Edward Bates to the Whig Committee of New York, February 24, 1859

St. Louis, Feb. 24, 1859.

To Messrs. J. PHILIPS PHOENIX, WILLIS BLACKSTONE, H. M. BININGER, DAVID J. LILET AND H. R. SMITH, Committee, New York.

Sirs: A short time ago I was favored with your note of the 7th inst., covering a resolution of the Committee, to the effect that it is inexpedient at this time further to discuss or agitate the Negro question, but rather to turn the attention of the people to other topics — "topics of general importance, such as our Foreign Relations, including the Extension of Territory; the building of Railroads for National purposes; the improvement of our Harbors, the navigation of our Rivers to facilitate Internal Commerce; the subject of Currency, and a Tariff of Duties, and other means of developing our own internal resources, our home wealth, and binding together by ties of national and fraternal feelings, the various parts and sections of our widely extended Republic."

Your letter, gentlemen, opens a very wide field, in asking for my "opinion upon the subject, and my views as to the signs of the times." Books have been written upon these matters, and speeches delivered by the thousand ; and yet the argument seems as far from being exhausted as it was at the beginning ; and I take it for certain that you do not expect or desire me to discuss at large, all or any of these interminable quarrels. That I have opinions upon all or most of them, is true — not the opinions of this or that party, ready to be abandoned or modified to suit this or that platform, but my own opinions — perhaps the more fixed and harder to be changed because deliberately formed in the retirement of private life, free from the exigencies of official responsibility and from the perturbations of party policy. They are my own opinions, right or wrong.

As to the Negro question — I have always thought, and often declared in speech and in print, that it is a pestilent question, the agitation of which has never done good to any party, section or class, and never can do good, unless it be accounted good to stir up the angry passions of men, and exasperate the unreasoning jealousy of sections, and by those bad means foist some unfit men into office, and keep some fit men out. It is a sensitive question into whose dangerous vortex it is quite possible for good men to be drawn unawares. But when I see a man, at the South or the North, of mature age and some experience, persist in urging the question, after the sorrowful experience of the last few years, I can attribute his conduct to no higher motive than personal ambition or sectional prejudice.

As to the power of the General Government to protect the persons and properties, and advance the interests of the people, by laying taxes, raising armies and navies, building forts and arsenals, light houses, moles, and breakwaters, surveying the coasts and adjacent seas, improving rivers, lakes, and harbors, and making roads — I should be very sorry to doubt the existence of the power, or the duty to exercise it, whenever the constituted authorities have the means in their hands, and are convinced that its exercise is necessary to protect the country and advance the prosperity of the people.

In my own opinion, a government that has no power to protect the harbors of its country against winds and waves and human enemies, nor its rivers against snags, sands and rocks, nor to build roads for the transportation of its armies and its mails and the commerce of its people, is a poor, impotent government, and not at all such a government as our fathers thought they had made when they produced the Constitution which was greeted by intelligent men everywhere with admiration and gratitude as a government free enough for all the ends of legal liberty and strong enough for all the purposes of national and individual protection. A free people, if it be wise, will make a good constitution; but a constitution, however good in itself, did never make a free people. The people do not derive their rights from the government, but the government derives its powers from the people; and those powers are granted for the main, if not the only, purpose of protecting the rights of the people. Protection, then, if not the sole, is the chief end of government.

And it is for the governing power to judge, in every instance, what kind and what degree of protection is needful — whether a Navy to guard our commerce all around the world, or an Army to defend the country against armed invasion from without, or domestic insurrection from within; or a Tariff, to protect our home industry against the dangerous obtrusion of foreign labor and capital.

Of the existence of the power and duty of the Government to protect the People in their persons, their property, their industry and their locomotion, I have no doubt; but the time, the mode and the measure of protection, being always questions of policy and prudence, must of necessity be left to the wisdom and patriotism of those whose duty it is to make laws for the good government of the country. And with them I freely leave it, as the safest, and indeed the only, constitutional depository of the power.

As to our Foreign Policy generally, I have but little to say. I am not much of a progressive, and am content to leave it where Washington [Jefferson] placed it, upon that wise, virtuous, safe maxim — "Peace [. . .] with all nations; entangling alliance[s] with none." The greedy and indiscriminate appetite for foreign acquisition, which makes us covet our neighbor's lands, and devise cunning schemes to get them, has little of my sympathy. I view it as a sort of political gluttony, as dangerous to our body politic as gluttony is to the natural man — producing disease certainly, hastening death, probably. Those of our politicians who are afflicted with this morbid appetite are wont to cite the purchase of Louisiana and Florida, as giving countenance to their inordinate desires. But the cases are wholly unlike in almost every particular. Louisiana was indispensable to our full and safe enjoyment of an immense region which was already owned, and its acquisition gave us the unquestioned control of that noble system of Mississippi waters, which nature seems to have made to be one and indivisible, and rounded off the map of the nation into one uniform and compacted whole. Nothing remained to mar and disfigure our national plat, but Florida, and that was desirable, less for its intrinsic value, than because it would form a dangerous means of annoyance, in case of war with a Maritime Power, surrounded as it is, on three sides by the ocean, and touching three of our present States, with no barrier between. The population of Louisiana and Florida, when acquired, was very small compared with the largeness of the territory; and, lying in contact with the States, was easily and quickly absorbed into and assimilated with the mass of our people. Those countries were acquired, moreover, in the most peaceful and friendly manner, and for a satisfactory consideration.

Now, without any right or any necessity, it is hard to tell what we do not claim in all the continent south of us, and the adjacent islands. Cuba is to be the first fruit of our grasping enterprise, and that is to be gotten at all hazards, by peaceful purchase if we can, by war and conquest if we must.² But Cuba is only an outpost to the Empire of Islands and continental countries that are to follow. A leading Senator³ has lately declared (in debate on the Thirty Million bill⁴) that we must not only have Cuba, but all the islands from Cape Florida to the Spanish Main, so as to surround the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, and make them our "mare clausum" like the Mediterranean, in old times, when the Roman Emperor ruled both its shores, from the pillars of Hercules to the Hellespont.⁵ This claim of mare nostrum implies, of course, that we must own the continent that bounds our sea on the west, as well as the string of islands that inclose it on the east — that is, Mexico, Central America, and all South America, so far south at least as the Orinoco.⁶ In that wide compass of sea and land there are a good many native governments, and provinces belonging to the strongest maritime powers, and a narrow continental isthmus which we ourselves, as well as England and France, are wont to call the highway of nations. To fulfill the grand conception, and perfect our tropical empire, we must buy or conquer all these torrid countries, and their mongrel populations. As to buying them, it strikes me that we had better waite [sic] awhile, at least until the Government has ceased to borrow money to pay its current expenses. And as to conquering them, perhaps it would be prudent to pause and make some estimate of costs and contingencies, before we rush into war with all maritime Europe and half America.

I am not one of those who believe that the United States is not an independent and safe nation, because Cuba is not a part of it. On the contrary, I believe that we are quite capable of self-defense, even if the "Queen of the Antilles" were a province of England, France or Russia; and surely, while it remains an appendage of a comparatively feeble nation, Cuba has much more cause to fear us than we have to fear Cuba. In fact, gentlemen, I cannot help doubting the honesty of the cowardly argument by which we are urged to rob poor old Spain of this last remnant of her Western empire, for fear that she might use it to rob us.

But suppose we could get, honestly and peaceably, the whole of the country — continental and insular — from the Rio Grande to the Orinoco, and from Trinidad to Cuba, and thus establish our mare clausum, and shut the gate of the world across the Isthmus, can we govern them wisely and well? For the last few years, in the attempt to govern our home Territories of Kansas and Utah, we have not very well maintained the dignity and justice of the nation, nor secured the peace and prosperity of the subject people.⁷ Can we hope to do better with the various mixed races of Mexico, Central and South America, and the West India Islands? Some of those countries have been trying for fifty years to establish republican governments on our model, but in every instance have miserably failed; and yet, there was no obstacle to complete success but their own inaptitude.

For my part, I should be grieved to see my country become, like Rome, a conquering and dominant nation; for I think there are few or no examples in history, of Governments whose chief objects were glory and power, which did ever secure the happiness and prosperity of their own people. Such Governments may grow great and famous, and advance a few of their citizens to wealth and nobility; but the price of their grandeur is the personal independence and individual freedom of their people. Still less am I inclined to see absorbed into our system, "on an equal footing with the original States," the various and mixed races (amounting to I know not how many millions) which inhabit the continent and islands south of our present border. I am not willing to inoculate our body politic with the virus of their diseases, political and social — diseases which, with them, are chronic and hereditary, and with us could hardly fail to produce corruption in the head and weakness in the members.

Our own country, as it is, in position, form and size, is a wonder which proclaims a wisdom above the wit of man. Large enough for our posterity, for centuries to come: All in the temperate zone, and therefore capable of a homogeneous population, yet so diversified in climates and soils, as to produce everything that is necessary to the comfort and wealth of a great people: Bounded east and west by great oceans, and bisected in the middle by a mighty river, which drains and fructifies the continent, and binds together the most southern and northern portions of our land by a bond stronger than iron. Beside all this, it is new and growing — the strongest on the continent, with no neighbor whose power it fears, or of whose ambition it has cause to be jealous. Surely such a country is great enough and good enough for all the ends of honest ambition and virtuous power.

It seems to me that an efficient home-loving Government, moderate and economical in its administration, peaceful in its objects, and just to all nations, need have no fear of invasion at home, or serious aggression abroad. The nations of Europe have to stand continually in defense of their existence; but the conquest of our county by a foreign power is simply impossible, and no nation is so absurd as to entertain the thought. We may conquer ourselves by local strifes and sectional animosities; and when, by our folly and wickedness, we have accomplished that great calamity, there will be none to pity us for the consequences of so great a crime.

If our Government would devote all its energies to the promotion of peace and friendship with all foreign countries, the advancement of Commerce, the increase of Agriculture, the growth and stability of Manufactures, and the cheapening, quickening and securing the internal trade and travel of our country ; in short, if it would devote itself in earnest to the establishment of a wise and steady policy of internal government, I think we should witness a growth and consolidation of wealth and comfort and power for good, which cannot be reasonably hoped for from a fluctuating policy, always watching for the turns of good fortune, or from a grasping ambition to seize new territories, which are hard to get and harder to govern.

The present position of the Administration is a sorrowful commentary upon the broad democracy of its professions. In theory, the people have the right and ability to do anything; in practice, we are verging rapidly to the One-Man power.

The President, the ostensible head of the National Democrats, is eagerly striving to concentrate power in his own hands, and thus to set aside both the People and their Representatives in the actual affairs of government. Having emptied the Treasury, which he found full, and living precariously upon borrowed money, he now demands of Congress to entrust to his unchecked discretion the War power, the Purse and the Sword. First, he asks Congress to authorize him, by statute, to use the Army to take military possession of the Northern Mexico, and hold it under his protectorate, and as a security for debts due to our citizens⁸ — civil possession would not answer, for that might expose him, as in the case of Kansas, to be annoyed by a factious Congress and a rebellious Territorial Legislature.

Secondly: Not content with this, he demands the discretionary power to use the Army and Navy in the South, also in blockading the coast and marching his troops into the interior of Mexico and New Granada, to protect our citizens against all evil-doers along the transit routes of Tehuantepec and Panama.⁹ And he and his supporters in Congress claim this enormous power upon the ground that, in this particular at least, he ought to be the equal of the greatest monarch of Europe. They forget that our fathers limited the power of the President by design, and for the reason that they had found out by sad experience that the monarchs of Europe were too strong for freedom.

Third: In strict pursuance of this doctrine, first publicly announced from Ostend,¹⁰ he demands of Congress to hand over to him thirty millions of dollars to be used at his discretion, to facilitate his acquisition of Cuba.¹¹ Facilitate how ? Perhaps it might be imprudent to tell.

Add to all this, the fact (as yet unexplained) that one of the largest naval armaments which ever sailed from our coast is now operating in South America, ostensibly against a poor little republic far up the Plate River,¹² to settle some little quarrel between the two Presidents.¹³ If Congress had been polite enough to grant the President's demand of the sword and the purse against Mexico, Central America and Cuba, this navy, its duty done at the south, might be made, on its way home, to arrive in the Gulf very opportunely, to aid the " Commander-in-Chief " in the acquisition of some very valuable territory.

I allude to these facts with no malice against Mr. Buchanan, but as evidences of the dangerous change which is now obviously sought to be made in the practical working of the Government — the concentration of power in the hands of the President, and the dangerous policy, now almost established, of looking abroad for temporary glory and aggrandizement, instead of looking at home, for all the purposes of good government — peaceable, moderate, economical, protecting all interests alike, and by a fixed policy, calling into safe exercise all the talents and industry of our people, and thus steadily advancing our country in everything which can make a nation great, happy, and permanent.

The rapid increase of the Public Expenditures (and that, too, under the management of statesmen professing to be peculiarly economical) is an alarming sign of corruption and decay.

That increase bears no fair proportion to the growth and expansion of the country, but looks rather like wanton waste or criminal negligence. The ordinary objects of great expense are not materially augmented — the Army and Navy remain on a low peace establishment— the military defenses are little, if at all, enlarged — the improvement of Harbors, Lakes and Rivers is abandoned, and the Pacific Railroad is not only not begun but its very location is scrambled for by angry sections, which succeed in nothing but mutual defeat. In short, the money to an enormous amount (I am told at the rate of $80,000,000 to $100,000,000 a year) is gone, and we have little or nothing to show for it. In profound peace with foreign nations, and surrounded with the proofs of National growth and individual prosperity, the Treasury, by less than two years of mismanagement, is made bankrupt, and the Government itself is living from hand to mouth, on bills of credit and borrowed money!

This humiliating state of things could hardly happen if men in power were both honest and wise. The Democratic economists in Congress confess that they have recklessly wasted the Public Revenue; they confess it by refusing to raise the Tariff to meet the present exigency, and by insisting that they can replenish the exhausted Treasury and support the Government, in credit and efficiency, by simply striking off their former extravagances.

An illustrious predecessor of the President is reported to have declared "that those who live on borrowed money ought to break." I do not concur in that harsh saying; yet I am clearly of opinion that the Government, in common prudence (to say nothing of pride and dignity), ought to reserve its credit for great transactions and unforeseen emergencies. In common times of peace, it ought always to have an established revenue, equal, at least, to its current expenses. And that revenue ought to be so levied as to foster and protect the Industry of the country employed in our most necessary and important manufactures.

Gentlemen, I cannot touch upon all the topics alluded to in your letter and resolution. I ought rather to beg your pardon for the prolixity of this answer. I speak for no party, because the only party I ever belonged to has ceased to exist as an organized and militant body.

And I speak for no man but myself.

I am fully aware that my opinions and views of public policy are of no importance to anybody but me, and there is good reason to fear that some of them are so antiquated and out of fashion as to make it very improbable that they will ever again be put to the test of actual practice.

Most respectfully,

EDWARD BATES.

_______________

² This was the substance of the Ostend Manifesto which Buchanan as Minister to Great Britain had joined Ministers John Y. Mason and Pierre Soulé in promulgating. As Secretary of State under President Polk, Buchanan had tried to buy Cuba. In his second, third, and fourth annual messages he urged Congress to cooperate with him in securing it by negotiation.

³ Robert Toombs of Georgia: Whig state legislator, 1837-1840, 1841-1844; states' rights Democratic congressman, 1845-1853; U. S. senator, 1853-1861. He was later a leader in the Georgia Secession Convention, and congressman, brigadier-general, and secretary of State under the Confederacy.

⁴ January, 1859, Senate Reports, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., ser. no. 994, doc. no. 351. The bill purposed to appropriate $30,000,000 "to facilitate the acquisition of Cuba by negotiation." Senator Slidell (infra, Nov. 24, 1859, note 89) introduced it on January 10. 1859 (Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 277) ; it was reported favorably by the Committee on Foreign Relations of which he was chairman, on January 24, 1859 (ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 538) ; it was debated at great length on January 24, February 9-10, February 15—17, February 21, and February 25 (ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 538-544, 904-909, 934-940, 960968, 1038, Appendix [155-169], 1058-1063, 1079-1087, 1179-1192, 1326-1363) ; but because of opposition, it was withdrawn on February 26 (ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 13S51387). At the next session, on December 8, 1859, Senator Slidell reintroduced this bill (ibid., 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 53), had it referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on December 21 (ibid., 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 199), reported it out favorably to the Senate on May 30, 1860, but because of opposition did not push it (ibid., 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 2456). He promised to call it up again at the next session, but when that time arrived was too busy seceding to bother about Cuba.

⁵ On January 24, Toombs had said, "Cuba has fine ports, and with her acquisition, we can make first the Gulf of Mexico, and then the Caribbean Sea, a mare clausum. Probably younger men than you or I will live to see the day when no flag shall float there except by permission of the United States of America . . . that development, that progress throughout the tropics [is] the true, fixed unalterable policy of the nation." Ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 543.

⁶ I. e., as far as Venezuela.

⁷ Bitterness over the slavery question had reached the point of armed conflict, raids, and murder in Kansas in 1855-1856, and Utah was at this time subject to frequent Indian raids. It was in 1859, too, that the Republicans tried to prohibit polygamy in Utah and the Democrats succeeded, probably with slavery in other territories in mind, in preventing Congressional legislation on the subject.

⁸ Dec. 6, 1858, James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, V, 514. See infra, Feb. 15, 1860.

⁹ J. D. Richardson, op. cit., V, 516-517.

¹⁰ Supra, April 20, 1859, note 2.

¹¹ J. D. Richardson, op. cit., V, 508-511.

¹² Rio de La Plata in South America.

¹³ An expedition of some 19 ships, 200 guns, and 2.500 men which was sent against Paraguay because a vessel of that nation had fired upon the United States steamer Water Witch. A mere show of force sufficed to secure both an apology and an indemnity on February 10, 1859. The President of Argentina was so interested and so pleased that he presented the commander with a sword.

SOURCE: Howard K. Beale, Editor, Annual Report of The American Historical Association For The Year 1930, Vol. 4, The Diary Of Edward Bates, pp. 1-9

Governor Salmon P. Chase to Senator Charles Sumner, December 13, 1856

State Of Ohio, Executive Department,                       

Columbus, Dec 13, 1856.

Dear Sumner, I long to hear of you at the Capitol, but I long infinitely more to hear of your perfect restoration. At the present moment you are not greatly needed at Washington. Nothing can be done now but to announce principles, & make test questions. A year hence it will be important to have our strongest men in the field. Mr. Buchanan's Administration will then be fairly under way. For that time you should be prepared, &, if need be, reserved. I write this because I see it stated that you propose going to Washington about the first of January. Let me beg you to risk nothing; but to lay aside every care except that of your own restoration. You will of course be reelected. Why not let the present session go, & take a trip somewhere out of sight and as far as possible out of recollection, of disturbing & exciting causes. If your friends think it well, you might resign that your place this session be filled by somebody else. Then be whole for the next session.

My intelligence from Kansas is encouraging. The reasons for believing it will be a free state preponderate more & more. I expect next week the return of a gentleman whom I sent to the territory to ascertain the precise condition & to bear to Gov Geary a letter in behalf of the prisoners, & to them some little relief. I hope the best. But for our cause — we must make a deeper issue; believe that right is expedient; be consistent & trust the people. Then I believe will come the day when the Republic, restored to its original policy, will renew her strength & move forward in the fulfilment of her sublime mission, with the applause of all the patriotic & all the good. Talia sӕcla, cunite.

Affectionately yours,

[SALMON P. CHASE.]

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. Chase, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 274-5

Joseph Holt to Abraham Lincoln, January 15, 1862

St Louis Jan 15th 1862

Dear Sir.

I cannot repress the desire that I feel as an American citizen to thank you — which I do from my heart — for the appointment of the present Secretary of War. In him you will find a friend true as steel, & a support, which no pressure from within or from without, will ever shake. It was my fortune to know him during the darkest days of the late administration & I think I know him well. With his great talents, he is the soul of honor, of courage, & of loyalty. In the progress of the terrible events inseperable from the struggle for the life of our country, in which you are heroically engaged, you can assign to Edwin M. Stanton no duty however stern, or solemn or self-sacrificing, which he will not nobly & efficiently perform.

Very Sincerely

Yours

J Holt.

SOURCE: The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

Salmon P. Chase to Alphonso Taft, April 28, 1861

washington, April 28, 1861.

My Dear Sir: To correct misapprehensions, except by acts, is an almost vain endeavor. You may say, however, to all whom it may concern, that there is no ground for the ascription to me by Major Brown of the sentiment to which you allude.

True it is that before the assault on Fort Sumter, in anticipation of an attempt to provision famishing soldiers of the Union, I was decidedly in favor of a positive policy and against the notion of drifting — the Micawber policy of “waiting for something to turn up.”

As a positive policy, two alternatives were plainly before us. (1) That of enforcing the laws of the Union by its whole power and through its whole extent; or (2) that of recognizing the organization of actual government by the seven seceded States as an accomplished revolution — accomplished through the complicity of the late administration and letting the Confederacy try its experiment of separation; but maintaining the authority of the Union and treating secession as treason everywhere else.

Knowing that the former of these alternatives involved destructive war, and vast expenditure, and oppressive debt, and thinking it possible that through the latter these great evils might  be avoided, the union of the other States preserved unbroken, the return even of the seceded States, after an unsatisfactory experiment of separation, secured, and the great cause of freedom and constitutional government peacefully vindicated — thinking, I say, these things possible, I preferred the latter alternative.

The attack on Fort Sumter, however, and the precipitation of Virginia into hostility to the National Government, made this latter alternative impracticable, and I had then no hesitation about recurring to the former. Of course, I insist on the most vigorous measures, not merely for the preservation of the Union and the defense of the Government, but for the constitutional re-establishment of the full authority of both throughout the land.

In laboring for these objects I know hardly the least cessation, and begin to feel the wear as well as the strain of them. When my criticizers equal me in labor and zeal, I shall most cheerfully listen to their criticisms.

All is safe here now. Baltimore is repenting, and by repentance may be saved, if she adds works meet for repentance. Soon something else will be heard of.

Yours truly,

S. P. Chase.

Hon. Alphonso Taft.

SOURCES: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 366-7

Montgomery Blair to Abraham Lincoln, March 15, 1861

Post Office Department

Washington March 15th 1861.

Sir

In reply to your interrogatory whether in my opinion it is wise to provision Fort Sumpter under present circumstances, I submit the following considerations in favor of provisioning that Fort—

The ambitious leaders of the late Democratic party have availed themselves of the disappointment attendant upon defeat in the late Presidential election to found a Military Government in the Seceding States. To the connivance of the late administration it is due alone that this Rebellion has been enabled to attain its present proportions– It has grown by this complicity into the form of an organized Government in Seven States and up to this moment nothing has been done to check its progress or prevent its being regarded either at home or abroad as a successful revolution– Every hour of acquiescence in this condition of things and especially every new conquest made by the rebels strengthens their hands at home and their claim to recognition as an independent people abroad. It has from the beginning and still is treated practically as a lawful proceeding and the honest and Union loving people in those States must by a continuance of this policy become reconciled to the new Government and though founded in wrong come to be regard it as rightful Government.

I in common with all my associates in your council agree that we must look to the people of these States for the overthrow of this rebellion and that it is proper to exercise the powers of the Federal Government only so far as to maintain its authority to collect the revenue and maintain possession of the public property in the states and that this should be done with as little blood-shed as possible. How is this to be carried into effect? That it is by measures which will inspire respect for the power of the Government and the firmness of those who administer it does not admit of debate.

It is equally obvious that rebellion was checked in 1833 by the promptitude of the President in taking measures which made it manifest that it could not be attempted with impunity and that it has grown to its present formidable proportions only because similar measures were not taken.

The action of the President in 1833 inspired respect whilst in 1860 the rebels were encouraged by the contempt they felt for the incumbent of the Presidency.

But it was not alone upon Mr. Buchanans weakness the rebels relied for success. They for the most part believe that the Northern men are deficient in the courage necessary to maintain the Government. It is this prevalent error in the South which induces so large a portion of the people there to suspect the good faith of the people of the North and enables the demagogues so successfully to inculcate the notion that the object of the Northern people is to abolish Slavery and make the Negroes the equals of the whites. Doubting the manhood of northern men they discredit their disclaimers of a this purpose to humiliate and injure them—

Nothing would so surely gain credit for such disclaimers as the manifestation of resolution on the part of the President to maintain the lawful authority of the nation – no men or people have so many difficulties as those whose firmness is doubted.

The evacuation of Fort Sumpter when it is known that it can be provisioned and manned will convince the rebels that the administration lacks firmness and will therefore tend more than any event that has happened to embolden them and so far therefore from tending to prevent collision will, ensure it unless all the other forts are evacuated and all attempts are given up to maintain the authority of the United States.

Mr. Buchanans policy has I think re-rendered collision almost inevitable & a continuance of that policy will not only bring it about but will go far to produce a permanent division of the Union.

This is manifestly the public Judgment which is much more to be relied on than that of any individual: I believe that Fort Sumpter may be provisioned and relieved by Captn Fox with little risk and Genl. Scotts opinion that with its war compliment there is no force in South Carolina which can take it – renders it almost certain that it will not then be attempted. This would completely demoralize the Rebellion. The impotent rage of the Rebels and the outburst of patriotic feeling which would follow this achievement would initiate a reactionary movement throughout the South which would speedily overwhelm the traitors. No expense or care should therefore be spared to achieve this success—

The appreciation of our stocks will pay for the most lavish outlay to make it one. Nor will the result be materially different to the nation if the attempt fails and its gallant leader and followers are lost. It will in any event vindicate the hardy courage of the North and the determination of the people and their President to maintain the authority of the Government, & this is all that is wanting in my judgment to restore it.

You should give no thought for the Commander and his comrades in this enterprize– They willingly take the hazards for the sake of the country and the honor which, successful or not, they will receive from you and the lovers of free Government in all lands.

I am Sir very respectfully

Yr obt sevt

M. Blair

To the President

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

William H. Seward to Abraham Lincoln, March 15, 1861

Department of State

Washington, 15th March, 1861.

The President submits to me the following question, namely, “Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances, is it wise to attempt it?”

If it were possible to peacefully provision Fort Sumter, of course I should answer that it would be both unwise and inhuman not to attempt it. But the facts of the case are known to be, that the attempt must be made with the employment of a military and marine force, which would provoke combat, and probably initiate a civil war, which the Government of the United States would be committed to maintain through all changes to some definite conclusion.

History must record that a sectional party practically constituting a majority of the people of the fifteen Slave States, excited to a high state of jealous apprehension for the safety of life and property, by impassioned, though groundless appeals, went into the late election with a predetermined purpose, if unsuccessful at the polls, to raise the standard of secession immediately afterwards, and to separate the Slave States, or so many of them as could be detached from the Union, and to organize them in a new, distinct, and independent confederacy: that party was unsuccessful at the polls. In the frenzy which followed the announcement of their defeat, they put the machinery of the State Legislatures and conventions into motion, and within the period of three months, they have succeeded in obtaining ordinances of secession by which seven of the Slave States have seceded and organized a new Confederacy under the name of the Confederated States of America. These States finding a large number of the mints, customhouses, forts and arsenals of the United States situate within their limits, unoccupied, undefended, and virtually abandoned by the late Administration, have seized and appropriated them to their own use, and under the same circumstances have seized and appropriated to their own use, large amounts of money and other public property of the United States, found within their limits. The people of the other Slave States, divided and balancing between sympathy with the seceding slave States and loyalty to the Union, have been intensely excited, but, at the present moment, indicate a disposition to adhere to the Union, if nothing extraordinary shall occur to renew excitement and produce popular exasperation. This is the stage in this premeditated revolution, at which we now stand.

The opening of this painful controversy, at once raised the question whether it would be for the interest of the country to admit the projected dismemberment, with its consequent evils, or whether patriotism and humanity require that it shall be prevented. As a citizen, my own decision on this subject was promptly made, namely, that the Union is inestimable and even indispensable to the welfare and happiness of the whole country, and to the best interests of mankind. As a statesman in the public service, I have not hesitated to assume that the Federal government is committed to maintain preserve and defend the Union, peaceably if it can, forcibly if it must, to every extremity. Next to Disunion itself, I regard civil war as the most disastrous and deplorable of national calamities, and as the most uncertain and fearful of all remedies for political disorders. I have therefore made it the study and labor of the hour, how to save the Union from dismemberment by peaceful policy and without civil war.

Influenced by these sentiments, I have felt that it is exceedingly fortunate that, to a great extent, the Federal government occupies, thus far, not an aggressive attitude, but, practically, a defensive one, while the necessity for action, if civil war is to be initiated, falls on those who seek to dismember and subvert this Union.

It has seemed to me equally fortunate that the Disunionists are absolutely without any justification for their rash and desperate designs. The administration of the Government had been for a long time virtually in their own hands, and controlled and directed by themselves, when they began the work of revolution. They had therefore no other excuse than apprehension of oppression from the new and adverse administration which was about to come into power

It seemed to me farther, to be a matter of good fortune that the new and adverse administration must come in with both Houses of Congress containing majorities opposed to its policy, so that, even if it would, it could commit no wrong or injustice against the States which were being madly goaded into revolution. Under the circumstances, Disunion could have no better basis to stand upon than a blind unreasoning popular excitement, arising out of a simple and harmless disappointment in a Presidential election – that excitement, if it should find no new aliment, must soon subside and leave Disunion without any real support. On the other hand, I have believed firmly that every where, even in South Carolina, devotion to the Union is a profound and permanent national sentiment which, although it may be suppressed and silenced by terror for a time, could, if encouraged, be ultimately relied upon to rally the people of the seceding States to reverse, upon due deliberation, all the popular acts of legislatures and Conventions by which they were hastily and violently committed to Disunion.

The policy of the time, therefore, has seemed to me to consist in conciliation, which should deny to the Disunionists any new provocation or apparent offence, while it would enable the Unionists in the slave states to maintain, with truth and with effect, that the claims and apprehensions put forth by the Disunionists, are groundless and false.

I have not been ignorant of the objection that the Administration was elected through the activity of the Republican party, that it must continue to deserve and retain the confidence of that party while conciliation towards the Slave States tends to demoralize the Republican party itself, on which party the main responsibility of maintaining the Union must rest.

But it has seemed to me a sufficient answer first, that the Administration could not demoralize the Republican party without making some sacrifice of its essential principles when no such sacrifice is necessary or is any where authoritatively proposed; and secondly, if it be indeed true that pacification is necessary to prevent dismemberment of the Union and civil war, or either of them, no patriot and lover of humanity could hesitate to surrender party for the higher interests of country and humanity.

Partly by design, partly by chance, this policy has been hitherto pursued by the last Administration of the Federal government and by the Republican party in its corporate action. It is by this policy thus pursued, I think, that the progress of dismemberment has been arrested after the seven Gulf States had seceded, and the Border States yet remain, although they do so uneasily, in the Union.

It is to a perseverance in this policy for a short time longer that I look as the only peaceful means of assuring the continuance of Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri and Arkansas, or most of those States, in the Union. It is through their good and patriotic offices that I look to see the Union sentiment revived and brought once more into activity in the seceding States, and through this agency those states themselves returning into the Union.

I am not unaware that I am conceding more than can reasonably be demanded by the people of the Border States. They could, speaking justly, demand nothing. They are bound by the federal obligation to adhere to the Union without concession or conciliation just as much as the people of the Free States are. But in administration we must deal with men, facts and circumstances not as they ought to be, but as they are.

The fact then is that while the people of the Border States desire to be loyal, they are at the same time sadly though temporarily demoralized by a sympathy for the Slave States which makes them forget their loyalty whenever there are any grounds for apprehending that the Federal Government will resort to military coercion against the seceding States, even though such coercion should be necessary to maintain the authority or even the integrity of the Union. This sympathy is unreasonable, unwise and dangerous, and therefore cannot, if left undisturbed, be permanent. It can be banished, however, only in one way, and that is by giving time for it to wear out and for reason to resume its sway. Time will do this, if it be not hindered by new alarms and provocations.

South Carolina opened the revolution Apprehending chastisement by the military arm of the United States, she seized all the Forts of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, except Fort Sumter, which, garrisoned by less than one hundred men, stands practically in a state of siege, but at the same time defying South Carolina and, as the seceding States imagine, menacing her with conquest. Every one knows, first, that even if Sumter were adequately reinforced, it would still be practically useless to the Government, because the administration in no case could attempt to subjugate Charleston or the State of South Carolina.

It is held now only because it is the property of the United States and is a monument of their authority and sovereignty. I would so continue to hold it so long as it can be done without involving some danger or evil greater than the advantage of continued possession. The highest military authority tells us that without supplies the garrison must yield in a few days to starvation, that its numbers are so small that it must yield in a few days to attack by the assailants lying around it, and that the case in this respect would remain the same even if it were supplied but not reinforced. All the military and naval authorities tell us, that any attempt at supplies would be unavailing without the employment of armed military and naval force. If we employ armed force for the purpose of supplying the fort, we give all the provocation that could be offered by combining reinforcement with supply.

The question submitted to me then, practically, is, Supposing it to be possible to reinforce and supply Fort Sumter, is it wise now to attempt it, instead of withdrawing the garrison. The most that could be done by any means now in our hands, would be to throw 250 to 400 men into the garrison with provisions for supplying it for six months. In this active and enlightened country, in this season of excitement with a daily press, daily mails and incessantly operating telegraph, the design to reinforce and supply the garrison must become known to the opposite party at Charleston as soon, at least, as preparation for it should begin. The garrison would then almost certainly fall by assault before the expedition could reach the harbor of Charleston. But supposing the secret kept, the expedition must engage in conflict on entering the harbor of Charleston, suppose it to be overpowered and destroyed, is that new outrage to be avenged or are we then to return to our attitude of immobility? Shall we be allowed to do so? Moreover, in that event, what becomes of the garrison?

Suppose the expedition successful– We have then a garrison in Fort Sumter that can defy assault for six months. What is it to do then? Is it to make war by opening its batteries and attempting to demolish the defences of the Carolinians? Can it demolish them if it tries? If it cannot, what is the advantage we shall have gained? If it can, how will it serve to check or prevent Disunion? In either case, it seems to me that we will have inaugurated a civil war by our own act, without an adequate object, after which reunion will be hopeless, at least under this administration, or in any other way than by a popular disavowal, both of the war and of the administration which unnecessarily commenced it. Fraternity is the element of Union. War the very element of disunion. Fraternity, if practiced by this administration, will rescue the Union from all its dangers. If this administration, on the other hand, take up the sword, then an opposition party will offer the olive branch and will, as it ought, profit by the restoration of peace and Union.

I may be asked, whether I would in no case and at no time, advise force – whether I propose to give up everything. I reply, no, I would not initiate a war to regain a useless and unnecessary position on the soil of the seceding States. I would not provoke war in any way now. I would resort to force to protect the collection of the revenue, because this is a necessary as well as a legitimate union object. Even then, it should be only a naval force that I would employ, for that necessary purpose– While I would defer military action on land until a case should arise when we would hold the defence. In that case, we should have the spirit of the country and the approval of mankind on our side. In the other, we should peril peace and Union, because we had not the courage to practice prudence and moderation at the cost of temporary misapprehension. If this counsel seems to be impassive and even unpatriotic, I console myself by the reflection that it is such as Chatham gave to his country under circumstances not widely different.

William H. Seward

SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Diary of William Howard Russell: April 27, 1861

Mrs. Trescot, it seems, spent part of her night in attendance on a young gentleman of color, who was introduced into the world in a state of servitude by his poor chattel of a mother. Such kindly acts as these are more common than we may suppose; and it would be unfair to put a strict or unfair construction on the motives of slave owners in paying such attention to their property. Indeed, as Mrs. Trescot says, “When people talk of my having so many slaves, I always tell them it is the slaves who own me. Morning, noon, and night, I'm obliged to look after them, to doctor them, and attend to them in every way.” Property has its duties, you see, madam, as well as its rights.

The planter's house is quite new, and was built by himself; the principal material being wood, and most of the work being done by his own negroes. Such work as window-sashes and panellings, however, was executed in Charleston. A pretty garden runs at the back, and from the windows there are wide stretches of cotton-fields visible, and glimpses of the river to be seen.

After breakfast our little party repaired to the river side, and sat under the shade of some noble trees waiting for the boat which was to bear us to the fishing grounds. The wind blew up stream, running with the tide, and we strained our eyes in vain for the boat. The river is here nearly a mile across, — a noble estuary rather, — with low banks lined with forests, into which the axe has made deep forays and clearings for cotton-fields.

It would have astonished a stray English traveller, if, penetrating the shade, he heard in such an out-of-the-way place familiar names and things spoken of by the three lazy persons who were stretched out — cigar in mouth — on the ant-haunted trunks which lay prostrate by the seashore. Mr. Trescot spent some time in London as attaché to the United States Legation, was a club man, and had a large circle of acquaintance among the young men about town, of whom he remembered many anecdotes and peculiarities, and little adventures. Since that time he was Under-Secretary of State in Mr. Buchanan's administration, and went out with Secession. He is the author of a very agreeable book on a dry subject, “The History of American Diplomacy,” which is curious enough as an unconscious exposition of the anti-British jealousies, and even antipathies, which have animated American statesmen since they were created. In fact, much of American diplomacy means hostility to England, and the skilful employment of the anti-British sentiment at their disposal in their own country and elsewhere. Now he was talking pleasantly of people he had met — many of them mutual friends.”Here is the boat at last!” I had been sweeping the broad river with my glass occasionally, and at length detected a speck on its broad surface moving down towards us, with a white dot marking the foam at its bows. Spite of wind and tideway, it came rapidly, and soon approached us, pulled by six powerful negroes, attired in red-flannel jackets and white straw hats with broad ribbons. The craft itself — a kind of monster canoe, some forty-five feet long, narrow, wall-sided, with high bow and raised stern — lay deep in the water, for there were extra negroes for the fishing, servants, baskets of provisions, water buckets, stone jars of less innocent drinking, and abaft there was a knot of great strong planters, — Elliots all — cousins, uncles, and brothers. A friendly hail as they swept up along-side, — an exchange of salutations.

“Well, Trescot, have you got plenty of Crabs?"

A groan burst forth at his insouciant reply. He had been charged to find bait, and he had told the negroes to do so, and the negroes had not done so. The fishermen looked grievously at each other, and fiercely at Trescot, who assumed an air of recklessness, and threw doubts on the existence of fish in the river, and resorted to similar miserable subterfuges; indeed, it was subsequently discovered that he was an utter infidel in regard to the delights of piscicapture.

“Now, all aboard! Over, you fellows, and take these gentlemen in!" The negroes were over in a moment, waist deep, and, each taking one on his back, deposited us dry in the boat. I only mention this to record the fact, that I was much impressed by a practical demonstration from my bearer respecting the strong odor of the skin of a heated African. I have been wedged up in a column of infantry on a hot day, and have marched to leeward of Ghoorkhas in India, but the overpowering pungent smell of the negro exceeds everything of the kind I have been unfortunate enough to experience.

The vessel was soon moving again, against a ripple, caused by the wind, which blew dead against us; and, notwithstanding the praises bestowed on the boat, it was easy to perceive [t]hat the labor of pulling such a dead-log-like thing through the water told severely on the rowers, who had already come some twelve miles, I think. Nevertheless, they were told to sing, and they began accordingly one of those wild Baptist chants about the Jordan in which they delight, — not destitute of music, but utterly unlike what is called an Ethiopian melody.

The banks of the river on both sides are low; on the left covered with wood, through which, here and there, at intervals, one could see a planter's or overseer's cottage. The course of this great combination of salt and fresh water sometimes changes, so that houses are swept away and plantations submerged; but the land is much valued nevertheless, on account of the fineness of the cotton grown among the islands. “Cotton at twelve cents a pound, and we don't fear the world.”

As the boat was going to the fishing ground, which lay towards the mouth of the river at Hilton Head, our friends talked politics and sporting combined, — the first of the usual character, the second quite new.

I heard much of the mighty devil-fish which frequents these waters. One of our party, Mr. Elliot, sen., a tall, knotty, gnarled sort of man, with a mellow eye and a hearty voice, was a famous hand at the sport, and had had some hair-breadth escapes in pursuit of it. The fish is described as of enormous size and strength, a monster ray, which possesses formidable antennae-like horns, and a pair of huge fins, or flappers, one of which rises above the water as the creature moves below the surface. The hunters, as they may be called, go out in parties, — three or four boats, or more, with good store of sharp harpoons and tow-lines, and lances. When they perceive the creature, one boat takes the lead, and moves down towards it, the others following, each with a, harpooner standing in the bow. The devil-fish sometimes is wary, and dives, when it sees a boat, taking such a long spell below that it is never seen again. At other times, however, it backs, and lets the boat come so near as to allow of the harpooner striking it, or it dives for a short way and comes up near the boats again. The moment the harpoon is fixed, the line is paid out by the rush of the creature, which is made with tremendous force, and all the boats at once hurry up, so that one after another they are made fast to that in which the lucky sportsman is seated. At length, when the line is run out, checked from time to time as much as can be done with safety, the crew take their oars and follow the course of the ray, which swims so fast, however, that it keeps the line taut, and drags the whole flotilla seawards. It depends on its size and strength to determine how soon it rises to the surface; by degrees the line is warped in and hove short till the boats are brought near, and when the ray comes up it is attacked with a shower of lances and harpoons, and dragged off into shoal water to die.

On one occasion, our Nimrod told us, he was standing in the bows of the boat, harpoon in hand, when a devil-fish came up close to him; he threw the harpoon, struck it, but at the same time the boat ran against the creature with a shock which threw him right forward on its back, and in an instant it caught him in its horrid arms and plunged down with him to the depths. Imagine the horror of the moment! Imagine the joy of the terrified drowning, dying man, when, for some inscrutable reason, the devil-fish relaxed its grip, and enabled him to strike for the surface, where he was dragged into the boat more dead than alive by his terror-smitten companions, — the only man who ever got out of the embraces of the thing alive. “Tom is so tough that even a devil-fish could make nothing out of him.”

At last we came to our fishing ground. There was a substitute found for the favorite crab, and it was fondly hoped our toils might be rewarded with success. And these were toils, for the water is deep and the lines heavy. But to alleviate them, some hampers were produced from the stern, and wonderful pies from Mrs. Trescot's hands, and from those of fair ladies up the river whom we shall never see, were spread out, and bottles which represented distant cellars in friendly nooks far away. “No drum here! Up anchor, and pull away a few miles lower down.” Trescot shook his head, and again asserted his disbelief in fishing, or rather in catching, and indeed made a sort of pretence at arguing that it was wiser to remain quiet and talk philosophical politics; but, as judge of appeal, I gave it against him, and the negroes bent to their oars, and we went thumping through the spray, till, rounding a point of land, we saw pitched on the sandy shore ahead of us, on the right bank, a tent, and close by two boats. “There is a party at it!” A fire was burning on the beach, and as we came near, Tom and Jack and Harry were successfully identified. “There's no take on, or they would not be on shore. This is very unfortunate.”

All the regret of my friends was on my account, so to ease their minds I assured them I did not mind the disappointment much. “Hallo Dick! Caught any drum?” “A few this morning; bad sport now, and will be till tide turns again.” I was introduced to all the party from a distance, and presently I saw one of them raising from a boat something in look and shape and color like a sack of flour, which he gave to a negro, who proceeded to carry it towards us in a little skiff. “Thank you, Charley. I just want to let Mr. Russell see a drum-fish.” And a very odd fish it was, — a thick lumpish form, about four and a half feet long, with enormous head and scales, and teeth like the grinders of a ruminant animal, acting on a great pad of bone in the roof of the mouth, — a very unlovely thing, swollen with roe, which is the great delicacy.

“No chance till the tide turned,” — but that would be too late for our return, and so unwillingly we were compelled to steer towards home, hearing now and then the singular noise like the tap on a large unbraced drum, from which the fish takes its name. At first, when I heard it, I was inclined to think it was made by some one in the boat, so near and close did it sound; but soon it came from all sides of us, and evidently from the depths of the water beneath us, — not a sharp rat-tat-tap, but a full muffled blow with a heavy thud on the sheepskin. Mr. Trescot told me that on a still evening by the river side the effect sometimes is most curious, — the rolling and pattering is audible at a great distance. Our friends were in excellent humor with everything and everybody, except the Yankees, though they had caught no fish, and kept the negroes at singing and rowing till at nightfall we landed at the island, and so to bed after supper and a little conversation, in which Mrs. Trescot again explained how easily she could maintain a battalion on the island by her simple commissariat, already adapted to the niggers, and that it would therefore be very easy for the South to feed an army, if the people were friendly

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 141-6

Senator Jefferson Davis to Governor Francis W. Pickens, January 13, 1861

washington, D. C,

January 13, 1861.

Governor F. W. Pickens,

My dear sir: A serious and sudden attack of neuralgia has prevented me from fulfilling my promise to communicate more fully by mail than could safely be done by telegraph. I need hardly say to you that a request for a conference on questions of defense had to me the force of a command; it, however, found me under a proposition from the Governor of Mississippi, to send me as a commissioner to Virginia, and another to employ me in the organization of the State militia. But more than all, I was endeavoring to secure the defeat of the nomination of a foreign collector for the port of Charleston, and at that time it was deemed possible that in the Senate we could arrest all hostile legislation such as might be designed either for the immediate or future coercion of the South. It now appears that we shall lack one or two votes to effect the legislative object just mentioned, and it was decided last evening, in a conference which I was not able to attend, that the Senators of the seceded States should promptly withdraw upon the telegraphic information already received. I am still confined to my bed, but hope soon to be up again, and, at as early a day as practicable, to see you. I cannot place any confidence in the adherence of the administration to a fixed line of policy. The general tendency is to hostile measures, and against these it is needful for you to prepare. I take it for granted that the time allowed to the garrison of Fort Sumter has been diligently employed by yourselves, so that before you could be driven out of your earthworks you will be able to capture the fort which commands them. I have not sufficiently learned your policy in relation to the garrison at Fort Sumter, to understand whether the expectation is to compel them to capitulate for want of supplies, or whether it is only to prevent the transmission of reports and the receipt of orders. To shut them up with a view to starve them into submission would create a sympathetic action much greater than any which could be obtained on the present issue. I doubt very much the loyalty of the garrison, and it has occurred to me that if they could receive no reinforcements—and I suppose you sufficiently command the entrance to the harbor to prevent it — that there could be no danger of the freest intercouse between the garrison and the city. We have to-day news of the approach of a mixed commission from Fort Sumter and Charleston, but nothing further than the bare fact. We are probably soon to be involved in that fiercest of human strifes, a civil war. The temper of the Black Republicans is not to give us our rights in the Union, or allow us to go peaceably out of it. If we had no other cause, this would be enough to justify secession, at whatever hazard. When I am better I will write again, if I do not soon see you.

Very sincerely yours,

Jefferson Davis.*

­­­­_______________

* From original letter.

SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 265-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Friday, September 26, 1862

At several meetings of late the subject of deporting the colored race has been discussed. Indeed for months, almost from the commencement of this administration, it has been at times considered. More than a year ago it was thrust on me by Thompson and others in connection with the Chiriqui Grant, a claim to title from the Government of Central America of a large part of Costa Rica. Speculators used it as a means of disposing of that grant to our Government. It was a rotten remnant of an intrigue of the last administration. The President, encouraged by Blair and Smith, was disposed to favor it. Blair is honest and disinterested; perhaps Smith is so, yet I have not been favorably impressed with his zeal in behalf of the Chiriqui Association. As early as May, 1861, a great pressure was made upon me to enter into a coal contract with this company. The President was earnest in the matter; wished to send the negroes out of the country. Smith, with the Thompsons, urged and stimulated him, and they were as importunate with me as the President. I spent two or three hours on different days looking over the papers, — titles, maps, reports, and evidence, — and came to the conclusion that there was fraud and cheat in the affair. It appeared to be a swindling speculation. Told the President I had no confidence in it, and asked to be released from its further consideration. The papers were then referred to Smith to investigate and report. After a month or two he reported strongly in favor of the scheme, and advised that the Navy Department should make an immediate contract for coal before foreign governments got hold of it. Mr. Toucey had investigated it. Commodore Engle had been sent out to examine the country and especially in relation to coal. The President was quite earnest in its favor, but, satisfied myself it was a job, I objected and desired to be excused from any participation in it. Two or three times it has been revived, but I have crowded off action. Chase gave me assistance on one occasion, and the scheme was dropped until this question of deporting colored persons came up, when Smith again brought forward Thompson's Chiriqui Grant. He made a skillful and taking report, embracing both coal and negroes. Each was to assist the other. The negroes were to be transported to Chiriqui to mine coal for the Navy, and the Secretary of the Navy was to make an immediate advance of $50,000 for coal not yet mined, — nor laborers obtained to mine it, nor any satisfactory information or proof that there was decent coal to be mined. I respectfully declined adopting his views. Chase and Stanton sustained me, and Mr. Bates to an extent. Blair, who first favored it, cooled off, as the question was discussed, but the President and Smith were persistent.

It came out that the governments and rival parties in Central America denied the legality of the Chiriqui Grant and Thompson's claim, — declared it was a bogus transaction. The President concluded he ought to be better satisfied on this point, and determined he would send out an agent. At this stage of the case Senator Pomeroy appeared and took upon himself a negro emigrating colonization scheme. Would himself go out and take with him a cargo of negroes, and hunt up a place for them, — all, professedly, in the cause of humanity.

On Tuesday last the President brought forward the subject and desired the members of the Cabinet to each take it into serious consideration. He thought a treaty could be made to advantage, and territory secured to which the negroes could be sent. Thought it essential to provide an asylum for a race which we had emancipated, but which could never be recognized or admitted to be our equals. Several governments had signified their willingness to receive them. Mr. Seward said some were willing to take them without expense to us.

Mr. Blair made a long argumentative statement in favor of deportation. It would be necessary to rid the country of its black population, and some place must be found for them. He is strongly for deportation, has given the subject much thought, but yet seems to have no matured system which he can recommend. Mr. Bates was for compulsory deportation. The negro would not, he said, go voluntarily, had great local attachments but no enterprise or persistency. The President objected unequivocally to compulsion. Their emigration must be voluntary and without expense to themselves. Great Britain, Denmark, and perhaps other powers would take them. I remarked there was no necessity for a treaty, which had been suggested. Any person who desired to leave the country could do so now, whether white or black, and it was best to leave it so, — a voluntary system; the emigrant who chose to leave our shores could and would go where there were the best inducements.

These remarks seemed to strike Seward, who, I perceive, has been in consultation with the President and some of the foreign ministers, and on his motion the subject was then postponed, with an understanding it would be taken up to-day. Mr. Bates had a very well prepared paper which he read, expressing his views. Little was said by any one else except Seward, who followed up my suggestions. But the President is not satisfied; says he wants a treaty. Smith says the Senate would never ratify a treaty conferring any power, and advised that Seward should make a contract.

The Governors of the loyal States called to-day on the President. They have had a meeting at Altoona, for what purpose I scarcely know. It was an unauthorized gathering of State Executives, doubtless with good intent; but I dislike these irregular and extraordinary movements. They must tend to good or evil, and I see no good. These officials had better limit their efforts within their legitimate sphere.

Admiral Gregory came to see me in relation to the ironclads which are being constructed under his superintendence. Enjoined upon him to have them completed by November at farthest. A demonstration is to be made on Charleston, and it will not do to depend upon the army even for cooperation there.

It is now almost a fortnight since the battle near Sharpsburg. The Rebels have recrossed the Potomac, but our army is doing nothing. The President says Halleck told him he should want two days more to make up his mind what to do. Great Heavens! what a General-in-Chief!

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 150-3

James Buchanan to Major-General John A. Dix, April 19, 1861

Wheatland, near Lancaster, April 19,1861.

My Dear General, — I need scarcely say I was much gratified with your letter to Major Anderson, as well as with his answer. You placed in an eloquent and striking light before him the infamous conduct of General Twiggs and others. His response was manly and loyal. By-the-bye, I some time since received an insulting letter from General Twiggs, dated in Mississippi, on the 30th ultimo. Its conclusion is as follows: “Your usurped right to dismiss me from the army might be acquiesced in, but you had no right to brand me as a traitor: this was personal, and I shall treat it as such—not through the papers, but in person. I shall most assuredly pay a visit to Lancaster for the sole purpose of a personal interview with you. So, Sir, prepare yourself. I am well assured that public opinion will sanction any course I may take with you.”

I have paid no attention to this note, and entertain but little apprehension from the threats of this hoary-headed rebel. My fate, however, is in some respects hard. After my Annual Message of the 3d of December, in which I made as able an argument as I could against secession, and indicated my purpose to collect the revenue and defend the Federal forts in South Carolina, etc., etc., the Southern friends of the administration fell away from it. From the line prescribed in this Message I am not conscious that I have departed a hair's breadth so far as it was practicable to pursue it. I was ready and willing at all times to attempt to collect the revenue, and, as a necessary preliminary, I nominated a Collector to the Senate. You know the result.

After my explosition (sic) with the Commissioners of South Carolina at the end of December, the Southern Senators denounced me on the floor of the Senate; but after my Message to Congress of the 8th of January, one of them at least abused me in terms which I would not repeat. In that Message I declared that “the right and the duty to use military force defensively against those who resist the Federal officers in the execution of their loyal functions, and against those who assail the property of the Federal Government, is clear and undeniable’ — and more to the same purpose.

Warning was repeatedly given that if the authorities of South Carolina should assail Fort Sumter this would be the commencement of a civil war, and they would be responsible for the consequences. The last and most emphatic warning of this character is contained in the concluding sentence of Mr. Holt's final and admirable answer to Mr. Hayne of the 6th of February. It is as follows: “If, with all the multiplied proofs which exist of the President's anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall assault Fort Sumter and peril the lives of the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our common country into the horrors of civil war, then upon them and those they represent must rest the responsibility.” This letter has been published, but seems to have been forgotten. I perceive that you are to be President of the great Union meeting. Would it not be well, in portraying the conduct of South Carolina in assailing Fort Sumter, to state that this had been done under the most solemn warnings of the consequences, and refer to this letter of Mr. Holt? Nobody seems to understand the course pursued by the late administration. A quotation from Holt's letter would strengthen the hands of the present administration. You were a member of the Cabinet at its date, and I believe it received your warm approbation. Hence it would come from you with peculiar propriety.

Had I known you were about to visit Washington on the business of the Treasury, I should have urged you to call at Wheatland on your return. You would then, as you will at all times, be a most welcome visitor.

They talk about keeping secrets. Nobody seems to have suspected the existence of an expedition to re-enforce and supply Fort Sumter at the close of our administration.

The present administration had no alternative but to accept the war initiated by South Carolina or the Southern Confederacy. The North will sustain the administration almost to a man: and it ought to be sustained at all hazards.

Miss Hetty feels very much indebted to you, and you are frequently the subject of kindly remembrance in our small family circle. Please to present my kind regards to Mrs. Dix.

From your friend always,

james Buchanan.

General John A. Dix.

SOURCE: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 5-6

Edwin M. Stanton to Major-General John A. Dix, April 8, 1861

Washington, April 8,1861.

Dear Sir, — I am as much in the dark as yourself in regard to the actions and designs of the present administration.

This city has been in a great state of excitement about the military and naval movements of the last few days, and no one but the officers of government know their purpose. In this respect they have a great advantage over the last administration, because the Secessionists have now no representative in the Cabinet or kitchen. I saw Mr. Holt last evening, and he is also ignorant of the object of the active preparations going on. He made, however, this suggestion, that the Confederate Government refuses to allow a simple evacuation of Fort Sumter, but requires an ignominious surrender. That the administration will fight before submitting to such a condition. If this be the reason, I am with the administration on that point. And although Mr. Holt says he knows nothing about it, the shrewdness of the guess leads me to think he has received some information. So far as Chase is concerned, I do not think there has been anything unfair or concealed in his action. The loan turned oat better than I expected, and had I been Secretary, I would have taken the whole eight millions on the terms offered, rather than risk the chances of the times. I have no doubt there has been a settled purpose to evacuate Sumter, and that the delay has arisen from the terms required by the Confederates. The country would stand war, rather than see Anderson a captive, or required to haul down his flag. The administration will also hold on to Pickens, and aid Houston in Texas.

I do not think peaceful relations will continue much longer; nor do I think hostilities will be so great an evil as many apprehend. A round or two often serves to restore harmony; and the vast consumption required by a state of hostilities will enrich rather than impoverish the North.

The best joke I have known lately is a note from Twiggs to Holt in respect to the epithets contained in his order of dismissal. Twiggs don't like them. How would he relish the original order? I have not heard from Wheatland since you were here. Mrs. Stanton and your juvenile friend are well. Mrs. S. and L. shall visit New York in a few weeks, unless Ben McCullough should capture us before long.

The herds of office-seekers still throng the city.

With sincere regards, I remain, yours truly,

Edwin M. Stanton.

Hon. John A. Dix.

SOURCE: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 4-5

Edwin M. Stanton to General William Robinson, December 30, 1860

Private.

Washington City, 30th December, 1860.

Dear Sir:

I am truly grateful for your hearty message of good will and congratulation and for your promise that the State of Pennsylvania can be relied on for whatever aid may be needed to preserve our imperiled Union.

We are enveloped in a great deal of dust and fog, but the smudge is not so thick that I cannot distinctly discern treason all around us.

Judge Black and myself have been dumbfounded by a meeting of the President, as President, with the so-called South Carolina commissioners. At first we agreed to resign at once, but after going carefully over the subject thought it better to state our objections or views in writing before taking any step that might later be considered precipitate.

Judge Black is closer to the President than myself and exercises a great deal of influence over him. He will present the written objections, which I have just prepared, and stand by for the purpose of extricating the President from his present peril.

If he shall refuse to recede, it seems to me there is no escape for Black, Holt, and myself except resignation.

I tremble to think that the administration is already semi-officially committed to the theory that South Carolina is an independent nation or “republic” capable of negotiating treaties; and if that theory shall not be completely broken down, followed by reinforcements to hold our beleaguered and threatened Southern forts, there will not be a semblance of the Union left on March 4, next.

I fear that your offer of help on the part of Pennsylvania may be founded on a necessity greater than yourself or the public now discern.

I have written Judge Loomis to bring you to the house when you arrive in Washington next week. I shall be happy to have your company under my roof. Although for over a week breakfast has been my only meal at home, I look forward to more time early next month. Extending to you the compliments of the season, believe me,

Very truly yours,

Edwin M. Stanton.

To General William Robinson.

SOURCE: Frank Abial Flower, Edwin McMasters Stanton: The Autocrat of Rebellion, Emancipation, and Reconstruction, p. 90-1