The First Battalion moved (eight miles) from Flat Lick to Camp Buckner. The latter camp appeared somewhat lonely now, as the infantry had left, as previously mentioned. Two companies of Brazelton's Battalion were still back in the neighborhood of Barboursville.
Our battalion moved (twelve miles) from Camp Buckner to within four miles of the Gap, where we remained until Thursday, November 7th.
McNairy's Battalion marched out of Kentucky, through Cumberland Gap, thence along a fertile valley in the direction of Jacksborough, Tennssee, and bivouacked eighteen miles from the Gap.
General Zollicoffer set out for Jacksborough yesterday from the Gap. Four regiments of infantry (Battle's, Cumming's, Newman's and Statham's), four cavalry companies (Branner) and a battery of artillery (six 6-pounders and two Parrott guns) were now in the neighborhood of Jacksborough. The Twenty-ninth Tennessee (Colonel Powell) and a battalion of the Sixteenth Alabama (Lieutenant-Colonel Harris)1 were on their way to the same place, leaving Colonels Rains' and Churchwell's Regiments well intrenched, and seven guns in good positions at the Gap, with two companies of Brazelton's Battalion to scout in front of that position.
A military engineer, Captain Victor Sheliha, had been sent to Zollicoffer, and was now reconnoitering the mountain passes in the vicinity of Jacksborough.
Before leaving Cumberland Gap yesterday Zollicoffer received the following dispatch from Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan, stationed near Jamestown:
I have information that is entirely reliable that the enemy is approaching this point 6,000 strong-1,500 cavalry and the balance artillery and infantry. The infantry and artillery camped last night, the 3d, five miles east of Monticeliu, a portion of the cavalry in town, their pickeis seven miles below.
Colonel Murray is at Camp Zollicoffer, in Overton County. I dispatched him yesterday, urging him to move to this place. Colonel Stanton, I understand, is at Celina.2
This was the information that Zollicoffer had been expecting
to receive, and, in anticipation of which, he had previously (October 31st)
ordered Colonels, Stanton, Murray and McClellan to concentrate their commands,
and throw up intrenchments at some suitable point, near Jamestown,3
and was now moving as rapidly as possible with the force above named, including
McNairy's Battalion, by the way of Jacksborough, Clinton and Montgomery, to
their support.
1 Colonel Wood had the other battalion of this regiment with him at Knoxville. He was in command of that post.
2 Rebellion Records, Vol. IV., p. 514.
3 Ibid, p. 493.
General Zollicoffer
sent the
following telegram this morning to General Johnston, Bowling Green
Kentucky:
One Ohio Regiment said to be twelve miles distant. Another regiment of the enemy a few miles beyond. I will feel of them today with two regiments and some cavalry. My force here is about 5,400.1
Johnston
replied, the same day, thus:
Your telegram from
London received. The information we have of the enemy in your front is this:
10,000 at Camp Dick Robinson, of these 4,000 are in advance toward Cumberland
Gap, but how far is not known; it is commanded by Garrard; and 10,000 dotted
from Robinson to Cincinnati.
General Polk ordered
two howitzers, one Parrott and three iron guns to be shipped for you to
Knoxville, October 15. A company to man this battery will be sent in a few
days.2
On advancing with
the infantry, about daybreak, Zollicoffer soon learned that the enemy had so
blockaded the road, by cutting trees across it, that it was very difficult for
infantry to approach the enemy's position, much less cavalry and artillery;
and, moreover, the enemy's entrenched camp on Rockcastle Hills was a natural
fortification, almost inaccessible, from our side of approach.
Winding their way,
as best they could, between two hills, over the fallen timber, and up, up, up
the rugged cliffs. Finally, about 9 A. M., the Eleventh (Rains) and Seventeenth
(Newman) Tennessee Regiments attacked the Federals in their entrenchments on
Rockcastle Hills. The following is taken from Colonel
Newman's official report:
NEAR ROCKCASTLE
HEIGHTS, October 21, 1861.
As ordered, I formed
my regiment from hill-top to hill-top at open intervals to move in rear of
Colonel Rains' Regiment and support him. Lieutenant-Colonel Miller was ordered
to take command of the left wing, composed of Companies A, D, F and I . . . . and
for the movements of said companies on the field I refer you to the report of
Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, which is hereto appended and made a part of my
report.3 The six companies, viz.: B, C, E, G, H and K, . . . . constituting
the right wing, were under my immediate command, and moved forward in line of
battle in the direction of the heights in front of our position.
Upon reaching a
point within eighty yards of the heights, we discovered a number of men
ascending the heights and entering the fortifications, but supposing these men
to be a portion of Colonel Rains' command, I did not order them to be fired
upon.
At this point we
received a heavy volley of rifles and musketry. The command moved on, however,
without returning the fire until within forty paces of the enemy's works before
we discovered they were not Colonel Rains' men, at which time the men were
ordered to cover as well as they could and to return the enemy's fire. In this
position we maintained a heavy fire for twenty-five minutes, when I ordered
Captain Armstrong and Lieutenant Harrison to move their companies around to my
extreme right to prevent a flank movement of the enemy, which I saw they were
about to make. These officers executed the order with promptness and alacrity,
under fire.
The fire was kept up
by all the companies for an hour and ten minutes, and, seeing that it was
impossible to fall back without great loss, I ordered the works to be charged.
Four companies gallantly charged the works, as ordered. Officers and men
seemingly vied with each other as to who should be first to reach the works of
the enemy.
After the
fortification was reached, and many of my men had got within the works, driving
the enemy from the first parallel, not receiving any support, and being nearly
destitute of cartridges, I ordered my command to fall back, which it did in
good order. While this was being executed the other two companies maintained
their position as ordered. . . . . . . . . . . .
Killed, 11; wounded,
34.
After he had fallen
back to Flat Lick, between Barboursville and Camp Buckner, Zollicoffer sent the
following
report to A. S. Johnston:
CAMP FLAT LICK, KNOX
COUNTY, October 24, 1861.
On the 21st I
reached the enemy's entrenched camp, on Rockcastle Hills, a natural
fortification, almost inaccessible. Having reconnoitered in force under heavy
fire for several hours from heights on the right, left and in front, I became
satisfied that it could not be carried otherwise than by immense exposure, if
at all. received large reinforcements.
Our loss was
forty-two wounded and eleven killed and missing. We captured twenty-one
prisoners, about 100 guns and four horses. The loss of the enemy in killed and
wounded unknown.
The country is so
poor that we had exhausted the forage on the road for fifteen miles back in
twenty-four hours. Our subsistence nearly exhausted. Under these circumstances
I deemed it proper the next day to fall back. Enemy's camp said to be 7,000
strong, with large reserves near at hand.
I have not been able
to find Colonel Rains' official report, therefore can give no further account
of the part taken by his regiment in the above action, though it would seem
that the most of the fighting was done by Newman's Regiment, from the fact that
Zollicoffer reports the same number, eleven, “killed and missing" from the
brigade that Newman reports “killed" from his regiment; the former,
however, reports eight more wounded, which may have been the loss of Rains'
Regiment.6
Remaining in front
of the Federal position, Zollicoffer made another slight attack about two
o'clock, P. M., but still he could not induce the enemy to come from his
intrenchments and give battle on equal footing.
The Thirty-third
Indiana Infantry, under Colonel John Coburn, and the First Kentucky Cavalry,
under Colonel Frank Wolford, did the most of the fighting on the part of the
enemy.
I take the following
from Colonel
John Coburn's official report, addressed to “General A. Schoepf, Commanding
Brigade:
They (Rebels) soon
came near us7 under cover of a wood, which entirely concealed their
approach until we were apprised of their presence by the firing of musketry. At
this time we were reinforced by a portion of the First Kentucky Cavalry,
dismounted, under Colonel Wolford, about two hundred and fifty strong, who
immediately formed and took part in the engagement. The firing at this time was
very severe, which caused the cavalry to waver and retreat. They were soon,
however, rallied and formed again in order, and fought with good spirit.
The enemy engaged
was composed of a portion of General Zollicoffer's command, and consisted of
two regiments of Tennesseans, under the command of Colonels Newman and Cummings
(Rains). They charged up the hill upon us, and were met by a galling and deadly
fire, which wounded and killed many of them. The front of their column approached
within a few rods of us with their bayonets fixed, declaring themselves “Union
men,” and “all right,” at the next moment leveling their guns at us and firing.
After being engaged
nearly an hour, the enemy retreated, bearing off a portion of their dead and
wounded and their arms. Our men have buried their dead left on the field and
taken the wounded8 to our hospitals. Thirty corpses have been found
up to this time (October 22d). A large number of their wounded and dead were carried
off in their wagons. It is safe to estimate the loss of the enemy at least one
hundred killed. . . . . . . . . .
About the close of
the engagement four companies of the Seventeenth Ohio, Colonel Connell, came
upon the hill and formed in line of battle. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . About two
o'clock, P. M., we were again attacked. At this time the Fourteenth Ohio,
Colonel Steedman, appeared upon the field. . . . . . . . . . . .
At ten o'clock at
night Lieutenant Sypher, of Captain Standart's Ohio Battery, came on the hill,
on an alarm fired three rounds. They were the last shots fired.
At about two o'clock
in the morning we heard sounds which betokened a movement of General
Zollicoffer's army. It proved to be a retreat. . . . . . . . . . . .
The number of our
loss is a follows: Company D, one killed and five wounded; Company I, one
killed and ten wounded, three mortally. Colonel Wolford lost one killed and
eleven wounded.9
Colonel T. T.
Garrard, Third Kentucky, who was in command at Wildcat before General Schoepf
arrived, wrote to General Thomas, under October 25th, thus:
Your aid arrived in
time to save us from a certain defeat (what others may say to the contrary
notwithstanding). It is not necessary for me to say one word about the fight,
for you have no doubt been fully posted. Though don't be deceived as to the
number killed by us; my impression is that we did not kill to exceed sixteen,
and wounded some thirty or forty.
Many say we lost a
great victory by not pursuing the enemy. It is true, if we had have known as
much then as now, we might have done.wonders. But we expected an attack the
next morning, and every one was sleeping on their arms, and we never knew the
enemy had left camps until near eight o'clock. We have a great many here who
know precisely how to manage affairs when the enemy is out of hearing, but
would be as much at a loss to do so in a fight as I would be.
I am glad to have an
opportunity of proving by a Federal Colonel, who was
present at Wildcat, that Colonel Coburn did greatly overestimate our
loss at that place.
Supposing that all
of the missing were killed, Colonel Newman reported eleven killed, but as three
of them were only wounded, our loss was really eight killed and forty-five
wounded, one mortally.
Colonel Garrard does
not say any thing about the Federal loss in his report. General Schoepf reports
four killed and eighteen wounded, while Colonel Coburn reports twenty-six
wounded from his and Walford's regiments.
1 Rebellion
Records, Vol. IV., p. 209.
2 Rebellion
Records, Vol. IV., p. 212.
3 Not found.
4 Rebellion
Records, Vol. IV., p. 213.
5 Rebellion
Records, Vol. IV., p. 210.
6 Since writing the above I have learned (from
Military Annals of Tennessee, p. 293) that Rains lost “one killed and six or
eight wounded."
7 On an eminence east of the Federal encampment.
8 Three, one mortally, so General Schoepf
reports. See Rebellion
Records Vol. IV., p. 207.
9 Rebellion Records, Vol.
IV., p. 208.
10 Rebellion Records, Vol.
IV., p. 319.
Eleven men from First Battalion were sent back in the direction of Wildcat to make a report to General Zollicoffer and get orders. They had gone only about one mile when they met the advance of the brigade on the retreat.
Zollicoffer had decided that if the Federal position at Wildcat could have been taken at all by storm, it would have been at a cost of too great a sacrifice of his men, and as he had declined the idea of going back by the way of Mill Springs or Burkesville, as he had intimated to Colonel Murray on the 16th,* he was now on his way back to Camp Buckner.
Passing back through London, the brigade bivouacked six miles from that place, on the Barboursville road.
Twenty-five of Allison's company and about the same number
from Harris' First Battallion, went back to within two miles and a half of
London to picket that road for the night.
* On October 28th, at Camp Buckner, Zollicoffer wrote to Murray as follows: “Learning that the enemy had retired from Albany, and desiring to see that the guns were all in position at the gap, I determined to return this way.” Rebellion Records, Vol. IV, p. 483.
The infantry and
artillery moved on in the direction of Camp Buckner. A part of Brazelton's
Battalion was left on the London road a short distance north-west of
Barboursville.
Colonel McNairy
ordered Captain Allison to take his company and picket the road leading east
from Barboursville in the direction of Mount Pleasant. Going about one mile and
a half from town, Allison ordered his company to halt, except five men who were
ordered to take post about half a mile in advance of the picket base. About the
time the company had dismounted and tied up their horses, our pickets commenced
firing, only about four hundred yards from us. In less than three minutes we
were in the saddle again, and going in a dash to see what the trouble was.
We soon learned that
our pickets had seen only one man, who, on being ordered to halt, took to the
bushes. They fired about four shots at him, but he made good his escape. We
then returned to where we had first dismounted, but did not unsaddle that
night.
Captain Allison sent some of his men out to search the woods into which the bush-whacker was chased last evening to see what discovery they could make. They soon after returned with four muskets, about twenty thousand caps, and some powder, which they had found hid out in the woods.
Captain Horn's servant was shot, but only wounded, by a bush-whacker between Barboursville and Camp Buckner.
Calling in Allison's company off of picket, McNairy moved two miles from Barboursville on the road to Cumberland Ford.
As we were on the lookout for the enemy, we did not unsaddle our horses.
SOURCE: Richard
R. Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee
Confederate Cavalry, p. 66-7
Several detachments were sent out over the country after beef cattle. Some sixty beeves were brought in during the day.
The battalion moved some three miles nearer Camp Buckner.
SOURCE: Richard
R. Hancock, Hancock's Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee
Confederate Cavalry, p. 67
Lieutenant George Alexander, Dr. J. S. Harrison (afterward Lieutenant) and R. Davenport rejoined Allison's company. They had been home on a visit.
Our battalion moved about three miles and encamped at Flat Lick, within eight miles of Camp Buckner, at Cumberland Ford, where we remained for several days.
As Cumberland Gap was naturally a strong position, and as the three Log Mountains between Camp Buckner and the Gap would soon be almost impassable, General Zollicoffer therefore believed that the Federals would attempt to enter East Tennessee at some point west of the Gap, and for this reason he decided to abandon his position at Camp Buckner. I shall now let our General explain his contemplated movement as follows:
BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,
CAMP BUCKNER, CUMBERLAND FORD, October 29, 1861.
Lieutenant-Colonel Mackall, Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Kentucky:
Sir: My pickets at Laurel Ridge yesterday drove back a small cavalry picket of the enemy and took three prisoners, who represented that a portion of the enemy's force has advanced to London. Their force at and on this side of Rockcastle River (Wildcat) is reported at nine thousand.
There are three main roads by which, if an invasion of East Tennessee is contemplated, an enemy might approach. On this, by Cumberland Gap, we have heretofore concentrated nearly our whole force, and we now have seven guns in position at Cumberland Gap. The most westernly road is by Monticello, in Kentucky, and Jamestown, in Tennessee. The counties of Fentress, Scott, Morgan, and Anderson are poor, mountainous, and disaffected. Should a force select that route of invasion, I could meet them at the mountain passes near Clinton, and between Kingston and Morgan Court-house, and keep them on that broad, sterile region until it would be practicable for General Buckner to throw a force in their rear and cut them off.
In view of this danger they may select
the middle route, by Williamsburg, Ky., and Jacksborough, Tenn. The road over
the Log Mountains will soon become almost impassable between here and
Cumberland Gap. The Gap is a much stronger position than this. While I am
watching the road from here to Laurel River, the enemy might be advancing on
the Jacksborough or the Jamestown road without my knowledge. For these reasons
I send four cavalry companies to scout on the roads from the neighborhood of
Jacksborough into Kentucky, and I have ordered one infantry regiment to
Jacksborough, one six miles east to Big Creek Gap, two about half-way between
Jacksborough and Cumberland Gap, while four will remain at present at
Cumberland Gap. I leave six cavalry companies to observe this road. One cavalry
company is posted on the road from William[s]burg, Ky., to Huntsville, Tenn.,
and six cavalry companies, McClellan's Battalion, and I suppose Colonel
Murray's Regiment of infantry, are in the neighborhood of Jamestown.1
It is currently reported that an invading force from twenty thousand to thirty thousand is on the road from Cincinnati to East Tennessee, but I have no means of knowing any thing of the accuracy of the rumor.2
Except cavalry scouts, my force will be withdrawn from this post to-morrow. Acting upon my best judgment, I have supposed the disposition of my forces I have described the very best under the circumstances. Had I a military engineer in whose judgment I could rely, to reconnoiter the mountain roads, gaps and passes from Cumberland Gap to Jamestown I would feel much more capable of making a judicious disposition of troops.
I have had rumors that reinforcements of Confederate troops were to be thrown upon this part of the border, but as I have no official information I take it for granted the rumors are erroneous.
Very respectfully,
F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,
1 Colonels Murray and Stanton had, according to orders from A. S. Johrston, broken up a Federal camp at Burkesville, Ky., and on the same day that Zollicoffer wrote the above they were at Albany, Ky., on their way back to Overton County, Tenn. Captain Bledsoe's company was at Camp McGinnis between Jamestown, Tenn., and Albany, Ky.
2 It appears that General Geo. H. Thomas, who commanded the Second Division of Sherman's army, and was now in front of Zollicoffer, had, subject to his orders, twenty-nine regiments and three batteries of artillery, though some of the regiments were not fully organized and equipped at this time. See Rebellion Records, Vol. IV., pp. 334, 315.
3 Brigadier-General L. P. Walker had been (October 22d) ordered by General A. S. Johnston to move his brigade from Huntsville, Ala., via Knoxville, to the support of Zollicoffer, and General W. H. Carroll, at Memphis, had been (October 26th) ordered by Secretary of War to join Zollicoffer with three regiments, but neither one of them could obey the order, because their men were not armed. See Rebellion Records, Vol. IV., pp. 470, 476, 486.
L. V. Kennedy and Dr. Monroe Knight, having received an honorable discharge from the service on account of ill health, started home. We regretted very much to lose from our company (Allison's) two such good soldiers. They were always ready and willing to do duty when called upon, so far as able, and besides they were strictly gentlemen.
A part of the infantry moved from Camp Buckner to Cumberland Gap, yesterday, and Zollicoffer followed with the rest to-day.
SIR: My pickets
at Laurel Bridge yesterday drove back a small cavalry picket of the enemy and
took 3 prisoners, who represent that portion of the enemy's force has advanced
to London. Their force at and on this side of the Rockcastle River is reported
at 9,000. There are three main roads by which, if an invasion of East Tennessee
is contemplated, an enemy might approach. On this, by Cumberland Gap, we have
heretofore concentrated nearly our whole force, and we now have seven guns in
position at Cumberland Gap. The most westerly road is by Monticello, in
Kentucky, and Jamestown, in Tennessee. The counties of Fentress, Scott, Morgan,
and Anderson are poor, mountainous, and disaffected. Should a force select that
route of invasion I could meet them at the mountain passes near Clinton and
between Kingston and Morgan Court-House, and keep them on that broad, sterile
region until it would be practicable for General Buckner to throw a force in
their rear and cut them off.
In view of this
danger they may select the middle route, by Williamsburg and Jacksborough. The
road over the Log Mountains will soon become almost impassable between here and
the Cumberland Gap. The Gap is a much stronger position than this. While I am
watching the road from here to Laurel River, the enemy might be advancing on
the Jacksborough or the Jamestown road without my knowledge. For these reasons
I send four cavalry companies to scout on the roads from the neighborhood of
Jacksborough into Kentucky, and I have ordered one infantry regiment to
Jacksborough, one 6 miles east to Big Creek Gap, two about half way between
Jacksborough and Cumberland Gap, while four will remain at present at
Cumberland Gap. I leave six cavalry companies to observe this road. One cavalry
company is posted on the road from Williamsburg, Ky., to Huntsville, Tenn., and
six cavalry companies (I suppose) Colonel Murray's regiment of infantry are in
the neighborhood of Jamestown.
It is currently
reported that an invading force, from 20,000 to 30,000, is on the road, from
Cincinnati to East Tennessee, but I have no means of knowing anything of the
accuracy of the rumor. Except cavalry Scouts, my force will be withdrawn from
this post to-morrow. Acting upon my best judgment, I have supposed the
disposition of my roes I have described the very best under the circumstances.
Had I a military engineer, in whose judgment I could rely, to reconnoiter the
mountain roads, gaps, and passes from Cumberland Gap to Jamestown, I would feel
much more capable of making a judicious disposition of troops. I have had
rumors that re-enforcements of Confederate troops were to be thrown upon this
part of the border, but as I have no official information, I take it for
granted the rumors are erroneous.
SOURCE: The
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 4 (Serial No. 4), p. 486-7
SIR: I felt of
the enemy's intrenched camp at Rockcastle Hills, on the road from London to
Mount Vernon, on the 21st instant; found the position almost a natural
fortification. My information [was] that the enemy was nine regiments strong
there, and large reserves between there and Cincinnati. I fell back on the 22d,
and will retire to Cumberland Gap, where I have placed a number of guns in
position. The Log Mountains will soon be impassable, making this position
difficult to hold. If the enemy advances, the approach is likely to be by way
of Jacksborough or Jamestown. So soon, therefore, as I can complete the work,
strengthening the pass at the Cumberland Gap (now in a few days), I will
dispose my forces so as to be ready to meet the enemy on either of the other
routes.
I hope you and
Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan will co-operate to watch that border, and give me
early and frequent reliable intelligence.
Learning that the
enemy had retired from Albany, and desiring to see that the guns were all in
position at the gap, I determined to return this way.
CAMP NEAR ROCKCASTLE
RIVER, October 20, 1861.
SIR: I have advanced
4 miles north of London, under disability to an embarrassing extent for want of
subsistence and transportation. The country is very poor indeed. The enemy
occupy a strong position 8 miles ahead. We had a skirmish between pickets day
before yesterday, in which we killed 1 man and captured another. We lost
yesterday 1 man killed. We had a force yesterday 3 or 4 miles ahead, but, for
want of water, subsistence, forage, and transportation (our wagons having been
by an accident detained at and near London), had to return here to camp.
On the 21st I
reached the enemy's intrenched camp, on Rockcastle Hills, a natural
fortification, almost inaccessible. Having reconnoitered in force under heavy
fire for several hours from heights on the right, left, and in front, I became
satisfied that it could not be carried otherwise than by immense exposure, if
at all. The enemy received large re-enforcements.
Our loss was 42
wounded and 11 killed and missing. We captured 21 prisoners, about 100 guns,
and 4 horses. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded unknown.
The country is so
poor we had exhausted the forage on the road for 15 miles back in twenty-four
hours. Our subsistence nearly exhausted. Under these circumstances I deemed it
proper the next day to fall back. Enemy's camp said to be 7,000 strong, with
large reserves near at hand.
On the 21st I
reached the enemy's intrenched camp on Rockcastle Hills, a natural
fortification, almost inaccessible. Having reconnoitered it in three under
heavy fire for several hours from heights on the right, left, and in front, I
became satisfied that it could not be carried otherwise than by immense
exposure, if at all. The enemy received large re-enforcements.
Our loss was 42
wounded and 11 killed and missing. We captured 21 prisoners, about 100 guns,
and 4 horses. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded unknown.
The country is so
poor we had exhausted the forage along the road for 15 miles back in
twenty-four hours. Our subsistence nearly exhausted. Under these circumstances
I deemed it proper the next day to fall back. Enemy's camp said to be 7,000
strong, with large reserves near at hand.
SIR: I have
information that the enemy were nine regiments at Rock-castle Hills. They are
thought to have large re-enforcements close at hand. The country is very poor
generally between here and there, particularly beyond London. I learn that some
signs of trouble are again arising in East Tennessee, as the impression
increases that the enemy is soon to advance in force. The new levies I learn
come in slowly. Could General William R. Caswell, who recently resigned when
the Tennessee regiments were transferred, have a commission it would greatly
promote the public interest. He has been very efficient in advising me to
dispose matters properly in East Tennessee since I have been in Kentucky. He is
a true gentleman, of high courage, sound sense, exemplary habits, and of
popularity worth much in the present condition of affairs in East Tennessee.
The Log Mountains,
between here and Cumberland Gap, will soon, I learn, become almost impassable.
The road is now very bad. There is reason to suppose the enemy may advance by
way of Jamestown, 120 miles below here, instead of by this route. I have seven
cavalry companies watching that route; no infantry or artillery, two regiments
there having been ordered away by General Johnston. If I get news of their
approach in that direction I will proceed as rapidly as possible to meet them,
and have already collected some stock of commissary stores in that
neighborhood.
CAMP BUCKNER,
October 26, 1861.
I have fallen back to this position. I am reliably informed that there were nine regiments of the enemy at Rockcastle Hills on the 21st. Uncertain news that they were to camp at Laurel Bridge last night. Think there is danger they may advance by Jamestown, 120 miles from here. I have seven cavalry companies there; no infantry or artillery, Stanton and Murray being removed. Colonel Churchwell, at the gap, reports three 8-inch howitzers in position, but that the ordnance stores sent with them are totally insufficient, the shells not filled, &c. I fear we have no powder to fill them. Two Parrott guns have reached Knoxville and are ordered on. We much need an ordnance and competent engineer officer.
Being much
embarrassed for want of transportation in some of the regiments and battalions,
we made a march of only 10 miles to-day. Letters from Colonel Stanton and Major
Bridgman, dated 11th and 12th, received this evening. They both think the enemy
has retired from Albany towards Columbia or Camp Dick Robinson. My plan to get
behind them and cut them off may be defeated; but Stanton's regiment has now
left for Bowling Green, and Bridgman returned to Post Oak Springs. What has
become of the two companies of Colonel Brazel-ton's battalion or of Captain
Bledsoe's company neither explains. Perhaps the latter is with Colonel Murray's
regiment at Camp Myers, in Overton County. This retiring of our forces may
induce the Lincoln forces to return again. I wish the subsistence supply
mentioned heretofore taken to Jamestown by the 25th instant; and you will order
those cavalry companies to rendezvous in that neighborhood at the same time,
that the subsistence stores may not be exposed. I must ask you to transmit from
Knoxville the necessary orders to insure this and the inclosed letter to
Colonel Murray.
SIR: I am 10 miles
on the march toward a camp of the enemy on Rock-castle River, having left
Cumberland Ford this evening with the greater part of my command. I learned
that the enemy at Albany has retired. My plan has been to fall in their rear
and cut them off. Now that Colonel Stanton and our cavalry have left the
neighborhood of Jamestown, the enemy may return in force near the line. I have
ordered stores of subsistence for my troops to be placed at Jamestown by the
25th instant, and have ordered the same cavalry companies to return to that
neighborhood almost the same time, to prevent the enemy from seizing and
appropriating the stores. Perhaps the cavalry from above would not be
sufficient to prevent an incursion. I expect to pass down by Somerset and
Monticello or by Columbia and Burkesville, in the hope of capturing any forces
they may be threatening your position with. As secrecy is the element of
success, I must beg of you not to mention to any solitary person this
enterprise. My object in writing to you is to ask you, about the 25th, to move
in such a way as to insure, by the aid of the cavalry, the safety of the
stores, until I can reach the neighborhood. Inform General Caswell at Knoxville
what you can do, and he will communicate with me.
GENERAL: Your
telegram from London received. The information we have of the enemy in your
front is this: 10,000 at Camp Dick Robinson; of these 4,000 are in advance
towards Cumberland Gap, but how far is not known; it is commanded by Garrard;
and 10,000 dotted from Robinson to Cincinnati. General Polk ordered 2
howitzers, 1 Parrott, and 3 iron guns to be shipped for you to Knoxville
October 15. A company to man this battery will be sent in a few days.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 4 (Serial No. 4), p. 209-13
McNairy's Battalion
moved from Camp Buckner about four miles down the Cumberland River to Bald
Hill. We were well pleased with the change. This camp was on elevated ground in
an old field, and hence, not so muddy.
According to orders
of yesterday, about 5,400 of Zollicoffer's Brigade, including six pieces of
artillery, were put in motion along the London road.
The First Battalion
struck tents and prepared to move, but as McNairy was ordered to bring up the
rear, and as the infantry, artillery, and wagons (about two hundred of the
latter) were nearly all day passing his camp, he camped for another night on
Bald Hill. The head of the column bivouacked some six miles from Bald Hill and
ten from Camp Buckner.
Through
carelessness, or some other cause, five barrels of salt were left where they
were captured, near where the enemy had been camping. Lieutenant M. V. Wilson
was ordered to take twenty-five of Allison's Company and a wagon and go back
after the salt, while the rest of the command moved on toward Barboursville. We
regarded this as rather a hazardous trip, though we went back to, and loaded
in, four barrels of the salt (thinking five would be too much for our team)
without any incident worthy of note; but we had not gone far with our salt
before bang! bang! bang! went several guns back about where our rear guard was.
This caused considerable excitement in our little squad, though one of the rear
guard soon came dashing up, and reported that it was only bush-whackers that
had fired on them, and that some of the balls cut very close,
but no one was hurt. So we felt better then, and moved on to Barboursville
without any more trouble. Here we found two companies of our battalion (B and
C), but the other two (A and D) had gone on back to Camp Buckner, on Cumberland
river. We found Rains' Regiment and the balance of our company (E) encamped two
miles from Barboursville on the road leading back to Camp Buckner.
Col. Cummings went with
his detachment to the Salt Works, loaded in all the salt there, 200 bushels,
and returned without coming in contact with the enemy. He receipted for the
salt, as directed by General Zollicoffer. The Salt Works belonged to Union men,
yet Zollicoffer expected to have it paid for at the price of salt at the
works—forty cents per bushel.
Rain's Regiment and
Allison's Company returned to camp at Camp Buckner. Companies B and C of
McNairy's Battalion remained at Barboursville.
Several of Allison's
Company who had been home returned to camp, brother Will (W. C. Hancock) and J.
C. McAdoo, who were sick of the measles at Camp Schuyler, last August, and went
home from there, were among the number.
Companies B and C
(they had been at Barboursville since the 29th ultimo) rejoined the battalion
at Camp Buckner.
Gen. Zollicoffer ordered
Col. McNairy to go with his battalion on a reconnoitering expedition as far as
London.
As soon as his men
could prepare two days' rations, McNairy set out from Camp Buckner about 10:30
A. M., and, after, a ride of about forty miles, he drew rein a little after
midnight, within two miles of London. Our advance guard, going on to that
place, returned and reported no enemy there. We then took a nap of some two or
three hours.
Setting out on his
return between daybreak and sunrise, McNairy arrived at Camp Buckner a little
after dark, and reported the result of his reconnoissance to Zollicoffer, who,
on the next day, the 6th, sent the following communication to A. S. Johnston:
A
reconnoitering detachment has just returned from London, reporting no
appearance of an enemy there. They report, upon general information from
country people, that there are 3,300 of the enemy encamped on Rockcastle hills
(Wildcat), a strong position thirteen miles beyond, where the Mount Vernon road
crosses the Rockcastle River.
I
would move forward and attack them instantly but for unexpected deficiency in
subsistence stores. Ten days ago I ordered the brigade commissary to accumulate
a stock of thirty days' rations for 5,000 men. To-day I have not five days'
rations. I could not properly advance with less than ten. I hope soon to have
the supplies.
I
sent a large detachment into Harlan county, where I heard there were 500 or 600
men embodied under arms. No organized enemy found.
I
have sent a cavalry detachment to Williamsburg, some thirty miles west.
Not
yet returned. This is nearly my only means of getting information of the
country.1
1 Rebellion
Records, Vol. IV., p. 439.
Col. James E. Rains
will march at 4 o'clock to-morrow morning, via Barboursville, to Laurel Bridge,
on the London road, with his regiment, provisioned for six days, three rations
of which should be cooked, leaving his tents in this encampment. Colonel
McNairy's command will accompany him or follow him, by a right-hand road
crossing Laurel Creek about 2 miles above the bridge. Colonel R. will have
command, and will dislodge a supposed force of the enemy at the bridge by
attacking simultaneously with infantry and cavalry at both ends of the bridge.
He will be furnished a guide who will give him information of some arms, which
he will capture, if practicable. He will take with him also Lieutenant
Falcond's section of artillery. A battalion of Colonel Statham’s infantry, with
three companies of Colonel Branner's cavalry, will be posted on the road to be
pursued by Colonel McNairy about 10 miles back, to give support, if necessary.
Simultaneously. Colonel Cummings' regiment, with two companies of Colonel
Broydton's [Brazelton's?] cavalry, will escort a train of wagons to the Goose
Creek Salt Works, 16 or 18 miles east, in Clay County, to load with salt. The
different detachments will communicate by express messengers with each other
and with me, and when the salt train returns all will return to this
encampment. Much is trusted to Colonel Rains' discretion in whatever may
transpire on the way.
