DIVISION HEADQUARTERS,
Camp Fogg, Tenn., February 13, 1862.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the
engagement of January 19, near, Pulaski County, Kentucky:
On January 17 I was occupying Mill Springs, on the south
side of the Cumberland River, with the Seventeenth, Twenty-eighth, and
Thirty-seventh Tennessee Regiments, the First Battalion Tennessee Cavalry, two
companies of the Third Battalion Tennessee Cavalry, and four pieces of
artillery. I was also at the same time occupying Beech Grove, on the north bank
of the river, and directly opposite Mill Springs, with the Fifteenth
Mississippi, Sixteenth Alabama, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-fifth, and
Twenty-ninth Tennessee Regiments, two battalions of Tennessee cavalry, two
independent cavalry companies, and twelve pieces of artillery.
For some time the enemy in front of Beech Grove had occupied
Somerset, 18 miles distant, with eight regiments of infantry and with
artillery; and Columbia, 35 miles distant, with five regiments of infantry. On
January 17 I was informed that the force from Columbia, with a large addition,
making a total of from 6,000 to 10,000 men, with guns of a large caliber, under
General Thomas, commanding the First Division of the Federal Army in Kentucky,
was moving across my front, on the road from Columbia towards Somerset, with
the intention of forming a junction with the Somerset force and attacking Beech
Grove.
On the 18th, at daylight, I moved the Seventeenth and
Twenty-eighth Tennessee Regiments across the river from Mill Springs to Beech
Grove. On the 18th I was informed that the force under General Thomas was
encamped at Webb's [Logan's] Cross-Roads, a point 10 miles from Beech Grove and
8 miles from Somerset, at which the roads from Columbia to Somerset and Beech
Grove to Somerset unite, and that it would there await both a re-enforcement
(that I was advised was advancing from the rear) and the passage of Fishing
Creek by the Somerset force. It was necessary that the Somerset force should
cross Fishing Creek before it could join the force under General Thomas or
approach Beech Grove, and for these purposes it had advanced from Somerset. I
was advised that late and continuous rains would prevent the passage of Fishing
Creek on the 18th and 19th by any infantry force.
In the then condition of my command I could array for battle
about 4,000 effective men. Absolute want of the necessary provisions to feed my
command was pressing. The country around was barren or exhausted. Communication
with Nashville by water was cut off by a force of the enemy occupying the river
below. The line of communication in the rear was too long to admit of winter
transportation and extended through a barren or exhausted country.
To defend Beech Grove required me to draw into it the force
from Mill Springs. From the course of the river and the condition of things it
was easy for a detachment from the force of the enemy occupying it below to
cross over, intercept the line of land communication, and, taking Mill Springs,
entirely prevent my recrossing the Cumberland. This river (greatly swollen),
with high, muddy banks, was a troublesome barrier in the rear of Beech Grove.
Transportation over it was, at best, very difficult. A small stern-wheel
steamboat, unsuited for the transportation of horses, with two flat-boats, were
the only means of crossing.
Beech Grove was protected in front by earthworks; but these
incomplete and insufficient, and necessarily of such extent that I had not
force to defend them. The range of our artillery was bad, and there were
commanding positions for the batteries of the enemy. Every effort had been made
to provision the command, to increase the means of crossing the river, and to
perfect the works for defense, under the charge of a skillful engineer officer,
Captain Sheliha.
When I first heard that the enemy was approaching in front
it was my opinion that I could not retire with my command—artillery, transportation,
camp and garrison equipage, baggage, and cavalry horses—from Beech Grove to
Mill Springs without information of such a movement reaching the enemy, and a
consequent attack during the movement and heavy loss. I was out of reach of
support or re-enforcement. Under these circumstances I determined not to
retreat without a battle. I decided that it was best to attack the enemy, if
possible before the coming re-enforcements from his rear should arrive and
before the Somerset force could cross Fishing Creek. I could reasonably expect
much from a bold attack and from the spirit of my command.
On the evening of the 18th I called in council
Brigadier-Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll and the commanding officers of
regiments and of cavalry and artillery; and there it was determined, without
dissent, to march out and attack the enemy under General Thomas on the next
morning. Accordingly Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll were ordered to move
their brigades at midnight in the following order:
1st. The brigade of General Zollicoffer, in the following
order: In front, the independent cavalry companies of Captains Saunders and
Bledsoe; then the Fifteenth Mississippi Regiment, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall; then the Nineteenth Tennessee, commanded by Col. D.
H. Cummings; then the Twentieth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Battle; then
the Twenty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Col. S.S. Stanton; then four guns of
Rutledge's battery, commanded by Captain Rutledge.
2d. The brigade of General Carroll in this order: In front,
the Seventeenth Tennessee, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller; then the
Twenty-eighth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Murray; then the Twenty-ninth
Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Powell; then two guns of —— battery, commanded
by Captain McClung.
In rear were the Sixteenth Alabama, as a reserve, commanded
by Col. W. B. Wood, and the cavalry battalions of Lieutenant-Colonel Branner
and Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan.
Soon after daylight on the morning of January 19 the cavalry
advance came in contact with the pickets of the enemy, after a march of near 9
miles, over a deep and muddy road. With a few shots the enemy's pickets were
driven in, retiring about a quarter of a mile to a house on the left of the
road. From this house and woods in the rear of it quite a brisk firing was
opened upon the head of the column. Skirmishers having been thrown forward,
General Zollicoffer's brigade was formed in line of battle and ordered to
advance upon the enemy, whom I supposed would come out from their camp, which
we were now approaching, to take position. The road here extended straight in
front for near a mile towards the north.
A company of skirmishers from the Mississippi regiment,
advancing on the left of the road, after sharp firing, drove a body of the enemy
from the house and the woods next to it, and then, under orders, crossing the
road, fell in with their regiment. Following this company of skirmishers on the
left of the road to the point where it crossed to the right, the regiment of
Colonel Cummings (Nineteenth Tennessee) kept straight on, and, crossing a field
about 250 yards wide at a double-quick, charged into the woods where the enemy
was sheltered, driving back the Tenth Indiana Regiment until it was re-enforced.
At this time General Zollicoffer rode up to the Nineteenth
Tennessee and ordered Colonel Cummings to cease firing, under the impression
that the fire was upon another regiment of his own brigade. Then the general
advanced, as if to give an order to the lines of the enemy, within bayonet
reach, and was killed just as he discovered his fatal mistake. Thereupon a
conflict ensued, when the Nineteenth Tennessee broke its line and gave back.
Rather in the rear and near to this regiment was the Twenty-fifth Tennessee,
commanded by Colonel Stanton, which engaged the enemy, when the colonel was
wounded at the head of his men; but this regiment, impressed with the same idea
which had proved fatal to General Zollicoffer—that it was engaged with friends—soon
broke its line and fell into some disorder.
At this time—the fall of General Zollicoffer having been
announced to me—I went forward in the road to the regiments of Colonels
Cummings and Stanton, and announced to Colonel Cummings the death of General
Zollicoffer, and that the command of the brigade devolved upon him.
There was a cessation of firing for a few moments, and I
ascertained that the regiment of Colonel Battle was on the right and the
Mississippi regiment in the center, neither as yet having been actively
engaged, and the enemy in front of the entire line. I had ordered General
Carroll to bring up his brigade, and it was now, in supporting distance,
displayed in line of battle.
I now repeated my orders for a general advance, and soon the
battle raged from right to left. When I sent my aide to order the Fifteenth
Mississippi to charge, I sent by him an order to General Carroll to advance a
regiment to sustain it. He ordered up for that purpose Colonel Murray's
(Twenty-eighth Tennessee) regiment, which engaged the enemy on the left of the
Mississippi regiment and on the right of Stanton's (Tennessee) regiment. I
ordered Captain Rutledge, with two of his guns, forward in the road to an
advanced and hazardous position, ordering Colonel Stanton to support him, where
I hoped he might bring them to play effectively upon the enemy; but the
position did not permit this, and he soon retired, under my order. At this
point the horse of Captain Rutledge was killed under him.
Very soon the enemy began to gain ground on our left and to
use their superior force for flanking in that quarter. I was in person at the
right of the line of Stanton's regiment, the battle raging, and did not observe
this so soon as it was observed by General Carroll, who moved the regiment of
Colonel Cummings, then commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, to the left, to
meet this movement of the enemy, and formed the Seventeenth Tennessee,
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, to support the regiments on the left.
The regiments of Murray, Stanton, and Cummings were driven back by the enemy,
and, while reforming in the rear of the Seventeenth Tennessee, that
well-disciplined regiment met and held in check for some time the entire right
wing of the Northern army. These regiments on my left and on the left of the
road retired across the field a distance of about 250 yards, and there for a
time repulsed the advancing enemy. Especially the regiment of Colonel Stanton,
partially rallied by its gallant field officers, formed behind a fence, and,
pouring volleys into the ranks of the enemy coming across the field, repulsed
and drove them back for a time with heavy loss.
For an hour now the Fifteenth Mississippi, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall, and the Twentieth Tennessee, under Col. Joel A.
Battle, of my center and right, had been struggling with the superior force of
the enemy.
I cannot omit to mention the heroic valor of these two
regiments, officers and men. When the
left retired they were flanked and compelled to leave their position. In their
rear, on the right of the road, was the regiment of Colonel Powell
(Twenty-ninth Tennessee), which had been formed in the rear and ordered forward
by me some time before. General Carroll ordered this regiment to face the
flanking force of the enemy, which was crossing the road from the left side,
which it did, checking it with a raking fire at 30 paces. In this conflict
Colonel Powell, commanding, was badly wounded.
The Sixteenth Alabama, which was the reserve corps of my
division, commanded by Colonel Wood, did at this critical juncture most eminent
service. Having rushed behind the right and center, it came to a close
engagement with the pursuing enemy, to protect the flanks and rear of the
Fifteenth Mississippi and Twentieth Tennessee, when they were the last, after
long fighting, to leave the front line of the battle, and, well led by its
commanding officer. In conjunction with portions of other regiments, it
effectually prevented pursuit and protected my return to camp.
Owing to the formation and character of the field of battle
I was unable to use my artillery and cavalry to advantage in the action. During
much of the time the engagement lasted rain was falling. Many of the men were
armed with flint-lock muskets and they became soon unserviceable.
On the field and during the retreat to camp some of the
regiments became confused and broken and great disorder prevailed. This was
owing, in some measure, to a want of proper drill and discipline, of which the
army had been much deprived by reason of the nature of its constant service and
of the country in which it had encamped.
During the engagement, or just prior to it, the force under
General Thomas was increased by the arrival, on a forced march, of a brigade
from his rear, which I had hoped would not arrive until the engagement was
over. This made the three of the enemy about 12,000 men. My effective force was
four thousand. The engagement lasted three hours. My loss was 125 killed, 309
wounded, and 99 missing, as follows:
|
|
Killed.
|
Wounded.
|
Missing.
|
|
15th Mississippi Regiment
|
44
|
153
|
29
|
|
20th Tennessee (Battle)
|
33
|
59
|
18
|
|
19th Tennessee (Cummings).
|
10
|
22
|
2
|
|
25th Tennessee (Stanton)
|
10
|
28
|
17
|
|
17th Tennessee (Newman)
|
11
|
25
|
2
|
|
28th Tennessee (Murray)
|
3
|
4
|
5
|
|
29th Tennessee (Powell)
|
5
|
12
|
10
|
|
16th Alabama
|
9
|
5
|
12
|
|
Captain Saunders' cavalry.
|
....
|
1
|
....
|
The loss of the enemy, from the best information I have and
statements made by themselves, may be estimated at 700 killed and wounded. It
was larger than mine from the fact that my regiments on the left, after first
being driven back, fired from the cover of woods and fences upon the large
numbers advancing upon them through the open field, inflicting heavy loss and
sustaining but little.
My command retired to Beech Grove without any annoyance in
the rear by infantry or cavalry. On the return, one piece of artillery, of
Captain Rutledge's battery, mired down and was left.
To myself, to the army, and to the country the fall of
General Zollicoffer was a severe loss. I found him wise in council, heroic in
action. He fell in the front, close to the enemy, and they bore off his body.
Of his staff, Lieutenants Fogg and
Shields were mortally wounded and have since died. They displayed conspicuous
courage. Lieutenant Bailie Peyton, jr., commanding Company A (of Battle's
regiment), was killed in the heat of the action. Adjt. Joel A. Battle, jr., was
badly wounded while in front with the colors of his regiment, which he seized
when the bearer was shot down. Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, a distinguished
officer of this same regiment, was taken prisoner. Colonel Battle commanded
with marked ability and courage. Colonel Statham, of the Fifteenth Mississippi
Regiment, was absent at the time of the battle on furlough. His regiment was
most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall. The reputation of the
Mississippians for heroism was fully sustained by this regiment. Its loss in
killed and wounded, which was far greater than that of any other regiment,
tells sufficiently the story of discipline and courage. The already extended
limits of this report will not permit me, even if I had them at hand, to
enumerate the individual acts of courage with which this regiment abounded.
Suffice it to say that it is entitled to all praise.
General Carroll, in his dispositions and conduct during the
engagement, manifested both military skill and personal valor. My assistant
adjutant-general, A. S. Cunningham, and my aides, Lieuts. W. W. Porter and H.
I. Thornton, displayed throughout the action intelligence, activity, and
courage, and were of great service to me. Happening with me at the time, Maj. James F. Brewer
volunteered as my aide and was very active and gallant during the battle.
Surgeons Morton, Cliff, and Dulany, unwilling to leave the wounded, remained at
the hospital and were taken prisoners by the enemy.
I resumed position at Beech Grove early in the afternoon.
The enemy followed and took positions in force on my left, center, and right.
On my left they proceeded to establish a battery, which was not ready before
nightfall. They opened with two batteries—one in front of my center and one on
my right. Captain McClung and Lieutenant Falconet, commanding a section of the
battery of Captain Rutledge, replied to the battery of the enemy in front. From
the right the enemy fired upon the steamboat, which, at the crossing, was
commanded by their position. Their first shots fell short; afterwards, mounting
a larger gun, as it grew dark, they fired a shot or two over the boat, and
awaited the morning to destroy it. The steamboat destroyed, the crossing of the
river would have been impossible.
I considered the determination in the council of war on the
previous evening to go out and attack the enemy virtually a determination that
Beech Grove was untenable against his concentrating force. That it was so
untenable was my decided opinion. With the morale of the army impaired
by the action of the morning and the loss of what cooked rations had been
carried to the field, I deemed an immediate crossing of the Cumberland River
necessary. With a view to retiring from Beech Grove, I had already some days
before ordered the transfer of trains and unused horses and mules to Mill
Springs.
On the evening of the 19th I called in consultation General
Carroll, Colonel Cummings, engineers, artillery, and other officers, and it was
considered best by all to retire from Beech Grove.
I directed at once that the crossing should be effected
during the night, with every effort and artifice to insure perfect concealment
from the enemy and the success of the movement. Great difficulty attended the
movement from the high and muddy banks and the width and heavy current of the
river, the limited means of transportation (the small steamboat and two small
flats) and the immediate presence of the enemy in overwhelming force. I ordered
the men to be crossed over—first, by commands, in designated order; then the
artillery to be crossed over; then what could be crossed of baggage and mules,
horses, wagons, &c. I directed the cavalry to swim their horses over. Time
only permitted to cross the infantry under arms, the sick and wounded, one
company of cavalry mounted, the rest of the cavalry dismounted, the
artillery-men, and some horses. Many cavalry horses, artillery horses, mules,
wagons, and eleven pieces of artillery, with baggage and camp and garrison
equipage were left behind.
Much is due to the energy, skill, and courage of Captain
Spiller, of the cavalry, who commanded the boat, and continued crossing over
with it until fired upon by the enemy in the morning, when he burned it, by my
directions.
On the morning of the 20th I had my command—nine regiments
of infantry, parts of four battalions and two companies of cavalry
(dismounted), my sick and wounded, parts of two artillery companies, (without
guns or horses), and six pieces of artillery (manned)—on the south side of the
Cumberland River, at Mill Springs. On the other side, at Beech Grove (without
any means of crossing), were twenty-seven regiments of infantry, with cavalry
and artillery, of the enemy.
Any further collision was now prevented, but the want of
commissary stores compelled me at once to move to Gainesborough, lower down on
the river, a distance of 80 miles, and the nearest point where I could have
communication by water with Nashville and could obtain supplies.
My march was through a poor country, over very bad roads. It
was hard to obtain the necessaries of life along the route, and from scant
subsistence and difficult marching my command suffered greatly. Maj. Giles M.
Hillyer, of my staff, division commissary, with untiring energy and marked
ability, exhausted every effort in the management of his department, and
supplied whatever could be obtained, in some instances sacrificing the forms
prescribed for purchase and distribution to the exigencies of the occasion and the
necessities of the command.
From the fatigues of the march and the want of proper food
many were taken sick. I am much gratified to commend especially the care for
the wounded and sick, under most embarrassing circumstances, on the field and
on the march, under the efficient charge of the accomplished medical director
of my division, Dr. F. A. Ramsey.
From Mill Springs and on the first stages of my march many
officers and men, frightened by false rumor of the movements of the enemy,
shamelessly deserted, and, stealing horses and mules to ride, fled to
Knoxville, Nashville, and other places in Tennessee. To prevent this I used
every endeavor, and was laboriously assisted by my staff and other officers of
the command.
I am proud to say that the field officers of all the
commands, and some commands almost entire, and the main body of each command,
remained ready to do their duty in any emergency, except one battalion of
cavalry—which had not been in the battle, of which the lieutenant-colonel,
together with some other officers and some privates, were absent on furlough—of
the body of which being present only one captain, several officers and men—in
all about 25—did not run away.
From Gainesborough I have moved my division to this point,
where it is refurnished and drilling, and I have the honor to report that it is
ready for any service to which it may be assigned.
G. B. CRITTENDEN,
Major-General Provisional Army Confederate States.
Lieut. Col. W. W. MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,
Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 105-110
