CAMP NEAR ROCKCASTLE
RIVER, October 20, 1861.
SIR: I have advanced
4 miles north of London, under disability to an embarrassing extent for want of
subsistence and transportation. The country is very poor indeed. The enemy
occupy a strong position 8 miles ahead. We had a skirmish between pickets day
before yesterday, in which we killed 1 man and captured another. We lost
yesterday 1 man killed. We had a force yesterday 3 or 4 miles ahead, but, for
want of water, subsistence, forage, and transportation (our wagons having been
by an accident detained at and near London), had to return here to camp.
Assistant Adjutant-General.
On the 21st I
reached the enemy's intrenched camp, on Rockcastle Hills, a natural
fortification, almost inaccessible. Having reconnoitered in force under heavy
fire for several hours from heights on the right, left, and in front, I became
satisfied that it could not be carried otherwise than by immense exposure, if
at all. The enemy received large re-enforcements.
Our loss was 42
wounded and 11 killed and missing. We captured 21 prisoners, about 100 guns,
and 4 horses. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded unknown.
The country is so
poor we had exhausted the forage on the road for 15 miles back in twenty-four
hours. Our subsistence nearly exhausted. Under these circumstances I deemed it
proper the next day to fall back. Enemy's camp said to be 7,000 strong, with
large reserves near at hand.
Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Ky.
On the 21st I
reached the enemy's intrenched camp on Rockcastle Hills, a natural
fortification, almost inaccessible. Having reconnoitered it in three under
heavy fire for several hours from heights on the right, left, and in front, I
became satisfied that it could not be carried otherwise than by immense
exposure, if at all. The enemy received large re-enforcements.
Our loss was 42
wounded and 11 killed and missing. We captured 21 prisoners, about 100 guns,
and 4 horses. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded unknown.
The country is so
poor we had exhausted the forage along the road for 15 miles back in
twenty-four hours. Our subsistence nearly exhausted. Under these circumstances
I deemed it proper the next day to fall back. Enemy's camp said to be 7,000
strong, with large reserves near at hand.
SIR: I have
information that the enemy were nine regiments at Rock-castle Hills. They are
thought to have large re-enforcements close at hand. The country is very poor
generally between here and there, particularly beyond London. I learn that some
signs of trouble are again arising in East Tennessee, as the impression
increases that the enemy is soon to advance in force. The new levies I learn
come in slowly. Could General William R. Caswell, who recently resigned when
the Tennessee regiments were transferred, have a commission it would greatly
promote the public interest. He has been very efficient in advising me to
dispose matters properly in East Tennessee since I have been in Kentucky. He is
a true gentleman, of high courage, sound sense, exemplary habits, and of
popularity worth much in the present condition of affairs in East Tennessee.
The Log Mountains,
between here and Cumberland Gap, will soon, I learn, become almost impassable.
The road is now very bad. There is reason to suppose the enemy may advance by
way of Jamestown, 120 miles below here, instead of by this route. I have seven
cavalry companies watching that route; no infantry or artillery, two regiments
there having been ordered away by General Johnston. If I get news of their
approach in that direction I will proceed as rapidly as possible to meet them,
and have already collected some stock of commissary stores in that
neighborhood.
Richmond, Va.
CAMP BUCKNER,
October 26, 1861.
I have fallen back to this position. I am reliably informed that there were nine regiments of the enemy at Rockcastle Hills on the 21st. Uncertain news that they were to camp at Laurel Bridge last night. Think there is danger they may advance by Jamestown, 120 miles from here. I have seven cavalry companies there; no infantry or artillery, Stanton and Murray being removed. Colonel Churchwell, at the gap, reports three 8-inch howitzers in position, but that the ordnance stores sent with them are totally insufficient, the shells not filled, &c. I fear we have no powder to fill them. Two Parrott guns have reached Knoxville and are ordered on. We much need an ordnance and competent engineer officer.
Being much
embarrassed for want of transportation in some of the regiments and battalions,
we made a march of only 10 miles to-day. Letters from Colonel Stanton and Major
Bridgman, dated 11th and 12th, received this evening. They both think the enemy
has retired from Albany towards Columbia or Camp Dick Robinson. My plan to get
behind them and cut them off may be defeated; but Stanton's regiment has now
left for Bowling Green, and Bridgman returned to Post Oak Springs. What has
become of the two companies of Colonel Brazel-ton's battalion or of Captain
Bledsoe's company neither explains. Perhaps the latter is with Colonel Murray's
regiment at Camp Myers, in Overton County. This retiring of our forces may
induce the Lincoln forces to return again. I wish the subsistence supply
mentioned heretofore taken to Jamestown by the 25th instant; and you will order
those cavalry companies to rendezvous in that neighborhood at the same time,
that the subsistence stores may not be exposed. I must ask you to transmit from
Knoxville the necessary orders to insure this and the inclosed letter to
Colonel Murray.
SIR: I am 10 miles
on the march toward a camp of the enemy on Rock-castle River, having left
Cumberland Ford this evening with the greater part of my command. I learned
that the enemy at Albany has retired. My plan has been to fall in their rear
and cut them off. Now that Colonel Stanton and our cavalry have left the
neighborhood of Jamestown, the enemy may return in force near the line. I have
ordered stores of subsistence for my troops to be placed at Jamestown by the
25th instant, and have ordered the same cavalry companies to return to that
neighborhood almost the same time, to prevent the enemy from seizing and
appropriating the stores. Perhaps the cavalry from above would not be
sufficient to prevent an incursion. I expect to pass down by Somerset and
Monticello or by Columbia and Burkesville, in the hope of capturing any forces
they may be threatening your position with. As secrecy is the element of
success, I must beg of you not to mention to any solitary person this
enterprise. My object in writing to you is to ask you, about the 25th, to move
in such a way as to insure, by the aid of the cavalry, the safety of the
stores, until I can reach the neighborhood. Inform General Caswell at Knoxville
what you can do, and he will communicate with me.
GENERAL: Your
telegram from London received. The information we have of the enemy in your
front is this: 10,000 at Camp Dick Robinson; of these 4,000 are in advance
towards Cumberland Gap, but how far is not known; it is commanded by Garrard;
and 10,000 dotted from Robinson to Cincinnati. General Polk ordered 2
howitzers, 1 Parrott, and 3 iron guns to be shipped for you to Knoxville
October 15. A company to man this battery will be sent in a few days.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 4 (Serial No. 4), p. 209-13
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