MAJOR: I have the
honor to report, as directed by Major-General Steedman, the operations of my
command since the 20th ultimo:
On the evening of
December 19 I received orders to march with my regiment from Wauhatchie, near
Chattanooga, where I was encamped, to Bridgeport, where transports would
probably meet me to take my command to Decatur. I reached Bridgeport at 4 p.m.
on the 20th, but found no transports, and after telegraphing the facts to
General Steedman, at Murfreesborough, was directed by telegraph on the evening
of the 22d to march immediately to Huntsville. I accordingly started at 6 p.m.
the same day, but was obliged to go into camp six miles from Bridgeport, on the
bank of Widow's Creek, in consequence of that stream being past fording and of
the bridges having been swept away. I marched at daylight the next morning, and
by taking circuitous route around the source of Widow's Creek, succeeded in
reaching Stevenson with my wagons early in the afternoon. Here I met
Major-General Steedman, who had just arrived by rail from Murfreesborough, and
received from him verbal instructions to leave my wagons at Caperton's Ferry,
to be shipped by transports to Decatur, and to march as rapidly as possible
with my regiment to the same place. This march occupied four days and a half,
the rise of water in Crow Creek and Paint Rock River making it necessary to go
around by the head of Coon Creek and of Hurricane Fork of Paint Rock River,
crossing the spur of the Cumberland Mountain which divides these streams at their
source. On this route I had no difficulty in fording the water courses, and
found sufficient forage for my command. I reached the north bank of the
Tennessee River, opposite Decatur, at 1 p.m. of December 28, and by dark had
finished crossing, the infantry and artillery of the expedition, with
Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's command of cavalry, having nearly finished
crossing when I arrived at the river-bank. I at once received orders from
Major-General Steedman to take command of Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's cavalry
(detachments of the Second Tennessee and Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth
Indiana, numbering in all about 300 effective men), in connection with my own
regiment, and to advance on the Courtland road. After feeding the horses I
started at 8 p.m., and on reaching a hill two miles from Decatur saw the camp
fires of the enemy on an elevation about two miles beyond. Halting the command
I took a battalion of 130 men of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry and
advanced to reconnoitre the enemy's strength and position. On nearing the
lights their pickets fired, when I ordered my advance guard of thirty men to
charge, which they did so boldly that the enemy, who proved to be Colonel
Windes' regiment, of Roddey's command, had not time to form, but fled in disorder
down the road, followed closely by my advance guard for one mile, when the
enemy attempted to make a stand to cover his artillery. Another vigorous charge
by our advance, however, drove him from his guns (two 6-pounders), which fell
into our hands, with all the horses standing hitched to them in the road. We
then went into camp (at 10 p.m.) to rest the men and animals for the next day's
work. Thus in less than four hours after landing from the boats at Decatur we
had advanced in the night six miles in a country and against an enemy of which
we were almost entirely ignorant, and had taken possession of the camp and
artillery of his rear guard.
Early the next
morning [29th] I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser with his command on the main
Courtland road, while I advanced with the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry by the
Brown's Ferry and Courtland road, both for the purpose of meeting the flank
movement of any force that might come up from Bainbridge, where Hood's army had
but just crossed the Tennessee River, and also to enable me to get in the rear
of Roddey's force, if practicable, while he was being attacked by Colonel
Prosser in front. Colonel Prosser first encountered the enemy at Hillsborough,
five miles from our camp, and after a running skirmish of five miles more met
General Roddey's main force drawn up in two lines at Pond Spring; without
hesitation he charged it in the most gallant manner, broke both lines of the
enemy, routing him so completely that he hardly attempted to make another
stand, but fled ingloriously through Courtland and for eight miles beyond to
Town Creek, on the banks of which General Roddey succeeded in reforming such
portion of his command as had not taken advantage of their two successive
defeats to go home and spend Christmas with their families. Colonel Prosser's
attack was so vigorous that my force on the Brown's Ferry road, having several
miles the longer distance to march, and in an unknown country, did not have
time to reach the flank or rear of the enemy. Forty-five prisoners were
captured in this affair, including 3 commissioned officers; the enemy also lost
1 man killed and 2 wounded. Colonel Prosser's loss was 1 man wounded. It
appeared that Patterson's (so called) brigade, of Roddey's command, having
crossed at Bainbridge, had come up the preceding evening to Pond Spring to
re-enforce Roddey, and constituted, with the balance of Windes' regiment, the
force in our front on this day.
Being now within
half a day's march of Bainbridge, where I knew the whole of Forrest's cavalry
had but just crossed the river, it was necessary to advance with more caution.
We reached Leighton, however, thirteen miles west of Courtland, by 1 p.m. of
the next day, Friday, December 30, having skirmished nearly all the way with
flying parties of Roddey's cavalry, who attempted to delay us by burning a
bridge over Town Creek, on the Bainbridge Road, and by some show of holding the
ford of the same stream on the main Tuscumbia Road. Most of the latter force
drifted in squads southward toward the mountains, the remainder, with General
Roddey, taking the roads to Tuscumbia and Florence. Toward dark a new force
appeared in our front on the Tuscumbia Road, believed to be Armstrong's
brigade, which I afterward learned definitely had been sent back by Forrest
from Barton Station to re-enforce Roddey and protect General Hood's trains. At
Leighton I learned that Hood had commenced crossing the river at Bainbridge on
Sunday morning and finished on Tuesday evening, marching at once toward
Corinth; his railroad had never been in operation east of Cane Creek, three
miles west of Tuscumbia. I also learned that the pontoon bridge had been taken
up on Tuesday night and Wednesday morning, and that the entire pontoon train of
200 wagons had passed through Leighton on Thursday and camped at La Grange the
same night, and that it was bound for Columbus, Miss., with a comparatively
small guard. Roddey's so-called division of cavalry had apparently been relied
upon to prevent any advance of our forces until the train could get to a safe
distance, but his men had become so demoralized by their successive defeats
that we could afford to disregard him.
Having communicated
with Major-General Steedman, who left me free to make the expedition or not, as
I might deem best, I started from Leighton before daylight on Saturday morning,
December 31, taking a trail which enabled us to avoid Armstrong's force and to
get in the rear of a portion of Roddey's command at La Grange, where we
captured Col. Jim Warren, of Tenth [Fifth] Alabama Cavalry, and some other
prisoners. About 1 p.m. we passed through Russellville, where we encountered
another portion of Roddey's force, which had just arrived from Tuscumbia, and
drove it out on the Tuscaloosa road, while we kept on the Cotton-Gin or Bull
Mountain road, after the train. Some attempt was made to delay us by burning a
bridge over Cedar Creek, but we found a ford and caught up with the rear of the
pontoon train at dark, ten miles beyond Russellville. We met no resistance, and
our advance guard rode through to the front of the train, which extended for
five miles, and consisted of seventy-eight pontoon-boats and about 200 wagons,
with all the necessary accouterments and material, engineering instruments,
&c.; all the mules and oxen, except what the pontoniers and teamsters were
able to cut loose and ride off, were standing hitched to the wagons. Three
boats had been set fire to, but so carelessly that no damage had been done. We
captured a few prisoners, and went into camp at about the center of the train,
fed our horses, and I then started the entire command out in either direction
to burn the train, which was done in the most thorough manner, and occupied
till 3 a.m. 1 should have been glad to bring the pontoon train—which was built
at Atlanta last winter, and was an exceedingly well appointed one—back to our
lines, but the condition of the mules, the mountainous character of the
country, and the presence in our rear of a force of the enemy's cavalry
estimated at three times our own strength, prevented. I had also learned from a
negro servant of Captain Cobb, of the engineers, who commanded the train, that
a large supply train of General Hood, bound from Barton Station to Tuscaloosa,
was ahead.
Early next morning
(Sunday) I pushed on through Nauvoo, taking the Aberdeen road, which I knew
would flank the train. I led a detachment from near Bexar, across by a trail to
head the train on the Cotton-Gin road, and sent another, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Lamborn, to follow it, and by 10 p.m. had surprised it in
camp a few miles over the State line in Itawamba County, Miss. It consisted of
110 wagons and over 500 mules. We burned the wagons, shot or sabered all the
mules we could not lead off or use to mount prisoners, and started back. In one
of the wagons was Colonel McCrosky, of Hood's infantry, who had been badly
wounded at Franklin. I left a tent with him, some stores, and one of the prisoners
to take care of him. About twenty of the teamsters were colored U.S. soldiers
of the garrison captured by Hood at Dalton; these came back with us. We
returned via Toll-gate and the old military and Hackleburg roads, capturing an
ambulance with its guard on the way, to within twenty-five miles south of
Russellville, when I found that Roddey's force and the so-called brigades of
Biffle and Russell were already stationed in our front at Bear Creek, and on
the Biler road, toward Moulton, to retard us, while Armstrong was reported as
being in pursuit. The country was very difficult and rugged, with few roads or
trails and scarcely any forage, but we evaded, by a night march of twenty-three
miles, all the forces of the enemy except Colonel Russell, whom we attacked
unexpectedly on the Moulton and Tuscaloosa road, twelve miles east of Thorn
Hill, on Wednesday noon (Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser having the advance),
routing him so speedily and completely that he did not delay our march twenty
minutes, and this only to pick up prisoners and burn his five wagons, including
his headquarters wagons, out of which we got all the brigade and other official
papers. We had but a few hours previously captured, with its guard of three
men, a small mail bound for Tuscaloosa. About fifty or seventy-five conscripts
from both sides of the Tennessee River, that Russell was hustling off to
Tuscaloosa, were released by our attack, also eight Indiana soldiers captured
by Russell near Decatur. We then continued our march unmolested by way of Mount
Hope toward Leighton, but, learning when within ten miles of that place that
all our troops had returned to Decatur, we came on by easy marches to the same
post, reaching it on Friday evening, 6th instant.
The whole distance
marched from the time of leaving Decatur, nine days previously, was 265, and
about 400 miles from the time of leaving Chattanooga, two weeks and three days
previous.
My entire command
numbered less than 600 men, consisting of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania (Anderson)
Cavalry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Charles B. Lamborn, and detachments of the
Second Tennessee and Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Indiana Cavalry, commanded
by Lieut. Col. William F. Prosser. To these officers and all those under them,
much credit is due for their gallantry and energy, as well as to all their men,
for the dash and courage with which they attacked any enemy that appeared, and
for the patient manner in which they bore, on the most scanty rations, the
severe fatigue of this expedition. I desire particularly to recommend for
honorable mention in general orders Sergt. Arthur P. Lyon, of Company A, of the
Anderson Cavalry, for repeated acts of marked bravery during this short
campaign, including the capture of two pieces of artillery, which fell into his
hands on the night of December 28, six miles from Decatur, on the Courtland
road, by a daring charge of our advance guard of fifteen inert, which he led on
this occasion.
We took about 150
prisoners after leaving Leighton, including 2 colonels (one of whom was left in
consequence of his wounds), 2 captains, and 6 lieutenants, and destroyed in all
between 750 and 1,000 stand of arms, and captured a considerable number of
pistols.
Our entire loss, 1
man killed and 2 wounded, all of Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's command, in the
charge on Russell's force.
The whole of
Forrest's cavalry, except Armstrong's brigade, was at Okolona, Miss., within
one day's march of us, when the supply train was captured. He had been sent
there as soon as he crossed at Bainbridge, on Tuesday evening, to repel our
cavalry from Memphis, who had destroyed the railroad for twenty miles near and
above Okolona. I do not think General Hood brought across the Tennessee River
at Bainbridge more than 12,000 infantry and thirty-five pieces of artillery.
Assistant Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. District of the Etowah.
Ass. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Dept. of the Cumberland, Nashville:
CAPTAIN: As
supplementary to my report of my operations in North Alabama, directed to be
sent in by the major-general commanding, I inclose a copy of a letter from
Major-General Steedman, which left me free to make the expedition after the
enemy's pontoon train or not, as I might deem best.
COLONEL: Your
dispatch just received. The infantry, if it should move now, could not reach
Leighton before 2 a.m. to-morrow. You will, therefore, have to exercise your
own judgment as to whether you can safely make the expedition without support
from the infantry. It is fair to suppose that the pontoon train has a guard at
least equal to your own force. The service of your command will be needed to
scout in the direction of the river and Tuscumbia. I do not wish you to break
down your horses, but leave you free to make the expedition, if you think you
can do it with perfect safety. Send me a commissioned officer with twenty-five
of your men for courier duty. Please inform me whether you pursue the train or
not.
