so that one after another they are made fast to that in which the lucky sportsman is seated. At length, when the line is run out, checked from time to time as much as can be done with safety, the crew take their oars and follow the course of the ray, which swims so fast, however, that it keeps the line taut, and drags the whole flotilla seawards. It depends on its size and strength to determine how soon it rises to the surface; by degrees the line is warped in and hove short till the boats are brought near, and when the ray comes up it is attacked with a shower of lances and harpoons, and dragged off into shoal water to die.

On one occasion, our Nimrod told us, he was standing in the bows of the boat, harpoon in hand, when a devil-fish came up close to him; he threw the harpoon, struck it, but at the same time the boat ran against the creature with a shock which threw him right forward on its back, and in an instant it caught him in its horrid arms and plunged down with him to the depths. Imagine the horror of the moment! Imagine the joy of the terrified drowning, dying man, when, for some inscrutable reason, the devil-fish relaxed its grip, and enabled him to strike for the surface, where he was dragged into the boat more dead than alive by his terror-smitten companions, — the only man who ever got out of the embraces of the thing alive. “Tom is so tough that even a devil-fish could make nothing out of him.”

At last we came to our fishing ground. There was a substitute found for the favorite crab, and it was fondly hoped our toils might be rewarded with success. And these were toils, for the water is deep and the lines heavy. But to alleviate them, some hampers were produced from the stern, and wonderful pies from Mrs. Trescot's hands, and from those of fair ladies up the river whom we shall never see, were spread out, and bottles which represented distant cellars in friendly nooks far away. “No drum here! Up anchor, and pull away a few miles lower down.” Trescot shook his head, and again asserted his disbelief in fishing, or rather in catching, and indeed made a sort of pretence at arguing that it was wiser to remain quiet and talk philosophical politics; but, as judge of appeal, I gave it against him, and the negroes bent to their oars, and we went thumping through the spray, till, rounding a point of land, we saw pitched on the sandy shore ahead of us, on the right bank, a tent, and close by two boats. “There is a party at it!” A fire was burning on the beach, and as we came near, Tom and Jack and Harry were successfully identified. “There's no take on, or they would not be on shore. This is very unfortunate.”

All the regret of my friends was on my account, so to ease their minds I assured them I did not mind the disappointment much. “Hallo Dick! Caught any drum?” “A few this morning; bad sport now, and will be till tide turns again.” I was introduced to all the party from a distance, and presently I saw one of them raising from a boat something in look and shape and color like a sack of flour, which he gave to a negro, who proceeded to carry it towards us in a little skiff. “Thank you, Charley. I just want to let Mr. Russell see a drum-fish.” And a very odd fish it was, — a thick lumpish form, about four and a half feet long, with enormous head and scales, and teeth like the grinders of a ruminant animal, acting on a great pad of bone in the roof of the mouth, — a very unlovely thing, swollen with roe, which is the great delicacy.

“No chance till the tide turned,” — but that would be too late for our return, and so unwillingly we were compelled to steer towards home, hearing now and then the singular noise like the tap on a large unbraced drum, from which the fish takes its name. At first, when I heard it, I was inclined to think it was made by some one in the boat, so near and close did it sound; but soon it came from all sides of us, and evidently from the depths of the water beneath us, — not a sharp rat-tat-tap, but a full muffled blow with a heavy thud on the sheepskin. Mr. Trescot told me that on a still evening by the river side the effect sometimes is most curious, — the rolling and pattering is audible at a great distance. Our friends were in excellent humor with everything and everybody, except the Yankees, though they had caught no fish, and kept the negroes at singing and rowing till at nightfall we landed at the island, and so to bed after supper and a little conversation, in which Mrs. Trescot again explained how easily she could maintain a battalion on the island by her simple commissariat, already adapted to the niggers, and that it would therefore be very easy for the South to feed an army, if the people were friendly

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 141-6

Sunday, September 6, 2015

Senator Jefferson Davis to Governor Francis W. Pickens, January 13, 1861

washington, D. C,
January 13, 1861.
Governor F. W. Pickens,

My dear sir: A serious and sudden attack of neuralgia has prevented me from fulfilling my promise to communicate more fully by mail than could safely be done by telegraph. I need hardly say to you that a request for a conference on questions of defense had to me the force of a command; it, however, found me under a proposition from the Governor of Mississippi, to send me as a commissioner to Virginia, and another to employ me in the organization of the State militia. But more than all, I was endeavoring to secure the defeat of the nomination of a foreign collector for the port of Charleston, and at that time it was deemed possible that in the Senate we could arrest all hostile legislation such as might be designed either for the immediate or future coercion of the South. It now appears that we shall lack one or two votes to effect the legislative object just mentioned, and it was decided last evening, in a conference which I was not able to attend, that the Senators of the seceded States should promptly withdraw upon the telegraphic information already received. I am still confined to my bed, but hope soon to be up again, and, at as early a day as practicable, to see you. I cannot place any confidence in the adherence of the administration to a fixed line of policy. The general tendency is to hostile measures, and against these it is needful for you to prepare. I take it for granted that the time allowed to the garrison of Fort Sumter has been diligently employed by yourselves, so that before you could be driven out of your earthworks you will be able to capture the fort which commands them. I have not sufficiently learned your policy in relation to the garrison at Fort Sumter, to understand whether the expectation is to compel them to capitulate for want of supplies, or whether it is only to prevent the transmission of reports and the receipt of orders. To shut them up with a view to starve them into submission would create a sympathetic action much greater than any which could be obtained on the present issue. I doubt very much the loyalty of the garrison, and it has occurred to me that if they could receive no reinforcements—and I suppose you sufficiently command the entrance to the harbor to prevent it — that there could be no danger of the freest intercouse between the garrison and the city. We have to-day news of the approach of a mixed commission from Fort Sumter and Charleston, but nothing further than the bare fact. We are probably soon to be involved in that fiercest of human strifes, a civil war. The temper of the Black Republicans is not to give us our rights in the Union, or allow us to go peaceably out of it. If we had no other cause, this would be enough to justify secession, at whatever hazard. When I am better I will write again, if I do not soon see you.

Very sincerely yours,
Jefferson Davis.*
­­­­_______________

* From original letter.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 265-6

Monday, August 3, 2015

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, September 26, 1862

At several meetings of late the subject of deporting the colored race has been discussed. Indeed for months, almost from the commencement of this administration, it has been at times considered. More than a year ago it was thrust on me by Thompson and others in connection with the Chiriqui Grant, a claim to title from the Government of Central America of a large part of Costa Rica. Speculators used it as a means of disposing of that grant to our Government. It was a rotten remnant of an intrigue of the last administration. The President, encouraged by Blair and Smith, was disposed to favor it. Blair is honest and disinterested; perhaps Smith is so, yet I have not been favorably impressed with his zeal in behalf of the Chiriqui Association. As early as May, 1861, a great pressure was made upon me to enter into a coal contract with this company. The President was earnest in the matter; wished to send the negroes out of the country. Smith, with the Thompsons, urged and stimulated him, and they were as importunate with me as the President. I spent two or three hours on different days looking over the papers, — titles, maps, reports, and evidence, — and came to the conclusion that there was fraud and cheat in the affair. It appeared to be a swindling speculation. Told the President I had no confidence in it, and asked to be released from its further consideration. The papers were then referred to Smith to investigate and report. After a month or two he reported strongly in favor of the scheme, and advised that the Navy Department should make an immediate contract for coal before foreign governments got hold of it. Mr. Toucey had investigated it. Commodore Engle had been sent out to examine the country and especially in relation to coal. The President was quite earnest in its favor, but, satisfied myself it was a job, I objected and desired to be excused from any participation in it. Two or three times it has been revived, but I have crowded off action. Chase gave me assistance on one occasion, and the scheme was dropped until this question of deporting colored persons came up, when Smith again brought forward Thompson's Chiriqui Grant. He made a skillful and taking report, embracing both coal and negroes. Each was to assist the other. The negroes were to be transported to Chiriqui to mine coal for the Navy, and the Secretary of the Navy was to make an immediate advance of $50,000 for coal not yet mined, — nor laborers obtained to mine it, nor any satisfactory information or proof that there was decent coal to be mined. I respectfully declined adopting his views. Chase and Stanton sustained me, and Mr. Bates to an extent. Blair, who first favored it, cooled off, as the question was discussed, but the President and Smith were persistent.

It came out that the governments and rival parties in Central America denied the legality of the Chiriqui Grant and Thompson's claim, — declared it was a bogus transaction. The President concluded he ought to be better satisfied on this point, and determined he would send out an agent. At this stage of the case Senator Pomeroy appeared and took upon himself a negro emigrating colonization scheme. Would himself go out and take with him a cargo of negroes, and hunt up a place for them, — all, professedly, in the cause of humanity.

On Tuesday last the President brought forward the subject and desired the members of the Cabinet to each take it into serious consideration. He thought a treaty could be made to advantage, and territory secured to which the negroes could be sent. Thought it essential to provide an asylum for a race which we had emancipated, but which could never be recognized or admitted to be our equals. Several governments had signified their willingness to receive them. Mr. Seward said some were willing to take them without expense to us.

Mr. Blair made a long argumentative statement in favor of deportation. It would be necessary to rid the country of its black population, and some place must be found for them. He is strongly for deportation, has given the subject much thought, but yet seems to have no matured system which he can recommend. Mr. Bates was for compulsory deportation. The negro would not, he said, go voluntarily, had great local attachments but no enterprise or persistency. The President objected unequivocally to compulsion. Their emigration must be voluntary and without expense to themselves. Great Britain, Denmark, and perhaps other powers would take them. I remarked there was no necessity for a treaty, which had been suggested. Any person who desired to leave the country could do so now, whether white or black, and it was best to leave it so, — a voluntary system; the emigrant who chose to leave our shores could and would go where there were the best inducements.

These remarks seemed to strike Seward, who, I perceive, has been in consultation with the President and some of the foreign ministers, and on his motion the subject was then postponed, with an understanding it would be taken up to-day. Mr. Bates had a very well prepared paper which he read, expressing his views. Little was said by any one else except Seward, who followed up my suggestions. But the President is not satisfied; says he wants a treaty. Smith says the Senate would never ratify a treaty conferring any power, and advised that Seward should make a contract.

The Governors of the loyal States called to-day on the President. They have had a meeting at Altoona, for what purpose I scarcely know. It was an unauthorized gathering of State Executives, doubtless with good intent; but I dislike these irregular and extraordinary movements. They must tend to good or evil, and I see no good. These officials had better limit their efforts within their legitimate sphere.

Admiral Gregory came to see me in relation to the ironclads which are being constructed under his superintendence. Enjoined upon him to have them completed by November at farthest. A demonstration is to be made on Charleston, and it will not do to depend upon the army even for cooperation there.

It is now almost a fortnight since the battle near Sharpsburg. The Rebels have recrossed the Potomac, but our army is doing nothing. The President says Halleck told him he should want two days more to make up his mind what to do. Great Heavens! what a General-in-Chief!

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 150-3

Friday, July 3, 2015

James Buchanan to Major-General John A. Dix, April 19, 1861

Wheatland, near Lancaster, April 19,1861.

My Dear General, — I need scarcely say I was much gratified with your letter to Major Anderson, as well as with his answer. You placed in an eloquent and striking light before him the infamous conduct of General Twiggs and others. His response was manly and loyal. By-the-bye, I some time since received an insulting letter from General Twiggs, dated in Mississippi, on the 30th ultimo. Its conclusion is as follows: “Your usurped right to dismiss me from the army might be acquiesced in, but you had no right to brand me as a traitor: this was personal, and I shall treat it as such—not through the papers, but in person. I shall most assuredly pay a visit to Lancaster for the sole purpose of a personal interview with you. So, Sir, prepare yourself. I am well assured that public opinion will sanction any course I may take with you.”

I have paid no attention to this note, and entertain but little apprehension from the threats of this hoary-headed rebel. My fate, however, is in some respects hard. After my Annual Message of the 3d of December, in which I made as able an argument as I could against secession, and indicated my purpose to collect the revenue and defend the Federal forts in South Carolina, etc., etc., the Southern friends of the administration fell away from it. From the line prescribed in this Message I am not conscious that I have departed a hair's breadth so far as it was practicable to pursue it. I was ready and willing at all times to attempt to collect the revenue, and, as a necessary preliminary, I nominated a Collector to the Senate. You know the result.

After my explosition (sic) with the Commissioners of South Carolina at the end of December, the Southern Senators denounced me on the floor of the Senate; but after my Message to Congress of the 8th of January, one of them at least abused me in terms which I would not repeat. In that Message I declared that “the right and the duty to use military force defensively against those who resist the Federal officers in the execution of their loyal functions, and against those who assail the property of the Federal Government, is clear and undeniable’ — and more to the same purpose.

Warning was repeatedly given that if the authorities of South Carolina should assail Fort Sumter this would be the commencement of a civil war, and they would be responsible for the consequences. The last and most emphatic warning of this character is contained in the concluding sentence of Mr. Holt's final and admirable answer to Mr. Hayne of the 6th of February. It is as follows: “If, with all the multiplied proofs which exist of the President's anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall assault Fort Sumter and peril the lives of the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our common country into the horrors of civil war, then upon them and those they represent must rest the responsibility.” This letter has been published, but seems to have been forgotten. I perceive that you are to be President of the great Union meeting. Would it not be well, in portraying the conduct of South Carolina in assailing Fort Sumter, to state that this had been done under the most solemn warnings of the consequences, and refer to this letter of Mr. Holt? Nobody seems to understand the course pursued by the late administration. A quotation from Holt's letter would strengthen the hands of the present administration. You were a member of the Cabinet at its date, and I believe it received your warm approbation. Hence it would come from you with peculiar propriety.

Had I known you were about to visit Washington on the business of the Treasury, I should have urged you to call at Wheatland on your return. You would then, as you will at all times, be a most welcome visitor.

They talk about keeping secrets. Nobody seems to have suspected the existence of an expedition to re-enforce and supply Fort Sumter at the close of our administration.

The present administration had no alternative but to accept the war initiated by South Carolina or the Southern Confederacy. The North will sustain the administration almost to a man: and it ought to be sustained at all hazards.

Miss Hetty feels very much indebted to you, and you are frequently the subject of kindly remembrance in our small family circle. Please to present my kind regards to Mrs. Dix.

From your friend always,
james Buchanan.
General John A. Dix.

SOURCE: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 5-6

Thursday, July 2, 2015

Edwin M. Stanton to Major-General John A. Dix, April 8, 1861

Washington, April 8,1861.

Dear Sir, — I am as much in the dark as yourself in regard to the actions and designs of the present administration.

This city has been in a great state of excitement about the military and naval movements of the last few days, and no one but the officers of government know their purpose. In this respect they have a great advantage over the last administration, because the Secessionists have now no representative in the Cabinet or kitchen. I saw Mr. Holt last evening, and he is also ignorant of the object of the active preparations going on. He made, however, this suggestion, that the Confederate Government refuses to allow a simple evacuation of Fort Sumter, but requires an ignominious surrender. That the administration will fight before submitting to such a condition. If this be the reason, I am with the administration on that point. And although Mr. Holt says he knows nothing about it, the shrewdness of the guess leads me to think he has received some information. So far as Chase is concerned, I do not think there has been anything unfair or concealed in his action. The loan turned oat better than I expected, and had I been Secretary, I would have taken the whole eight millions on the terms offered, rather than risk the chances of the times. I have no doubt there has been a settled purpose to evacuate Sumter, and that the delay has arisen from the terms required by the Confederates. The country would stand war, rather than see Anderson a captive, or required to haul down his flag. The administration will also hold on to Pickens, and aid Houston in Texas.

I do not think peaceful relations will continue much longer; nor do I think hostilities will be so great an evil as many apprehend. A round or two often serves to restore harmony; and the vast consumption required by a state of hostilities will enrich rather than impoverish the North.

The best joke I have known lately is a note from Twiggs to Holt in respect to the epithets contained in his order of dismissal. Twiggs don't like them. How would he relish the original order? I have not heard from Wheatland since you were here. Mrs. Stanton and your juvenile friend are well. Mrs. S. and L. shall visit New York in a few weeks, unless Ben McCullough should capture us before long.

The herds of office-seekers still throng the city.

With sincere regards, I remain, yours truly,
Edwin M. Stanton.
Hon. John A. Dix.

SOURCE: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 4-5

Sunday, June 7, 2015

Edwin M. Stanton to General William Robinson, December 30, 1860

Private.
Washington City, 30th December, 1860.
Dear Sir:

I am truly grateful for your hearty message of good will and congratulation and for your promise that the State of Pennsylvania can be relied on for whatever aid may be needed to preserve our imperiled Union.

We are enveloped in a great deal of dust and fog, but the smudge is not so thick that I cannot distinctly discern treason all around us.

Judge Black and myself have been dumbfounded by a meeting of the President, as President, with the so-called South Carolina commissioners. At first we agreed to resign at once, but after going carefully over the subject thought it better to state our objections or views in writing before taking any step that might later be considered precipitate.

Judge Black is closer to the President than myself and exercises a great deal of influence over him. He will present the written objections, which I have just prepared, and stand by for the purpose of extricating the President from his present peril.

If he shall refuse to recede, it seems to me there is no escape for Black, Holt, and myself except resignation.

I tremble to think that the administration is already semi-officially committed to the theory that South Carolina is an independent nation or “republic” capable of negotiating treaties; and if that theory shall not be completely broken down, followed by reinforcements to hold our beleaguered and threatened Southern forts, there will not be a semblance of the Union left on March 4, next.
I fear that your offer of help on the part of Pennsylvania may be founded on a necessity greater than yourself or the public now discern.

I have written Judge Loomis to bring you to the house when you arrive in Washington next week. I shall be happy to have your company under my roof. Although for over a week breakfast has been my only meal at home, I look forward to more time early next month. Extending to you the compliments of the season, believe me,

Very truly yours,
Edwin M. Stanton.
To General William Robinson.

SOURCE: Frank Abial Flower, Edwin McMasters Stanton: The Autocrat of Rebellion, Emancipation, and Reconstruction, p. 90-1

Saturday, October 11, 2014

Governor Samuel J. Kirkwood’s Second Inaugural Address, January 15, 1862

Gentlemen of the Senate and House of Representatives:

As this is the first time in the history of our State that the same person has been twice elected to the office, the duties of which I have for the second time just assumed, and as the transmission to you of a message in writing, communicating the condition of the State and recommending such matters as seemed to me expedient, was among the last of the official acts of my first term of service, it was for some time a question with me whether it was proper for me, in commencing my second term, to conform to the custom heretofore acted on by incoming Governors of delivering an inaugural address. Upon reflection, I did not feel at liberty to disregard what is a well established, and what is considered a useful, custom.

When, two years ago, I first assumed the duties of my present office, I saw, and in my inaugural address alluded to, the bitter and exasperated feelings existing in certain portions of our country, which have since resulted in the present Rebellion, and pointed out what seemed to me to be some of the exciting causes of that feeling. The people of our country were then about entering upon one of those political contests by which the policy of our General Government is, for a time, determined; and I expressed the belief that this angry and excited feeling would not result in an appeal to arms, but that a people taught as ours have been to yield almost instinctively to the fairly expressed will of the majority would, when the feeling engendered by its contest had passed away, again permit the calm dictates of reason to resume their sway, and that we would again become a contented and happy nation Time has shown that my belief was erroneous, and yet it seems to me it was a reasonable and just belief.

All men know well that the government against which rebellion would be made, if raised at all, was the government which made the least exactions and conferred the most benefits upon its people of any government in the world. All men knew well, and none better than those now in rebellion, that the Administration, whose accession to power their opponents declared they would consider cause for revolt, could not during their term of office, even if so disposed, inflict upon the defeated party any wrong. And it seemed then, and seems yet, to me to be a reasonable and just belief that no portion of a people, so intelligent as ours has claimed to be, could revolt against a government which had conferred upon them only benefits, and against an Administration powerless to injure them. All men know, too, that rebellion must bring upon those engaged in it terrible calamities, if not sure destruction, and it did seem reasonable and just to believe that sane men would not bring upon themselves such results without cause.

Yet there were other things bearing upon this question which we did not know. We did not know, even although we were so told by some far-sighted men — it seemed too monstrous for our honest and loyal-hearted people to believe — that men whom they had delighted to honor, men upon whom they had conferred the high places, even the highest place of honor and profit and trust under our government, could, whilst yet holding these places and pledged in the sight of God and before men faithfully to discharge their trust, and with professions of love and attachment to our government yet warm upon their lips, deliberately conspire to overthrow and destroy that government which they were so strongly bound to protect and defend. I repeat it, our honest and loyal-hearted people could not believe these things to be true: they were to them too monstrously infamous for their belief. They had not yet learned the bitter lesson that honesty, truth, good faith and loyalty were but mere words used by these men as a cover under which to deal, as they hoped, a fatal stab to that government from which they had derived all they ever had of honor or importance. Had this not been so (and although its truth has produced such terrible results, I thank God our people could not then believe it possible), I am well convinced we would to-day have no Rebellion. Had the occupant of the Presidential chair, for the year preceding the 4th day of March, 1861, and his advisers, been true men, and had they done their duty as such and stricken rebellion one honest, downright blow when first it reared its hateful head, we would have to-day a peaceful and united nation. But this, unfortunately, was not so. Treason and imbecility sat in our high places, and surrendered one after another the outposts of the citadel of our strength into the hands of Rebels, until, emboldened by success, they believed the citadel itself to be within their grasp. In this way the Rebellion was encouraged and strengthened, and thousands of men were induced to array themselves upon its side from the conviction that the government was powerless to protect its friends or punish its enemies.

At last, but too late, came a change of administration. Our Government asserted its rights, and gave evidence of its will and power to maintain them, and then came the Civil War that is now upon us.

I need not undertake to point out to you the primary cause which has led to this disastrous issue. Although there may have been many minor causes, all tending to the same end, such as the disappointed ambition of bad men and the lust for power, the clear common sense of our people has seen and accepted the fact that the one great controlling cause of this wicked Rebellion, and of all the fearful consequences which have followed and must follow from it, is the system of Human Slavery. Sophistry cannot disguise this fact, nor argument illustrate it. It is patent, tangible, and sooner or later it must be accepted by our rulers, as well as by our people, and acted on by all. This baneful system, which has wrought such terrible results, was accepted with great reluctance by our fathers as an existing but most unfortunate fact, and its existence recognized and protected by them as such, but surrounded at the same time by influences such as they confidently hoped would soon eventuate in its total and peaceful extinction. That hope has been sadly disappointed. This system, so reluctantly admitted into our form of government, and so antagonistic to its vital principles, has, like a foreign substance in the human body, been to the body politic a source of constant irritation, and has been the real cause of all the heart-burnings and ill-will among our people. Circumstances, not foreseen at the beginning, have fostered and encouraged it. It has been defended, protected and nourished by its votaries with a devotion almost unparalleled, until it has acquired a strength and power which enabled it, at first by stealthy approaches and then by bold attack, to seize the reins of government and control the policy of our people. And when peacefully and constitutionally it was driven from its usurped seat of empire, and the determination expressed that for the future it should be kept in the subordination for which it was originally intended, it revolted and by civil war has sought to destroy the Republic it could no longer control, and from the remains to build a new one in which its empire should be absolute and undisputed.

I have said that our people have seen and accepted these facts, and that the time must come, sooner or later, when our rulers, too, must see them, and when all, rulers and ruled, must act upon them. It is not for us to determine what that action shall be. That is the right and duty of others. But it is for us — it is our right and duty — to advise with those others, and to point out to them the course which, in our best judgments, should be pursued Understand me rightly. I freely accept, and have cordially acted upon, the theory that it is for our rulers to determine the policy to be pursued, and for us to sustain them, even if that policy should not meet our approbation. But it does not follow that we must not advise a change of policy, if our judgment teaches or experience has shown such change to be necessary.

What then, if anything, have we to advise? Let us see where we stand, and what are our surroundings. More than twelve months ago this war upon our government was begun, and it has been prosecuted up to this moment on the one side with fierce vindictiveness, and terrible earnestness. Nothing, literally nothing, has been allowed to stand in the way of the advancement of the cause for which this war has been waged, by those who advocate that cause. Officers of the army and navy, to advance that cause have deserted their flag. Statesmen, to advance it have betrayed their trusts. Among all ranks, acts of fraud, words of falsehood and deeds of violence have been held good and honorable service, if thereby the cause might be advanced, and the entire energies of its advocates have been directed to that single end. The sole question they have asked has been: “What thing can we do which will most effectually and speedily break the strength of our adversaries?” And when that question has been answered, they have as one man done that thing. How have they been met? Until the 4th day of March last past, not only were no steps taken to arrest their progress, but many of those who now are not of and with them, insisted that coercion should not be used to arrest it. After that date although the new admi[ni]stration took prompt and vigorous steps to meet the crises, many people in the loyal States still protested against coercive measures to suppress rebellion, and many others sought, as if expecting to find, some neutral ground on which to stand, some middle ground between loyalty and treason, as if a citizen could be loyal to his government who did not lend his hand to defend it when rebels sought to destroy it But time passed on till Sumter fell and our nation awoke from what appeared to be the slumber of death. With fiery zeal and generous emulation, the young men of all classes and all parties in the loyal States rallied around the government, until today we have under our banner the best army the world has ever seen; ready and eager to meet in battle all enemies who seek the destruction of the Union. And yet it seems to me that we do not bring to this conflict the same directness, the same unity of purpose and action our adversaries do. It seems to me we do not ask ourselves what one thing can we do that will most effectually and speedily break the strength of our enemies? and when that question is answered, do that thing. It seems to me the idea still pervades and controls the minds of many of us that our duty requires of us not only the preservation and protection of the Union, but the preservation and protection of slavery; that we have sometimes feared to strike an earnest blow against rebellion, lest that blow should fall on the head of slavery; that we regard slavery as an essential part of the Union itself, and that the Union would not be worth preserving, unless slavery could be preserved with and remain part of it.

If these things be so, we are yet far from the path that will lead to success. Slavery, the leading cause of this rebellion, is an element of strength or of weakness to the rebels, just as we will it shall be. If we say to the slaves of rebels, we are your enemies, they will remain with their masters and be to them a strength and support. If we say to them, we are your friends, come to us and you shall be free, they will seek to come by thousands, and the armies now standing in battle array against our soldiers, will be needed at home to restrain them. Take the case of South Carolina. Our soldiers are to-day upon her soil. She has a population of about 700,000 souls, more than one-half of whom are slaves. Experience, the best of teachers, has shown that these slaves want freedom, that they look upon our soldiers as friends, and would, if encouraged so to do, flock to our camps by thousands. As the slaves of rebel masters, their labor in the field and in the camp, furnishes the rebel troops with food, and does for them much of that severe camp labor which exhausts the energies of the soldiers and brings sickness upon them. Thus rebellion is strengthened by slavery. Shall we continue to leave it this strength? shall we do more than this? Shall we continue to drive back to their rebel masters these unfortunates, and compel them to be our enemies although they wish to be our friends? Shall we continue to require of our brave soldiers who have gone forth to fight our battles, those exhausting labors that have brought sickness and death to so many of them, when these people stand ready and willing to relieve them if allowed?

It may be said that if we proclaim freedom to slaves of rebel masters, slavery must suffer and may be extinguished. I reply: So be it. The friends of slavery have in its supposed interest thrust this war with all its evils upon the country, and upon them and upon it be the consequences. It may be said the slaves of loyal masters will escape and thus loyal men will suffer loss. This may be, probably will be so. But if we shall be successful in preserving our government, and putting down this rebellion, we can and will make good all losses caused to them by the acts of the government for its preservation. Besides, it is their misfortune and not our fault that they live in sections of our country in which the war is carried on and in which either a majority of the people are rebels, or the loyal men in the majority have suffered themselves to be prostrated and trampled on by the rebel minority. We regret their condition, we pity their misfortunes, we will make good their losses caused by our acts for the preservation of the Union, but we cannot allow the Union to be stricken down because efforts for its preservation may work them present injury. War necessarily brings suffering and loss to the people among whom it is waged. This war brings suffering and loss to the loyal people of all our States, and we all must bear as well and as patiently as we may, until the end, when it will be our duty to repair so far as we may, the losses sustained by loyal men because of their devotion to their country.

I will not be misunderstood. This war is waged by our government for the preservation of the Union, and not for the extinction of slavery, unless the preservation of the one shall require the extinction of the other. If the war were so prosecuted that on to-morrow the preservation of the Union were effected and secured, I would not now wage the war another day. I would not now spend further treasure or further life to effect the extinction of slavery, although I might regret that the war of its own producing had left in it enough of life to leave it to be our bane and pest in the future as it has been in the past. But while this is true, it is also true that if I had the power on to-morrow to end this terrible strife and preserve our Union by the extinction of slavery, while to preserve both would require a month's or a week's or a day's or an hour's further war; the spending of a single additional dollar to the loss of a single additional life; so surely as the Lord lives, this war would close to-morrow. No wife should mourn her husband, no mother her son, no maiden her lover, slain in a war protracted by me a single hour to preserve to rebels that which caused them to commence and which enables them to maintain rebellion. I would not believe that I had, nor do I believe that others have the right, although they may have the power to protract this war in order to preserve that which has caused the war. My deliberate convictions are that to prosecute this war successfully, we must strike directly at slavery, and that the time must soon come when every man must determine for himself which he loves most, the Union or slavery, and must act accordingly.

In the mean time, and at all times, it is our duty to rally around and support the government. We are not of those whose loyalty is doubtful or conditional. We do not say we will support the government if it adopts our views or carries out our plans, and if not, we will become neutral or join the enemy. We support it with hearts and hands and means, although we may doubt its policy, trusting time will demonstrate the correctness of our views, and bring about their adoption if found correct. The giving of honest counsel and the rendering of faithful service make up the duty of all true men.

The war has brought on us severe trials, and others are yet to come. Many of our best and bravest have died upon the battle-field or in the hospital, and many more must die. Our business operations have been interrupted, our markets have been closed, the prices of the products of our industry have been lessened, we have been compelled to wholly forego or materially to curtail the use of some luxuries which, by use, had become to us comforts of life, and these things must continue to be. They are the inevitable attendants of war, and must be borne as they have been borne, bravely, unflinchingly and cheerfully. Life is valuable, but it is intended to be useful; and how can anyone make his life more useful than by giving it for his country? Could our own brave men who died at Wilson's Creek, Blue Mills and Belmont have used their lives in any other way to better purpose than by losing them on those bloody but glorious battle-fields? Their names will live after them, embalmed in the hearts of our children and our children's children, as the names of men who died for their country, and their example will fire the hearts of generations yet to come to deeds of equal and as noble daring.

We are eminently a peaceful and peace loving people, and the interruption of our peaceful avocations of war and its incidents bears hardly upon us; but we must remember, that the only way to bring back and make permanently secure to us that peace we love so well, is to convince those who have thrust this war upon us and to convince all others that although we love peace much, we love our country's honor and the perpetuity of our Union more. But do we exaggerate the evils of our condition? I am well convinced that there is not in the world a people of equal numbers, all of whom enjoy to-day so many of the necessaries and of the comforts of life as are enjoyed by our people. In our own State our cause of complaint is not that we have not enough of the necessaries of life, but that we cannot get high enough prices for what we can spare of our superabundance; not, that we have not food but that we cannot sell to advantage food, we do not need!

But we will have to pay heavy taxes. True, we will and it is equally true we can. We have to do but one thing, and that thing we must do. We must give up the idea of money making to a great extent until this war is over. We must be content to devote to the preservation of the country a portion of all of the surplus we have been accustomed to lay up in years gone by. We may be required to return to customs and expedients for many years abandoned. We may be compelled to do as our fathers and mothers did, clothe ourselves as they did with the products of their farms and their own hands. What then? Our men will be none the less brave, loyal and loving; our women none the less true hearted, lovely and beloved. We may be required to do and may do all these things and yet suffering and want still be far from us. We may be required to do and may do all these things, and yet will not have done nearly so much as our fathers did to hand down to us the rich inheritance we are now striving to transmit unimpaired to our children. And if required, will we not do it promptly and cheerfully?

There may be amongst us a few men who know no impulse of patriotism, have no love of country, and can see nothing but sordid gain! There may be amongst us a few others who, blinded by prejudice, engendered by former political strife, cannot forget that the Government is guided in this struggle for its life by the hands of political opponents, and who would rather see it perish than have it saved by their hands, who will cry peace when there is no peace, and who will endeavor to turn us from the prosecution of this war by continually dwelling upon and exaggerating the misfortunes it has brought and will bring upon us. But these men are few in number and weak in influence. The great mass of our people see clearly and know well that no peace can be permanent which is made by compromising with armed rebels, and which will leave our present territory divided between jealous and hostile nations by such boundaries as it must be if not preserved in its integrity.

I cannot close this address without paying a well deserved tribute to the brave men who represent our State in the great army collected to do battle for our country. We may well be proud of them. We here as officers, and all our people as citizens, should feel that there is much for us to do to maintain that high reputation they have won for our State.

Trace the Iowa First on their weary way to Springfield; see them ragged and hungry but cheerful and ready; listen to their marching song as it rolls along the column, lending new vigor to themselves and their tired comrades; hear their fierce shouts and witness their daring deeds on the field where Lyon fought and fell; witness the heroic spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice with which the Iowa Third at Blue Mills attacked, and the bravery with which they fought the enemy in overpowering numbers to delay that enemy's retreat until expected reinforcements could arrive. See the Iowa Seventh on the bloody field of Belmont, heading the attack and covering the retreat; witness the cheerful endurance, the untiring energy, the indomitable valor of all our troops whenever and wherever tried, and who does not feel proud that he too is an Iowan? We owe these gallant men much. The rank and file of our regiments have never been surpassed. I doubt very much if they have ever been equaled. There is not a company in any of our regiments which does not contain in its ranks men who, in intelligence and moral worth, are the peers of any man who hears me. They have left behind them the comforts and endearments of home, their business, their friends, their all, and have taken their places as privates in the ranks with nominal pay and almost without a hope for honor and distinction. This is patriotism, and I repeat it “to these men we owe much.” It is due to them at least, that all shall be done that our circumstances will allow to promote their health and comfort and I doubt not you will see to it that the debt is paid.

When the war commenced many of us hoped that by this time it would have been completed, or that at least we would be able to see the beginning of that desirable end. But we have been disappointed. The rebellion had greater strength than we supposed. Obstacles have arisen that we had not anticipated, and the end is not yet. But these things should not discourage, and I am glad to say they have not discouraged us. As the greater strength of the rebellion has been developed, we have promptly furnished the greater needed strength to put it down, and if need be Iowa can yet send forth many regiments as brave, as loyal, and as true as those that have already gone. As obstacles have arisen they have been met as brave men meet them. They have been trampled upon and we have passed on. And now when as it seems to us here that all things are ready, we are waiting patiently, but with beating hearts, for the day when the great battle shall be fought — listening intently, and oh! how anxiously, for the battle shout, “God for the right,” which will on that day roll over that battlefield from the brave men who will be privileged there to rally around our dear old flag and strike in its defense, and trusting humbly and confidently that because they will strike for the right, the God of battles will give us the victory!

SOURCES: Henry Warren Lathrop, The Life and Times of Samuel J. Kirkwood, Iowa's War Governor, p. 193-201; Iowa House of Representatives, Journal of the House of the Ninth General Assembly of the State of Iowa, p. 37-45; Benjamin F. Shambaugh, The Messages and Proclamations of the Governors of Iowa, Volume 2, p. 296-310