CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade north of the Tennessee River:
The brigade left Florence with the division on the 20th of November, and arrived in front of Columbia on the morning of the 27th; went into position and skirmished with the enemy late in the afternoon, but without any result. On the 29th, the enemy having withdrawn from the town, I crossed Duck River at 10 o'clock at night and formed on the brigade of General Pettus, which had effected a lodgment during the day. I had worked the remainder of the night intrenching within 100 yards of the enemy's skirmish line. At 4 a.m. the enemy withdrew, closely pursued by my skirmish line, under Major H. I. Thornton, who succeeded in capturing about forty prisoners from their rear guard. At daylight I moved forward with the division in pursuit of the enemy, believing and hoping that he would be forced to a general engagement while en route to Franklin. My command, notwithstanding it had worked all night without a moment for repose, moved forward with great alacrity and marched the twenty-four miles to Franklin by 4.30 p.m., not a straggler falling from the ranks. At sundown I moved forward with the remainder of the division to support a line of General Cheatham's corps then hotly engaged with the enemy, intrenched around the town of Franklin, halting just beyond musket range. I remained in line until 4 a.m., when I moved into the town of Franklin, where I remained till 1 p.m. guarding stores and prisoners, moving at that hour with the command en route for Nashville. I arrived in front of the enemy on the 1st of December, my brigade in advance of the army. Driving in the skirmish line of the enemy, I established myself in position, which the next day became the line for the corps. The next twelve days were spent in intrenching and strengthening the position, which was made impregnable. I organized an efficient corps of shoemakers, finding no difficulty in procuring leather in the surrounding country—would have soon been able to supply all the wants of my command in this respect.
On the 12th of December the skirmish line in my front, without difficulty, drove in the enemy's line to their main works and established our line half a mile in advance. My loss was one man in this affair.
On the morning of the 15th of December the unusual activity of the enemy had the whole command under arms, demonstrating on the extreme right. He attacked late in the day in force on the left. The line gradually contracting to repel the attack, my line became extended three-quarters of a mile. About sundown I closed my line on its extreme left to repel a threatened attack of the enemy. He, however, made no advance, contenting himself with a spirited shelling, mostly under the protection of works. My command sustained no loss. At night the army dropped back to a new line one mile. I brought up the rear and gained my new position at 2 a.m., which was right across the Franklin pike, the road being my center, my left behind a stone wall. I commenced work immediately, and continued until the opening of the enemy's batteries at 7 a.m. obliged me to desist. He soon advanced in force all along my front. At 10 o'clock [he] made a desperate charge, but was driven back, with loss. He then commenced a most furious shelling from three six-gun batteries, concentrating his fire mainly upon my right. One battery of unusually heavy guns was brought down the pike to within 600 yards of my line. The conformation of the ground prevented me sharpshooting it sufficiently to drive it away. At 12 m. the enemy made a most determined charge on my right. Placing a negro brigade in front they gallantly dashed up to the abatis, forty feet in front, and were killed by hundreds. Pressed on by their white brethren in the rear they continued to come up in masses to the abatis, but they came only to die. I have seen most of the battle-fields of the West, but never saw dead men thicker than in front of my two right regiments; the great masses and disorder of the enemy enabling the left to rake them in flank, while the right, with a coolness unexampled, scarcely threw away a shot at their front. The enemy at last broke and fled in wild disorder. With great difficulty I prevented my line from pursuing; with a supporting line I should certainly have done so; but covering the pike, which would be our only line of retreat in case of disaster, I did not feel justified in hazarding the position for what might only have been a temporary success. A color-bearer of the negro brigade brought his standard to within a few feet of my line. He was shot down, and Lieutenant Knox, of the Thirty-sixth Alabama Regiment, sprang over the shattered works and brought it in. Another flag was carried off by an officer after five different bearers had fallen in the vain effort to plant it in my works. At 2 p.m. the enemy attempted a second charge, less determined than the first. Their brave officers could neither lead nor drive their men to such certain death; I noticed as many as three mounted who fell far in advance of their commands urging them forward. The shelling of the enemy's batteries between 12 and 3 p.m. was the most furious I ever witnessed, while the range was so precise that scarce a shell failed to explode in the line. The enemy seemed now to be satisfied that he could not carry my position, and contented himself by shelling and sharpshooting everything in sight. About 4 p.m. I saw the left suddenly give way three or four brigades distant from me. Almost instantaneously the line crumbled away till it reached me. I had no time to give any order or make any disposition to check the disaster, when my command showed symptoms of taking care of themselves. I could only order them back, hoping to reform in a new position. I had to retire under a destructive fire of eighteen guns, 600 yards distant, sweeping almost an open plain. I could not maintain order. The parallel stone walls on the pike separated my command in the center. I had neither staff officer nor courier mounted with me, and used my best endeavors to get my command all on the same side of the pike. I succeeded in doing this about one mile from the field, getting the greater body of the brigade together. I was directed by the major-general commanding to take position as rear guard of the army across the pike. Shortly after dark I moved slowly back, driving up and hurrying stragglers forward. At 11 p.m. I halted four miles from Hollow Tree Gap, remaining until 3 a.m. [17th], when I moved inside of the gap and halted in rear of Pettus' brigade. At daylight our cavalry stampeded, ran through the gap, and formed a mile in the rear. I sent, by direction of the major-general, a regiment up the hollow to the left of the gap. The enemy passing to the right induced the withdrawal of the brigades from the gap. I was unable to communicate with a portion of the regiment sent out, the enemy dashing in in force between us. I moved in rear of the brigade in line of battle to within one mile of Franklin, where I passed the brigade of General Gibson, drawn up to support a section of artillery. I hurried across the river and formed on the southern bank, in Franklin. By the time I had formed, the enemy's cavalry pursued Buford's cavalry division, driving it in confusion into the river. They were repulsed by Pettus' brigade, in the works north of the river, and the section of Bledsoe's battery, in my line on the south, not getting in musket-range of my command. The portion of the regiment I had detached in the morning and could not communicate with passed around the hills to the left of the pike, running five miles to get there. They came into the pike just at the position taken by General Gibson, exhausted with running around the enemy's cavalry. Without notice to myself or authority from the major-general, Brigadier-General Gibson ordered this detachment of about seventy-five men to remain and cover the battery. Then withdrawing with the battery he withdrew his brigade, while my small detachment, in obedience to his orders, held the position, covered the retreat of himself and the section. As a matter of course they were overwhelmed by the enemy's cavalry, 2,000 or 3,000 of whom had surrounded them, three officers and five men only escaping. I went into line next just outside of the trenches of Franklin. The enemy's cavalry dashed up to within 300 yards of my line, firing carbines and pistols. Three or four volleys drove them back. I then marched back in line, halting every few hundred yards until I passed through the gap south of Franklin. Moving on with the division I was ordered into line about six miles from Franklin just before dark. Just after I had formed another of the many cavalry stampedes from Chalmers' division occurred. In trying to get them out of my line and formed on the left I received a severe contusion on the ankle, so painful as to prevent my doing anything for several hours. I retired to seek medical aid, a fight with the enemy's cavalry occurring shortly after. My brigade acted under orders of the major-general. I need not, therefore, speak of its operations in that affair.
I joined my command at Columbia the next day. The corps of General Cheatham bringing up the rear, I with it marched to the Tennessee River, which we reached on the 25th of December, and fortified and crossed on the morning of the 27th.
I will say nothing of the hardships and exposures borne by my command; they but bore their part of the general burden; yet that part they bore with cheerfulness and spirit, and repulsed the enemy, with loss, whenever they encountered him on the soil of Tennessee.
My officers and men conducted themselves to my entire satisfaction throughout all the fights and marches.
To my division and corps commanders I return my sincere thanks. In every emergency of the campaign I have found them at hand ready to advise and assist me.
I offer no excuse for not bringing off Stanford's battery on the right of my line. It was so badly crippled as to be immovable, scarce a whole wheel remaining in its carriages, sustaining, without works, a fire from eighteen of the enemy's guns for seven hours.
Many daring achievements were performed by both officers and men of my command during our stay, which I will hereafter notice in application for them to the department and to army headquarters.
To the efficient commissary of my brigade, Maj. J. W. Williams, I am indebted for the faithful and prompt discharge of his duties. My quartermaster, W. B. Hoyt, by his vigilance and activity, succeeded in bringing every mule and wagon of my command south of the Tennessee River. He also accumulated and brought out in his train a wagonload of leather and a fine supply of shoemakers' tools.
My loss while north of the Tennessee River was as follows: 1 officer and 8 men killed, 1 officer and 27 men wounded, and 13 officers and 149 men missing; total, officers, 15; men, 184; grand total, 199. A good many of the missing, I am satisfied, were killed and wounded in coming out of the trenches, while some made their way across the Tennessee River at different points and have not yet found their commands.
Assistant Adjutant-General.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 704-7
