HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT
OF THE MISSOURI,
Saint Louis, January
6, 1862.
To His Excellency the PRESIDENT:
In reply to your excellency's letter of the 1st instant,† I have to state that on
receiving your telegram I immediately communicated with General Buell and have
since sent him all the information I could obtain of the enemy's movements
about Columbus and Camp Beauregard. No considerable force has been sent from
those places to Bowling Green. They have about 22,000 men at Columbus, and the
place is strongly fortified. I have at Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah only about
15,000, which, after leaving guards at these places, would give me but little
over 10,000 men with which to assist General Buell. It would be madness to
attempt anything serious with such a force, and I cannot at the present time
withdraw any from Missouri without risking the loss of this State. The troops
recently raised in other States of this department have without my knowledge
been sent to Kentucky and Kansas.
I am satisfied that the authorities at Washington do not
appreciate the difficulties with which we have to contend here. The operations
of Lane, Jennison, and others have so enraged the people of Missouri, that it
is estimated that there is a majority of 80,000 against the Government. We are
virtually in an enemy's country. Price and others have a considerable army in
the Southwest, against which I am operating with all my available force.
This city and most of the middle and northern counties are
insurrectionary – burning bridges, destroying telegraph lines, &c. – and
can be kept down only by the presence of troops. A large portion of the foreign
troops organized by General Frémont are unreliable; indeed, many of them are
already mutinous. They have been tampered with by politicians, and made to
believe that if they get up a mutiny and demand Frémont's return the Government
will be forced to restore him to duty here. It is believed that some high
officers are in the plot. I have already been obliged to disarm several of
these organizations and I am daily expecting more serious outbreaks. Another
grave difficulty is the want of proper general officers to command the troops
and enforce order and discipline, and especially to protect public property
from robbery and plunder. Some of the brigadier-generals assigned to this
department are entirely ignorant of their duties and unfit for any command. I
assure you, Mr. President, it is very difficult to accomplish much with such
means. I am in the condition of a carpenter who is required to build a bridge
with a dull ax, a broken saw, and rotten timber. It is true that I have some
very good green timber, which will answer the purpose as soon as I can get it
into shape and season it a little.
I know nothing of General Buell's intended operations, never
having received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign. If
it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green while another moves
from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will be a repetition
of the same strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull Run. To operate
on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a central position will fail, as
it always has failed, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. It is condemned by
every military authority I have ever read.
General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy
precisely the same position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did
the armies of McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.
Very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.
[Indorsement. ]
The within is a copy of a letter just received from General
Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be
done.
A. LINCOLN.
JANUARY 10, 1862.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
7 (Serial No. 7), p. 532-3
