Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 243. — Report of Brig. Gen. James T. Holtzclaw, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations November 20-December 27, 1864.

No. 243.

Report of Brig. Gen. James T. Holtzclaw, C. S. Army,

commanding brigade, of operations November 20-December 27, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS HOLTZCLAW'S BRIGADE,        

Near Tupelo, Miss., January 12, 1865.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade north of the Tennessee River:

The brigade left Florence with the division on the 20th of November, and arrived in front of Columbia on the morning of the 27th; went into position and skirmished with the enemy late in the afternoon, but without any result. On the 29th, the enemy having withdrawn from the town, I crossed Duck River at 10 o'clock at night and formed on the brigade of General Pettus, which had effected a lodgment during the day. I had worked the remainder of the night intrenching within 100 yards of the enemy's skirmish line. At 4 a.m. the enemy withdrew, closely pursued by my skirmish line, under Major H. I. Thornton, who succeeded in capturing about forty prisoners from their rear guard. At daylight I moved forward with the division in pursuit of the enemy, believing and hoping that he would be forced to a general engagement while en route to Franklin. My command, notwithstanding it had worked all night without a moment for repose, moved forward with great alacrity and marched the twenty-four miles to Franklin by 4.30 p.m., not a straggler falling from the ranks. At sundown I moved forward with the remainder of the division to support a line of General Cheatham's corps then hotly engaged with the enemy, intrenched around the town of Franklin, halting just beyond musket range. I remained in line until 4 a.m., when I moved into the town of Franklin, where I remained till 1 p.m. guarding stores and prisoners, moving at that hour with the command en route for Nashville. I arrived in front of the enemy on the 1st of December, my brigade in advance of the army. Driving in the skirmish line of the enemy, I established myself in position, which the next day became the line for the corps. The next twelve days were spent in intrenching and strengthening the position, which was made impregnable. I organized an efficient corps of shoemakers, finding no difficulty in procuring leather in the surrounding country—would have soon been able to supply all the wants of my command in this respect.

On the 12th of December the skirmish line in my front, without difficulty, drove in the enemy's line to their main works and established our line half a mile in advance. My loss was one man in this affair.

On the morning of the 15th of December the unusual activity of the enemy had the whole command under arms, demonstrating on the extreme right. He attacked late in the day in force on the left. The line gradually contracting to repel the attack, my line became extended three-quarters of a mile. About sundown I closed my line on its extreme left to repel a threatened attack of the enemy. He, however, made no advance, contenting himself with a spirited shelling, mostly under the protection of works. My command sustained no loss. At night the army dropped back to a new line one mile. I brought up the rear and gained my new position at 2 a.m., which was right across the Franklin pike, the road being my center, my left behind a stone wall. I commenced work immediately, and continued until the opening of the enemy's batteries at 7 a.m. obliged me to desist. He soon advanced in force all along my front. At 10 o'clock [he] made a desperate charge, but was driven back, with loss. He then commenced a most furious shelling from three six-gun batteries, concentrating his fire mainly upon my right. One battery of unusually heavy guns was brought down the pike to within 600 yards of my line. The conformation of the ground prevented me sharpshooting it sufficiently to drive it away. At 12 m. the enemy made a most determined charge on my right. Placing a negro brigade in front they gallantly dashed up to the abatis, forty feet in front, and were killed by hundreds. Pressed on by their white brethren in the rear they continued to come up in masses to the abatis, but they came only to die. I have seen most of the battle-fields of the West, but never saw dead men thicker than in front of my two right regiments; the great masses and disorder of the enemy enabling the left to rake them in flank, while the right, with a coolness unexampled, scarcely threw away a shot at their front. The enemy at last broke and fled in wild disorder. With great difficulty I prevented my line from pursuing; with a supporting line I should certainly have done so; but covering the pike, which would be our only line of retreat in case of disaster, I did not feel justified in hazarding the position for what might only have been a temporary success. A color-bearer of the negro brigade brought his standard to within a few feet of my line. He was shot down, and Lieutenant Knox, of the Thirty-sixth Alabama Regiment, sprang over the shattered works and brought it in. Another flag was carried off by an officer after five different bearers had fallen in the vain effort to plant it in my works. At 2 p.m. the enemy attempted a second charge, less determined than the first. Their brave officers could neither lead nor drive their men to such certain death; I noticed as many as three mounted who fell far in advance of their commands urging them forward. The shelling of the enemy's batteries between 12 and 3 p.m. was the most furious I ever witnessed, while the range was so precise that scarce a shell failed to explode in the line. The enemy seemed now to be satisfied that he could not carry my position, and contented himself by shelling and sharpshooting everything in sight. About 4 p.m. I saw the left suddenly give way three or four brigades distant from me. Almost instantaneously the line crumbled away till it reached me. I had no time to give any order or make any disposition to check the disaster, when my command showed symptoms of taking care of themselves. I could only order them back, hoping to reform in a new position. I had to retire under a destructive fire of eighteen guns, 600 yards distant, sweeping almost an open plain. I could not maintain order. The parallel stone walls on the pike separated my command in the center. I had neither staff officer nor courier mounted with me, and used my best endeavors to get my command all on the same side of the pike. I succeeded in doing this about one mile from the field, getting the greater body of the brigade together. I was directed by the major-general commanding to take position as rear guard of the army across the pike. Shortly after dark I moved slowly back, driving up and hurrying stragglers forward. At 11 p.m. I halted four miles from Hollow Tree Gap, remaining until 3 a.m. [17th], when I moved inside of the gap and halted in rear of Pettus' brigade. At daylight our cavalry stampeded, ran through the gap, and formed a mile in the rear. I sent, by direction of the major-general, a regiment up the hollow to the left of the gap. The enemy passing to the right induced the withdrawal of the brigades from the gap. I was unable to communicate with a portion of the regiment sent out, the enemy dashing in in force between us. I moved in rear of the brigade in line of battle to within one mile of Franklin, where I passed the brigade of General Gibson, drawn up to support a section of artillery. I hurried across the river and formed on the southern bank, in Franklin. By the time I had formed, the enemy's cavalry pursued Buford's cavalry division, driving it in confusion into the river. They were repulsed by Pettus' brigade, in the works north of the river, and the section of Bledsoe's battery, in my line on the south, not getting in musket-range of my command. The portion of the regiment I had detached in the morning and could not communicate with passed around the hills to the left of the pike, running five miles to get there. They came into the pike just at the position taken by General Gibson, exhausted with running around the enemy's cavalry. Without notice to myself or authority from the major-general, Brigadier-General Gibson ordered this detachment of about seventy-five men to remain and cover the battery. Then withdrawing with the battery he withdrew his brigade, while my small detachment, in obedience to his orders, held the position, covered the retreat of himself and the section. As a matter of course they were overwhelmed by the enemy's cavalry, 2,000 or 3,000 of whom had surrounded them, three officers and five men only escaping. I went into line next just outside of the trenches of Franklin. The enemy's cavalry dashed up to within 300 yards of my line, firing carbines and pistols. Three or four volleys drove them back. I then marched back in line, halting every few hundred yards until I passed through the gap south of Franklin. Moving on with the division I was ordered into line about six miles from Franklin just before dark. Just after I had formed another of the many cavalry stampedes from Chalmers' division occurred. In trying to get them out of my line and formed on the left I received a severe contusion on the ankle, so painful as to prevent my doing anything for several hours. I retired to seek medical aid, a fight with the enemy's cavalry occurring shortly after. My brigade acted under orders of the major-general. I need not, therefore, speak of its operations in that affair.

I joined my command at Columbia the next day. The corps of General Cheatham bringing up the rear, I with it marched to the Tennessee River, which we reached on the 25th of December, and fortified and crossed on the morning of the 27th.

I will say nothing of the hardships and exposures borne by my command; they but bore their part of the general burden; yet that part they bore with cheerfulness and spirit, and repulsed the enemy, with loss, whenever they encountered him on the soil of Tennessee.

My officers and men conducted themselves to my entire satisfaction throughout all the fights and marches.

To my division and corps commanders I return my sincere thanks. In every emergency of the campaign I have found them at hand ready to advise and assist me.

I offer no excuse for not bringing off Stanford's battery on the right of my line. It was so badly crippled as to be immovable, scarce a whole wheel remaining in its carriages, sustaining, without works, a fire from eighteen of the enemy's guns for seven hours.

Many daring achievements were performed by both officers and men of my command during our stay, which I will hereafter notice in application for them to the department and to army headquarters.

To the efficient commissary of my brigade, Maj. J. W. Williams, I am indebted for the faithful and prompt discharge of his duties. My quartermaster, W. B. Hoyt, by his vigilance and activity, succeeded in bringing every mule and wagon of my command south of the Tennessee River. He also accumulated and brought out in his train a wagonload of leather and a fine supply of shoemakers' tools.

My loss while north of the Tennessee River was as follows: 1 officer and 8 men killed, 1 officer and 27 men wounded, and 13 officers and 149 men missing; total, officers, 15; men, 184; grand total, 199. A good many of the missing, I am satisfied, were killed and wounded in coming out of the trenches, while some made their way across the Tennessee River at different points and have not yet found their commands.

I am, captain, your obedient servant,

J. T. HOLTZCLAW,        

Brigadier-General.

Capt. J. M. MACON,
        Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 704-7

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 242. — Report of Brig. Gen. Randall L. Gibson, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations December 15-17, 1864.

No. 242.

Report of Brig. Gen. Randall L. Gibson, C. S. Army,

commanding brigade, of operations December 15-17, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS GIBSON'S BRIGADE,        

Near Tupelo, Miss., January 11, 1865.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor, in compliance with orders from division headquarters, to submit the following report of operations before Nashville and along the line of our march to Columbia:

About 2 o'clock on the 15th of December I was directed by Lieutenant-General Lee to move my brigade to the extreme left of his corps and to deploy it in one rank, so as to cover as much space as possible. A little while before sunset the troops in line at right angles to the line in which I was posted—a line extending along the left flank of the army—gave way, and soon those immediately upon my left fell back, the whole moving rapidly in some confusion to the rear. The enemy advanced, and seeing that my left flank was exposed and likely to be involved, I withdrew my brigade from the trenches and formed a line of battle at right angles to them, my right resting upon them. I also threw forward a strong line of skirmishers under Lieut. A. T. Martin, who at once attacked the enemy, but he showed no disposition to advance. By this time it was twilight, and in a few minutes night closed operations.

The next day, the line having been retired about two and a half miles, my skirmishers were attacked early in the morning, but not ordered in until near I o'clock, when it was discovered that preparations were being made to charge us in force. The enemy assaulted my brigade either with one large or two small brigades, and after several attempts only came up to within seventy-five yards, and remaining there a few minutes broke and fled. We killed and wounded a great many for the time they were under fire and the force engaged. I estimate his loss at 200 killed and from 700 to 900 wounded. Observing just before sundown troops and ambulances passing into the Franklin turnpike from the left, and double-quicking toward the rear, I at once dispatched my aide-de-camp, Lieut. Cartwright Eustis, to say to Brigadier-General Pettus that I would co-operate with him in any plan to arrest the progress of the enemy, who had evidently broken the line somewhere to his left. Scarcely had my aide reached me and informed me of the intentions of General Pettus, when the enemy was observed already upon our rear and our troops upon all Sides breaking and striving to reach the line of retreat, which was nearly covered. I had ordered Lieut. Col. R. H. Lindsay, commanding Sixteenth Louisiana Volunteers, to get ready to deploy his regiment as skirmishers along the trenches, while I withdrew the brigade and attempted to arrest the enemy, but at this time confusion prevailed over everything. Arriving at the woods in front of Colonel Overton's I formed a line, as again directed by Lieutenant-General Lee, and moving back half a mile farther Major-General Clayton reformed his division, and we continued the retreat until we reached Hollow Tree Gap, where we bivouacked.

Early the next morning I was sent as a reserve near the hotel, 600 yards in rear of the gap. While there, in accordance with an order from division headquarters, I sent Col. S. E. Hunter, with the greater part of the Fourth and Thirtieth Louisiana Volunteers, and my inspector-general to report to Major-General Clayton. He was placed on picket in a gap in rear of the division, by order of Lieutenant-General Lee, and while being posted there I moved the balance of my brigade to attack the enemy, who was approaching the road between us and Franklin. I drove him back very easily, and was moving to the road again, when I was informed by a staff officer of Lieutenant-General Lee (Lieutenant Farish) that Colonel Hunter and his detachment had been captured. I was again placed in position in an earth-work 1,000 yards from Harpeth River, and before any instructions reached me our cavalry stampeded. The enemy, 5,000 strong, charged in three columns, with squadrons covering the intervening ground and connecting them—one in front, one in rear upon the left flank, and one in rear upon the right flank. I found a section of artillery upon the road and apart of a regiment of infantry under Colonel Hunley. I had the section to open upon the enemy, but it had no effect except to increase the speed of his flanking columns, and made no impression upon that one advancing directly upon our front. After firing ten rounds, with no better effect, I ordered the officer (I do not know his name) to move his pieces to the rear. I also directed Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, commanding Sixteenth Louisiana Volunteers, upon my extreme right, to deploy his regiment as skirmishers in retreat, and Colonel Campbell and Major Flournoy, with the First, Thirteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth (in all, about 250 muskets), to move to the rear and to fight as they went. I also directed Colonel Hunley to deploy his men as skirmishers. The cavalry of the enemy charged all around us. Colonel Campbell broke up, by a well-delivered fire, the column charging down the road, and thus gave time to the section of artillery to cross the river. The enemy came up within less than 100 yards of the section and fired his revolvers at those about it. My command fought its way to the river, entirely surrounded, with a loss of 10 killed, 25 wounded, and 5 captured. We continued to make dispositions against this cavalry, under orders of Major-General Clayton, without being engaged, until near sunset, when he again charged, coming from the left, and wheeled into and down the road just where my left flank rested upon it. I immediately changed front upon the left regiment, and ordered Colonel Henderson (Forty-second Georgia), temporarily in charge of Stovall's brigade, upon my right, to face by the rear rank and wheel to the right, so as to cover the road. A few well-directed volleys cut the charging column, and a part of two regiments continued down the road, while the rest fell back into the woods. Major-General Clayton, coming from the front, where he had gone to superintend the advance of Holtzclaw's brigade, then came up and made dispositions which resulted in the defeat of this body of cavalry, the killing of many, and the capture of colors and prisoners. My command was not again engaged.

I trust my officers and men behaved themselves, under all circumstances, in a way to entitle them to the confidence of my superior officers. Colonel Hunter, Fourth Louisiana Volunteers; Major Picolet, commanding Thirtieth; Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, Colonel Campbell, and Major Flournoy--all gave every assistance and conducted their parts with skill and courage.

I would particularly commend Lieut. A. T. Martin, commanding battalion of sharpshooters, for his conspicuous gallantry and skill, and regret to say he was wounded and captured when quitting the trenches.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, while temporarily in command of my brigade, displayed fine qualities as an officer, and Colonel Henderson was conspicuous for his efficiency and bravery, while for a short time in command of Stovall's brigade, under trying circumstances.

I would again commend Capt. A. L. Stuart, acting inspector-general, for his courage, judgment, and promptness. I regret to say that he was severely wounded. Capt. It. H. Bein, assistant adjutant-general, and Capt. G. Norton, acting assistant adjutant-general, were always prompt, efficient, and gallant, and especially so was Lieut. C. Eustis, my aide-decamp. Capt. J. Hodges, assistant quartermaster, and Maj. W. V. Crouch, commissary of subsistence, have discharged their duties throughout with fidelity and intelligence.

I have to announce and to deplore the death of Capt. C. W. Cushman, Thirtieth Louisiana Volunteers, who was killed at the trenches. He was a brave, intelligent, and efficient officer. Nor less zealous and worthy were Lieut. J. J. Cawthon, Nineteenth Louisiana Volunteers, and Lieut. C. Miller, Twentieth Louisiana Volunteers, who likewise fell in the discharge of their duties.

The annexed paper* (marked "A") contains a list of casualties.

Yours, very respectfully,

R. L. GIBSON,        

Brigadier-General.

Capt. J. M. MACON,

        Assistant Adjutant-General.

_______________

* Not found.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 702-4

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 240. — Report of Maj. Gen. Henry D. Clayton, C. S. Army, commanding division, of operations November 20-December 27, 1864.

No. 240.

Report of Maj. Gen. Henry D. Clayton, C. S. Army,

commanding division, of operations November 20-December 27, 1864.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following, being a report of the operations of this division in the campaign north of the Tennessee River, embracing a period from the 20th of November to the 27th of December:

On the 20th of November the line of march was taken up from Florence, Ala., in the direction of Nashville. The division reached Columbia on the 27th without incident worthy of mention, except the usual bad roads and bad weather incident to the season of the year. Here the enemy, having massed his forces from Pulaski and other neighboring points, was found strongly intrenched.

On the 29th, the enemy having withdrawn across Duck River, the balance of the army was moved to the right, leaving Stevenson's division and my own to confront him at this point. Preparations were made for crossing the river, which was accomplished on the evening of the 29th and the morning of the 30th of November. Moving rapidly up the road to Franklin we came up with the balance of the army at Spring Hill, and all soon moved on to Franklin, which was reached late in the afternoon of that day. We found that bloody and disastrous engagement begun, and were put in position to attack, but night mercifully interposed to save us from the terrible scourge which our brave companions had suffered.

On the following morning this division, being in front, resumed the march to Nashville, where it arrived in front of the enemy's works on the 1st of December, and, driving in his vedettes, took position, which was established as line of battle of the whole army. From this time until the morning of the 15th was spent in almost incessant work upon lines of intrenchments, of which four were constructed by this division.

Upon the morning of the 15th the engagement was begun by the enemy, who attacked the extreme right and left of the army and demonstrated along my front. It becoming necessary to send re-enforcements to the left, my line was extended in that direction until Stovall's and Holtzclaw's brigades were deployed to cover the whole front occupied by the corps in the morning, and Gibson's brigade, which was upon the left, was taken out of the trenches and thrown back perpendicularly to check the advance of the enemy, who was sweeping down the lines from the left. This maneuver and night stopped the farther progress of the enemy. About midnight this division was moved back and took position on what is known as the Overton Hill, four miles from the city, upon the extreme right of the army, conforming to the position already taken by the left. Here breast-works were constructed.

The enemy made their appearance early on the morning of the 16th, and soon developed along our whole line. Having placed several batteries in position along my front with concentrated fire upon the Overton Hill, which was mainly occupied by Stovall's brigade, the enemy opened a terrible fire, which did considerable damage to that brigade and very materially injured Stanford's battery, which was in position on the left of Stovall's and right of Holtzclaw's brigades. At 1 p.m. the enemy, having driven in the skirmish line, made a vigorous assault upon portions of Gibson's and Holtzclaw's brigades, which was subsequently renewed twice along my whole front, except the extreme right of Stovall's brigade. One of these charges was made by negro troops. In these assaults the enemy suffered great slaughter, their loss being estimated at 1,500 or 2,000 killed and wounded. It was with difficulty that the enthusiasm of the troops could be repressed so as to keep them from going over the works in pursuit of the enemy. Five color-bearers with their colors were shot down in a few steps of the works, one of which, having inscribed on its folds "Eighteenth Regiment U.S. Colored Infantry; presented by the colored ladies of Murfreesborough," was brought in. About 4 p.m., while the division was thus in the highest state of enthusiasm, I received a message from the lieutenant-general commanding corps, through Lieutenant Hunter, aide-de-camp, that he would expect me to bring off my division in order. I inquired when, what was going on upon the left, and whether I should do so at once, but could get no information. I turned to a staff officer and directed the batteries to be ready to limber up, and ordered Brigadier-General Stovall, who was standing by, to be in readiness to move out in order, but to wait until I could make an effort to bring off Stanford's battery. I then saw the troops on my left flying in disorder, and it having been reported to me that Stanford's battery was so disabled as to make it impossible to bring it off, I ordered the Eufaula Light Artillery to withdraw, and so soon as it had begun to move directed the same orders to be given to the several brigade commanders. The whole army--except this division, Pettus' brigade, of Stevenson's division, and the Thirty-ninth Georgia Regiment, of Cumming's brigade, also of Stevenson's division, which had a short time before been sent to me as a support and held in reserve—was then in complete rout. Some confusion existed even in these commands, though scarcely perceptible in Stovall's brigade and the Thirty-ninth Georgia Regiment, above referred to, which latter deserves great credit for the manner in which it responded to my appeal to halt and check the advance of the enemy's skirmish line, which had then reached the top of the hill. Having gone about half a mile I found' the Eufaula Light Artillery about to move off from a position in which it had been halted. Halting the Thirty-ninth Georgia Regiment as a support to the battery, I ordered it to continue the firing. Sending my staff to halt the division, and Lieutenant Jones, aide-de-camp, especially to Brigadier-General Stovall to halt his brigade and put it in position, I soon after ordered the battery and regiment supporting it to withdraw, and rode off to take command of the division. Too much praise cannot be awarded the officers and men of this battery for the coolness and deliberation with which they managed their guns under these trying circumstances. Upon coming up with the division, being unable to find Brigadier-General Stovall, I ordered Col. A. Johnson, the senior colonel, to take the command and halt it in a position which I indicated. In a few moments the whole division and Pettus' brigade were in line. This occurred in about one mile of the breast-works. Night soon coming on, Holtzclaw's brigade was placed across the road, with skirmishers in front, and the balance of the command moved off toward Franklin. About 2 o'clock at night it was halted seven miles from Franklin and bivouacked until 5 o'clock. Daylight on the morning of the 17th found us in position at Hollow Tree Gap, five miles from Franklin, Stovall's brigade and a section of Bledsoe's battery being upon the right and Pettus' brigade upon the left of the road, and the other two brigades in rear. About 8 a.m. the enemy's cavalry made their appearance, driving in our own cavalry in a most shameful manner, a few pursuing them even through the line of infantry and cutting with their sabers right and left. A few shots from the infantry, however, drove them back, with the loss of a stand of colors. About 9 a.m. they again advanced upon this position, when we succeeded in capturing about 100 men, with their horses, and another stand of colors. At about 10 a.m. we were withdrawn from this position and crossed Harpeth River a few miles from this place. After some slight skirmishing we were relieved by Major-General Stevenson's division. For the particulars of the capture of seventy-five officers and men of Holtzclaw's brigade, and a like number from Gibson's brigade, I refer to the reports of their respective brigade commanders. For this occurrence I think no one to blame but our cavalry, who, all the day long, behaved in a most cowardly manner. It is proper, however, that I should make one bright exception to this general remark: I refer to the case of Colonel Falconnet, commanding a brigade, who, when about to cross the Harpeth River, seeing the enemy charging upon Gibson's brigade, drew his revolver, and gathering less than 100 brave followers, dashed upon the enemy, more than twenty times his number. After having been relieved, as above stated, by General Stevenson, the division was moved on slowly, halting occasionally so as to keep within a short distance of his command. Six miles south of Franklin, the division being at a halt in the road, I learned that the enemy were moving around General Stevenson. I immediately placed my command across the road, Stovall's brigade, Col. R. J. Henderson commanding, on the right, Gibson's in the center, and Holtzclaw's, Col. Bushrod Jones commanding, upon the left. Hearing considerable firing in the rear I ordered Colonel Jones to move Holtzclaw's brigade forward in line of battle, keeping his right resting on the pike, so as to render any assistance that might be necessary to General Stevenson. Having given some general instructions to General Gibson as to keeping out skirmishers and scouts, I directed him to take command of the two brigades, and with my staff rode up the pike to communicate with General Stevenson. Upon coming up with Colonel Jones I learned that the enemy in large force was forming upon his left as if for the purpose of charging. I then rode forward and informed General Pettus, whose brigade was near by, of the disposition I had made for his support, and started back to where I had left General Gibson with the two brigades; when in about 100 yards of the left of General Gibson's command, which rested upon the pike, I saw a column of cavalry moving obliquely and just entering the road a few paces in my front. An infantry soldier of my command, recognizing me (it being then quite dark), ran up to me and whispered, "They are Yankees." Turning my horse to the left, so as to avoid them, I moved rapidly to the right of General Gibson's line, and after narrowly escaping being killed by several shots fired at me through mistake, I communicated the information to General Gibson, who promptly wheeled his brigade to the left and delivered a volley which scattered the enemy, killing many of them. I then, at the suggestion of General Gibson, moved back these two brigades behind a fence, in order to better resist a charge and also for greater security against firing into our own men. This position was scarcely taken when the enemy again began to move from the left upon the pike in our immediate front. Demanding to know who they were, I was promptly answered, "Federal troops," which was replied to by a volley, killing several and again driving them off, leaving a stand of colors, which was secured. The enemy having finally retired and the firing having ceased, I communicated my intentions to General Stevenson and moved off my command.

In this affair, so trying to both officers and men, all behaved in the best possible manner. While I cheerfully concede all that is due to General Stevenson's division in checking the advance of the enemy and thus helping to save the army, without entering into anything further than the above brief recital of facts, I believe it is not claiming too much to say that this division, by preventing the enemy from massing in his rear, saved that division.

I tender to Brigadier-General Gibson especially my cordial thanks for the part performed by him on this occasion, and also to Colonels Henderson and Jones, of whose brigade commanders I may say, without reflecting upon them, that their commands lost nothing by their absence on this trying occasion.

After moving back a few miles the division bivouacked for the night and resumed the march on the following day for the Tennessee River, which it reached at Bainbridge on the 25th of December, after a most painful march, characterized by more suffering than it had ever before been my misfortune to witness.

H. D. CLAYTON,        

Major-General.

Maj. J. W. RATCHFORD,
        Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 697-700

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 239. — Report of Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson, C. S. Army, commanding division, of operations September 29-December 17, 1864.

No. 239.

Report of Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson, C. S. Army,

commanding division, of operations September 29-December 17, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS STEVENSON'S DIVISION,        

In the Field, January 20, 1865.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division during the recent campaign in Tennessee:

The march from Palmetto to the front of Columbia was without incident worthy of mention, except perhaps the demonstration upon Resaca, Ga., in which my command acted with spirit in the skirmishing which resulted in driving the enemy within their works. My loss was numerically insignificant at this point, but among the killed was numbered the gallant soldier and genial gentleman, Col. F. K. Beck, Twenty-third Alabama Regiment. By his fall my division lost a chivalrous soldier and his native State one of her worthiest sons.

Upon our arrival in front of Columbia my position in line was assigned from the right of Mount Pleasant pike, the front of the division in line of battle. The investment was characterized by nothing of interest as far as my division was concerned. A desultory skirmish fire was kept up most of the time. My losses here were few.

On the night of the 27th of November my scouts reported that there were indications that the enemy were evacuating Columbia. I immediately increased the number of scouts, and about an hour before day sent forward the Eighteenth and Third Tennessee Regiments (consolidated), under the command of Lieut. Col. W. R. Butler. He found the reports of the scouts to be correct, and occupied the town without opposition. I then moved forward my division, except Cumming's brigade (commanded in the campaign by Col. E. P. Watkins, Fifty-sixth Georgia), which, by General Lee's order, was sent down the river to press those of the enemy who had taken that route, and endeavor to save the railroad bridge, which, however, had been fired before their arrival. In the fort at Columbia we secured a large amount of howitzer and small-arm ammunition and two siege howitzers. Colonel Butler had, immediately upon gaining possession of the town, sent a force to the ford of Duck River. The enemy's skirmishers were found to be in large force on the opposite bank, and the enemy in position behind works about three-quarters of a mile from the river. He immediately moved down his command and skirmished with them briskly. The Sixtieth North Carolina, coming up soon after, was sent farther up the bank of the river to a point from which they obtained a flanking fire upon the enemy. This drove them back from the immediate bank of the river. Orders were soon after received to discontinue the skirmishing.

On the night of that day General Hood, with Cheatham's and Stewart's corps and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, crossed Duck River some miles above Columbia and pushed for the enemy's rear, leaving General Lee with Clayton's and my divisions to occupy the enemy in front until he should have reached his position, then to force a crossing of the river and attack the enemy as he attempted to extricate himself. The greater part of the next day was spent in preparations for this movement. The bank of the river was quite steep on the side held by the enemy. A pontoon boat in charge of Captain Ramsey, engineer, was taken down the river, under a galling fire, launched, and could then, under the cover of our artillery and skirmish fire, be used without much exposure in ferrying our troops. This was done with practicable rapidity, the troops as they crossed forming under the cover of the steep bank to which I have alluded. About an hour before sunset I had succeeded in crossing three regiments of Pettus' brigade, Brigadier-General Pettus in command. The Twentieth Alabama Regiment (Col. J. M. Dedman), of his brigade, had previously been sent up the bank of the river to obtain a flanking fire upon the enemy, and the Thirtieth Alabama (Lieut. Col. J. K. Elliott) was retained on the Columbia side to cover the ford in case of my failure. Everything being made ready I directed General Pettus to advance, and his command dashed forward at the word, driving the [enemy] before them by a charge which elicited the warmest admiration of all who witnessed it. Their loss was slight; that of the enemy so considerable that to explain the affair the commander of the enemy saw fit to attribute to an entire division an attack made by three of its regiments. Having driven the enemy within their main line General Pettus halted, selected a position to prevent the enemy from interrupting the laying of the pontoons, and was subsequently re-enforced by the rest of his brigade and by Holtzclaw's brigade, of Clayton's division. The pontoon bridge was then laid with all practicable expedition.

During this night General Pettus reported that the enemy was retiring and he following with his skirmishers. This was as anticipated, and orders had already been given by General Lee to have everything in readiness to move, coupled with the statement that General Hood had advised him that he was between the enemy and Nashville, near Spring Hill. At daybreak I put my division in motion in rear of Clayton's. Upon arriving at Spring Hill we were informed that from some cause, which has not been explained, the enemy had been suffered to pass unattacked along the road commanded by the troops which the commanding general took with him. We were then ordered to push on to Franklin. My division was halted about dark in three miles of that place, and took no part in the battle. During the night this division was put in position preparatory to an assault which it was announced was to be made by the entire army at daybreak. The enemy, however, evacuated the town before the hour for the assault. We then advanced to within a few miles of Nashville and threw up a line of works, my position being on the right and left of the Franklin pike. Several new lines were built, but my position with regard to this pike remained unchanged.

Until the opening of the battles around Nashville nothing of interest transpired in my command, except the part taken by my skirmishers, commanded by Lieut. Col. J. B. Bibb, Twenty-third Alabama, in a demonstration made by Lee's corps. The enemy's skirmishers were driven by a greatly inferior force from all of their intrenched positions. My skirmishers were handsomely handled, and did their work with a dash and gallantry which deserve praise. Just before this demonstration Palmer's brigade (consolidated from Brown's and Reynolds' old brigades) was detached and ordered to report to Maj. Gen. N. B. Forrest, in front of Murfreesborough. It remained so detached from this division until it reached Bear Creek, on this side of Barton Station.

On the 15th of December the battle in front of Nashville opened. Except some unimportant skirmishing, my division took no part in that day's fight, although its position was frequently shifted and the line greatly attenuated to fill vacancies in the works, caused by the withdrawal of the troops.

On the next day the enemy advanced early in heavy force in front of the new line which we had constructed late the previous night, my division extending its entire length, part of it in two and part in one thin rank, from a short distance to the left of the Franklin pike. The skirmishers of the right of Lee's corps (Clayton's) and mine maintained their position so well, though in small force, that in their subsequent accounts the enemy have seen fit to magnify their affair with them into a desperate assault by two corps upon our first line, which was finally successful, but attended with heavy loss. Soon afterward their forces advanced to the assault, principally upon a part of General Clayton's line and upon Pettus' brigade, of my division, exposing in their assault upon Pettus their flank to a fire from Cumming's brigade. Their success the previous day had emboldened them, and they rushed forward with great spirit, only to be driven back with dreadful slaughter. Finding at last that they could make no impression upon our lines, they relinquished their attempt and contented themselves with keeping up an incessant fire of small-arms at long-range and an artillery fire which I have never seen surpassed for heaviness, continuance, and accuracy. This state of things continued until evening, doing, however, but little damage, my men keeping closely in the trenches and perfectly cool and confident. Toward evening General Lee sent me information that things were going badly on the left, and that it might be necessary to retire under cover of the approaching night. I at once hurried off orders for the artillery horses, which had been removed some distance to the rear to protect them from the fire of the enemy's artillery, under which they could not have lived half an hour, to be brought up. (It was proper to observe that about the middle of the day mist and rain arose, which entirely prevented my seeing anything that was going on beyond my own line.) The messengers had hardly gone for the horses before the break, which, commencing some distance beyond the left of Lee's corps, extended to my line. Seeing it, the men on my left commenced leaving the works, but at the call of their officers returned at once and held the line until the enemy were in fifty steps of them on their flank and pouring a fire into them from the flank and rear. When the true situation of affairs became apparent, and it was evident that the whole army, with the exception of my division and Clayton's, had been broken and scattered, the order for their withdrawal was given, an effort being made to deploy skirmishers from my left brigade at right angles to the works to cover, in some measure, the movement. Amid the indescribable confusion of other troops, and with the enemy pouring in their fire upon their flanks and from the front—having rushed toward the break and then forward when they perceived that the troops on my left had broken—it was impossible to withdraw the command in order, and it became considerably broken and confused. Many of them were unable to get out of the ditches in time and were captured. All this happened in as short a time as it has taken to describe it. The artillery horses of Rowan's battery, on the left of my line, could not be brought up in time, and one of the guns of Corput's battery was lost by being driven at full speed against a tree and the carriage broken. The different brigade and regimental commanders had sent off their horses, there being no protection for them near the breast-works, and, being thus unable to move about more rapidly than the men, were prevented from reforming their commands as quickly as could have been desired and extricating them from the throng of panic-stricken stragglers from other commands who crowded the road. This was done at last, and the line of march taken up for Franklin. On the way I received orders from General Lee to leave Pettus' brigade at Hollow Tree Gap to assist in bringing up the rear, and to proceed with Cumming's brigade and bivouac near the battle-field at Franklin, leaving guard upon the road to stop the stragglers of the army.

The next morning, by General Lee's order, I returned with Cumming's brigade to Franklin, and was there joined by General Pettus with his brigade, which had that morning, before reaching Franklin, captured a stand of colors. Soon after crossing the Harpeth Lieutenant-General Lee was wounded. When about three miles from Franklin General Lee moved off with the rest of the corps, and directed me to take command of the cavalry commanded by Brigadier-General Chalmers, which, with my division, was to constitute the rear guard. The enemy did not press us heavily until we arrived near Johnson's house, five or six miles north of Spring Hill. Here I formed my line, having about 700 infantry, with the cavalry on my flanks. The enemy advanced rapidly upon me, attacking me in front. I found it impossible to control the cavalry and, with the exception of a small force on the left, for a short time, to get them into action. I may as well state that at this point, as soon as the enemy engaged us heavily, the cavalry retired in disorder, leaving my small command to their fate. The enemy, perceiving the shortness of my line, at once threw a force around my left flank and opened fire upon it and its rear. This was a critical moment, and I felt great anxiety as to its effect upon my men, who, few in numbers, had just had the shameful example of the cavalry added to the terrible trial of the day before. I at once ordered Colonel Watkins to prepare to retire fighting by the flank, and General Pettus to move in line of battle to the rear, with a regiment thrown at right angles to his flank, thus forming three sides of a square. Watkins drove the enemy in his front in confusion, moved, at the order which was given in the instant of success, by the flank and charged those on his flank, drove them also. I halted again in about half a mile, formed a line upon each side of the pike—Pettus on the right, Watkins on the left, each with a regiment formed on his flank perpendicularly to his line to the rear—and having made these dispositions moved again to the rear. The enemy soon enveloped us in front, flank, and rear, but my gallant men under all their charges never faltered, never suffered their formation to be broken for an instant, and thus we moved, driving our way through them, fighting constantly, until within a short distance of Spring Hill, where we found that Major-General Clayton, hearing of our situation, had turned and moved back to our assistance. Here I halted for a time, and Holtzclaw's brigade, of Clayton's division, was formed upon Watkins' left flank in the manner which I have described. While here the enemy made several attacks and opened upon us with artillery but were readily repulsed. This was some time after dark. We finally moved off, and after marching about a mile farther, finding that the enemy had evidently become disheartened and abandoned his attacks, I placed the whole command again upon the pike and marched in the ordinary manner until I reached the bivouac of the remainder of the corps. I desire here to record my acknowledgments to the officers and men of General Holtzeclaw's brigade, commanded on the occasion by Colonel Jones, for the timely aid which they so gallantly afforded. Lieutenant-General Lee was pleased to acknowledge, in grateful and complimentary terms, the services of my division upon this occasion, and I make no vain boast when I, too, thank them for their conduct, and declare that never did a command in so perilous a position extricate itself by the force of more admirable coolness, determination, and unflinching gallantry. On that night I was directed by Lieutenant-General Lee to assume command of his corps during his disability.

I am greatly indebted to my staff—Maj. J. J. Reeve, assistant adjutant-general; Surg. H. M. Compton, medical director; Maj. J. E. McElrath, assistant quartermaster; Maj. J. H. F. Mayo, assistant commissary of subsistence; Maj. H. M. Mathews, ordnance officer; Capt. G. D. Wise, assistant inspector-general; Capt. Charles Vidor, assistant quartermaster; Lieut. H. T. Botts, aide-de-camp; Lieut. G. A. Hayward, aide-de-camp; also Capt. W. H. Sikes, Forty fifth Tennessee Regiment, and Lieut. W. E. McElwee, Twenty-sixth Tennessee Regiment, temporarily on duty at my headquarters--for their most efficient and valuable services, and for their untiring efforts to assist me during this arduous and trying campaign.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. L. STEVENSON,        

Major-General.

Maj. J. W. RATCHFORD,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Lee's Corps.

 

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 693-7

Senator Jefferson Davis to Robert Barnwell Rhett, Jr., November 10, 1860

Warren County, Missi., Nov. 10, 1860.

Dear Sir:—I had the honor to receive, last night, yours of the 27th ulto., and hasten to reply to the inquiries proprounded. Reports of the election leave little doubt that the event you anticipated has occurred, that electors have been chosen securing the election of Abraham Lincoln, and I will answer on that supposition.

My home is so isolated that I have had no intercourse with those who might have aided me in forming an opinion as to the effect produced on the mind of our people by the result of the recent election, and the impressions which I communicate are founded upon antecedent expressions.

1. I doubt not that the Gov'r of Missi. has convoked the Legislature to assemble within the present month, to decide upon the course which the State should adopt in the present emergency. Whether the Legislature will direct the call of a convention, of the State, or appoint delegates to a convention of such Southern States as may be willing to consult together for the adoption of a Southern plan of action, is doubtful.

2. If a convention, of the State, were assembled, the proposition to secede from the Union, independently of support from neighboring States, would probably fail.

3. If South Carolina should first secede, and she alone should take such action, the position of Missi. would not probably be changed by that fact. A powerful obstacle to the separate action of Missi. is the want of a port; from which follows the consequence that her trade being still conducted through the ports of the Union, her revenue would be diverted from her own support to that of a foreign government; and being geographically unconnected with South Carolina, an alliance with her would not vary that state of case.

4. The propriety of separate secession by So. Ca. depends so much upon collateral questions that I find it difficult to respond to your last enquiry, for the want of knowledge which would enable me to estimate the value of the elements involved in the issue, though exterior to your state. Georgia is necessary to connect you with Alabama and thus to make effectual the cooperation of Missi. If Georgia would be lost by immediate action, but could be gained by delay, it seems clear to me that you should wait. If the secession of So. Ca. should be followed by an attempt to coerce her back into the Union, that act of usurpation, folly and wickedness would enlist every true Southern man for her defence. If it were attempted to blockade her ports and destroy her trade, a like result would be produced, and the commercial world would probably be added to her allies. It is therefore probable that neither of those measures would be adopted by any administration, but that federal ships would be sent to collect the duties on imports outside of the bar; that the commercial nations would feel little interest in that; and the Southern States would have little power to counteract it.

The planting states have a common interest of such magnitude, that their union, sooner or later, for the protection of that interest is certain. United they will have ample power for their own protection, and their exports will make for them allies of all commercial and manufacturing powers.

The new states have a heterogeneous population, and will be slower and less unanimous than those in which there is less of the northern element in the body politic, but interest controls the policy of states, and finally all the planting communities must reach the same conclusion. My opinion is, therefore, as it has been, in favor of seeking to bring those states into cooperation before asking for a popular decision upon a new policy and relation to the nations of the earth. If So. Ca. should resolve to secede before that cooperation can be obtained, to go out leaving Georgia and Alabama and Louisiana in the Union, and without any reason to suppose they will follow her; there appears to me to be no advantage in waiting until the govt. has passed into hostile hands and men have become familiarized to that injurious and offensive perversion of the general government from the ends for which it was established. I have written with the freedom and carelessness of private correspondence, and regret that I could not give more precise information.

Very respectfully, Yrs, etc..

Jeffn Davis.

SOURCES: Lynda Lasswell Christ and Mary Seaton Dix, editors, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Volume 6, pp. 368-71; The Vicksburg Harold, Vicksburg, Mississippi, March 3, 1867, p. 1; The Clarion, Jackson, Mississippi, March 7, 1867, p. 1.

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: August 1, 1863

The President learns, by a dispatch from Gen. Hardee, of Mississippi, that information has reached him, which he considers authentic, that Gen. Taylor has beaten Banks in Louisiana, taking 6000 prisoners; but then it is said that Taylor has fallen back.

I see by Mr. Memminger's correspondence that he has been sending $1,000,000 in sterling exchange, with the concurrence of the President and the Secretary of War, to Gen. Johnston and Gov. Pettus. What can this mean? Perhaps he is buying stores, etc.

Gen. Pemberton, it is said, has proclaimed a thirty days' furlough to all his paroled army — a virtue of necessity, as they had all gone to their homes without leave.

Gen. Lee writes that fifty men deserted from Scale's Regiment, North Carolina (a small regiment), night before last, being incited thereto by the newspapers. He wants pickets placed at certain places to catch them, so that some examples may be made.

Gov. Vance urges the War Department to interdict speculation on the part of officers of the government and army, as it tempts them to embezzle the public funds, enhances prices, and enrages the community.

Peter V. Daniel, Jr., President of the Central Railroad, is anxious for the defense of the four bridges near Hanover Junction, which, if destroyed by the enemy, could not be replaced for months, and Lee would have to fall back to Richmond, if not farther, as all his supplies must be transported by the road. He indicates the places where troops should be stationed, and says from those places, if needed in battle, 10,000 men could be transported in twenty-four hours to either Fredericksburg or Richmond.

Gen. Bragg is hurt, because one of his captains has been given an independent command, without consulting him, to defend Atlanta, in his department. He says the captain has no merit, and Atlanta and Augusta are in great danger — the newspapers having informed the enemy of the practicability of taking them. He intimates an inclination to be relieved.

Mr. Plant, President of the Southern Express Company, was “allowed” to leave the Confederate States to-day by the Assistant Secretary of War, subject to the discretion of Gen. Whiting at Wilmington. I suppose his fortune is made.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 3-4

Cheering News From Alabama, Mississippi, And Georgia

The editor of the Carolinian has conversed with a gentleman who brings cheering news from the Executives of the above States.  Gov. PETTUS, of Mississippi, on the receipt of the news of LINCOLN’S election, will immediately convene the Legislature.  The Disunion vote will be overwhelming.  The Governor of Georgia will call for a large appropriation to arm the State.  Gov. MOORE, of Alabama, will immediately issue writes of election for a new Legislature.  In Louisiana it is thought that the Disunion movement will prevail, and Florida is said to consider herself in advance of South Carolina.  We have no fears of Southern co-operation.  The cotton States at least must be united.

— Published in The Abbeville Press, Abbeville, South Carolina, Friday Morning, November 9, 1860, p. 2

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: May 11, 1863

Lieut.-Gen. J. T. Jackson died at 3 P.M. yesterday. His remains will arrive in the city at 5 P.M. this afternoon. The flags are at half-mast, and all the government offices and even places of business are closed. A multitude of people, mostly women and children, are standing silently in the streets, awaiting the arrival of the hero, destined never again to defend their homes and honor.

A letter from Gen. Lee says, emphatically, that if cavalry be not brought from North Carolina and the South, the enemy's cavalry will be enabled to make raids almost anywhere without molestation. I recollect distinctly how he urged the Secretary of War (Randolph), months ago, to send to Texas for horses, but it was not attended to — and now we see the consequences.

The exchanged prisoners here, taken at Arkansas Post, are ordered to the Mississippi. Gen. Longstreet urged the Secretary to send them off, if that were their destination, without a moment's delay, several days ago — else they would be too late to participate in the campaign.

Northern papers set down Hooker's loss at 20,000, a modest figure, subject to revision.

The Federal Secretary of War has issued a statement to mollify the panic. He is bound to acknowledge that, whereas Hooker advanced upon Lee across the river, he is now, after the battle, back again, where he started from. But he says not more than a third of the army was engaged; and as 30,000 reinforcements have been sent from Washington, and as many from Suffolk, the army will soon be as strong as ever, and in condition for another advance — and defeat.

But what credit can we attach to such statements, since McClellan, under oath, said that he had ninety odd thousand men at the battle of Sharpsburg, 75,000 of whom only were actually engaged, while Lee had 100,000? We know that he did not have 40,000 engaged!

Gen. Van Dorn is dead—being killed by a man whose peace he had ruined.

More applications for passports to leave the country are coming in — and they are "allowed" by the Assistant Secretary of War. How could he refuse, since his own family (at least a portion of it) have enjoyed the benefits of sojourning in the North since the war began?

A letter was received to day from Mr. Ranney, president of the N. C., Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad Co., asking the protection of government from harm for violations of the Act of Congress of April 19th, 1862, prohibiting the transportation of cotton within the enemy's lines. He incloses a number of peremptory orders from Lieut.-Gen. Pemberton, dated January 19th, February l6th and 19th, to take large amounts of cotton into the enemy's lines for S. J. Josephs (Jew?), and for Messrs. Clarke, Ford, and Hust, etc. etc. He says Gen. P. threatened to seize the road if he did not comply, and asserted that he had authority from the Secretary of War to issue the orders. One of these orders was from Gov. Pettus, for a small lot not more than fifty bales, to be exchanged for salt. This was authorized by the President, who most positively forbid the others. The letter from Gen. Johnston the other day said this traffic was subjugating the people. Was that “allowed” to reach the Secretary and the President? I know not; it has not yet passed through my hands from the President back to the department.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 319-21

Diary of William Howard Russell: June 16, 1861

I was compelled to send my excuses to Governor Pettus, and remained quietly within the house of my host, entreating him to protect me from visitors and especially my own confreres, that I might secure a few hours even in that ardent heat to write letters to home. Now, there is some self-denial required, if one be at all solicitous of the popularis aura, to offend the susceptibilities of the irritable genus in America. It may make all the difference between millions of people hearing and believing you are a high-toned, whole souled gentleman or a wretched, ignorant and prejudiced John Bull; but, nevertheless, the solid pudding of self-content and the satisfaction of doing one's work are preferable to the praise even of a New York newspaper editor.

When my work was over I walked out and sat in the shade with a gentleman whose talk turned upon the practices of the Mississippi duello. Without the smallest animus, and in the most natural way in the world, he told us tale after tale of blood, and recounted terrible tragedies enacted outside bars of hotels and in the public streets close beside us. The very air seemed to become purple as he spoke, the land around a veritable “Aceldama.” There may, indeed, be security for property, but there is none for the life of its owner in difficulties, who may be shot by a stray bullet from a pistol as he walks up the street.

I learned many valuable facts. I was warned, for example, against the impolicy of trusting to small-bored pistols or to pocket six-shooters in case of a close fight, because suppose you hit your man mortally he may still run in upon you and rip you up with a bowie-knife before he falls dead; whereas if you drive a good heavy bullet into him, or make a hole in him with a “Derringer” ball, he gets faintish and drops at once.

Many illustrations, too, were given of the value of practical lessons of this sort. One particularly struck me. If a gentleman with whom you are engaged in altercation moves his hand towards his breeches pocket, or behind his back, you must smash him or shoot him at once, for he is either going to draw his six-shooter, to pull out a bowie-knife, or to shoot you through the lining of his pocket. The latter practice is considered rather ungentlemanly, but it has somewhat been more honored lately in the observance than in the breach. In fact, the savage practice of walking about with pistols, knives, and poniards, in bar-rooms and gambling-saloons, with passions ungoverned, because there is no law to punish the deeds to which they lead, affords facilities for crime which an uncivilized condition of society leaves too often without punishment, but which must be put down or the country in which it is tolerated will become as barbarous as a jungle inhabited by wild beasts.

Our host gave me an early dinner, at which I met some of the citizens of Jackson, and at six o'clock I proceeded by the train for Memphis. The carriages were, of course, full of soldiers or volunteers, bound for a large camp at a place called Corinth, who made night hideous by their song and cries, stimulated by enormous draughts of whiskey and a proportionate consumption of tobacco, by teeth and by fire. The heat in the carriages added to the discomforts arising from these causes, and from great quantities of biting insects in the sleeping places. The people have all the air and manners of settlers. Altogether the impression produced on my mind was by no means agreeable, and I felt as if I was indeed in the land of Lynch-law and bowie-knives, where the passions of men have not yet been subordinated to the influence of the tribunals of justice. Much of this feeling has no doubt been produced by the tales to which I have been listening around me — most of which have a smack of manslaughter about them.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 300-1

Diary of William Howard Russell: Friday, June 14, 1861

Last night with my good host from his plantation to the great two-storied steamer General Quitman, at Natchez. She was crowded with planters, soldiers and their families, and as the lights shone out of her windows, looked like a walled castle blazing from double lines of embrasures.

The Mississippi is assuredly the most uninteresting river in the world, and I can only describe it hereabout by referring to the account of its appearance which I have already given — not a particle of romance, in spite of oratorical patriots and prophets, can ever shine from its depths, sacred to cat and buffalo fish, or vivify its turbid waters.

Before noon we were in sight of Vicksburg, which is situated on a high bank or bluff on the left bank of the river, about 400 miles above New Orleans and some 120 miles from Natchez.

Mr. MacMeekan, the proprietor of the "Washington," declares himself to have been the pioneer of hotels in the far west; but he has now built himself this huge caravansary, and rests from his wanderings. We entered the dining saloon, and found the tables closely packed with a numerous company of every condition in life, from generals and planters down to soldiers in the uniform of privates. At the end of the room there was a long table on which the joints and dishes were brought hot from the kitchen to be carved by the negro waiters, male and female, and as each was brought in the proprietor, standing in the centre of the room, shouted out with a loud voice, "Now, then, here is a splendid goose! ladies and gentlemen, don't neglect the goose and apple-sauce! Here's a piece of beef that I can recommend! upon my honor you will never regret taking a slice of the beef. Oyster-pie! oyster-pie! never was better oyster-pie seen in Vicksburg. Run about, boys, and take orders. Ladies and gentlemen, just look at that turkey! who's for turkey?" — and so on, wiping the perspiration from his forehead and combating with the flies.

Altogether it was a semi-barbarous scene, but the host was active and attentive; and after all, his recommendations were very much like those which it was the habit of the taverners in old London to call out in the streets to the passers-by when the joints were ready. The little negroes who ran about to take orders were smart, but now and then came into violent collision, and were cuffed incontinently. One mild-looking little fellow stood by my chair and appeared so sad that I asked him "Are you happy, my boy?" He looked quite frightened. "Why don't you answer me?" "I'se afeered, sir; I can't tell that to Massa." "Is not your master kind to you?" "Massa very kind man, sir; very good man when he is not angry with me," and his eyes filled with tears to the brim.

The war fever is rife in Vicksburg, and the Irish and German laborers, to the extent of several hundreds, have all gone off to the war.

When dinner was over, the mayor and several gentlemen of the city were good enough to request that I would attend a meeting at a room in the railway-station, where some of the inhabitants of the town had assembled. Accordingly I went to the terminus and found a room filled with gentlemen. Large china bowls, blocks of ice, bottles of wine and spirits, and boxes of cigars were on the table, and all the materials for a symposium.

The company discussed recent events, some of which I learned for the first time. Dislike was expressed to the course of the authorities in demanding negro labor for the fortifications along the river, and uneasiness was expressed respecting a negro plot in Arkansas; but the most interesting matter was Judge Taney's protest against the legality of the President's course in suspending the writ of habeas corpus in the case of Merriman. The lawyers who were present at this meeting were delighted with his argument, which insists that Congress alone can suspend the writ, and that the President cannot legally do so.

The news of the defeat of an expedition from Fortress Monroe against a Confederate post at Great Bethel, has caused great rejoicing. The accounts show that there was the grossest mismanagement on the part of the Federal officers. The Northern papers particularly regret the loss of Major Winthrop, aide-de-camp to General Butler, a writer of promise. At four o'clock, P. M., I bade the company farewell, and the train started for Jackson. The line runs through a poor clay country, cut up with gulleys and watercourses made by violent rain.

There were a number of volunteer soldiers in the train; and their presence no doubt attracted the girls and women who waved flags and cheered for Jeff Davis and States' Rights. Well, as I travel on through such scenes, with a fine critical nose in the air, I ask myself, "Is any Englishman better than these publicans and sinners in regard to this question of slavery?" It was not on moral or religious grounds that our ancestors abolished serfdom. And if to-morrow our good farmers, deprived of mowers, reapers, ploughmen, hedgers and ditchers, were to find substitutes in certain people of a dark skin assigned to their use by Act of Parliament, I fear they would be almost as ingenious as the Rev. Dr. Seabury in discovering arguments physiological, ethnological, and biblical, for the retention of their property. And an evil day would it be for them if they were so tempted; for assuredly, without any derogation to the intellect of the Southern men, it may be said that a large proportion of the population is in a state of very great moral degradation compared with civilized Anglo-Saxon communities.

The man is more natural, and more reckless; he has more of the qualities of the Arab than are to be reconciled with civilization; and it is only among the upper classes that the influences of the aristocratic condition which is generated by the subjection of masses of men to their fellow-man are to be found.

At six o'clock, the train stopped in the country at a railway crossing by the side of a large platform. On the right was a common, bounded by a few detached wooden houses, separated by palings from each other, and surrounded by rows of trees. In front of the station were two long wooden sheds, which, as the signboard indicates, were exchanges or drinking saloons; and beyond these again were visible some rudimentary streets of straggling houses, above which rose three pretentious spires and domes, resolved into insignificance by nearer approach. This was Jackson.

Our host was at the station in his carriage, and drove us to his residence, which consisted of some detached houses shaded by trees in a small enclosure, and bounded by a kitchen garden. He was one of the men who had been filled with the afflatus of 1848, and joined the Young Ireland party before it had seriously committed itself to an unfortunate outbreak; and when all hope of success had vanished, he sought, like many others of his countrymen, a shelter under the stars and stripes, which, like most of the Irish settled in the Southern States, he was now bent on tearing asunder. He has the honor of being mayor of Jackson, and of enjoying a competitive examination with his medical rivals for the honor of attending the citizens.

In the evening I walked out with him to the adjacent city, which has no title to the name, except as being the State capital. The mushroom growth of these States, using that phrase merely as to their rapid development, raises hamlets in a small space to the dignity of cities. It is in such outlying expansion of the great republic that the influence of the foreign emigration is most forcibly displayed. It would be curious to inquire, for example, how many men there are in the city of Jackson exercising mechanical arts or engaged in small commerce, in skilled or manual labor, who are really Americans in the proper sense of the word. I was struck by the names over the doors of the shops, which were German, Irish, Italian, French, and by foreign tongues and accents in the streets ; but, on the other hand, it is the native-born American who obtains the highest political stations and arrogates to himself the largest share of governmental emoluments.

Jackson proper consists of strings of wooden houses, with white porticoes and pillars a world too wide for their shrunk rooms, and various religious and other public edifices, of the hydrocephalic order of architecture, where vulgar cupola and exaggerated steeple tower above little bodies far too feeble to support them. There are of course a monster hotel and blazing bar-rooms — the former celebrated as the scene of many a serious difficulty, out of some of which the participators never escaped alive. The streets consist of rows of houses such as I have seen at Macon, Montgomery, and Baton Rouge; and as we walked towards the capital or State-house there were many more invitations "to take a drink" addressed to my friend and me than we were able to comply with. Our steps were bent to the State-house, which is a pile of stone, with open colonnades, and an air of importance at a distance which a nearer examination of its dilapidated condition does not confirm. Mr. Pettus, the Governor of the State of Mississippi, was in the Capitol; and on sending in our cards, we were introduced to his room, which certainly was of more than republican simplicity. The apartment was surrounded with some common glass cases, containing papers and old volumes of books; the furniture, a table or desk, and a few chairs and a ragged carpet; the glass in the windows cracked and broken; the walls and ceiling discolored by mildew.

The Governor is a silent man, of abrupt speech, but easy of access; and, indeed, whilst we were speaking, strangers and soldiers walked in and out of his room, looked around them, and acted in all respects as if they were in a public-house, except in ordering drinks. This grim, tall, angular man seemed to me such a development of public institutions in the South as Mr. Seward was in a higher phase in the North. For years he hunted deer and trapped in the forest of the far west, and lived in a Natty Bumpo or David Crocket state of life; and he was not ashamed of the fact when taunted with it during his election contest, but very rightly made the most of his independence and his hard work.

The pecuniary honors of his position are not very great as Governor of the enormous State of Mississippi. He has simply an income of £800 a year and a house provided for his use; he is not only quite contented with what he has but believes that the society in which he lives is the highest development of civilized life, notwithstanding the fact that there are more outrages on the person in his State, nay, more murders perpetrated in the very capital, than were known in the worst days of mediaeval Venice or Florence; — indeed, as a citizen said to me, "Well, I think our average in Jackson is a murder a month;" but he used a milder name for the crime.

The Governor conversed on the aspect of affairs, and evinced that wonderful confidence in his own people which, whether it arises from ignorance of the power of the North, or a conviction of greater resources, is to me so remarkable. "Well, sir," said he, dropping a portentous plug of tobacco just outside the spittoon, with the air of a man who wished to show he could have hit the centre if he liked, "England is no doubt a great country, and has got fleets and the like of that, and may have a good deal to do in Europe; but the sovereign State of Mississippi can do a great deal better without England than England can do without her." Having some slight recollection of Mississippi repudiation, in which Mr. Jefferson Davis was so actively engaged, I thought it possible that the Governor might be right; and after a time his Excellency shook me by the hand, and I left, much wondering within myself what manner of men they must be in the State of Mississippi when Mr. Pettus is their chosen Governor; and yet, after all, he is honest and fierce; and perhaps he is so far qualified as well as any other man to be Governor of the State. There are newspapers, electric telegraphs, and railways; there are many educated families, even much good society, I am told, in the State; but the larger masses of the people struck me as being in a condition not much elevated from that of the original backwoodsman. On my return to the Doctor's house I found some letters which had been forwarded to me from New Orleans had gone astray, and I was obliged, therefore, to make arrangements for my departure on the following evening.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, p. 295-300

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: November 29, 1862

The Quartermaster-General publishes a notice that he will receive and distribute contributions of clothing, etc. to the army, and even pay for the shirts $1 each! Shirts are selling at $12. The people will not trust him to convey the clothing to their sons and brothers, and so the army must suffer on. But he is getting in bad odor. A gentleman in Alabama writes that his agents are speculating in food: the President tells the Secretary to demand explanations, and the Secretary does so. Col. Myers fails, I think, to make the exhibit required, and it may be the worse for him.

I see by the papers that another of Gen. Winder's police has escaped to Washington City, and is now acting as a Federal detective. And yet many similar traitors are retained in service here!

The Governor of North Carolina writes the President that his State intends to organize an army of 10,000 men for its own defense, besides her sixty regiments in the Confederate States service; and asks if the Confederate States Government can furnish any arms, etc. The President sends this to the Secretary of War, for his advice. He wants to know Mr. Seddon's views on the subject — a delicate and embarrassing predicament for the new Secretary, truly! He must know that the President frowns on all military organizations not under his own control, and that he counteracted all Gen. Floyd's efforts to raise a division under State authority. Beware, Mr. Seddon! The President is a little particular concerning his prerogatives; and by the advice you now give, you stand or fall. What is North Carolina to the Empire? You tread on dangerous ground. Forget your old State Rights doctrine, or off goes your head.

To-day we have a dispatch from Gov. Pettus, saying authority to pass cotton through the lines of the army, and for salt to have ingress, must be given immediately. The President directs the Secretary to transmit orders to the generals to that effect. He says the cotton is to go to France without touching any port in the possession of the enemy.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 198-9

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: November 28, 1862

All is quiet on the Rappahannock; the enemy reported to be extending his line up the river some twenty miles, intending to find a passage. He might have come over last week but for a ruse of Gen. Lee, who appeared near Fredericksburg twenty-four hours in advance of the army. His presence deceived Burnside, who took it for granted that our general was at the head of his army!

M. Paul carried the day yesterday, in the Confederate Court, in the matter of $2,000,000 worth of tobacco, which, under pretense of its belonging to French citizens (though bought by Belmont, of New York, an alien enemy), is rescued from sequestration. In other words, the recognition of M. Paul as Consul, and the validity of his demands, deprives the Confederate Government of two millions; and really acknowledges the exequatur of the United States, as M. Paul is not Consul to the Confederate States but to the United States. This looks like submission; and a great fee has been realized by somebody. If the enemy were to take Richmond, this tobacco would be destroyed by the military.

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston is assigned to the command of the army of the West.

To-day we have a dispatch from Gov. Pettus, saying authority to pass cotton through the lines of the army, and for salt to have ingress, must be given immediately. The President directs the Secretary to transmit orders to the generals to that effect. He says the cotton is to go to France without touching any port in the possession of the enemy.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 197-8

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: November 12, 1862

The heavy firing heard did no execution. Letters from Gen. Lee indicate no battle, unless the enemy should make an egregious blunder. He says he has not half men enough to resist McClellan's advance with his mighty army, and prefers manoeuvring to risking his army. He says three-fourths of our cavalry horses are sick with sore-tongue, and their hoofs are falling off, and the soldiers are not fed and clad as they should be. He urges the sending of supplies to Gordonsville.

And we have news of a simultaneous advance of Northern armies everywhere; and everywhere we have the same story of deficiency of men and provisions. North and south, east and west of us, the enemy is reported advancing.

Soon we shall have every one blaming the Secretary of War for the deficiency of men, and of quartermaster and commissary stores.

The Commissary-General, backed by the Secretary of War, made another effort to-day to obtain the President's permission to trade cotton with “Butler, the Beast.” But the President and Gov. Pettus will manage that little matter without their assistance.

Major Ruffin's (Commissary's Bureau) statement of the alarming prospects ahead, unless provisions be obtained outside of the Confederacy (for cotton), was induced by reports from New Orleans. A man was in the office to-day exhibiting Butler's passport, and making assurances that all the Yankee generals are for sale — for cotton. Butler will make a fortune — and so will some of our great men. Butler says the reason he don't send troops into the interior is that he is afraid we will burn the cotton.

It is reported that a fleet of the enemy's gun-boats are in the James River.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 187-8

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: November 9, 1862

It is too true that Charleston, Va., and the great Kanawha salt works have been abandoned by Gen. Echols for the want of an adequate force to hold them. If the President had only taken Gen. Lee's advice a month ago, and ordered a few thousand more men there, under the command of Gen. Ed. Johnson, we should have kept possession of the works. The President may seem to be a good nation-maker in the eyes of distant statesmen, but he does not seem to be a good salt-maker.for the nation. The works he has just relinquished to the enemy manufacture 7000 bushels of salt per day — two million and a half a year — an ample supply for the entire population of the Confederacy, and an object adequate to the maintenance of an army of 50,000 in that valley. Besides, the troops necessary for its occupation will soon be in winter quarters, and quite as expensive to the government as if in the valley. A Caesar, a Napoleon, a Pitt, and a Washington, all great nation-makers, would have deemed this work worthy their attention.

Only three days ago the President wrote to the Secretary that the idea of trading cotton to the enemy must be postponed until the first of January, and perhaps indefinitely, but now he informs Mr. Randolph that he has sent the requisite authority to his friend, Gov. Pettus, to launch out in that trade.

No, the people have made the nation. It is a people's war, and it is the momentum of a united, patriotic people, which carries everything with it. Our brave men win victories under adverse circumstances, and often under incompetent officers, and the people feed and clothe the armies in spite of the shortcomings of dishonest commissaries and quartermasters. They are now sending ten thousand pairs of shoes to Lee's army in opposition to the will of the Jew Myers, Quartermaster-General, who says everything must be contracted and paid for by his agents, according to red-tape rule and regulation.

The weather continues cold, 38°, and snow still lies on the ground This must produce a cessation of hostilities, and afford Lincoln's drafted recruits opportunity for meditation.

If it be true that the Democrats have carried the day in the North, I think the war is approaching a termination.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 185-6