Showing posts with label Councils of War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Councils of War. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 10, 2024

Major-General Henry W. Slocum to L. H. Morgan, January 2, 1864

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH CORPS,                
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,        
TULLAHOMA, TENN., January 2d, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR:

I presume you have read Meade's Report of the battle of Gettysburg. I can imagine the feeling that its perusal has caused you. I have not met a sensible man who has read it, either soldier or civilian, who has not felt disappointed on reading it. It purports to be the official history of the most important contest of modern times a contest in which our troops fought with a valor and determination never before exhibited and the only evidence in the entire report which tends to prove this heroism is contained in the closing sentence, "our losses were very severe, amounting to 23,186." Your disappointment must have been greater from the fact that the true history of the operations on the right had already been made known to you by me, and Meade's report is a plain contradiction of almost every statement I have ever written to you. It is in direct conflict with my official report, and the reports of all my subordinate commanders. My first impulse on reading his report was to ask for a court of inquiry. I was prompted to this course not so much from personal consideration, as from a desire to have justice done to General Williams and his division.

Although Meade professed the warmest friendship for me, and the utmost confidence in me, not only during the entire battle, but at all times subsequent to it while I remained in his army, yet in his report he utterly ignores me. That he did repose this confidence in me, and that he placed the right wing entirely under my control, I have abundant written evidence now in my possession. In proof of this I enclose a copy of an order sent me during the battle, showing that he had sent part of Sedgwick's corps to me, and that without visiting me or my portion of the line, he wished me to place it in a central position where he could use it as soon as I could I also enclose a copy it. spare of an order received at ten-twenty A. M., on July second, directing me to move from the strong position we then held, and with the Fifth and Twelfth Corps, then under my command, and the Sixth, which was hourly expected, to attack the enemy. The latter order was not obeyed because every general officer consulted on the subject deemed it unwise to leave the almost impregnable position we then held.

I send you copies of these orders to convince you that although my name is not mentioned in the report, yet I really occupied the position and had the commands mentioned in my former letters. At no time was I in command of less than two corps during the entire campaign, and during all the battle the right wing was entrusted entirely to me—a position to which my rank entitled me. Williams commanded the Twelfth Corps, and was at all times during the battle treated as a corps commander by Meade. He was invited by him to the council with other corps commanders, and yet no mention is made of this fact in the report. Nor is Williams's name or that of his division to be found in it. I finally gave up the idea of asking for a court of inquiry, knowing that the interests of the service could not be promoted by such a course. I wrote a letter to Meade, however, asking him to correct his report, a copy of which I enclose. There is much secret history connected with the Gettysburg campaign which will some day be made public. The proceedings of a secret council of the corps commanders held the night before the enemy crossed the river was at once divulged, and the remarks of Meade, Warren and Pleasanton published to the world in full. It was for the interest of Meade that this publication should be made; and there is no doubt that publicity was given to it with his consent, if not through his direct instrumentality. There were other councils, however, the proceedings of which were not made public and which never will be published with the consent of Meade.

On the evening of July second a council was called, and each corps commander was asked his opinion as to the propriety of falling back towards Washington that night. The majority opposed it, and after the vote was taken Meade declared that "Gettysburg was no place to risk a battle;" and there is no doubt but for the decision of his corps commanders, the army on the third of July would have been in full retreat. The 4th of July, 1863, instead of being a day of rejoicing throughout the North, would have been the darkest day ever known to our country. This piece of history can be verified by the records of that council kept by Butterfield, and cannot have been forgotten by any officer present.

On the fourth of July nearly every corps commander urged an immediate movement, but my corps was kept three days in idleness. In the meantime the enemy reached Hagerstown, took up his new line, and had abundant time to fortify. At the council held on the thirteenth of July, by which "Meade was overruled," the following question was proposed to each officer, viz.: "Shall we, without further knowledge of the position of the enemy, make an attack?"

Previous to putting the question, Meade answered that he could get no knowledge of the position of the enemy. This announcement, together with the peculiar phraseology of the question, indicated the decision the commanding general anticipated. He offered no remarks until a vote was taken, and the question answered in the negative. He then made some general remarks about "the necessity of doing something," which was approved by all. Having "placed himself right on record," as the politicians would say, he retired. This record he at once used to sustain himself at the expense of his brother officers, although the action of these officers was precisely what he desired and anticipated it would be when he framed the question.

You may think this a hard charge to bring against a soldier, but I believe I am fully justified in making it. There are circumstances which I will make known to you when we meet which will convince you that I have not done him injustice.

As long as this war continues I shall pursue the course I have thus far followed. I shall ask for no court, enter into no controversy, write no letters. But when the danger has passed from us many facts will come to light, giving to the public a better knowledge of the real history of this war than can be obtained through the medium of such reports as that written by General Meade. Very respectfully,

Your Obt. Servant,
H. W. SLOCUM.
Hon. L. H. MORGAN,
Syracuse, N. Y.

SOURCE: New York (State). Monuments Commission for the Battlefields of Gettysburg and Chattanooga, In Memoriam: Henry Warner Slocum, 1826-1894, p. 83-5

Saturday, September 30, 2023

Diary of Private Theodore Reichardt, Saturday, July 20, 1861

Quiet during the day. About six o'clock in the evening the army got ready to advance; but after council of war was held by the chief commanders, they concluded to wait till the next day.

SOURCE: Theodore Reichardt, Diary of Battery A, First Regiment Rhode Island Light Artillery, p. 11

Saturday, May 8, 2021

Diary of Corporal David L. Day: May 25, 1863

THE BOYS' STORY.

For the past day or two I have been a good deal amused and interested in hearing the boys relate their adventures at Dover and Gum swamps. Their stories conflict a little, but as: near as I can make it out I fix up a little story: To prepare little, we hold an outpost and signal station some twelve miles up the railroad, it Bachellor's creek towards Kinston. This is garrisoned by the 58th Pennsylvania, Col. Jones. He is one of those stirring, active, restless sort of men, always finding out everything and getting interested in it. Well, he had discovered an outpost of the enemy some ten or twelve miles in his front and some six miles this side of Kinston, at a place called Gum swamp, and garrisoned by a considerable force. Now it occurred to him that it would be a capital joke to capture that post. So he comes down and shows his plans to the general, asking permission and troops to carry them out. He knew just who was there and how many; he had been around that swamp half a dozen times and knew all about it. That suited the general; he patted Jones on the back, called him a good fellow and told him to sail in, and he should have all the troops he wanted.

On the afternoon of the 21st, the 25th, with two or three other regiments, went aboard the cars for Bachellor's creek. Not feeling very well, I was excused from going. Arriving at the creek, Col. Jones with his regiment heads the column, and leads off into the woods. This was a night march, and just here I will explain that always on the march, whether day or night, all the officers that are mounted (and any of them can be who will take the trouble to steal an old horse or mule), have a disagreeable habit of riding up and down the column, opening it to the right and left, and those that have the least business do the most riding: The boys have become so accustomed to jumping out each side of the road on hearing Right, and Left, that this is about the first thing they do on hearing almost any order. .

THEY SEE A GHOST OR SOMETHING.

Sometime towards midnight the boys heard the cry, "Right and Left, double quick !” They made a jump, and just then what appeared to them like a streak of greased lightning went down the line. They say it wasn't a horse or man or anything they ever saw, and they are so filled with the marvelous and supernatural that some of them actually think they saw some sort of phantom or ghost. What they saw was probably a frightened deer or fox, but in the lone, dark woods, and near the witching hour of midnight, with their nerves and imaginations strained to their utmost tension, expecting that any moment, almost anything might happen, it is not surprising that they could see ghosts, phantoms and witches. But it is laughable to hear them tell it.

A COUNCIL OF WAR.

Soon after midnight they reached Core creek. Here they halted to rest and concert their plans. It was agreed that Jones, with his regiment and the 27th Massachusetts should make a detour around and gain the rear of the enemy, while the others were engaging their attention in front. When they heard him thundering in the rear, they were to charge in, and bag the whole swag. The plan was successfully carried out, so far as the charging in was concerned, but as they charged in most of the enemy charged out on either flank and escaped. They met with partial success, however, as they captured 165 prisoners, one 12-pounder gun, fifty horses and mules, and destroyed their camp and earthworks. The conflict was not very severe, as they had only five or six men slightly wounded. After having accomplished their object and sending off their trophies, instead of immediately starting on their return march, they lingered amid the scenes of their triumphs until late in the afternoon, when the enemy in force, swooped down upon them, cutting them off from the railroad and with shot and shell greatly accelerated their retreat.

THE RETREAT.

Late in the evening they reached Core creek, and being a little beyond pursuit, halted to rest. But instead of forcing the march and reaching our lines the same night, they crouched down and remained till morning. Then they discovered the enemy on three sides of them, with an almost impenetrable swamp on the other. This was Dover swamp, and as near as I can judge was similar to the one we went through on Roanoke island, only of greater extent.

There was only one choice, and that must be quickly accepted. Into the swamp they plumged, with mud and water to their knees, and thick tangle brush and briars higher than their heads. They could go only in single file, and their progress was slow and tedious. Towards noon they were met by another enemy; the water in their canteens had given out and they began to experience an intolerable thirst. With a burning sun above them and scarcely a breath of air, with all manner of insects, reptiles and creeping things around them, their condition was indeed pitiable. Still they pressed forward, some of them filtering the slimy, muddy water through their caps or handkerchiefs and drinking it, but it served better as in emetic than for quenching thirst. About 2 p. m., they emerged from the swamp, and nearly dying from exhaustion, reached our lines at Bachellor's creek. Here they had rest and refreshment, after which they boarded the cars and arrived back to camp about night, tired, ragged, covered with mud and completely played out. This was their Gum swamp excursion as they tell it. After the boys had left for home, the enemy still hovered around the vicinity of Col. Jones' camp, and in his impulsive way he went out to meet them, and while skirmishing with them was shot dead. The enemy soon afterwards retired. Col. Jones was a brave man but of rather rash judgement.

SOURCE: David L. Day, My Diary of Rambles with the 25th Mass. Volunteer Infantry, p. 91-3 

Tuesday, December 12, 2017

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General George G. Meade, July 13, 1863 – 9:30 p.m.

WASHINGTON, D.C., July 13, 1863 9.30 p.m.
Maj. Gen. GEORGE G. MEADE,
Army of the Potomac:

Yours of 5 p.m. is received. You are strong enough to attack and defeat the enemy before he can effect a crossing. Act upon your own judgment and make your generals execute your orders. Call no council of war. It is proverbial that councils of war never fight. Re-enforcements are pushed on as rapidly as possible. Do not let the enemy escape.

H. W. HALLECK,    
General-in-Chief.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 92

Tuesday, July 8, 2014

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, July 14, 1863

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, July 14, 1863.

I found Lee in a very strong position, intrenched. I hesitated to attack him, without some examination of the mode of approaching him. I called my corps commanders together, and they voted against attacking him. This morning, when I advanced to feel his position and seek for a weak point, I found he had retired in the night and was nearly across the river. I immediately started in pursuit, and my cavalry captured two thousand prisoners, two guns, several flags, and killed General Pettigrew. On reporting these facts to General Halleck, he informed me the President was very much dissatisfied at the escape of Lee. I immediately telegraphed I had done my duty to the best of my ability, and that the expressed dissatisfaction of the President I considered undeserved censure, and asked to be immediately relieved. In reply he said it was not intended to censure me, but only to spur me on to an active pursuit, and that it was not deemed sufficient cause for relieving me.1 This is exactly what I expected; unless I did impracticable things, fault would be found with me. I have ignored the senseless adulation of the public and press, and I am now just as indifferent to the censure bestowed without just cause.

I start to-morrow to run another race with Lee.
_______________

1 For telegram mentioned, see Appendix C.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 134

Monday, February 24, 2014

Major General George B. McClellan to Edwin M. Stanton, March 13, 1862

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fairfax Court. House, Va., March 13, 1862.

HON. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:

The council of commanders of army corps have unanimously agreed upon a plan of operations. General McDowell will at once proceed with it to Washington and lay it before you.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-general, U S. Army.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 51, Part 1 (Serial No. 107), p. 551