Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 242. — Report of Brig. Gen. Randall L. Gibson, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, of operations December 15-17, 1864.

No. 242.

Report of Brig. Gen. Randall L. Gibson, C. S. Army,

commanding brigade, of operations December 15-17, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS GIBSON'S BRIGADE,        

Near Tupelo, Miss., January 11, 1865.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor, in compliance with orders from division headquarters, to submit the following report of operations before Nashville and along the line of our march to Columbia:

About 2 o'clock on the 15th of December I was directed by Lieutenant-General Lee to move my brigade to the extreme left of his corps and to deploy it in one rank, so as to cover as much space as possible. A little while before sunset the troops in line at right angles to the line in which I was posted—a line extending along the left flank of the army—gave way, and soon those immediately upon my left fell back, the whole moving rapidly in some confusion to the rear. The enemy advanced, and seeing that my left flank was exposed and likely to be involved, I withdrew my brigade from the trenches and formed a line of battle at right angles to them, my right resting upon them. I also threw forward a strong line of skirmishers under Lieut. A. T. Martin, who at once attacked the enemy, but he showed no disposition to advance. By this time it was twilight, and in a few minutes night closed operations.

The next day, the line having been retired about two and a half miles, my skirmishers were attacked early in the morning, but not ordered in until near I o'clock, when it was discovered that preparations were being made to charge us in force. The enemy assaulted my brigade either with one large or two small brigades, and after several attempts only came up to within seventy-five yards, and remaining there a few minutes broke and fled. We killed and wounded a great many for the time they were under fire and the force engaged. I estimate his loss at 200 killed and from 700 to 900 wounded. Observing just before sundown troops and ambulances passing into the Franklin turnpike from the left, and double-quicking toward the rear, I at once dispatched my aide-de-camp, Lieut. Cartwright Eustis, to say to Brigadier-General Pettus that I would co-operate with him in any plan to arrest the progress of the enemy, who had evidently broken the line somewhere to his left. Scarcely had my aide reached me and informed me of the intentions of General Pettus, when the enemy was observed already upon our rear and our troops upon all Sides breaking and striving to reach the line of retreat, which was nearly covered. I had ordered Lieut. Col. R. H. Lindsay, commanding Sixteenth Louisiana Volunteers, to get ready to deploy his regiment as skirmishers along the trenches, while I withdrew the brigade and attempted to arrest the enemy, but at this time confusion prevailed over everything. Arriving at the woods in front of Colonel Overton's I formed a line, as again directed by Lieutenant-General Lee, and moving back half a mile farther Major-General Clayton reformed his division, and we continued the retreat until we reached Hollow Tree Gap, where we bivouacked.

Early the next morning I was sent as a reserve near the hotel, 600 yards in rear of the gap. While there, in accordance with an order from division headquarters, I sent Col. S. E. Hunter, with the greater part of the Fourth and Thirtieth Louisiana Volunteers, and my inspector-general to report to Major-General Clayton. He was placed on picket in a gap in rear of the division, by order of Lieutenant-General Lee, and while being posted there I moved the balance of my brigade to attack the enemy, who was approaching the road between us and Franklin. I drove him back very easily, and was moving to the road again, when I was informed by a staff officer of Lieutenant-General Lee (Lieutenant Farish) that Colonel Hunter and his detachment had been captured. I was again placed in position in an earth-work 1,000 yards from Harpeth River, and before any instructions reached me our cavalry stampeded. The enemy, 5,000 strong, charged in three columns, with squadrons covering the intervening ground and connecting them—one in front, one in rear upon the left flank, and one in rear upon the right flank. I found a section of artillery upon the road and apart of a regiment of infantry under Colonel Hunley. I had the section to open upon the enemy, but it had no effect except to increase the speed of his flanking columns, and made no impression upon that one advancing directly upon our front. After firing ten rounds, with no better effect, I ordered the officer (I do not know his name) to move his pieces to the rear. I also directed Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, commanding Sixteenth Louisiana Volunteers, upon my extreme right, to deploy his regiment as skirmishers in retreat, and Colonel Campbell and Major Flournoy, with the First, Thirteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth (in all, about 250 muskets), to move to the rear and to fight as they went. I also directed Colonel Hunley to deploy his men as skirmishers. The cavalry of the enemy charged all around us. Colonel Campbell broke up, by a well-delivered fire, the column charging down the road, and thus gave time to the section of artillery to cross the river. The enemy came up within less than 100 yards of the section and fired his revolvers at those about it. My command fought its way to the river, entirely surrounded, with a loss of 10 killed, 25 wounded, and 5 captured. We continued to make dispositions against this cavalry, under orders of Major-General Clayton, without being engaged, until near sunset, when he again charged, coming from the left, and wheeled into and down the road just where my left flank rested upon it. I immediately changed front upon the left regiment, and ordered Colonel Henderson (Forty-second Georgia), temporarily in charge of Stovall's brigade, upon my right, to face by the rear rank and wheel to the right, so as to cover the road. A few well-directed volleys cut the charging column, and a part of two regiments continued down the road, while the rest fell back into the woods. Major-General Clayton, coming from the front, where he had gone to superintend the advance of Holtzclaw's brigade, then came up and made dispositions which resulted in the defeat of this body of cavalry, the killing of many, and the capture of colors and prisoners. My command was not again engaged.

I trust my officers and men behaved themselves, under all circumstances, in a way to entitle them to the confidence of my superior officers. Colonel Hunter, Fourth Louisiana Volunteers; Major Picolet, commanding Thirtieth; Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, Colonel Campbell, and Major Flournoy--all gave every assistance and conducted their parts with skill and courage.

I would particularly commend Lieut. A. T. Martin, commanding battalion of sharpshooters, for his conspicuous gallantry and skill, and regret to say he was wounded and captured when quitting the trenches.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, while temporarily in command of my brigade, displayed fine qualities as an officer, and Colonel Henderson was conspicuous for his efficiency and bravery, while for a short time in command of Stovall's brigade, under trying circumstances.

I would again commend Capt. A. L. Stuart, acting inspector-general, for his courage, judgment, and promptness. I regret to say that he was severely wounded. Capt. It. H. Bein, assistant adjutant-general, and Capt. G. Norton, acting assistant adjutant-general, were always prompt, efficient, and gallant, and especially so was Lieut. C. Eustis, my aide-decamp. Capt. J. Hodges, assistant quartermaster, and Maj. W. V. Crouch, commissary of subsistence, have discharged their duties throughout with fidelity and intelligence.

I have to announce and to deplore the death of Capt. C. W. Cushman, Thirtieth Louisiana Volunteers, who was killed at the trenches. He was a brave, intelligent, and efficient officer. Nor less zealous and worthy were Lieut. J. J. Cawthon, Nineteenth Louisiana Volunteers, and Lieut. C. Miller, Twentieth Louisiana Volunteers, who likewise fell in the discharge of their duties.

The annexed paper* (marked "A") contains a list of casualties.

Yours, very respectfully,

R. L. GIBSON,        

Brigadier-General.

Capt. J. M. MACON,

        Assistant Adjutant-General.

_______________

* Not found.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 702-4

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 239. — Report of Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson, C. S. Army, commanding division, of operations September 29-December 17, 1864.

No. 239.

Report of Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson, C. S. Army,

commanding division, of operations September 29-December 17, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS STEVENSON'S DIVISION,        

In the Field, January 20, 1865.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division during the recent campaign in Tennessee:

The march from Palmetto to the front of Columbia was without incident worthy of mention, except perhaps the demonstration upon Resaca, Ga., in which my command acted with spirit in the skirmishing which resulted in driving the enemy within their works. My loss was numerically insignificant at this point, but among the killed was numbered the gallant soldier and genial gentleman, Col. F. K. Beck, Twenty-third Alabama Regiment. By his fall my division lost a chivalrous soldier and his native State one of her worthiest sons.

Upon our arrival in front of Columbia my position in line was assigned from the right of Mount Pleasant pike, the front of the division in line of battle. The investment was characterized by nothing of interest as far as my division was concerned. A desultory skirmish fire was kept up most of the time. My losses here were few.

On the night of the 27th of November my scouts reported that there were indications that the enemy were evacuating Columbia. I immediately increased the number of scouts, and about an hour before day sent forward the Eighteenth and Third Tennessee Regiments (consolidated), under the command of Lieut. Col. W. R. Butler. He found the reports of the scouts to be correct, and occupied the town without opposition. I then moved forward my division, except Cumming's brigade (commanded in the campaign by Col. E. P. Watkins, Fifty-sixth Georgia), which, by General Lee's order, was sent down the river to press those of the enemy who had taken that route, and endeavor to save the railroad bridge, which, however, had been fired before their arrival. In the fort at Columbia we secured a large amount of howitzer and small-arm ammunition and two siege howitzers. Colonel Butler had, immediately upon gaining possession of the town, sent a force to the ford of Duck River. The enemy's skirmishers were found to be in large force on the opposite bank, and the enemy in position behind works about three-quarters of a mile from the river. He immediately moved down his command and skirmished with them briskly. The Sixtieth North Carolina, coming up soon after, was sent farther up the bank of the river to a point from which they obtained a flanking fire upon the enemy. This drove them back from the immediate bank of the river. Orders were soon after received to discontinue the skirmishing.

On the night of that day General Hood, with Cheatham's and Stewart's corps and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, crossed Duck River some miles above Columbia and pushed for the enemy's rear, leaving General Lee with Clayton's and my divisions to occupy the enemy in front until he should have reached his position, then to force a crossing of the river and attack the enemy as he attempted to extricate himself. The greater part of the next day was spent in preparations for this movement. The bank of the river was quite steep on the side held by the enemy. A pontoon boat in charge of Captain Ramsey, engineer, was taken down the river, under a galling fire, launched, and could then, under the cover of our artillery and skirmish fire, be used without much exposure in ferrying our troops. This was done with practicable rapidity, the troops as they crossed forming under the cover of the steep bank to which I have alluded. About an hour before sunset I had succeeded in crossing three regiments of Pettus' brigade, Brigadier-General Pettus in command. The Twentieth Alabama Regiment (Col. J. M. Dedman), of his brigade, had previously been sent up the bank of the river to obtain a flanking fire upon the enemy, and the Thirtieth Alabama (Lieut. Col. J. K. Elliott) was retained on the Columbia side to cover the ford in case of my failure. Everything being made ready I directed General Pettus to advance, and his command dashed forward at the word, driving the [enemy] before them by a charge which elicited the warmest admiration of all who witnessed it. Their loss was slight; that of the enemy so considerable that to explain the affair the commander of the enemy saw fit to attribute to an entire division an attack made by three of its regiments. Having driven the enemy within their main line General Pettus halted, selected a position to prevent the enemy from interrupting the laying of the pontoons, and was subsequently re-enforced by the rest of his brigade and by Holtzclaw's brigade, of Clayton's division. The pontoon bridge was then laid with all practicable expedition.

During this night General Pettus reported that the enemy was retiring and he following with his skirmishers. This was as anticipated, and orders had already been given by General Lee to have everything in readiness to move, coupled with the statement that General Hood had advised him that he was between the enemy and Nashville, near Spring Hill. At daybreak I put my division in motion in rear of Clayton's. Upon arriving at Spring Hill we were informed that from some cause, which has not been explained, the enemy had been suffered to pass unattacked along the road commanded by the troops which the commanding general took with him. We were then ordered to push on to Franklin. My division was halted about dark in three miles of that place, and took no part in the battle. During the night this division was put in position preparatory to an assault which it was announced was to be made by the entire army at daybreak. The enemy, however, evacuated the town before the hour for the assault. We then advanced to within a few miles of Nashville and threw up a line of works, my position being on the right and left of the Franklin pike. Several new lines were built, but my position with regard to this pike remained unchanged.

Until the opening of the battles around Nashville nothing of interest transpired in my command, except the part taken by my skirmishers, commanded by Lieut. Col. J. B. Bibb, Twenty-third Alabama, in a demonstration made by Lee's corps. The enemy's skirmishers were driven by a greatly inferior force from all of their intrenched positions. My skirmishers were handsomely handled, and did their work with a dash and gallantry which deserve praise. Just before this demonstration Palmer's brigade (consolidated from Brown's and Reynolds' old brigades) was detached and ordered to report to Maj. Gen. N. B. Forrest, in front of Murfreesborough. It remained so detached from this division until it reached Bear Creek, on this side of Barton Station.

On the 15th of December the battle in front of Nashville opened. Except some unimportant skirmishing, my division took no part in that day's fight, although its position was frequently shifted and the line greatly attenuated to fill vacancies in the works, caused by the withdrawal of the troops.

On the next day the enemy advanced early in heavy force in front of the new line which we had constructed late the previous night, my division extending its entire length, part of it in two and part in one thin rank, from a short distance to the left of the Franklin pike. The skirmishers of the right of Lee's corps (Clayton's) and mine maintained their position so well, though in small force, that in their subsequent accounts the enemy have seen fit to magnify their affair with them into a desperate assault by two corps upon our first line, which was finally successful, but attended with heavy loss. Soon afterward their forces advanced to the assault, principally upon a part of General Clayton's line and upon Pettus' brigade, of my division, exposing in their assault upon Pettus their flank to a fire from Cumming's brigade. Their success the previous day had emboldened them, and they rushed forward with great spirit, only to be driven back with dreadful slaughter. Finding at last that they could make no impression upon our lines, they relinquished their attempt and contented themselves with keeping up an incessant fire of small-arms at long-range and an artillery fire which I have never seen surpassed for heaviness, continuance, and accuracy. This state of things continued until evening, doing, however, but little damage, my men keeping closely in the trenches and perfectly cool and confident. Toward evening General Lee sent me information that things were going badly on the left, and that it might be necessary to retire under cover of the approaching night. I at once hurried off orders for the artillery horses, which had been removed some distance to the rear to protect them from the fire of the enemy's artillery, under which they could not have lived half an hour, to be brought up. (It was proper to observe that about the middle of the day mist and rain arose, which entirely prevented my seeing anything that was going on beyond my own line.) The messengers had hardly gone for the horses before the break, which, commencing some distance beyond the left of Lee's corps, extended to my line. Seeing it, the men on my left commenced leaving the works, but at the call of their officers returned at once and held the line until the enemy were in fifty steps of them on their flank and pouring a fire into them from the flank and rear. When the true situation of affairs became apparent, and it was evident that the whole army, with the exception of my division and Clayton's, had been broken and scattered, the order for their withdrawal was given, an effort being made to deploy skirmishers from my left brigade at right angles to the works to cover, in some measure, the movement. Amid the indescribable confusion of other troops, and with the enemy pouring in their fire upon their flanks and from the front—having rushed toward the break and then forward when they perceived that the troops on my left had broken—it was impossible to withdraw the command in order, and it became considerably broken and confused. Many of them were unable to get out of the ditches in time and were captured. All this happened in as short a time as it has taken to describe it. The artillery horses of Rowan's battery, on the left of my line, could not be brought up in time, and one of the guns of Corput's battery was lost by being driven at full speed against a tree and the carriage broken. The different brigade and regimental commanders had sent off their horses, there being no protection for them near the breast-works, and, being thus unable to move about more rapidly than the men, were prevented from reforming their commands as quickly as could have been desired and extricating them from the throng of panic-stricken stragglers from other commands who crowded the road. This was done at last, and the line of march taken up for Franklin. On the way I received orders from General Lee to leave Pettus' brigade at Hollow Tree Gap to assist in bringing up the rear, and to proceed with Cumming's brigade and bivouac near the battle-field at Franklin, leaving guard upon the road to stop the stragglers of the army.

The next morning, by General Lee's order, I returned with Cumming's brigade to Franklin, and was there joined by General Pettus with his brigade, which had that morning, before reaching Franklin, captured a stand of colors. Soon after crossing the Harpeth Lieutenant-General Lee was wounded. When about three miles from Franklin General Lee moved off with the rest of the corps, and directed me to take command of the cavalry commanded by Brigadier-General Chalmers, which, with my division, was to constitute the rear guard. The enemy did not press us heavily until we arrived near Johnson's house, five or six miles north of Spring Hill. Here I formed my line, having about 700 infantry, with the cavalry on my flanks. The enemy advanced rapidly upon me, attacking me in front. I found it impossible to control the cavalry and, with the exception of a small force on the left, for a short time, to get them into action. I may as well state that at this point, as soon as the enemy engaged us heavily, the cavalry retired in disorder, leaving my small command to their fate. The enemy, perceiving the shortness of my line, at once threw a force around my left flank and opened fire upon it and its rear. This was a critical moment, and I felt great anxiety as to its effect upon my men, who, few in numbers, had just had the shameful example of the cavalry added to the terrible trial of the day before. I at once ordered Colonel Watkins to prepare to retire fighting by the flank, and General Pettus to move in line of battle to the rear, with a regiment thrown at right angles to his flank, thus forming three sides of a square. Watkins drove the enemy in his front in confusion, moved, at the order which was given in the instant of success, by the flank and charged those on his flank, drove them also. I halted again in about half a mile, formed a line upon each side of the pike—Pettus on the right, Watkins on the left, each with a regiment formed on his flank perpendicularly to his line to the rear—and having made these dispositions moved again to the rear. The enemy soon enveloped us in front, flank, and rear, but my gallant men under all their charges never faltered, never suffered their formation to be broken for an instant, and thus we moved, driving our way through them, fighting constantly, until within a short distance of Spring Hill, where we found that Major-General Clayton, hearing of our situation, had turned and moved back to our assistance. Here I halted for a time, and Holtzclaw's brigade, of Clayton's division, was formed upon Watkins' left flank in the manner which I have described. While here the enemy made several attacks and opened upon us with artillery but were readily repulsed. This was some time after dark. We finally moved off, and after marching about a mile farther, finding that the enemy had evidently become disheartened and abandoned his attacks, I placed the whole command again upon the pike and marched in the ordinary manner until I reached the bivouac of the remainder of the corps. I desire here to record my acknowledgments to the officers and men of General Holtzeclaw's brigade, commanded on the occasion by Colonel Jones, for the timely aid which they so gallantly afforded. Lieutenant-General Lee was pleased to acknowledge, in grateful and complimentary terms, the services of my division upon this occasion, and I make no vain boast when I, too, thank them for their conduct, and declare that never did a command in so perilous a position extricate itself by the force of more admirable coolness, determination, and unflinching gallantry. On that night I was directed by Lieutenant-General Lee to assume command of his corps during his disability.

I am greatly indebted to my staff—Maj. J. J. Reeve, assistant adjutant-general; Surg. H. M. Compton, medical director; Maj. J. E. McElrath, assistant quartermaster; Maj. J. H. F. Mayo, assistant commissary of subsistence; Maj. H. M. Mathews, ordnance officer; Capt. G. D. Wise, assistant inspector-general; Capt. Charles Vidor, assistant quartermaster; Lieut. H. T. Botts, aide-de-camp; Lieut. G. A. Hayward, aide-de-camp; also Capt. W. H. Sikes, Forty fifth Tennessee Regiment, and Lieut. W. E. McElwee, Twenty-sixth Tennessee Regiment, temporarily on duty at my headquarters--for their most efficient and valuable services, and for their untiring efforts to assist me during this arduous and trying campaign.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. L. STEVENSON,        

Major-General.

Maj. J. W. RATCHFORD,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Lee's Corps.

 

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 693-7

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 238. — Report of Lieut. Col. Llewellyn Hoxton, C. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery, of operations December l0-17, 1864.

No. 238.

Report of Lieut. Col. Llewellyn Hoxton, C. S. Artillery,

Chief of Artillery, of operations December l0-17, 1864.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY, LEE'S CORPS,        

Columbus, February 1, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command from the 10th of December (the day on which I assumed command), until the 17th of December, on which day you were wounded:

I found all of the guns of the corps in position on the line at Nashville except Marshall's battery, of Johnston's battalion, left in garrison at Columbia, and Fenner's battery, of Eldridge's battalion, which was at Murfreesborough with Palmers brigade, reporting to Major-General Forrest. I had, therefore, twenty-eight guns in position on the corps line on the 15th of December, none of which were engaged until evening, when a few rounds were fired by Courtney's battalion from the temporary line to which we had retired. During the night all of my guns were removed to the new line and placed in position early in the morning—Courtney's battalion of twelve guns were massed about the center of General Ed. Johnson's line; Eldridge's battalion of eight guns occupied position on the hill to the right of the Franklin pike on General Clayton's line; and six guns of Johnston's battalion were in position on General Stevenson's line; two guns of his battalion were held in reserve in accordance with your orders. Courtney's battalion opened upon the enemy's skirmishers as soon as they came in view, and in return received a terrific fire from the enemy's batteries, which killed and crippled many of their horses. Orders were received by me and given to my battalions not to fire except on lines of battle or well-defined bodies of men, and consequently my batteries did little firing after 9 o'clock, except when the enemy charged the lines of Generals Stevenson and Clayton, when Johnston's battalion and Eldridge's battalion (the latter commanded by Captain Fenner) did most splendid execution upon them with canister, killing and wounding large numbers. During the whole day the batteries were subjected to a terrible artillery fire, which destroyed a large number of horses in the best cover I could obtain, and exploded two limber chests. When the lines were abandoned every effort was made by my officers and men to save their guns, and although left without infantry support, with the enemy almost upon them, they succeeded in almost every instance in limbering up, and then had so many horses shot down as to be unable to haul their guns through the heavy soil to the pike. I lost in the lines the following guns, 16 in all:

Courtney's battalion:
Dent's battery	4
Douglas' battery	1
Garrity's battery	2
Johnston's battalion:
Rowan's battery	4
Corput's battery	1
Eldridge's battalion:
Stanford's battery	4

I also lost some caissons. The horses which were unhurt were mostly saved. The twelve guns saved from the lines were immediately placed in position and used with good effect in protecting the retreat of the army.

On the morning of the 17th I was ordered to leave the five guns of Courtney's battalion with General Stevenson, who was conducting the rear guard. During the day the enemy's cavalry dashed into our lines on the pike, between the divisions of Generals Stevenson and Clayton, and captured the three guns of Douglas' battery. They destroyed the harness and had to cut down the guns, and when we recaptured them we could not carry them off and were compelled to abandon them. Three of the guns of Fenner's battery were subsequently abandoned by order of General Forrest, he finding it impossible to save them; and two guns of McKenzie's battery, which had been ordered to report to Lieutenant-General Stewart, were left by him on the other side of Duck River and abandoned, as the pontoon bridge was taken up, the commanding officer having been previously refused permission to cross; this, however, was after you had relinquished command.

I regret that it is out of my power to furnish a list of casualties, none having been previously called for, and two of my battalions having been ordered away. My loss was small, however, except in Stanford's battery, which lost 12 men killed and wounded.

Captain Rowan, a good and gallant officer, was killed by a shell on the morning of the 16th.

In conclusion, I would say that the officers and men of my command exhibited the greatest coolness and gallantry during the fight and subsequent retreat; that they did all in their power to save their guns; and that they feel most keenly the misfortune which has disarmed them at a moment so perilous for their country, and ask your earnest intercession to place them again in the field at an early day.

Very respectfully,

L. HOXTON,        

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Lieut. Gen. S. D. LEE.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 691-2

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 237. — Report of Lieut. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army Corps, of operations November 2-December 17, 1864.

No. 237.

Report of Lieut. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army Corps,

of operations November 2-December 17, 1864.

COLUMBUS, MISS., January 30, 1865.

COLONEL: I have the honor to offer the following as my official report of the operations of my corps during the offensive movement commencing at Palmetto Station, Ga., September 29, 1864:

It is impracticable now, in consequence of the movement of troops and my temporary absence from the army, to obtain detailed reports from my division commanders.¹

My corps remained at Florence [from November 2] till November 20, when the army commenced moving for Tennessee, my command leading the advance, and marching in the direction of Columbia via Henryville and Mount Pleasant. I arrived in front of Columbia on the 26th, relieving Forrest's cavalry, then in position there, which had followed the enemy from Pulaski. The force of the enemy occupying Columbia was two corps. They confined themselves to their main works around the city, and their outposts and skirmishers were readily driven in.

On the night of the 27th the enemy evacuated Columbia and crossed Duck River. Stevenson's division, of my corps, entered the town before daylight. After crossing the enemy took a strong position on the opposite side of the river and intrenched, his skirmishers occupying rifle-pits 250 yards from the river. There was considerable skirmishing across the river during the day and some artillery firing, resulting in nothing of importance.

On the morning of the 29th Johnson's division, of my corps, was detached and ordered to report to the general commanding. I was directed to engage and occupy the enemy near Columbia, while the other two corps and Johnson's division would be crossed above and moved to the rear of the enemy in the direction of Spring Hill. The entire force of the enemy was in front of Columbia till about midday on the 29th, when one corps commenced moving off, the other remaining in position as long as they could be seen by us or even till dark. I had several batteries of artillery put in position to drive the skirmishers of the enemy from the vicinity of the river-bank, and made a display of pontoons, running several of them down to the river under a heavy artillery and musketry fire. Having succeeded in putting a boat in the river, Pettus' brigade, of Stevenson's division, was thrown across, under the immediate direction of Major-General Stevenson, and made a most gallant charge on the rifle-pits of the enemy, driving a much superior force and capturing the pits. The bridge was at once laid down and the crossing commenced.

During the affair around Columbia the gallant and accomplished soldier, Col. R. F. Beckham, commanding the artillery regiment of my corps, was mortally wounded while industriously and fearlessly directing the artillery firing against the enemy. He was one of the truest and best officers in the service.

The enemy left my front about 2.30 a.m. on the morning of the 30th, and the pursuit was made as rapidly as was possible in the night time. The advance of Clayton's division arrived at Spring Hill about 9 a.m., when it was discovered that the enemy had made his escape, passing around that portion of the army in that vicinity. My corps, including Johnson's division, followed immediately after Cheatham's toward Franklin. I arrived near Franklin about 4 p.m. The commanding general was just about attacking the enemy with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps, and he directed me to place Johnson's division, and afterward Clayton's, in position to support the attack. Johnson moved in rear of Cheatham's corps; and finding that the battle was stubborn General Hood instructed me to go forward in person to communicate with General Cheatham, and if necessary to put Johnson's division in the fight. I met General Cheatham about dark, and was informed by him that assistance was needed at once. Johnson was at once moved forward to the attack, but owing to the darkness and want of information as to the locality his attack was not felt by the enemy till about one hour after dark. This division moved against the enemy's breastworks under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, gallantly driving the enemy from portions of his line. The brigades of Sharp and Brantly (Mississippians) and of Deas (Alabamians) particularly distinguished themselves. Their dead were mostly in the trenches and on the works of the enemy, where they nobly fell in a desperate hand-to-hand conflict. Sharp captured three stand of colors. Brantly was exposed to a severe enfilade fire. These noble brigades never faltered in this terrible night struggle.

Brigadier-General Manigault, commanding a brigade of Alabamians and South Carolinians, was severely wounded in this engagement while gallantly leading his troops to the fight, and of his two successors in command, Colonel Shaw was killed and Colonel Davis wounded. I have never seen greater evidences of gallantry than was displayed by this division, under command of that admirable and gallant soldier, Maj. Gen. Ed. Johnson.

The enemy fought gallantly and obstinately at Franklin, and the position he held was, for infantry defense, one of the best I have ever seen.

The enemy evacuated Franklin hastily during the night of the 30th. My corps commenced the pursuit about 1 p.m. on December 1, and arrived near Nashville about 2 p.m. on the 2d. The enemy had then occupied the works around the city. My command was the center of the army in front of Nashville, Cheatham's corps being on my right and Stewards on my left. Nothing of importance occurred till the 15th. The army was engaged in intrenching and strengthening its position. On the l5th the enemy moved out on our left, and a serious engagement was soon commenced. In my immediate front the enemy still kept up his skirmish line, though it was evident that his main force had been moved. My line was much extended, the greater part of my command being in single rank. About 12 m. I was instructed to assist Lieutenant-General Stewart, and I commenced withdrawing troops from my line to send to his support. I sent him Johnson's entire division, each brigade starting as it was disengaged from the works. A short time before sunset the enemy succeeded in turning General Stewart's position, and a part of my line was necessarily changed to conform to his new line. During the night Cheatham's corps was withdrawn from my right and moved to the extreme left of the army. The army then took position about one mile in rear of its original line, my corps being on the extreme right. I was instructed by the commanding general to cover and hold the Franklin pike—Clayton's division occupied my right, Stevenson's my center, and Johnson's my left. It was evident soon after daylight that a large force of the enemy was being concentrated in my front on the Franklin pike.

About 9 a.m. on the 16th the enemy, having placed a large number of guns in position, opened a terrible artillery fire on my line, principally on the Franklin pike. This lasted about two hours, when the enemy moved to the assault. They came up in several lines of battle. My men reserved their fire until they were within easy range, and then delivered it with terrible effect. The assault was easily repulsed. It was renewed, however, several times with spirit, but only to meet each time with a like result. They approached to within thirty yards of our line, and their loss was very severe. Their last assault was made about 3.30 p.m., when they were driven back in great disorder. The assaults were made principally in front of Holtzclaw's (Alabama), Gibson's (Louisiana), and Stovall's (Georgia) brigades, of Clayton's division, and Pettus' (Alabama) brigade, of Stevenson's division, and too much credit cannot be awarded Major-General Clayton and these gallant troops for their conspicuous and soldierly conduct.

The enemy made a considerable display of force on my extreme right during the day, evidently with the intention of attempting to turn our right flank. He made, however, but one feeble effort to use this force, when it was readily repulsed by Stovall's and Brantly's brigades, which had been moved to the right. Smith's division, of Cheatham's corps, reported to me about 2 p.m. to meet any attempt of the enemy to turn our right flank. It was put in position, but was not needed, and, by order of the commanding general, it started to Brentwood about 3.30 p.m.

The artillery fire of the enemy during the entire day was very heavy, and right nobly did the artillery of my corps, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hoxton, perform their duty. Courtney's battalion, under Captain Douglas, was in Johnson's front; Johnston's battalion was in Stevenson's front; and Eldridge's battalion, under Captain Turner, was in Clayton's front. The officers and men of the artillery behaved admirably. Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon this efficient arm of the service in the Army of Tennessee.

The troops of my entire line were in fine spirits and confident of success--so much so that the men could scarcely be prevented from leaving their trenches to follow the enemy on and near the Franklin pike; but suddenly all eyes were turned to the center of our line of battle near the Granny White pike, where it was evident the enemy had made an entrance, although but little firing had been heard in that direction. Our men were flying to the rear in the wildest confusion, and the enemy following with enthusiastic cheers. The enemy at once closed toward the gap in our line and commenced charging on the left division (Johnson's) of my corps, but were handsomely driven back. The enemy soon gained our rear, and was moving on my left flank, when my line gradually gave way. My troops left their line in some disorder, but were soon rallied and presented a good front to the enemy. It was a fortunate circumstance that the enemy was too much crippled to pursue us on the Franklin pike. The only pursuit made at that time was by a small force coming from the Granny White pike.

Having been informed by an aide of the general commanding that the enemy was near Brentwood, and that it was necessary to get beyond that point at once, everything was hastened to the rear. When Brentwood was passed the enemy was only half a mile from the Franklin pike, where Chalmers' cavalry was fighting them. Being charged with covering the retreat of the army, I remained in rear with Stevenson's and part of Clayton's division, and halted the rear guard about seven miles north of Franklin about 10 p.m. on the 16th.

Early on the morning of the 17th our cavalry was driven in in confusion by the enemy, who at once commenced a most vigorous pursuit, his cavalry charging at every opportunity and in the most daring manner. It was apparent that they were determined to make the retreat a rout if possible. Their boldness was soon checked by many of them being killed and captured by Pettus' (Alabama) and Stovall's (Georgia) brigades and Bledsoe's battery, under General Clayton. Several guidons were captured in one of their charges. I was soon compelled to withdraw rapidly toward Franklin, as the enemy was throwing a force in my rear from both the right and left of the pike on roads coming into the pike near Franklin and five miles in my rear. This force was checked by Brigadier-General Gibson with his brigade and a regiment of Buford's cavalry under Colonel Shacklett. The resistance which the enemy had met with early in the morning, and which materially checked his movement, enabled us to reach Franklin with but little difficulty. Here the enemy appeared in considerable force and exhibited great boldness, but he was repulsed, and the crossing of the Harpeth River effected. I found that there was in the town of Franklin a large number of our own and of the enemy's wounded, and not wishing to subject them and the town to the fire of the enemy's artillery, the place was yielded with but little resistance. Some four or five hours were gained by checking the enemy one mile and a half south of Franklin and by the destruction of the trestle bridge over the Harpeth, which was effected by Captain Coleman, the engineer officer on my staff, and a party of pioneers, under a heavy fire of the enemy's sharpshooters. About 4 p.m. the enemy, having crossed a considerable force, commenced a bold and vigorous attack, charging with his cavalry on our flanks and pushing forward his lines in our front. A more persistent effort was never made to rout the rear guard of a retiring column. This desperate attack was kept up till long after dark, but gallantly did the rear guard--consisting of Pettus' (Alabama) and Cumming's (Georgia) brigades, the latter commanded by Colonel Watkins, of Stevenson's division, and under that gallant and meritorious officer Maj. Gen. C. L. Stevenson--repulse every attack. Brigadier-General Chalmers with his division of cavalry covered our flanks. The cavalry of the enemy succeeded in getting in Stevenson's rear, and attacked Major-General Clayton's division about dark, but they were handsomely repulsed, Gibson's and Stovall's brigades being principally engaged-Some four five guidons were captured from the enemy during the even ing. About 1 p.m. I was wounded while with the rear guard, but did not relinquish command of my corps till dark. Most of the details in conducting the retreat from that time were arranged and executed by Major-General Stevenson, to whom the army is much indebted for his skill and gallantry during the day.

I cannot close this report without alluding particularly to the conduct of the artillery of my corps on the 16th. Sixteen guns were lost on the lines. The greater portion of them were without horses, they having been disabled during the day. Many of the carriages were disabled also. The noble gunners, reluctant to leave their guns, fought the enemy in many instances till they were almost within reach of the guns.

Maj. Gen. Ed. Johnson was captured on the 16th. Being on foot he was unable to make his escape from the enemy in consequence of an old wound. He held his line as long as it was practicable to do so. The Army of Tennessee has sustained no greater loss than that of this gallant and accomplished soldier.

To my division commanders--Stevenson, Johnson, and Clayton--I am indebted for the most valuable services; they were always zealous in discharge of their duties.

Although it is my desire to do so, I cannot now allude to the many conspicuous acts of gallantry exhibited by general, field, and company officers and by different commands; it is my intention to do so in future when detailed reports are received.

To the officers of my personal staff, and also of the corps staff, I am indebted for valuable services; they were always at their posts and ready to respond to the call of duty.

Yours, respectfully,

S. D. LEE,        

Lieutenant-General.

Lieut. Col. A. P. MASON,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Tennessee.

ADDENDA.

Report of casualties in Johnson's division in battle of November 30, 1864, at Franklin, Tenn.

Command.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Deas' brigade	13	101	5	119
Manigault's brigade	5	85	1	91
Sharp's brigade	30	81	9	120
Brantly's brigade	76	140	21	237
Total infantry.	124	407	36	567
Artillery battalion	3	17		20
Grand total	127	424	36	587

ED. JOHNSON,        

Major-General, Commanding.

NEAR NASHVILLE, TENN., December 3, 1864.

_______________

¹ For portion of report here omitted, see Vol. XXXIX, part 1, p. 810.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 686-91

General Braxton Bragg to Colonel John B. Sale, July 19,1864

MONTGOMERY, July 19, 1864.        

(Via Columbus.)

Col. J. B. SALE:

The enemy still hold West Point railroad. Forces are moving forward to dislodge them. General S.D. Lee informs me 5,000 Thirteenth Army Corps passed Vicksburg on 16th, supposed going to White River, but reported Memphis. Nineteenth Army Corps (Franklin's) left New Orleans the 4th for Fort Monroe, 13,000 strong. Ought not Taylor's forces to cross Mississippi? I hear nothing from Johnston. Telegraph me to Columbus, Ga.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 38, Part 5 (Serial No. 76), p. 894

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: July 11, 1864

Hot and dry, and the famine continues.

The Secretary of War intimated on Saturday that if the clerks of the bureaus would raise a fund and send an agent South to buy provisions, he would insure them transportation, etc. To-day he denies that he made the promise, and refuses to aid them.

The government now proposes to increase its schedule of prices from 300 to 500 per cent., thus depreciating its own credit. Before harvest the impressing agents allowed about $40 per barrel for flour; now, that we have a good harvest, about $130 will be paid, thus raising the price everywhere. The transportation is the expensive item.

A dispatch from Gen. Johnston, at Atlanta, says the enemy having flanked him with his cavalry, he has fallen back across the Chattahoochee.

Dispatches from Gen. S. D. Lee, Tupelo, state that a column of the enemy, 20,000 strong, is about marching from New Orleans against Mobile, and he fears he cannot spare men to resist them. The reserve class is not ready. Also that 15,000 of the enemy are marching from Lagrange, and he will have to dismount some of Forrest's cavalry. Gen. E. K. Smith will not cross the Mississippi to assist in repelling the foe without orders. Orders have been sent from the Secretary of War I fear too late !

Northern papers of the 8th inst. indicate a state of high excitement. Some there believe we have an army of 60,000 pouring into Pennsylvania. Gold was $2.65 for one.

There is some commotion in Grant's army, and it is believed by some that he is about to retire down the river.

It is rumored that the prisoners heretofore confined at Point Lookout have been removed by the Federal Government.

At 7 P.M. we had a gentle shower, lasting more than an hour.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 247-8

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: July 21, 1864

Clear and warm. Bought fifty cabbage-plants and set them out before breakfast

Gen. Early met Gen. Hunter at Snicker's Gap, and whipped him.

All quiet at Petersburg. Grant must be dead, sure enough.

Gen. Bragg left the city some days ago. The following is a verbatim dispatch received from him yesterday:

MONTGOMERY, ALA., July 19th, 1864.

COL. J. B. SALE:—The enemy still hold West Point Railroad Forces are moving forward to dislodge them. Gen. S. D. Lee in forms me 5000 (13th Army Corps) passed Vicksburg on the 16th, supposed to be going to White River. Reported Memphis, 19th Army Corps, Franklin left New Orleans on the 4th for Fort Monroe, 13,000 strong. Ought not Taylor's forces to cross the Mississippi?

I hear nothing from Johnston.

Telegraph me to Columbus, Ga.

B. BRAGG, General.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 252

Major Charles Wright Wills: February 10, 1865

February 10, 1865.

Had no "general” this morning (our signal for getting up), so when the "assembly" sounded we climbed from our blankets to our saddles and went off on a railroad burning expedition. Our brigade by noon had completely destroyed two and one-half miles. The 17th and our 3d Division crossed the South Edisto to-day, four miles from here. We will cross to-morrow, I hear. Also hear that S. D. Lee's Corps of Hood's Army is at Augusta. We whipped them July 28, '64, and can do it again. I think the whole army is here now. We have 15-day half rations yet. Wonder where it will take us.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 343-4

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, September 17, 1863

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,                       

Camp on Big Black, Miss., September 17, 1863.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief, Washington, D.C.:

DEAR GENERAL: I have received your letter of August 29, and with pleasure confide to you fully my thoughts on the important matters you suggest, with absolute confidence that you will use what is valuable and reject the useless or superfluous.

That part of the continent of North America known as Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas is in my judgment the key to the whole interior. The Valley of the Mississippi is America, and although railroads have changed the economy of intercommunication, yet the water channels still mark the lines of fertile land and afford carriage to the heavy products of it. The inhabitants of the country on the Monongahela, the Illinois, the Minnesota, the Yellowstone, and Osage are as directly concerned in the security of the Lower Mississippi as are those who dwell on its very banks in Louisiana, and now that the nation has recovered its possession this generation of men would commit a fearful mistake if we again commit its charge to a people liable to mistake their title, and assert, as was recently done, treat because they dwell by sufferance on the banks of this mighty stream they had a right to control its navigation.

I would deem it very unwise at this time, or for years to come, to revive the State Governments of Louisiana, &c., or to institute in this quarter any civil government in which the local people have much to say. They had a government, and so mild and paternal that they gradually forgot they had any at all, save what they themselves controlled; they asserted absolute right to seize public moneys, forts, arms, and even to shut up the natural avenues of travel and commerce. They chose war; they ignored and denied all the obligations of the solemn contract of government and appealed to force. We accepted the issue, and now they begin to realize that war is a two-edged sword, and, it may be, that many of the inhabitants cry for peace. I know them well and the very impulses of their nature; and to deal with the inhabitants of that part of the South which borders the great river we must recognize the classes into which they have naturally divided themselves.

First, the large planters owning lands, slaves, and all kinds of personal property. These are on type whole the ruling class. They are educated, wealthy, and easily approached. In some districts they are as bitter as gall, and have given up slaves, plantations, and all, serving in the armies of the Confederacy, whereas in others they are conservative. None dare admit a friendship to us, though they say freely that they were opposed to war and disunion. I know we can manage this class, but only by action; argument is exhausted, and words have not their usual meaning. Nothing but the logic of events touches their understanding, but of late this has worked a wonderful change. If our country were like Europe, crowded with people, I would say it would be easier to replace this population than to reconstruct it subordinate to the policy of the nation; but as this is not the case, it is better to allow them, with individual exceptions, gradually to recover their plantations, to hire any species of labor, and adapt themselves to the new order of things. Still their friendship and assistance to reconstruct order out of the present ruin cannot be depended on. They watch the operations of our armies, and hope still for a Southern Confederacy that will restore to them the slaves and privileges which they feel are otherwise lost forever. In my judgment we have two more battles to win before we should even bother our minds with the idea of restoring civil order, viz, one near Meridian in November, and one near Shreveport in February and March, when Red River is navigable by our gunboats. When these are done, then, and not until then, win the planters of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi submit. Slavery is already gone, and to cultivate the land negro or other labor must be hired. This of itself is a vast revolution, and time must be afforded to allow men to adjust their minds and habits to the new order of things. A civil government of the representative type would suit this class far less than a pure military rule, one readily adapting itself to actual occurrences and able to enforce its laws and orders promptly and emphatically.

Second, the smaller farmers, mechanics, merchants, and laborers. This class will probably number three-fourths of the whole, have in fact no real interest in the establishment of a Southern Confederacy, and have been led or driven into war on the false theory that they were to be benefited somehow, they knew not how. They are essentially tired of the war, and would slink back home if they could. These are the real tiers-état of the South, and are hardly worthy a thought, for they swerve to and fro according to events they do not comprehend or attempt to shape. When the time for reconstruction comes they will want the old political system of caucuses, legislatures, &c., something to amuse them and make them believe they are achieving wonders, but in all things they will follow blindly the lead of the planter. The Southern politicians, who understand this class, use them as the French use their masses. Seemingly consulting their prejudices, they make their orders and enforce them. We should do the same.

Third, the Union men of the South. I must confess I have little respect for this class. They allowed a clamorous set of demagogues to muzzle and drive them as a pack of curs. Afraid of shadows, they submit tamely to squads of dragoons, and permit them, without a murmur to burn their cotton, take their horses, corn, and everything, and when we reach them they are full of complaints if our men take a few fence rails for fire or corn to feed our horses. They give us no assistance or information, and are loudest in the complaints at the smallest excess of our soldiers. Their sons, horses, arms, and everything useful are in the army against us, and they stay at home, claiming all the exemptions of peaceful citizens. I account them as nothing in this great game.

Fourth, the young bloods of the South, sons of planters, lawyers about towns, good billiard players, and sportsmen—men who never did work nor never will. War suits them, and the rascals are brave; fine riders, bold to rashness, and dangerous subjects in every sense. They care not a sou for niggers, land, or anything. They hate Yankees per se, and don't bother their brains about the past, present, or future. As long as they have good horses, plenty of forage, and an open country, they are happy. This is a larger class than most men supposed, and are the most dangerous set of men which this war has turned loose upon the world. They are splendid riders, shots, and utterly reckless. Stuart, John Morgan, Forrest, and Jackson are the types and leaders of this class. This class of men must all be killed or employed by us before we can hope for peace. They have no property or future, and therefore cannot be influenced by anything except personal considerations. I have two brigades of these fellows to my front, commanded by Cosby, of the old army, and Whitfield, of Texas, Stephen D. Lee in command of the whole. I have frequent interviews with the officers and a good understanding. Am inclined to think when the resources of their country are exhausted we must employ them. They are the best cavalry in the world, but it will tax Mr. Chase's genius of finance to supply them with horses. At present horses cost them nothing, for they take where they find and don't bother their brains who is to pay for them. Some of the corn-fields which have, as they believe, been cultivated by a good-natured people for their special benefit, we propose to share with them the free use of these corn-fields planted by willing hands that will never gather it.

Now that I have sketched the people who inhabit the district of country under consideration, I will proceed to discuss the future. A civil government for any part of it would be simply ridiculous. The people would not regard it, and even the military commanders of the antagonistic party would treat it lightly. Governors would be simply petitioners for military assistance to protect supposed friendly interests, and military commanders would refuse to disperse and weaken their armies for military reasons. Jealousies would arise between the two conflicting powers, and instead of contributing to the end we all have in view, would actually defer it. Therefore I contend that the interests of the United States and of the real parties concerned demand the continuance of the simple military rule till long after all the organized armies of the South are dispersed, conquered, and subjugated. All this region is represented in the Army of Virginia, Charleston, Mobile, and Chattanooga. They have sons and relations in each, and naturally are interested in their fate. Though we hold military possession of the key-points of this country, still they contend, and naturally, that should Lee succeed in Virginia or Bragg at Chattanooga, a change will occur here also. We cannot for this reason attempt to reconstruct parts of the South as we conquer it till all idea of the establishment of a Southern Confederacy is abandoned. We should avail ourselves of the lull here to secure the geographical points that give us advantage in future military movements, and should treat the idea of civil government as one in which we as a nation have a minor or subordinate interest. The opportunity is good to impress on the population the truth that they are more interested in civil government than we are, and that to enjoy the protection of laws they must not be passive observers of events, but must aid and sustain the constituted authorities in enforcing the laws; they must not only submit themselves, but pay their taxes and render personal services when called on. It seems to me, in contemplating the past two years history, all the people of our country, North, South, East, and West have been undergoing a salutary political schooling, learning lessons which might have been taught all by the history of other people, but we had all become so wise in our own conceit that we would only learn by actual experience of our own.

The people, even of small and unimportant localities, North as well as South, had reasoned themselves into the belief that their opinions were superior to the aggregated interest of the whole nation. Half our territorial nation rebelled on a doctrine of secession that they themselves now scout, and a real numerical majority actually believed that a little State was endowed with such sovereignty that it could defeat the policy of the great whole. I think the present war has exploded that notion, and were this war to cease now, the experience gained, though dear, would be worth the expense.

Another great and important natural truth is still in contest and can only be solved by war. Numerical majorities by vote is our great arbiter. Heretofore all have submitted to it in questions left open, but numerical majorities are not necessarily physical majorities. The South, though numerically inferior, contend they can whip the Northern superiority of numbers, and therefore by natural law are not bound to submit. This issue is the only real one, and in my judgment all else should be deferred to it. War alone can decide it, and it is the only question left to us as a people. Can we whip the South? If we can, our numerical majority has both the natural and constitutional right to govern. If we cannot whip them, they contend for the natural right to select their own government, and they have the argument. Our armies must prevail over theirs. Our officers, marshals, and courts must penetrate into the innermost recesses of their land before we have the natural right to demand their submission.

I would banish all minor questions and assert the broad doctrine, that as a nation the United States has the right, and also the physical power, to penetrate to every part of the national domain, and that we will do it; that we will do it in our own time, and in our own way; that it makes no difference whether it be in one year or two, or ten or twenty; that we will remove and destroy every obstacle—if need be, take every life, every acre of land, every particle of property, everything that to us seems proper; that we will not cease until the end is attained. That all who do not aid are enemies, and we will not account to them for our acts. If the people of the South oppose, they do so at their peril; and if they stand by mere lookers-on the domestic tragedy, they have no right to immunity, protection, or share in the final result.

I even believe, and contend further, that in the North every member of the nation is bound by both natural and constitutional to "maintain and defend the Government against all its opposers whomsoever." If they fail to do it they are derelict., and can be punished or deprived of all advantage arising from the labors of those who do. If any man, North or South, withholds his share of taxes or physical assistance in this crisis of our history, he should and could be deprived of all voice in the future elections of this country, and might be banished or reduced to the condition of a denizen of the land.

War is upon us; none can deny it. It is not the act of the Government of the United States but of a faction. The Government was forced to accept the issue or submit to a degradation fatal and disgraceful to all the inhabitants. In accepting war it should be pure and simple as applied to the belligerents. I would keep it so till all traces of the war are effaced; till those who appealed to it are sick and tired of it, and come to the emblem of our nation and sue for peace. I would not coax them or even meet them half way, but make them so sick of war that generations would pass before they would again appeal to it.

I know what I say when I repeat that the insurgents of the South sneer at all overtures looking to their interest. They scorn the alliance with copperheads. They tell me to my face that they respect Grant, McPherson, and our brave associates who fight manfully and well for a principle, but despise the copperheads and sneaks who profess friendship for the South and opposition to the war as mere covers for their knavery and poltroonery.

God knows that I deplored this fratricidal war as much as any man living; but it is upon us, a physical fact, and there is only one honorable issue from it. We must fight it out, army against army and man against man, and I know and you know and civilians begin to realize the fact that reconciliation and reconstruction will be easier through and by means of strong, well-equipped and organized armies than through any species of conventions that can be framed. The issues are made, and all discussion is out of place and ridiculous.

The section of 30-pounder Parrott rifles now drilling before my tent is a more convincing argument than the largest Democratic meeting the State of New York could assemble at Albany, and a simple order of the War Department to draft enough men to fill our skeleton regiments would be more convincing as to our national perpetuity than an humble pardon to Jeff. Davis and all his misled host.

The only government now needed or deserved by the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi now exists in Grant's army. It needs simply enough privates to fill its ranks; all else will follow in due season. This army has its well-defined code of laws and practice, and can adapt itself to the wants and necessities of a city, the country, the rivers, the sea; indeed, to all parts of this land. It better subserves the interest and policy of the General Government, and the people prefer it to any weak or servile combination that would at once, from force of habit, revive and perpetuate local prejudices and passions. The people of this country have forfeited all right to a voice in the councils of the nation. They know it and feel it, and in after years they will be the better citizens from the dear-bought experience of the present crisis. Let them learn now, and learn it well, that good citizens must obey as well as command. Obedience to law—absolute, yea, even abject—is the lesson that this war, under Providence, will teach the free and enlightened American citizen; as a nation we will be the better for it. I never have apprehended foreign interference in our family quarrel. Of course governments founded on a different, and it may be antagonistic, principle with ours, would naturally feel a pleasure at our complications, but in the end England and France will join with us in jubilations in the triumph of a constitutional government over faction; even now the English manifest this.

I do not profess to understand Napoleon's design in Mexico, but I do not see that his taking military possession of Mexico concerns us. We have as much territory as we want. The Mexicans have failed in self-government, and it was a question to what nation she would fall a prey. That is solved, and I don't see that we are damaged. We have the finest part of the North American continent, all we can people and take care of, and if we can suppress rebellion in our land and compose the strife generated by it, we will have people, resources, and wealth which, if well combined, can defy interference from any and every quarter.

I therefore hope the Government of the United States will continue as heretofore in collecting in well-organized armies the physical strength of the nation; apply it as heretofore in asserting the national authority, persevering without relaxation to the end. This, whether near or far off, is not for us to say, but, fortunately, we have no choice. We must succeed; no other choice is left us but degradation. The South must be ruled or will rule. We must conquer them ourselves or be conquered. There is no middle course. They ask and will have nothing else, and all the talk of compromise is bosh, for we know they would even now scorn the offer. I wish the war could have been deferred for twenty years, till the superabundant population of the North should flow in and replace the losses sustained by war, but this could not be, and we are forced to take things as they arise.

All therefore I can now venture to advise is the pushing the draft to its maximum, fill the present regiments to as large a standard as possible, and push the war, pure and simple.

Great attention should be paid to the discipline of our armies, for on them will be founded the future stability of our Government. The cost of the war is of course to be considered, but finances will adjust themselves to the-actual state of affairs, and even if we would we could not change the cost. Indeed, the larger the cost now the less will it be in the end, for the end must be attained somehow, regardless of cost of life and treasure, and is merely a question of time.

Excuse so long a letter.

With great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,                

Major-general.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 30, Part 3 (Serial No. 52), p. 694-700