SIR: The following brief outline of the operations of this
corps from September 29, 1864, to the close of the campaign is respectfully
submitted. It is necessarily an imperfect report, being made at the request of
the commanding general without the aid of the reports of subordinate
commanders.1
On Tuesday, November 29, following Cheatham's corps, we crossed Duck River above Columbia and arrived near sunset at Rutherford's Creek. Crossing it I moved to the right of Cheatham's corps, then in line near the pike from Columbia to Franklin, and about 11 p.m. bivouacked in rear of his right.
The next morning (30th) we moved at daylight, taking the advance, in pursuit of the retreating enemy. About midday we came in sight of his line, formed on a commanding ridge some two miles from Franklin. In compliance with the instructions of the commanding general I moved to the right toward Harpeth River, and formed to attack the enemy, who fell back to an intrenched line around the town. Loring's division was on the right, Walthall's in the center, French's on the left. Ector's brigade, of the last-named division, marched from Florence as guard to the pontoon train, and had not rejoined. Buford's division of cavalry covered the space between Loring's right and the river, while another was thrown across to the other bank. In the meantime Cheatham's corps was also formed for attack, and the two corps were to move forward simultaneously. I had one battery only, the pieces of which were distributed to the three divisions. About 4 p.m. a staff-officer from the commanding general brought me the order to advance, and the word forward was given. A body of the enemy's cavalry in front of Loring and the division on his right was soon routed, and the cavalry division (Buford's) ceased to operate with us. The line moved forward in fine order, the men in high spirits, drove the enemy from his outer line and fiercely assailed the second. The ground over which Loring's division advanced was obstructed by a deep railroad cut and an abatis and hedge of Osage orange. With these exceptions the space in front of the enemy's position on our side was perfectly open and swept by a terrible and destructive cross-fire of artillery from the works and from the opposite bank of the narrow stream—the Harpeth. The men, however, pressed forward again and again, with dauntless courage, to the ditch around the inner line of works, which they failed to carry, but where many of them remained, separated from the enemy only by the parapet, until the Federal Army withdrew.
A return of casualties has heretofore been made, the number reported amounting to something over 2,000 in killed, wounded, and missing. Among them were many of our best officers and bravest men. Brig. Gen. John Adams was killed, his horse being found lying across the inner line of the enemy's works. Brigadier-General Scott was paralyzed by the explosion near him of a shell. Brigadier-Generals Quarles and Cockrell were wounded severely, the former subsequently becoming a prisoner. Major-General Walthall had two horses killed, and was himself severely bruised. Many field and staff and company officers were either killed or severely wounded; they deserve special mention; but not having yet received reports from divisions, brigades, and regiments, it is not in my power to give all their names or to do justice to their heroic conduct.
On Friday, December 2, we moved to the vicinity of Nashville, finally taking a position on the left of the army extending across the Granny White (or middle Franklin) pike to a hill near the Hillsborough pike. This line was intrenched, was just a mile in length, and occupied by Loring's division alone. To protect our left flank works were commenced on four other hills lying along near to and on either side of the Hillsborough pike, the one farthest in rear being some mile and a half distant from the left of the front line. This latter line, to the left of the Hillsborough pike, was prolonged toward Cumberland River by the cavalry, though toward the last of our stay there Ector's brigade, under Colonel Coleman, was placed on picket on the Hardin pike, having Chalmers' cavalry on his right and left.
On the morning of December 15 information was received that the enemy were advancing west of the Hillsborough pike. General Walthall, whose troops were in bivouac, excepting the working parties engaged on the flank redoubts, was directed to place his men under arms and man the redoubts. General French having received leave of absence, his division, which was small, was attached to General Walthall's. Finding the enemy were advancing in force, and that Ector's brigade and the cavalry were forced to retire, all of Walthall's command not required for the redoubts was placed behind the stone fence along the Hillsborough pike between redoubt numbered 3 and 4 on the accompanying map.2 This map exhibits the position of Loring's division in the front line of the five hills crowned with unfinished works, and of Walthall's command, including his own and French's divisions. Each redoubt contained a section or battery of artillery and from 100 to 150 infantry. The enemy appeared in force along the entire line, extending around redoubts 1, 2, and 3, and as far as or beyond 4 and 5. My own line was stretched to its utmost tension, but could not reach far enough toward 4 and 5 without leaving the way open to the enemy between Loring's left and Walthall's right. The commanding general, who was notified as soon as practicable of the approach of the enemy, sent me as re-enforcements, first, Manigault's and soon after Deas brigades, of Johnson's division, Lee's corps, and later the two remaining brigades of that division, and I was informed that one or more divisions from Cheatham's corps (the extreme right) had been ordered to the left. As the object of the enemy seemed to be to turn our left flank by carrying the redoubts 4 and 5, Manigault's brigade on coming up was moved in line about parallel to the Hillsborough pike and opposite redoubt 4. Major-General Johnson arriving soon afterward was directed to place Deas' brigade on Manigault's right, so as to connect with Walthall's line. By this time the enemy had carried redoubts 4 and 5, capturing many of the men and all the artillery in them, besides killing and wounding many, and were making for the pike. The two brigades named, making but feeble resistance, fled, and the enemy crossed the pike, passing Walthall's left. Loring's line not being yet pressed, a battery had been ordered from it, which, arriving just at this moment, was placed on a commanding hill, and these same brigades rallied to its support. They again fled, however, on the approach of the enemy, abandoning the battery, which was captured. By this time the other brigades of Johnson's division had come up, but were unable to check the progress of the enemy, who had passed the Hillsborough pike a full half mile, completely turning our flank and gaining the rear of both Walthall and Loring, whose situation was becoming perilous in the extreme. Their positions were maintained to the last possible moment, in the hope that the expected succor would arrive and restore the fight on the left. Deeming it absolutely necessary for them to fall back, orders were dispatched to that effect, when it was found that Walthall had already ordered his line to retire not a moment too soon, and this of itself made it necessary for Loring to withdraw. The latter was directed also to form along the Granny White pike (which would place him nearly at right angles to his former position) to check the anticipated rush of the enemy from his and Walthall's fronts. This was gallantly and successfully done by this fine division, the corps retiring to a position between the Granny White and Franklin pikes, when night put an end to the conflict.
Brigadier-General Sears late in the day lost a leg, and subsequently fell into the enemy's hands. All the artillery in the redoubts, the battery above mentioned, and another on Loring's line, the horses of which were killed or wounded, were captured by the enemy.
In the meantime one or two divisions from Cheatham's corps had come up on the left, where the commanding general was in person, but being separated from that part of the field I am unable to state what occurred. Also Ector's brigade, commanded by Colonel Coleman, in falling back from its position on the Hardin pike, was thrown over on the left and beyond my personal observation. The report of Colonel Coleman is, therefore, referred to for account of its operations, which I have been told were characterized by the usual intrepidity of this small but firm and reliable body of men.3
During the night of the 15th the army was placed in position to receive the attack expected at an early hour next morning. The map shows the position of this corps, it being in the center, Lee's corps on the right, Cheatham's on the left, extending from the hill occupied by Bate's division, Cheatham's corps, along the range of hills on the west side of the Granny White pike. The line of this corps extended from the side of the hill occupied by Bate across the pike, along a stone fence on east side of the pike. In rear of the line and some half mile or more distant a high ridge lies in a general east and west direction, through the gaps of which run the Franklin, Granny White, and other pikes. It was the order of the commanding general that in case of disaster Lee's corps should hold the Franklin pike, this corps retiring by that pike and taking up position at or beyond Brentwood, so as to permit Lee to withdraw, while Cheatham was to move out on the Granny White pike. Instructions accordingly were given to subordinate commanders.
At an early hour in the morning the enemy approached, placing artillery in position and opening a heavy fire, which continued almost incessantly through the day. They confronted us everywhere with a force double or treble our own. Occasional attacks were made on various parts of our lines and repulsed, though their chief efforts seemed to be directed against our flanks for the purpose of gaining the roads in our rear.. Every attack made on the lines occupied by this corps to the last was repulsed with severe loss to the enemy.
In the course of the morning, the commanding general calling on me for a brigade to go to the right flank, Ector's, being in reserve, was dispatched. It was finally sent to the hills in our rear and on the east side of the Granny White pike to drive back the enemy who had passed our left, crossed to the east side of the pike, and held this portion of the ridge. Later in the day Reynolds' (Arkansas) brigade was withdrawn from Walthall's line and sent to the assistance of Ector's. They were strong enough to check the enemy, but not sufficiently so to drive him back and regain the pass by which this pike crosses the ridge, so that retreat was cut off in that direction and greatly endangered even by the Franklin pike, the only route now left open for the whole army. At one time the enemy gained the spurs on the west side of the Granny White pike occupied by Cheatham's men, some of whom, falling back, formed parallel to Bate's line, on the south side of the hill occupied by his division, but a few hundred yards from his line and fronting in the opposite direction.
The situation then, briefly, was this: The left flank completely turned, the enemy crossing to east side of Granny White pike in our rear, and holding the ridge on that side and the pass through which this road runs. The ridge was high and steep, and extended beyond the Franklin pike to the east, and was but a short distance in rear of our line. It seemed as though in case of disaster escape was impossible. There was no reserve force that could be brought up to restore any break that might occur.
About 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon the commanding general sent for me, and while in conversation with him an officer of his staff announced that the line had given way. Not being present at the moment this took place, at least where I could witness it, and not yet being in possession of the official reports of subordinate commanders, I do not deem it proper to attempt to decide where the line first yielded. It would seem, however, that when once broken it very soon gave way everywhere, and the whole army made for the Franklin pike. In accordance with the orders of the commanding general, before alluded to, I had dispatched Major Foster, of the engineers, to find a suitable position beyond Brentwood for holding this road.
On reaching Brentwood, however, about dark, I received orders to move on to Franklin, and next morning to move toward Spring Hill and Columbia. Arriving at the latter place on the morning of the 18th, this corps took position on the north bank of Duck River, covering the passage of the entire army, and crossing about daylight of the 20th; so the following week at Tennessee River, Bainbridge, this corps covered the operations, and was the last to cross, which it did on the morning of December 28. At Columbia, a rear guard, composed of several brigades from this and the other corps, was organized and placed under the command of Major-General Walthall. This force, in connection with the cavalry, covered the retreat from Columbia to the Tennessee River.
It is due to the officers and men of this corps that I should bear testimony to their patient endurance of fatigue and privation, their cheerfulness and alacrity in obeying orders, and, above all, their heroic valor as displayed on many occasions since I have had the honor to command them, but pre-eminently at Franklin.
My thanks are due to Major-Generals Loring, Walthall, and French for their cordial co-operation and skillful management of their respective divisions, and to the several members of my staff, who have uniformly shown themselves competent, faithful, and zealous in the discharge of their duties.
I have omitted to state in its proper place that a short time after our advance to the vicinity of Nashville, Cockrell's brigade of Missourians, French's division, was ordered by the commanding general to the mouth of Duck River. It rejoined at Bainbridge, where we recrossed the Tennessee River.
Accompanying this report are maps4 of the fields at Franklin and Nashville, as accurate as it is possible to make them.
I deem it proper to say that after the fall of Atlanta the condition of the army and other considerations rendered it necessary, in my judgment, that an offensive campaign should be made in the enemy's rear and on his line of communications. It is not my purpose, nor does it pertain to me, to explain the reasons which prompted the campaign, but simply to express my concurrence in the views which determined the operations of the army.
Assistant Adjutant-General.
SIR: In my report of the operations of my corps during the campaign made by General Hood into Tennessee I omitted the details of what transpired near Spring Hill during the afternoon and night of the 29th of November, 1864. I respectfully submit the following statement, and ask that it be filed as a part of my report:
On the morning of November 29 General Hood moved with Cheatham's corps and mine and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps (the latter reporting to me), Cheatham's corps in advance. We made a forced march to get in rear of the enemy. In the course of the afternoon, about 3 or 4 o'clock, I reached Rutherford's Creek as Cheatham's rear division was crossing. I received orders to halt and form on the south side of the creek, my right to rest on or near the creek, so as to move down the creek if necessary. Subsequently I received an order to send a division across the creek, and finally, between sunset and dark, an order was received to cross the creek, leaving a division on the south side. Johnson's division, being in rear, was designated to remain. Riding in advance of the column, about dusk, I found General Hood some half mile from the creek and about as far west of the road on which we were marching and which led to Spring Hill. The commanding general gave me a young man of the neighborhood as a guide, and told me to move on and place my right across the pike beyond Spring Hill, "your left, he added, "extending down this way." This would have placed my line in rear of Cheatham's, except that my right would have extended beyond his. The guide informed me that at a certain point the road made a sudden turn to the left, going into Spring Hill; that from this bend there used to be a road leading across to the pike, meeting it at the toll-gate some mile and a half beyond Spring Hill, toward Franklin. I told him if he could find it, that was the right road. Arriving at the bend of the road we passed through a large gateway, taking what appeared in the darkness to be an indistinct path. Within a short distance I found General Forrest's headquarters and stopped to ascertain the position of his pickets covering Cheatham's right and of the enemy. He informed me that his scouts reported the enemy leaving the direct pike--leading from Spring Hill to Franklin and Nashville-and taking the one down Carter's Creek. While in conversation with him I was informed that a staff officer from General Hood had come up and halted the column. It turned out to be a staff (engineer) officer of General Cheatham's, who informed me that General Hood had sent him to place me in position. It striking me as strange the commanding general should send an officer not of his own staff on this errand, or indeed any one, as he had given directions to me in person, I inquired of the officer if he had seen General Hood since I had. He replied that he had just come from General Hood, and that the reason why he was sent was that I was to go into position on General Brown's right (the right of Cheatham's corps), and he and General Brown had been over the ground by daylight. Thinking it possible the commanding general had changed his mind as to what he wished me to do, I concluded it was proper to be governed by the directions of this staff officer, and therefore returned to the road and moved on toward Spring Hill. Arriving near the line of Brown's division, General Brown explained his position, which was oblique to the pike, his right being farther from it than his left. It was evident that if my command were marched up and formed on his right, it being now a late hour, it would require all night to accomplish it, and the line, instead of extending across the pike, would bear away from it. Feeling satisfied there was a mistake, I directed the troops to be bivouacked, while I rode back to find the commanding general to explain my situation and get further instructions. On arriving at his quarters I inquired of him if he had sent this officer of General Cheatham's staff to place me in position. He replied that he had. I next inquired if he had changed his mind as to what he wished me to do. He replied that he had not, "But," said he, "the fact is, General Cheatham has been here and represented that there ought to be somebody an Brown's right." I explained to him that in the uncertainty I was in I had directed the troops, who had been marching rapidly since daylight, and it was now 11 p.m., to be placed in bivouac, and had come to report. He remarked, in substance, that it was not material; to let the men rest; and directed me to move before daylight in the morning, taking the advance toward Franklin. Subsequently General Hood made to me the statement:
I wish you and your people to understand that I attach no blame to you for the failure at Spring Hill; on the contrary, I know if I had had you there the attack would have been made.
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.
MY DEAR GENERAL: Before leaving for Texas I desire to say that I am sorry to know that some of your friends thought that I intended some slight reflection on your conduct at Spring Hill. You did all that I could say or claim that I would have done under similar circumstances myself. The great opportunity passed with daylight. Since I have been informed that your friends felt that my report led to uncertainty as to yourself and troops, I regret that I did not make myself more clear in my report by going more into detail about the staff officer of General Cheatham. I only regret, general, that I did not have you with your corps in front on that day. I feel, and have felt, that Tennessee to-day would have been in our possession.
* * * * * * *
Your friend,
1 For portion of report here omitted see Vol.XXXIX, Part 1, p. 812.
2 Plate LXXII, Map 2 of the Atlas.
3 Coleman’s Report not found.
4 See Plate LXXIII, Maps three and 2 of the Atlas.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 707-13
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