MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division during the recent campaign in Tennessee:
The march from Palmetto to the front of Columbia was without incident worthy of mention, except perhaps the demonstration upon Resaca, Ga., in which my command acted with spirit in the skirmishing which resulted in driving the enemy within their works. My loss was numerically insignificant at this point, but among the killed was numbered the gallant soldier and genial gentleman, Col. F. K. Beck, Twenty-third Alabama Regiment. By his fall my division lost a chivalrous soldier and his native State one of her worthiest sons.
Upon our arrival in front of Columbia my position in line was assigned from the right of Mount Pleasant pike, the front of the division in line of battle. The investment was characterized by nothing of interest as far as my division was concerned. A desultory skirmish fire was kept up most of the time. My losses here were few.
On the night of the 27th of November my scouts reported that there were indications that the enemy were evacuating Columbia. I immediately increased the number of scouts, and about an hour before day sent forward the Eighteenth and Third Tennessee Regiments (consolidated), under the command of Lieut. Col. W. R. Butler. He found the reports of the scouts to be correct, and occupied the town without opposition. I then moved forward my division, except Cumming's brigade (commanded in the campaign by Col. E. P. Watkins, Fifty-sixth Georgia), which, by General Lee's order, was sent down the river to press those of the enemy who had taken that route, and endeavor to save the railroad bridge, which, however, had been fired before their arrival. In the fort at Columbia we secured a large amount of howitzer and small-arm ammunition and two siege howitzers. Colonel Butler had, immediately upon gaining possession of the town, sent a force to the ford of Duck River. The enemy's skirmishers were found to be in large force on the opposite bank, and the enemy in position behind works about three-quarters of a mile from the river. He immediately moved down his command and skirmished with them briskly. The Sixtieth North Carolina, coming up soon after, was sent farther up the bank of the river to a point from which they obtained a flanking fire upon the enemy. This drove them back from the immediate bank of the river. Orders were soon after received to discontinue the skirmishing.
On the night of that day General Hood, with Cheatham's and Stewart's corps and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, crossed Duck River some miles above Columbia and pushed for the enemy's rear, leaving General Lee with Clayton's and my divisions to occupy the enemy in front until he should have reached his position, then to force a crossing of the river and attack the enemy as he attempted to extricate himself. The greater part of the next day was spent in preparations for this movement. The bank of the river was quite steep on the side held by the enemy. A pontoon boat in charge of Captain Ramsey, engineer, was taken down the river, under a galling fire, launched, and could then, under the cover of our artillery and skirmish fire, be used without much exposure in ferrying our troops. This was done with practicable rapidity, the troops as they crossed forming under the cover of the steep bank to which I have alluded. About an hour before sunset I had succeeded in crossing three regiments of Pettus' brigade, Brigadier-General Pettus in command. The Twentieth Alabama Regiment (Col. J. M. Dedman), of his brigade, had previously been sent up the bank of the river to obtain a flanking fire upon the enemy, and the Thirtieth Alabama (Lieut. Col. J. K. Elliott) was retained on the Columbia side to cover the ford in case of my failure. Everything being made ready I directed General Pettus to advance, and his command dashed forward at the word, driving the [enemy] before them by a charge which elicited the warmest admiration of all who witnessed it. Their loss was slight; that of the enemy so considerable that to explain the affair the commander of the enemy saw fit to attribute to an entire division an attack made by three of its regiments. Having driven the enemy within their main line General Pettus halted, selected a position to prevent the enemy from interrupting the laying of the pontoons, and was subsequently re-enforced by the rest of his brigade and by Holtzclaw's brigade, of Clayton's division. The pontoon bridge was then laid with all practicable expedition.
During this night General Pettus reported that the enemy was retiring and he following with his skirmishers. This was as anticipated, and orders had already been given by General Lee to have everything in readiness to move, coupled with the statement that General Hood had advised him that he was between the enemy and Nashville, near Spring Hill. At daybreak I put my division in motion in rear of Clayton's. Upon arriving at Spring Hill we were informed that from some cause, which has not been explained, the enemy had been suffered to pass unattacked along the road commanded by the troops which the commanding general took with him. We were then ordered to push on to Franklin. My division was halted about dark in three miles of that place, and took no part in the battle. During the night this division was put in position preparatory to an assault which it was announced was to be made by the entire army at daybreak. The enemy, however, evacuated the town before the hour for the assault. We then advanced to within a few miles of Nashville and threw up a line of works, my position being on the right and left of the Franklin pike. Several new lines were built, but my position with regard to this pike remained unchanged.
Until the opening of the battles around Nashville nothing of interest transpired in my command, except the part taken by my skirmishers, commanded by Lieut. Col. J. B. Bibb, Twenty-third Alabama, in a demonstration made by Lee's corps. The enemy's skirmishers were driven by a greatly inferior force from all of their intrenched positions. My skirmishers were handsomely handled, and did their work with a dash and gallantry which deserve praise. Just before this demonstration Palmer's brigade (consolidated from Brown's and Reynolds' old brigades) was detached and ordered to report to Maj. Gen. N. B. Forrest, in front of Murfreesborough. It remained so detached from this division until it reached Bear Creek, on this side of Barton Station.
On the 15th of December the battle in front of Nashville opened. Except some unimportant skirmishing, my division took no part in that day's fight, although its position was frequently shifted and the line greatly attenuated to fill vacancies in the works, caused by the withdrawal of the troops.
On the next day the enemy advanced early in heavy force in front of the new line which we had constructed late the previous night, my division extending its entire length, part of it in two and part in one thin rank, from a short distance to the left of the Franklin pike. The skirmishers of the right of Lee's corps (Clayton's) and mine maintained their position so well, though in small force, that in their subsequent accounts the enemy have seen fit to magnify their affair with them into a desperate assault by two corps upon our first line, which was finally successful, but attended with heavy loss. Soon afterward their forces advanced to the assault, principally upon a part of General Clayton's line and upon Pettus' brigade, of my division, exposing in their assault upon Pettus their flank to a fire from Cumming's brigade. Their success the previous day had emboldened them, and they rushed forward with great spirit, only to be driven back with dreadful slaughter. Finding at last that they could make no impression upon our lines, they relinquished their attempt and contented themselves with keeping up an incessant fire of small-arms at long-range and an artillery fire which I have never seen surpassed for heaviness, continuance, and accuracy. This state of things continued until evening, doing, however, but little damage, my men keeping closely in the trenches and perfectly cool and confident. Toward evening General Lee sent me information that things were going badly on the left, and that it might be necessary to retire under cover of the approaching night. I at once hurried off orders for the artillery horses, which had been removed some distance to the rear to protect them from the fire of the enemy's artillery, under which they could not have lived half an hour, to be brought up. (It was proper to observe that about the middle of the day mist and rain arose, which entirely prevented my seeing anything that was going on beyond my own line.) The messengers had hardly gone for the horses before the break, which, commencing some distance beyond the left of Lee's corps, extended to my line. Seeing it, the men on my left commenced leaving the works, but at the call of their officers returned at once and held the line until the enemy were in fifty steps of them on their flank and pouring a fire into them from the flank and rear. When the true situation of affairs became apparent, and it was evident that the whole army, with the exception of my division and Clayton's, had been broken and scattered, the order for their withdrawal was given, an effort being made to deploy skirmishers from my left brigade at right angles to the works to cover, in some measure, the movement. Amid the indescribable confusion of other troops, and with the enemy pouring in their fire upon their flanks and from the front—having rushed toward the break and then forward when they perceived that the troops on my left had broken—it was impossible to withdraw the command in order, and it became considerably broken and confused. Many of them were unable to get out of the ditches in time and were captured. All this happened in as short a time as it has taken to describe it. The artillery horses of Rowan's battery, on the left of my line, could not be brought up in time, and one of the guns of Corput's battery was lost by being driven at full speed against a tree and the carriage broken. The different brigade and regimental commanders had sent off their horses, there being no protection for them near the breast-works, and, being thus unable to move about more rapidly than the men, were prevented from reforming their commands as quickly as could have been desired and extricating them from the throng of panic-stricken stragglers from other commands who crowded the road. This was done at last, and the line of march taken up for Franklin. On the way I received orders from General Lee to leave Pettus' brigade at Hollow Tree Gap to assist in bringing up the rear, and to proceed with Cumming's brigade and bivouac near the battle-field at Franklin, leaving guard upon the road to stop the stragglers of the army.
The next morning, by General Lee's order, I returned with Cumming's brigade to Franklin, and was there joined by General Pettus with his brigade, which had that morning, before reaching Franklin, captured a stand of colors. Soon after crossing the Harpeth Lieutenant-General Lee was wounded. When about three miles from Franklin General Lee moved off with the rest of the corps, and directed me to take command of the cavalry commanded by Brigadier-General Chalmers, which, with my division, was to constitute the rear guard. The enemy did not press us heavily until we arrived near Johnson's house, five or six miles north of Spring Hill. Here I formed my line, having about 700 infantry, with the cavalry on my flanks. The enemy advanced rapidly upon me, attacking me in front. I found it impossible to control the cavalry and, with the exception of a small force on the left, for a short time, to get them into action. I may as well state that at this point, as soon as the enemy engaged us heavily, the cavalry retired in disorder, leaving my small command to their fate. The enemy, perceiving the shortness of my line, at once threw a force around my left flank and opened fire upon it and its rear. This was a critical moment, and I felt great anxiety as to its effect upon my men, who, few in numbers, had just had the shameful example of the cavalry added to the terrible trial of the day before. I at once ordered Colonel Watkins to prepare to retire fighting by the flank, and General Pettus to move in line of battle to the rear, with a regiment thrown at right angles to his flank, thus forming three sides of a square. Watkins drove the enemy in his front in confusion, moved, at the order which was given in the instant of success, by the flank and charged those on his flank, drove them also. I halted again in about half a mile, formed a line upon each side of the pike—Pettus on the right, Watkins on the left, each with a regiment formed on his flank perpendicularly to his line to the rear—and having made these dispositions moved again to the rear. The enemy soon enveloped us in front, flank, and rear, but my gallant men under all their charges never faltered, never suffered their formation to be broken for an instant, and thus we moved, driving our way through them, fighting constantly, until within a short distance of Spring Hill, where we found that Major-General Clayton, hearing of our situation, had turned and moved back to our assistance. Here I halted for a time, and Holtzclaw's brigade, of Clayton's division, was formed upon Watkins' left flank in the manner which I have described. While here the enemy made several attacks and opened upon us with artillery but were readily repulsed. This was some time after dark. We finally moved off, and after marching about a mile farther, finding that the enemy had evidently become disheartened and abandoned his attacks, I placed the whole command again upon the pike and marched in the ordinary manner until I reached the bivouac of the remainder of the corps. I desire here to record my acknowledgments to the officers and men of General Holtzeclaw's brigade, commanded on the occasion by Colonel Jones, for the timely aid which they so gallantly afforded. Lieutenant-General Lee was pleased to acknowledge, in grateful and complimentary terms, the services of my division upon this occasion, and I make no vain boast when I, too, thank them for their conduct, and declare that never did a command in so perilous a position extricate itself by the force of more admirable coolness, determination, and unflinching gallantry. On that night I was directed by Lieutenant-General Lee to assume command of his corps during his disability.
I am greatly indebted to my staff—Maj. J. J. Reeve, assistant adjutant-general; Surg. H. M. Compton, medical director; Maj. J. E. McElrath, assistant quartermaster; Maj. J. H. F. Mayo, assistant commissary of subsistence; Maj. H. M. Mathews, ordnance officer; Capt. G. D. Wise, assistant inspector-general; Capt. Charles Vidor, assistant quartermaster; Lieut. H. T. Botts, aide-de-camp; Lieut. G. A. Hayward, aide-de-camp; also Capt. W. H. Sikes, Forty fifth Tennessee Regiment, and Lieut. W. E. McElwee, Twenty-sixth Tennessee Regiment, temporarily on duty at my headquarters--for their most efficient and valuable services, and for their untiring efforts to assist me during this arduous and trying campaign.
Assistant Adjutant-General, Lee's Corps.
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