Diary of Private W. J. Davidson, July 7, 1863

While waiting for the brigade to move, I will endeavor to write up what transpired yesterday. At about I A. M. we were aroused from sleep with orders to fall into line, but no movement was made for nearly two hours. We saw that the wagon-train was in front, and this indicated a fight or a retreat; at 3 o'clock we began the march at a quick gait, which was kept up until evening, when we bivouaced on the Jackson road, fifteen miles from that place, and three from Clinton.

We had passed in a few miles of the enemy early in the morning, but so silently that he was probably unaware of the movement. The wagon train was sent by another route for safety. We now have confirmation of the news from Vicksburg. There is no longer any doubt about its truth. The place surrendered after the garrison had subsisted ten weeks upon mule meat and pea meal. The officers and men are to be brought within our lines and parolled, the officers to retain their side arms. It is said that there is a heavy column of the enemy, under General Osterhaus, following in our wake. General Johnston is having the pond, which afforded water to the army last week, ditched off, and to make it palatable for our pursuers, is having dead mules thrown into it. It is the only chance for them to get water this side of Big Black. Bragg's army is reported falling back to Chattanooga, leaving our homes to the mercy of the foe. It is now ten o'clock, and Ector's Brigade, which is in line of battle in our rear, and ours are all the troops left here, the rest having gone ahead.

SOURCE: Edwin L. Drake, Editor, The Annals of the Army of Tennessee and Early Western History, Vol. 1, p. 216-7

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 255. — Report of Brig. Gen. Lawrence S. Ross, C. S. Army, commanding Ross' brigade, of operations October 24-December 27, 1864.

No. 255.

Report of Brig. Gen. Lawrence S. Ross, C. S. Army, commanding Ross' brigade,

of operations October 24-December 27, 1864.

HDQRS. ROSS' BRIGADE, JACKSON'S CAVALRY DIVISION,        

Corinth, Miss., January 12, 1865.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part performed by my brigade in the late campaign into Middle Tennessee:

First, however, and by way of introduction, it is proper to premise that we bore a full share in the arduous duties required of the cavalry in the Georgia campaign, and were particularly active during the operations of the army upon the enemy's line of communication.

October 24, in compliance with orders from division commander, I withdrew from my position near Cave Spring, Ga. crossed the Coosa River at Gadsden the day following, and by rapid marches arrived in front of Decatur, Ala., on the evening of the 29th. Was here halted to observe the movements of the enemy while the army rested at Tuscumbia. On the morning of 8th of November a strong reconnoitering party, consisting of three regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, coming out from Decatur on the Courtland road, was promptly met, and after a sharp skirmish driven back, with some loss. The next day, being relieved by a portion of General Roddey's command, we retired down the valley to Town Creek and rested until the 18th, when we were ordered across the river at Florence, and moving at once to the front of the army, took position with the other cavalry commands on Shoal Creek.

November 21, all things being ready for the advance, we were ordered forward, following in rear of Armstrong's brigade. The effective fighting strength of my command at this time was as follows: Third Regiment Texas Cavalry, 218; Sixth Regiment Texas Cavalry, 218; Ninth Regiment Texas Cavalry, 110; Twenty-seventh Regiment Texas Cavalry, 140, making a total of 686. With this small force we joined the advance into Tennessee, strong in heart and resolved to make up in zeal and courage what was wanting in numbers. The day after crossing Shoal Creek General Armstrong, having still the advance, came up with the Federal cavalry at Lawrenceburg. The fighting was chiefly with artillery, Captain Young's battery being freely used and to good effect. About sunset the enemy withdrew in the direction of Pulaski. Early the next morning I was ordered to take the advance and move out on the Pulaski road. About twelve miles from Lawrenceburg came up with the Federal pickets and drove them in. The Third Texas now dismounted, and, with two squadrons from the Twenty-seventh Texas, moved forward and attacked the enemy, forcing him from his successive positions, and following him up so vigorously as to compel the precipitate abandonment of his camp and all his forage.

The next day, having still the advance, when within five miles of Pulaski we changed direction to the left, following the route taken by the enemy on his retreat the evening before, and arriving about noon in sight of the little village of Campbellsville, I found a large force of cavalry, which proved to be Hatch's division, drawn up to resist us. Lieutenant-Colonel Boggess was ordered promptly to dismount his regiment, the Third Texas, and move it to the front. Young's battery was hurried up from the rear, placed in position, supported by the Sixth Texas, Col. Jack Wharton commanding, and commenced shelling the enemy's lines. In the meanwhile the Ninth Texas and Legion were drawn up in column in the field to the right of the road, to be used as circumstances might require. These dispositions completed, I watched with interest the effect of the shelling from our battery, and very soon discovered from the movements of the enemy an intention to withdraw, whereupon, believing this to be the proper moment, I ordered everything forward. The Ninth Texas and Legion, led by their respective commanders, Colonel Jones and Lieutenant-Colonel Whitfield, rushed forward at a gallop, and passing through the village fell upon the enemy's moving squadrons with such irresistible force as to scatter them in every direction, pursuing and capturing numbers of prisoners, horses, equipments, small-arms, accouterments, and four stand of colors. The enemy made no effort to regain the field from which he had been driven, but, while endeavoring to withdraw his broken and discomfitted squadrons, was attacked vigorously in flank by a portion of General Armstrong's brigade and his rout made complete. The last of his forces, in full flight, disappeared in the direction of Lynnville about sunset, and we saw nothing more of them south of Duck River. Our loss in the fight at Campellsville was only 5 men wounded, while our captures, I found upon investigation, summed up to be 84 prisoners and all their horses, equipments, and small arms, 4 stand of colors, and 65 beef-cattle. Without further opposition we arrived the next day in front of Columbia and took the position assigned us on the Chapel Hill pike.

November 26, we remained in front of the enemy's works, skirmishing freely and keeping up a lively demonstration. On the morning of the 27th, being relieved by the infantry, we were ordered over to the Shelbyville pike, and camped the following night on Fountain Creek. Crossing Duck River the next morning, at the mill nine miles above Columbia, we were directed thence to the right, on the Shelbyville road, and when near the Lewisburg and Franklin pike, again encountered the Federal cavalry. A spirited engagement ensued, begun by the Third Texas, which being dispatched to attack a train of wagons moving in direction of Franklin, succeeded in reaching the pike, but was there met by a superior force of Yankees and driven back. Seeing this, I had Colonel Hawkins to hurry up his regiment (the Legion) to the assistance of the Third, and ordered a charge, which was made in gallant style, and resulted in forcing the Yankees from the field in confusion, and with the loss of several prisoners and the colors of the Seventh Ohio Cavalry. In the meanwhile Colonel Wharton with the Sixth Texas charged into the pike to the right of where the Third and Legion were engaged, capturing an entire company of the Seventh Ohio Cavalry, three stand of colors, several wagons loaded with ordnance, and a considerable number of horses with their equipments. The Ninth Texas, Colonel Jones, having been detached early in the evening to guard the road leading to our right, with the exception of a slight skirmish with the enemy's pickets, in which several prisoners were taken, was not otherwise engaged during the evening. It was now after night, and very dark. The enemy had disappeared from our front in direction of Franklin, but before establishing camps it was thought prudent to ascertain if any force had been cut off and yet remained between us and the river. Colonel Hawkins was therefore ordered up the pike with his regiment to reconnoiter, and had proceeded but a short distance before he was met by a brigade of Federal cavalry. An exciting fight ensued, lasting about half an hour, when the enemy, having much the larger force, succeeded in passing by us, receiving as he did so a severe fire into his flanks. This closed the operations of the day and we were allowed to bivouac, well pleased with the prospect of rest after so much fatiguing exercise.

At Hurt's Cross-Roads, the next day, where the other commands of cavalry took the left and moved upon Spring Hill, my brigade was advanced upon the road to Franklin. Afterward, in obedience to orders of the division commander, we turned toward Thompson's Station, being now in search of the Federal army, which still held its position on Rutherford's Creek. The Yankee cavalry, completely whipped, had disappeared in the direction of Franklin and did not again show itself that day. When near Thompson's Station I discovered a few wagons moving on the pike, and sent Colonel Jones with the Ninth and Legion to intercept and capture them. At the same time the Sixth and Third Texas were drawn up in line and a squadron from the latter dispatched to destroy the depot. Colonel Jones was partially successful, capturing and destroying one wagon and securing the team. He then charged train of cars, which came up from the direction of Franklin, when the engineer becoming frightened cut the engine loose and ran off southward. The train, thus freed, began to retrograde, and, in spite of the obstructions thrown in its way and the efforts of the men to stop it rolled back under the guns of the block-house and was saved. The guard, however, and all the men on the train, were forced to jump off and became our prisoners. I now had the railroad bridge destroyed, in consequence of which the engine had escaped from us and another became the prizes of our army the next day. In the meantime the enemy at the depot, observing the approach of the squadron from the Third Texas, set fire to all his valuables, including a train of cars loaded with ordnance, and evacuated the place. Having accomplished all that could be effected at the station, we withdrew late in the evening, dropping back to the left of Spring Hill, and halted until I could communicate with the division commander. About midnight I received the order directing me to again strike the pike and attack the enemy's train, then in full retreat to Franklin. Moved out at once to obey the order, guided by an officer of General Forrest's staff who knew the country. When within half a mile of the pike I dismounted three of my regiments, leaving the Ninth Texans mounted to guard their horses, and cautiously advancing on foot, got within 100 yards of the enemy's train without being discovered. The Legion, Colonel Hawkins commanding, having the advance, fronted into line, fired a well-directed volley, killing several Yankees and mules, and rushed forward with a yell, producing among the teamsters and wagon guards a perfect stampede. The Yankees lost thirty-nine wagons, some of which were destroyed and others abandoned for the want of the teams, which we brought off. We captured also several prisoners. Remaining in possession of the pike for half an hour we withdrew upon the approach of several bodies of infantry, which, coming up in opposite directions, by mistake got to shooting into each other and fired several volleys before finding out their error. Having remounted our horses, we remained on the hills overlooking the pike until daylight, and saw the Yankee army in full retreat. While this was passing a regiment of cavalry, appearing in an open field in our front, was charged by the Sixth Texas, completely routed, and driven behind his infantry column. Soon after this we again pushed forward, keeping parallel with the pike upon which our infantry was moving; crossed Harpeth River in the evening about three miles above Franklin, only a small force of the enemy appearing to dispute the passage. Half a mile from the river we came upon a regiment of Yankee cavalry drawn up in line. This the Ninth Texas at once charged and routed, but was met by a larger force and, in turn, compelled to give back, the enemy following in close pursuit. The Third Texas now rushed forward, checked the advancing squadrons of Yankees, and then hurled them back broken and disorganized, capturing several prisoners and driving the others back upon their heavier lines. The gallant bearing of the men and officers of the Third and Ninth Texas on this occasion is deserving of special commendation, and it affords me much gratification to record to the honor of these noble regiments that charges made by them at Harpeth River have never been and cannot be surpassed by cavalry of any nation. By the charge of the Third Texas we gained possession of an eminence overlooking the enemy's position, and held it until late in the evening, when, discovering an intention on the part of [the] Yankee commander to advance his entire force, and being without any support, I withdrew to the south side of the river again. Very soon the enemy advanced his whole line, but finding we had recrossed the river again retired, and during the night withdrew from our front.

The next day we moved forward, arrived in front of Nashville December 3, and took position on the Nolensville pike, three miles from the city. Just in our front was a line of works, and wishing to ascertain what force occupied them I had two squadrons of the Sixth Texas to dismount, deploy as skirmishers, and advance. We found the works held only by the enemy's skirmishers, who withdrew upon our approach. After this, being relieved by our infantry, we retired to the rear, with orders to cook up rations.

On the morning of December 5 the brigade was ordered to La Vergne. Found there a small force of infantry, which took refuge inside the fort, and after a slight resistance surrendered upon demand of the division commander. Moving thence to Murfreesborough, when within a few miles of the city, the enemy's pickets were encountered, and after a stubborn resistance driven back by the Sixth and Third Texas, dismounted. A few days after this Major-General Forrest invested Mur-freesborough with his cavalry and one division of infantry. The duty assigned my brigade, being to guard all the approaches to the city from the Salem to the Woodbury pikes inclusive, was very severe for so small a' force, and almost every day there was heavy skirmishing in some portion of our line.

December 15, a train of cars from Stevenson, heavily laden with supplies for the garrison at Murfreesborough, was attacked about seven miles south of the city, and although guarded by a regiment of infantry 200 strong, was captured and burned. The train was loaded with sugar, coffee, hard bread, and bacon, and carried full 200,000 rations. The men guarding it fought desperately for about an hour, haying a strong position in a cut of the railroad, but were finally routed by a most gallant charge of the Sixth Texas, supported by the Third Texas, and 150 of them captured; the others escaped to a block-house near by. The next day, in consequence of the reverse to our arms at Nashville, we were withdrawn from the front at Murfreesborough, ordered across to Triune, and thence to Columbia, crossing Duck River on the evening of the 18th.

December 24, while bringing up the rear of our army, the enemy charged my rear guard at Lynnville with a heavy force and threatened to break over all opposition, when the Sixth Texas, hastily forming, met and hurled them back, administering a most wholesome check to their ardor. At the moment this occurred our columns were all in motion, and it was of the utmost importance to break the charge of the enemy on our rear. Too much credit, therefore, cannot be given the Sixth Texas for gallant bearing on this occasion. Had it failed to check the enemy, my brigade and probably the entire division, taken at a disadvantage, might have suffered severely. At Richland Creek, where the cavalry took position later in the day, I was assigned a position on the right of the railroad and in front of the creek. Soon afterward, however, the enemy moving as if to cross above the bridge, I was withdrawn to the south side of the creek, and taking position on the hill near the railroad skirmished with the enemy in my front, holding him in check until our forces had all crossed the creek. We were then ordered to withdraw, and, passing through Pulaski, again crossed Richland Creek, and camped near Mr. Carter's for the night. The next day my brigade, alternating with General Armstrong in bringing up the rear, had frequent skirmishes with the enemy's advance. Nine miles from Pulaski, when the infantry halted and formed, I was ordered on the right. Soon after this the enemy made a strong effort to turn our right flank, but failed and was driven back. About the same time the infantry charged and captured his artillery, administering such an effectual check that he did not again show himself that day. This done, we retired leisurely, and after night bivouacked on Sugar Creek. Early the following morning the Yankees, still not satisfied, made their appearance, and our infantry again made dispositions to receive them. Reynolds' and Ector's brigades took position, and immediately in their rear I had the Legion and the Ninth Texas drawn up in column of fours to charge, if an opportunity should occur. The fog was very dense and the enemy, therefore, approached very cautiously. When near enough to be seen the infantry fired a volley and charged. At the same time the Legion and Ninth Texas were ordered forward, and passing through our infantry crossed the creek in the face of a terrible fire, overthrew all opposition on the farther side, and pursued the thoroughly routed foe nearly a mile, capturing twelve prisoners and as many horses, besides killing numbers of others. The force opposed to us here and which was so completely whipped, proved, from the statements of the prisoners, to be Hammond's brigade of cavalry. After this the Yankees did not again show themselves, and without further interruption we recrossed the Tennessee River, at Bainbridge, on the evening of 27th of December.

Our entire loss during the campaign sums up as follows:

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
3d Texas Cavalry.	....	2	3	22	1	2	30
6th Texas Cavalry.	....	6	3	19	....	1	29
9th Texas Cavalry.	....	4	....	17	....	1	22
Texas Legion	....	....	....	6	....	....	6
Total	....	12	6	64	1	4	87

We captured on the trip and brought off 550 prisoners, as shown by the records of my provost-marshal, 9 stand of colors, several hundred horses and their equipments, and overcoats and blankets sufficient to supply my command. We destroyed besides 2 trains of cars loaded, one with ordnance and the other with commissary stores, 40 or 50 wagons and mules, and much other valuable property belonging to the Federal army.

My brigade returned from Tennessee with horses very much jaded, but otherwise in no worse condition than when it started, its morale not in the least affected nor impaired by the evident demoralization which prevailed to a considerable extent throughout the larger portion of the army.

Before closing my report I desire to record an acknowledgment of grateful obligations to the gallant officers and brave men whom I have the honor to command. Entering upon the campaign poorly clad and illy prepared for undergoing its hardships, these worthy votaries of freedom nevertheless bore themselves bravely, and I did not hear a murmur nor witness the least reluctance in the discharge of duty however unpleasant. All did well, and to this I attribute, in a great measure, the unparalleled success which attended all our efforts during the campaign.

To Col. D. W. Jones, Col. E. R. Hawkins, Col. Jack Wharton, and Lieut. Col. J. S. Boggess, who commanded their respective regiments; Lieut. Col. P. F. Ross and Maj. S. B. Wilson, Sixth Texas; Lieut. Col. J. T. Whitfield and Maj. B. H. Norsworthy, of Legion; Maj. A. B. Stone, Third Texas, and Maj. H. C. Dial, Ninth Texas; also, Captains Gurley, Plummer, Killough, and Preston, Lieutenants Alexander and Sykes, members of my staff, I feel especially indebted for earnest, zealous, and efficient co-operation. These officers upon many trying occasions acquitted themselves with honor, and it affords me pleasure to be able to commend them to the favorable notice of the brigadier-general commanding.

I have the honor to be, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. S. ROSS,        

Brigadier-General, &c.

[Capt. E. T. SYKES,
        Assistant Adjutant-General, Jackson's Cavalry Division.]

[ Indorsement. ]

Lieutenant Hunt, of Twenty-eighth Mississippi, particularly distinguished himself; commanding a squadron of cavalry, dismounted his men in an open field.

W. H. JACKSON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 767-73

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 244. — Reports of Lieut. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, C. S. Army, commanding Army Corps, of operations November 29, 1864-January 20, 1865.

No. 244.

Reports of Lieut. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, C. S. Army,

commanding Army Corps, of operations November 29, 1864-January 20, 1865.

HDQRS. STEWART'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,        

Near Tupelo, Miss., January 20, 1865.

SIR: The following brief outline of the operations of this corps from September 29, 1864, to the close of the campaign is respectfully submitted. It is necessarily an imperfect report, being made at the request of the commanding general without the aid of the reports of subordinate commanders.¹

On Tuesday, November 29, following Cheatham's corps, we crossed Duck River above Columbia and arrived near sunset at Rutherford's Creek. Crossing it I moved to the right of Cheatham's corps, then in line near the pike from Columbia to Franklin, and about 11 p.m. bivouacked in rear of his right.

The next morning (30th) we moved at daylight, taking the advance, in pursuit of the retreating enemy. About midday we came in sight of his line, formed on a commanding ridge some two miles from Franklin. In compliance with the instructions of the commanding general I moved to the right toward Harpeth River, and formed to attack the enemy, who fell back to an intrenched line around the town. Loring's division was on the right, Walthall's in the center, French's on the left. Ector's brigade, of the last-named division, marched from Florence as guard to the pontoon train, and had not rejoined. Buford's division of cavalry covered the space between Loring's right and the river, while another was thrown across to the other bank. In the meantime Cheatham's corps was also formed for attack, and the two corps were to move forward simultaneously. I had one battery only, the pieces of which were distributed to the three divisions. About 4 p.m. a staff-officer from the commanding general brought me the order to advance, and the word forward was given. A body of the enemy's cavalry in front of Loring and the division on his right was soon routed, and the cavalry division (Buford's) ceased to operate with us. The line moved forward in fine order, the men in high spirits, drove the enemy from his outer line and fiercely assailed the second. The ground over which Loring's division advanced was obstructed by a deep railroad cut and an abatis and hedge of Osage orange. With these exceptions the space in front of the enemy's position on our side was perfectly open and swept by a terrible and destructive cross-fire of artillery from the works and from the opposite bank of the narrow stream—the Harpeth. The men, however, pressed forward again and again, with dauntless courage, to the ditch around the inner line of works, which they failed to carry, but where many of them remained, separated from the enemy only by the parapet, until the Federal Army withdrew.

A return of casualties has heretofore been made, the number reported amounting to something over 2,000 in killed, wounded, and missing. Among them were many of our best officers and bravest men. Brig. Gen. John Adams was killed, his horse being found lying across the inner line of the enemy's works. Brigadier-General Scott was paralyzed by the explosion near him of a shell. Brigadier-Generals Quarles and Cockrell were wounded severely, the former subsequently becoming a prisoner. Major-General Walthall had two horses killed, and was himself severely bruised. Many field and staff and company officers were either killed or severely wounded; they deserve special mention; but not having yet received reports from divisions, brigades, and regiments, it is not in my power to give all their names or to do justice to their heroic conduct.

On Friday, December 2, we moved to the vicinity of Nashville, finally taking a position on the left of the army extending across the Granny White (or middle Franklin) pike to a hill near the Hillsborough pike. This line was intrenched, was just a mile in length, and occupied by Loring's division alone. To protect our left flank works were commenced on four other hills lying along near to and on either side of the Hillsborough pike, the one farthest in rear being some mile and a half distant from the left of the front line. This latter line, to the left of the Hillsborough pike, was prolonged toward Cumberland River by the cavalry, though toward the last of our stay there Ector's brigade, under Colonel Coleman, was placed on picket on the Hardin pike, having Chalmers' cavalry on his right and left.

On the morning of December 15 information was received that the enemy were advancing west of the Hillsborough pike. General Walthall, whose troops were in bivouac, excepting the working parties engaged on the flank redoubts, was directed to place his men under arms and man the redoubts. General French having received leave of absence, his division, which was small, was attached to General Walthall's. Finding the enemy were advancing in force, and that Ector's brigade and the cavalry were forced to retire, all of Walthall's command not required for the redoubts was placed behind the stone fence along the Hillsborough pike between redoubt numbered 3 and 4 on the accompanying map.² This map exhibits the position of Loring's division in the front line of the five hills crowned with unfinished works, and of Walthall's command, including his own and French's divisions. Each redoubt contained a section or battery of artillery and from 100 to 150 infantry. The enemy appeared in force along the entire line, extending around redoubts 1, 2, and 3, and as far as or beyond 4 and 5. My own line was stretched to its utmost tension, but could not reach far enough toward 4 and 5 without leaving the way open to the enemy between Loring's left and Walthall's right. The commanding general, who was notified as soon as practicable of the approach of the enemy, sent me as re-enforcements, first, Manigault's and soon after Deas brigades, of Johnson's division, Lee's corps, and later the two remaining brigades of that division, and I was informed that one or more divisions from Cheatham's corps (the extreme right) had been ordered to the left. As the object of the enemy seemed to be to turn our left flank by carrying the redoubts 4 and 5, Manigault's brigade on coming up was moved in line about parallel to the Hillsborough pike and opposite redoubt 4. Major-General Johnson arriving soon afterward was directed to place Deas' brigade on Manigault's right, so as to connect with Walthall's line. By this time the enemy had carried redoubts 4 and 5, capturing many of the men and all the artillery in them, besides killing and wounding many, and were making for the pike. The two brigades named, making but feeble resistance, fled, and the enemy crossed the pike, passing Walthall's left. Loring's line not being yet pressed, a battery had been ordered from it, which, arriving just at this moment, was placed on a commanding hill, and these same brigades rallied to its support. They again fled, however, on the approach of the enemy, abandoning the battery, which was captured. By this time the other brigades of Johnson's division had come up, but were unable to check the progress of the enemy, who had passed the Hillsborough pike a full half mile, completely turning our flank and gaining the rear of both Walthall and Loring, whose situation was becoming perilous in the extreme. Their positions were maintained to the last possible moment, in the hope that the expected succor would arrive and restore the fight on the left. Deeming it absolutely necessary for them to fall back, orders were dispatched to that effect, when it was found that Walthall had already ordered his line to retire not a moment too soon, and this of itself made it necessary for Loring to withdraw. The latter was directed also to form along the Granny White pike (which would place him nearly at right angles to his former position) to check the anticipated rush of the enemy from his and Walthall's fronts. This was gallantly and successfully done by this fine division, the corps retiring to a position between the Granny White and Franklin pikes, when night put an end to the conflict.

Brigadier-General Sears late in the day lost a leg, and subsequently fell into the enemy's hands. All the artillery in the redoubts, the battery above mentioned, and another on Loring's line, the horses of which were killed or wounded, were captured by the enemy.

In the meantime one or two divisions from Cheatham's corps had come up on the left, where the commanding general was in person, but being separated from that part of the field I am unable to state what occurred. Also Ector's brigade, commanded by Colonel Coleman, in falling back from its position on the Hardin pike, was thrown over on the left and beyond my personal observation. The report of Colonel Coleman is, therefore, referred to for account of its operations, which I have been told were characterized by the usual intrepidity of this small but firm and reliable body of men.³

During the night of the 15th the army was placed in position to receive the attack expected at an early hour next morning. The map shows the position of this corps, it being in the center, Lee's corps on the right, Cheatham's on the left, extending from the hill occupied by Bate's division, Cheatham's corps, along the range of hills on the west side of the Granny White pike. The line of this corps extended from the side of the hill occupied by Bate across the pike, along a stone fence on east side of the pike. In rear of the line and some half mile or more distant a high ridge lies in a general east and west direction, through the gaps of which run the Franklin, Granny White, and other pikes. It was the order of the commanding general that in case of disaster Lee's corps should hold the Franklin pike, this corps retiring by that pike and taking up position at or beyond Brentwood, so as to permit Lee to withdraw, while Cheatham was to move out on the Granny White pike. Instructions accordingly were given to subordinate commanders.

At an early hour in the morning the enemy approached, placing artillery in position and opening a heavy fire, which continued almost incessantly through the day. They confronted us everywhere with a force double or treble our own. Occasional attacks were made on various parts of our lines and repulsed, though their chief efforts seemed to be directed against our flanks for the purpose of gaining the roads in our rear.. Every attack made on the lines occupied by this corps to the last was repulsed with severe loss to the enemy.

In the course of the morning, the commanding general calling on me for a brigade to go to the right flank, Ector's, being in reserve, was dispatched. It was finally sent to the hills in our rear and on the east side of the Granny White pike to drive back the enemy who had passed our left, crossed to the east side of the pike, and held this portion of the ridge. Later in the day Reynolds' (Arkansas) brigade was withdrawn from Walthall's line and sent to the assistance of Ector's. They were strong enough to check the enemy, but not sufficiently so to drive him back and regain the pass by which this pike crosses the ridge, so that retreat was cut off in that direction and greatly endangered even by the Franklin pike, the only route now left open for the whole army. At one time the enemy gained the spurs on the west side of the Granny White pike occupied by Cheatham's men, some of whom, falling back, formed parallel to Bate's line, on the south side of the hill occupied by his division, but a few hundred yards from his line and fronting in the opposite direction.

The situation then, briefly, was this: The left flank completely turned, the enemy crossing to east side of Granny White pike in our rear, and holding the ridge on that side and the pass through which this road runs. The ridge was high and steep, and extended beyond the Franklin pike to the east, and was but a short distance in rear of our line. It seemed as though in case of disaster escape was impossible. There was no reserve force that could be brought up to restore any break that might occur.

About 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon the commanding general sent for me, and while in conversation with him an officer of his staff announced that the line had given way. Not being present at the moment this took place, at least where I could witness it, and not yet being in possession of the official reports of subordinate commanders, I do not deem it proper to attempt to decide where the line first yielded. It would seem, however, that when once broken it very soon gave way everywhere, and the whole army made for the Franklin pike. In accordance with the orders of the commanding general, before alluded to, I had dispatched Major Foster, of the engineers, to find a suitable position beyond Brentwood for holding this road.

On reaching Brentwood, however, about dark, I received orders to move on to Franklin, and next morning to move toward Spring Hill and Columbia. Arriving at the latter place on the morning of the 18th, this corps took position on the north bank of Duck River, covering the passage of the entire army, and crossing about daylight of the 20th; so the following week at Tennessee River, Bainbridge, this corps covered the operations, and was the last to cross, which it did on the morning of December 28. At Columbia, a rear guard, composed of several brigades from this and the other corps, was organized and placed under the command of Major-General Walthall. This force, in connection with the cavalry, covered the retreat from Columbia to the Tennessee River.

It is due to the officers and men of this corps that I should bear testimony to their patient endurance of fatigue and privation, their cheerfulness and alacrity in obeying orders, and, above all, their heroic valor as displayed on many occasions since I have had the honor to command them, but pre-eminently at Franklin.

My thanks are due to Major-Generals Loring, Walthall, and French for their cordial co-operation and skillful management of their respective divisions, and to the several members of my staff, who have uniformly shown themselves competent, faithful, and zealous in the discharge of their duties.

I have omitted to state in its proper place that a short time after our advance to the vicinity of Nashville, Cockrell's brigade of Missourians, French's division, was ordered by the commanding general to the mouth of Duck River. It rejoined at Bainbridge, where we recrossed the Tennessee River.

Accompanying this report are maps⁴ of the fields at Franklin and Nashville, as accurate as it is possible to make them.

I deem it proper to say that after the fall of Atlanta the condition of the army and other considerations rendered it necessary, in my judgment, that an offensive campaign should be made in the enemy's rear and on his line of communications. It is not my purpose, nor does it pertain to me, to explain the reasons which prompted the campaign, but simply to express my concurrence in the views which determined the operations of the army.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEX. P. STEWART,        

Lieutenant-General.

Col. A. P. MASON,
        Assistant Adjutant-General.

_______________

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,        

Near Smithfield Depot, N. C., April 3, 1865.

SIR: In my report of the operations of my corps during the campaign made by General Hood into Tennessee I omitted the details of what transpired near Spring Hill during the afternoon and night of the 29th of November, 1864. I respectfully submit the following statement, and ask that it be filed as a part of my report:

On the morning of November 29 General Hood moved with Cheatham's corps and mine and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps (the latter reporting to me), Cheatham's corps in advance. We made a forced march to get in rear of the enemy. In the course of the afternoon, about 3 or 4 o'clock, I reached Rutherford's Creek as Cheatham's rear division was crossing. I received orders to halt and form on the south side of the creek, my right to rest on or near the creek, so as to move down the creek if necessary. Subsequently I received an order to send a division across the creek, and finally, between sunset and dark, an order was received to cross the creek, leaving a division on the south side. Johnson's division, being in rear, was designated to remain. Riding in advance of the column, about dusk, I found General Hood some half mile from the creek and about as far west of the road on which we were marching and which led to Spring Hill. The commanding general gave me a young man of the neighborhood as a guide, and told me to move on and place my right across the pike beyond Spring Hill, "your left, he added, "extending down this way." This would have placed my line in rear of Cheatham's, except that my right would have extended beyond his. The guide informed me that at a certain point the road made a sudden turn to the left, going into Spring Hill; that from this bend there used to be a road leading across to the pike, meeting it at the toll-gate some mile and a half beyond Spring Hill, toward Franklin. I told him if he could find it, that was the right road. Arriving at the bend of the road we passed through a large gateway, taking what appeared in the darkness to be an indistinct path. Within a short distance I found General Forrest's headquarters and stopped to ascertain the position of his pickets covering Cheatham's right and of the enemy. He informed me that his scouts reported the enemy leaving the direct pike--leading from Spring Hill to Franklin and Nashville-and taking the one down Carter's Creek. While in conversation with him I was informed that a staff officer from General Hood had come up and halted the column. It turned out to be a staff (engineer) officer of General Cheatham's, who informed me that General Hood had sent him to place me in position. It striking me as strange the commanding general should send an officer not of his own staff on this errand, or indeed any one, as he had given directions to me in person, I inquired of the officer if he had seen General Hood since I had. He replied that he had just come from General Hood, and that the reason why he was sent was that I was to go into position on General Brown's right (the right of Cheatham's corps), and he and General Brown had been over the ground by daylight. Thinking it possible the commanding general had changed his mind as to what he wished me to do, I concluded it was proper to be governed by the directions of this staff officer, and therefore returned to the road and moved on toward Spring Hill. Arriving near the line of Brown's division, General Brown explained his position, which was oblique to the pike, his right being farther from it than his left. It was evident that if my command were marched up and formed on his right, it being now a late hour, it would require all night to accomplish it, and the line, instead of extending across the pike, would bear away from it. Feeling satisfied there was a mistake, I directed the troops to be bivouacked, while I rode back to find the commanding general to explain my situation and get further instructions. On arriving at his quarters I inquired of him if he had sent this officer of General Cheatham's staff to place me in position. He replied that he had. I next inquired if he had changed his mind as to what he wished me to do. He replied that he had not, "But," said he, "the fact is, General Cheatham has been here and represented that there ought to be somebody an Brown's right." I explained to him that in the uncertainty I was in I had directed the troops, who had been marching rapidly since daylight, and it was now 11 p.m., to be placed in bivouac, and had come to report. He remarked, in substance, that it was not material; to let the men rest; and directed me to move before daylight in the morning, taking the advance toward Franklin. Subsequently General Hood made to me the statement:

I wish you and your people to understand that I attach no blame to you for the failure at Spring Hill; on the contrary, I know if I had had you there the attack would have been made.

Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

ALEX. P. STEWART,        

Lieutenant-General.

General S. COOPER,
        Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.

_______________

ADDENDA.

CHESTER, S.C., April 9, 1865.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Before leaving for Texas I desire to say that I am sorry to know that some of your friends thought that I intended some slight reflection on your conduct at Spring Hill. You did all that I could say or claim that I would have done under similar circumstances myself. The great opportunity passed with daylight. Since I have been informed that your friends felt that my report led to uncertainty as to yourself and troops, I regret that I did not make myself more clear in my report by going more into detail about the staff officer of General Cheatham. I only regret, general, that I did not have you with your corps in front on that day. I feel, and have felt, that Tennessee to-day would have been in our possession.

*          *          *          *          *          *          *

Your friend,

J. B. HOOD.

_______________

¹ For portion of report here omitted see Vol.XXXIX, Part 1, p. 812.

² Plate LXXII, Map 2 of the Atlas.

³ Coleman’s Report not found.

⁴ See Plate LXXIII, Maps three and 2 of the Atlas.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 707-13

Diary of Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle: Tuesday, May 19, 1863

The landlord of the Bowmont House gave a breakfast at 7 A.M. to General Gist and his Staff, to which I also was invited.

Shortly afterwards I was given a seat in a curious little vehicle belonging to Lieutenant Martino, a Spaniard, in the Confederate army. This vehicle caused considerable merriment amongst the soldiers, who called it a chicken-waggon.

We left Jackson with the leading troops about 8 A.M., amidst a great waving of handkerchiefs and showers of flowers, thrown by the few remaining ladies who were still left in that dilapidated place.

The corps under General Gist consisted of three weak brigades, the leading one composed of Georgians and South Carolinians; the next were Texans, under General Ector; and the last were Arkansians, under General M'Nair. General Gist had twelve good-looking Napoleon guns with him (twelve-pounders). The horses were fine animals, and were in wonderful good condition, considering that they had been ten days in the railroad coming from South Carolina.

The troops were roughly but efficiently clothed; their boots were in good order, and all were armed with Enfield rifles.

The weather was very hot, and we were halted to bivouac for the night, at a spot about seventeen miles from Jackson, on the road towards Vicksburg.

The straggling of the Georgians was on the grandest scale conceivable; the men fell out by dozens, and seemed to suit their own convenience in that respect, without interference on the part of the officers. But I was told that these regiments had never done any marching before, having hitherto been quartered in forts and transported by railroad.

The country is much covered with woods, and is sandy, with very little water.

I did not consider that the troops were marched judiciously; they were halted too long at a time, and not often enough. The baggage was carried on country carts pressed into the service.

We bivouacked in the woods near a very pretty house, belonging to a planter called Colonel Robinson. These immense woods make admirable bivouacs.

General State Rights Gist is a South Carolinian, only thirty-two years of age, and although not educated as a soldier, he seems easily to have adapted himself to the military profession. He looks a determined man, and he takes responsibility very coolly. In the early part of the day he was very doubtful as to the exact whereabouts of General Johnston; but about noon a courier arrived, from whom he received important and satisfactory information, otherwise General Gist had made up his mind for some “nasty work” before the junction could be effected. He told me that the present expedition was rather inconvenient to him, as he had only been married three days before he left Charleston. He lent me a magnificent rug, and I slept very comfortably in the open air for the first time since I was in Texas.

SOURCE: Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States: April-June, 1863, p. 112-4