This was the real christening fight of the regiment, and was
badly managed. In the assault on greatly superior numbers, the brigade was
marched in line of battle in quick time through the forest which was fiercely
shelled, as though at drill, the men not breaking — at least not in the Tenth
Vermont — until within about seventy-five yards of the enemy's unusually strong
and favorably posted skirmish line behind a very high rail fence in the edge of
a large cleared field in the midst of the forest, a corner of which field
opposite the three left companies of the regiment formed an acute angle
slightly less than a right angle, the two long sides of which opposite us being
skirted by a Virginia rail fence eight rails or more in height, in the edge of
the woods, considerably higher than a man's head.
When in the woods in a ravine running parallel to the long
base of the triangle directly in front — the sharp angle to the right — with
gradually upward sloping ground toward the enemy about seventy-five yards away,
the three left companies under severe fire had considerably curved to the rear,
each being a little further back than the one on its right, as usual in such
circumstances, which brought Company B being on the left of the regiment, not
only exposed to the severest fire, but the furtherest to the rear of any. With
reason, as unwisely no order had been given to fire in Company B, and the men
being inexperienced and supposing they had got to await orders to do so as at
drill, the line commenced to waver, when Colonel Albert B. Jewett approached from
the rear and cried out loudly, among other things: “Company B, what's the
matter?” or to that effect. As a matter of fact there was matter enough,
which he soon found after arriving, as he not only wisely sought cover himself,
but someone ordered the men to do so by lying down. There were no troops
immediately on the left of Company B and it drew the fire of the enemy's
Infantry behind the fence, not only in front, but for some, distance to the
left; and as the ground occupied by the enemy was considerably higher the
situation was most trying. I am aware it is claimed that the regiment was in
the centre of the brigade,1 but if it was, the regiment on its left
was out of sight, and as it was almost a dead level along the ravine as far as
the eye could reach through the woods from Company B which was on the left of
the regiment, it couldn't be seen by me. It is not probable this and many other
similar errors are the faults of the painstaking and estimable Historian Dr. E.
M. Haynes, but it is more probably due to erroneous official reports of battles
of regimental, brigade and other commanders as well as unreliable verbal
reports, etc., which when once in history are hard to correct. When forming,
too, for the assault, Lieut. Ezra Stetson who was in command of Company B stood
in front of it, and supposing he was going to advance in that position, I (then
Second Lieutenant Company D, but assigned to fight with my old Company B that
day), also took my position in front of the Company expecting to advance in the
same way, but was finally ordered just before advancing, by Stetson, to go to
the right of the front rank in line, where I supposed In my ignorance of
warfare, although a fair tactician, I had got to remain and did until the line
broke in the second advance, Stetson meantime being a novice in fighting men in
battle, going to the rear of the Company. As it may be convenient for the good
of the service for some to cite this battle, together with others, to Congressmen
as an important reason why men with no experience in battle should never be
placed in high position to command men especially in the regular army where it
can generally be avoided, I feel constrained to state that the derisive smile
and expression on the men's faces, etc., as I turned to obey Stetson's order
plainly showed that they disapproved of any such arrangement and persistently
hung back in the advance in consequence, which to say the least, was very
embarrassing to a proud spirit, my pride being very much centered in my old
Company, which I knew, if properly handled, would give a good account of
itself. Several times I was greatly tempted to go in front of the men and lead
them, as it was plain to be seen they sensibly wouldn't be driven at a slow
gait into battle like so many lambs for slaughter without even being given the
command to fire when within a stone's throw of the enemy, which with deadly aim
was shooting them down deliberately, for there was nothing to prevent its doing
so on our part, and why shouldn't it do so? It was war, that's what we were
there for, and being veteran fighters they took advantage of the situation. Who
wouldn't? The only trouble with us was there wasn't anyone with authority from
the highest officer down on that part of the line, who knew how to fight the
command or if there was they didn't do it. But they were not to blame for it.
Who was? It was the Congress which makes the laws for the Government of the
army; it has never enacted a law as important as it is, making it impossible to
appoint men to high army positions who have never been in battle enough to know
how to take care of their men, or to tell the officers of their command how to
do so.
But realizing that to lead the Company and make a dash for
the fence would be virtually taking the command from my superior officer, and
only at that time having a crude idea of such things even in such an emergency,
I held my peace, although the comparatively simple act of leading men in battle
in the circumstances, as some Company Commanders did in this fight, would have
been much more satisfactory to my troubled spirit than otherwise. As First
Sergeant it was generally acknowledged I had made Company B the best drilled
and disciplined Company in the regiment, and feeling much genuine pride in the
Company I had never felt more anxious for it than in this battle, as I wanted
it to give a good account of itself as a good fighting Company as well, which
it did in the latter part of the battle, when it largely went over the fence in
an endeavor to help make the star movement of the day, but which it failed in
helping to do, because of the weakness of some of the left Company Commanders
of the regiment. Although General Wm, H. Morris in his official report of the
fight cites this movement as due to enthusiasm on the part of the men on the
left of the Tenth Vermont, had he been on that part of the line he would not
only have commended it in stronger terms than he did, but if a good strategist
would have insisted on the movement being executed as if it was worth while to
engage the enemy at all here — which is now greatly doubted as Meade's army
wasn't then ready for a general engagement—it was certainly worth while to try
and turn the enemy's flank at this point, which could have been done by
advancing the three left companies of the regiment by a two-thirds right turn
or wheel across the before mentioned angle to the second fence. The enemy
understood the importance of the move, which was one reason doubtless that made
them contest so stubbornly the first line of fence. This we tried to do and in
the second assault the men, led by some of the most daring wisely broke and
made a dash for the first fence and over it half across the open field of the
triangle to the second fence when we were recalled to the first behind which
most had stopped and opened fire, including Stetson, Captain Hiram R. Steele
and others. I was the only officer over the fence, so far as seen by me, and had
fearlessly endeavored seeing at a glance an opportunity for an effective flank
movement which would greatly relieve the entire brigade to the right to take
the second line of fence on the opposite side of the triangle, which was just
what was needed, and which could have been done if the movement had been
supported with vim by the entire left wing of the regiment. During the day
private G. D. Storrs was killed, and Sergeant H. M. Pierce, of Montpelier, and
privates John Blanchard and Lafayette G. Ripley, of Barre, Peter Bover, H. W.
Crossett, J. M. Mather and W. M. Thayer, and perhaps others of Company B, all
brave good men, were so badly wounded as to disable most of them, such as did
not die, for the balance of the war for duty at the front; but two or more of
these died of their wounds.
Feeling nettled, although not in command of Company B, and
not responsible for its behavior, at Colonel Jewett's brusque manner towards it
in the ravine, when it was discovered that the flank movement before mentioned,
would be a failure for want of support, in order to say I had been the
furtherest to the front of anyone over the fence or in the regiment, I
foolishly ran forward under heavy fire a few steps after ordered back, to a big
stump, hit it with my sword savagely, as I was disgusted at not being fully
supported, when on turning round I found myself alone with bullets flying about
me faster than ever, and the men rapidly scaling the fence twenty-five yards in
rear on the left in full retreat from the angle. The men of Company B had gone
the furtherest ahead of any over the fence, Stetson and others repeatedly
calling, “Come back! Come back!” As usual, whenever there was an exceedingly
hot place on the line of battle in our front, Alexander Scott, A. H. Crown and
others of the Burlington Company (D), as well as Z. M. Mansur, the Bruces, W.
H. Blake, Judson Spofferd, J. W. Bancroft and others of Company K, were sure to
be there fighting vigorously in the very front, as most of them were on this
occasion. Fully forty or more men were with me from the three left companies,
and it is regretted more of them can't be remembered by name, but the movement
was too quickly executed, to go minutely into details, and forty years is a
long time for a professional soldier where he has had to do with so many
enlisted men meantime, to remember names.
Says General W. H. Morris in his official report of this
battle which as a whole is not in the best judgment, although he was a brave,
courageous man: “The enemy was holding a fence on the crest of a hill in our
front. I ordered the Tenth Vermont to charge and take it, and the regiment
advanced in gallant style and took the crest. The left wing in its enthusiasm
having advanced too far beyond the fence, it was necessary to recall it * * * I
cannot speak of the conduct of the officers and men with too much praise.” The
regiment's loss was seventy-one killed and wounded, of which eight were from
Company B. This loss was as needless as the fight, as we suspected at the time,
and as history has proved since.
Like most other engagements the most deserving who are
generally on the fighting line where their work is not usually seen by such as
can reward them in orders or otherwise, it was favorite staff officers and pets
who were mentioned for gallantry in general orders afterwards. Had the men
advanced less regularly in line as at drill, more independently and rapidly,
firing meantime when in range of the enemy, our loss in comparison with what it
was would have been insignificant. All the rest of the brigade had a less
trying time of it than the three left companies of the Tenth Vermont, as they
were advancing through the woods with no open field in front with two natural
lines of breastworks, such as the formidable rail fences which bordered both
long sides of the triangle before mentioned. This statement is in justice to
the three left companies of the Tenth Vermont. The manner in which they stood
the galling fire without breaking shows what splendid discipline they were
under. I commanded all three companies afterwards in battle separately, and
felt honored in doing so. There were few skulkers in these companies in any
battle they were ever in when under my command. This battle is another
illustration of the folly of appointing men inexperienced in scientific warfare
to high military office if it can be avoided, and it generally can be in time
of peace, especially in the regular army. Every army, Corps, Division, Brigade
and Regimental Commander, should be a man who has had enough actual experience
in fighting to know how to take care of his men in battle. If such had been the
case in this fight, comparatively few men would have been killed or wounded. It
is criminal to make any man a general, especially in the regular army, who has
not had enough experience in actual fighting to know how to fight his command
without an unnecessary loss of life; and Congress which has the authority and
is indirectly responsible in such matters, should make laws such as will render
it impossible to do so except in. emergencies, and until it does so every
individual member of Congress, will be criminally guilty before God for every
man so sacrificed in battle. It is not known to me whose fault it was that
orders were not given to advance more rapidly, and to fire sooner in the fight
at Locust Grove.
_______________
* No diary was kept at this time by Major Abbott, hence the
details of this battle are given here.
1 See Haynes’ “Hist. Tenth Regiment Vermont Infantry,” p. 54
SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections
and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 247-56
