Senator Charles Sumner to John Bigelow, October 24, 1851

I heard of your illness, while I was in New York, with great regret. Time and distance did not allow me to see you at your suburban retreat, although I wished very much to confer with you, particularly on the subject of your letter. Let me say frankly, however, that I despair of any arrangement by which any candidate can be brought out on the Democratic side so as to receive active support from antislavery men. Nor do I see much greater chance on the Whig side. The tendency of both the old parties at present is to national conventions; and in both of these our cause will perish. The material for a separate organization, by which to sustain our principles, seems to exist nowhere except in Massachusetts. Had the Barnburners kept aloof from the Hunkers in 1849, the Democratic split would have been complete throughout the free States, and it would have affected sympathetically the Whig party. A new order of things would have appeared, and the beginning of the end would have been at hand. But the work in some way is to be done over. There will be no peace until the slave-power is subdued. Its tyranny must be overthrown, and freedom, instead of slavery, must become the animating idea of the national government. But I see little chance of any arrangement or combination by which this truly Democratic idea can be promoted in the next Presidential contest.

The politicians are making all their plans to crush us, and they seem to be succeeding so well that all our best energies and most unflinching devotion to principles can alone save us. For myself I see no appreciable difference between Hunker Democracy and Hunker Whiggery: in both, all other questions are lost in the 'single idea' of opposition to the Free Soil sentiment. Nor can I imagine any political success, any party favor or popular reward, which would tempt me to compromise in any respect the independent position which I now hold.

It is vain to try to get rid of this question of the slave-power except by victory over it; and our best course, it seems to me, is to be always ready for the contest. But I am a practical man, and desire to act in such way as best to promote the ideas which we have at heart. If you can show me the road, I am ready to follow. . . The two years before us will be crucial years, years of the Cross. But I know that better times will soon come. For God's sake, stand firm! I hope John Van Buren will not allow himself to be enmeshed in any of the tempting arrangements for mere political success. He is so completely committed to our cause that he can hope for nothing except by its triumph. I know no one who has spoken a stronger or more timely word for us than he has. I am much attached to him personally. I admire his abilities, and am grateful for what he has done; but I feel that if he would surrender himself more unreservedly to the cause he would be more effective still. Few have such powers.

SOURCE: Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, Vol. 3, p. 255-6

Charles Sumner to Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, January 24, 1850

[January 24, 1850.]

DEAR HENRY,

Whittier is here on a short visit. I go to-night with Miss Bremer to hear Wendell Phillips, and to-morrow evening dine out, or I should insist upon taking him [Whittier] to you. He is staying at the Quincy Hotel, in Brattle Street.

I regret the sentiments of John Van Buren about mobs, but rejoice that he is right on slavery. I do not know that I should differ very much from him in saying that we have more to fear from the corruption of wealth than from mobs. Edmund Dwight once gave, within my knowledge, two thousand dollars to influence a single election. Other men whom we know very well are reputed to have given much larger sums. It is in this way, in part, that the natural antislavery sentiment of Massachusetts has been kept down; it is money, money, money, that keeps Palfrey from being elected. Knowing these things, it was natural that John Van Buren should say that we had more to fear from wealth than from mobs. He is a politician,—not a philanthropist or moralist, but a politician, like Clay, Winthrop, Abbott Lawrence; and he has this advantage, that he has dedicated his rare powers to the cause of human freedom. In this I would welcome any person from any quarter.

SOURCE: Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, Vol. 3, p. 212

Henry L. Benning* to Howell Cobb, February 23, 1848

Columbus [ga.], 23d Feby., 1848.

Dear Howell, You ask me to write you soon and fully my views of Cass's letter and Dickinson's resolution. I have had so much to do lately that I could not attempt an answer until now, although your letter of the 3d inst., has been on hand for a fortnight. What you require of me involves, I think, my opinion as to the course which ought to be pursued by the democatic party to secure the next Presidency. On a question of such magnitude I am not prepared to speak with confidence; and yet upon your invitation . . . I will venture a suggestion or two.

First then, I do not object to Mr. Dickinson's resolutions. Still I must say that they are not precisely the thing according to my notion of what the exigency demands. The sins are chiefly sins of omission. The resolutions do not declare what principle ought to govern in the interval between the time of acquiring territory and the time at which the people thereof may choose to settle those “questions of domestic policy”, which it is left to them to settle.

Again, they very indistinctly, if at all, condemn the principle of the Wilmot proviso. If I am not mistaken in that principle, it is that Congress may prohibit slavery in acquired territory as long as it remains territory. Now, Mr. D's resolutions say no more than that Congress cannot do anything inconsistent with the right of the people of the territories to form themselves into States equally sovereign with the old states. The W. Proviso principle is not inconsistent with this right. That which it is inconsistent with is the right of the people of the territories to hold slaves therein if Congress forbids.

Once more, no general principle is announced by the resolutions upon the question of the quantity of territory we ought to require from Mexico in a treaty of peace. Perhaps these omissions are merits, but I venture to think not, and more audacious still, to send you what I deem the remedy in three resolutions, or rather two, ac companying this. The first is new, the second, one of Mr. D's unchanged, and the third is the other of his with some additions important but not in my opinion affecting the abstract principle on which the resolution rests.

Why these alterations? Let us consider for a moment the strength of the two parties in a sectional point of view. We see the Whig majorities, both certain and expected, chiefly in the free states, the Democratic in the slave. We see also already organized in some of the important free states a third party having naturally more sympathy with the Whigs than with the Democrats, and in the other free states no inconsiderable amount of the same third party in the state of raw material. If we add together the votes of the certain free Whig states, 51, and of those in which the abolitionists are supposed by the Whigs to have a casting vote, viz, N. Y. 36, Pa. 26, Ind. 12, Me. 9, N. H. 6, we shall have 51 plus 84 equals 135. Now even allowing for Wisconsin, 143 elects, so that those free states with either Ky. 12, N. C. 11, or Mo. 8, may dictate their man. We see too in New York strong symptoms of this abolition element becoming truly formidable, and in Pa. we distrust somewhat—a very little—the ability of the new soldiers under the banner of free trade to resist the temptation which the enemy will assuredly offer them in the resurrection of the Act of 1842. Further, we behold the Whigs in their conventions, legislatures and public meetings North already adopting the Wilmot Proviso, and on the other hand the Democrats generally ejecting the “perilous stuff” from their stomachs, as witness the letters and speeches of Buchanan, Dallas, Cass, etc., Dickinson's resolutions, and the general tone of the press. Seeing all this and much more of the same sort, are we not obliged to infer as a thing accomplished, 1st: That the Whigs intend to bid for Abolition bodaciously? And 2d: That they can afford to bid higher for it than can the Democrats, supposing the latter base enough to enter the lists? And are we not bound also to admit that true policy demands of the Democrats to endeavor to counteract the effect of the fusion of the two factions into one? Can this be done at all except by looking to the slave states?

If, however, we carry the slave states, we have but 117 votes. It won't do, then, to hazard the loss of much of our strength in the free states. The problem is to gain South and not lose North. It is the aim of the resolutions which I send you to solve it.

First then, I say that the Whigs reckon without their host when they count upon absorbing abolition, because they will nominate either Clay or Taylor; and the abolitionists, the honestly mad ones, will die at the stake before they will vote for the reprobate who dares say in word or deed that man may hold property in man— may traffic and trade in human flesh—particularly when his opponent will be a non-slaveholder and a patriot competent to utter any amount of innocent but "moral and religious sentiment" against the “peculiar institution.” What says 1844? Has Mr. Clay set his negroes free since? And Genl. Taylor, a sugar planter, on the poisonous banks of the Mississippi; he is in a much worse predicament, beyond the reach of any fable in Æsop, because by his avowed innocence of all knowledge of political questions and by his self-imposed inexorable taciturnity he will not be able even to tell the abolitionists so much as that he believes slavery to be a great moral and political evil.

But suppose this eccentric faction shedding from its humid hair pestilence upon the nations shall, contrary to the best founded expectations, flying from its orb, sink into the sun of Whiggery. Console yourself because you could not by any possibility prevent it, and because all will not be lost. Democracy will have over-balancing accessions from other sources. The last four years have been fruitful in the product of every good thing, including voters, both indigenous and naturalized. It is not extravagant, I think, for our party to reckon upon two thirds of the former and nine tenths of the latter. Why there are but three modes, or rather two and a half, suggested for conducting the war — to fight, to tax, and to take — which is one; to back clean out of a conquered country, telling the cutthroats that we were unrighteously, unconstitutionally, and damnably there from the first, which is two — to back partly out to an unnamed line, going we only know from ocean to ocean, across the continent where it is all desert and mountain, and there to fight to the very death, provided always that any enemy should dare come up and knock a chip off of Jonathan's head — which is half a one. Now, will any but the old fools (of all fools the worst you know) take up with the second or third of these plans? The young have no more sense than to believe that war is war—blood, chains, gold, territory, and no more “sentiment” than to smite, to rivet, to sieze, and to annex. They feel that woe to the vanquished is weal to the victor. We may call these young fellows ours. How many are there? The New York Herald says 800,000 — two thirds of that number are 530,000, half of which 260.000 would be the excess in our favor. Of them 160 or 170 thousand are in the free states. Then the naturalized vote must be quite large. Again, how Democratic the Army is becoming, even the regulars. Every letter from it will be a personal appeal to father, brother, friends, to put down those who give aid and comfort to the enemy. Above all, our annexation policy must bring recruits from all classes and quarters. All this being so, are we not able to despise the nauseous compound?

How, then, are we to “gain South”? I say by the principle contained in the last clause of the third of the resolutions, declaring that citizens of the slave states may settle with their slaves in the acquired territory until such time as the people thereof see fit to forbid it by legislation. The adoption of this will not carry a single slave into such territory, not one, but it will carry many a vote into the ballot box. Mere barren option, never to be availed of tho' it is, still the candidate who refused it could not at the South in a contest with one who conceded it stand a fire of blank cartridges. What Hotspur felt is nature:

I'd give thrice as much land to any well deserving friend.

But in the way of Bargain I'd cavil on the ninth part of a hair.

But won't its adoption do us more harm at the North than even so much good as this at the South can outweigh? It is not possible. Remember how far Dickinson's untouched resolutions go. These say “it is best” (mind you only expediency) to leave questions of domestic policy, that is whether there shall or shall not be slavery, to the people of the territory. So then it is best to let the people there make it a slave territory if they will. Going thus far will not damage us, it is agreed. Why? Because the good sense of the people North sees that such a permission is a mere vanity. Like laying duties upon cotton — or coal at Newcastle. Now how much further does my amendment go? It only affirms that it is best (expediency too) on many momentous accounts to permit the citizens of all the states to have an equal right of removal into the acquired territory and of holding there as property whatever they held as such where they came from. It does not affirm that such “citizens” have a right to do this or that Congress has not the right to forbid it. The constitutional question, so difficult, such a tool of death in the hands of madmen whether at the North or the South, is honorably and fairly got rid of, as indeed it is in Dickinson's original resolution to the extent to which it goes. For the most that can be made out of the expression “by leaving”, “by permitting” is that it is doubtful whether Congress has power on this subject “to bind and to loose” and therefore that it ought not to interfere to do either. Now, if the reasons assigned by Buchanan, Cass, etc., are sufficient to prove the harmlessness of leaving the question of slavery to the people of the territory, they are equally sufficient to prove the harmlessness of permitting all citizens to remove into the territory with their slaves and there to hold them in bondage. Those reasons amount to this, that the interest of slaveholders will prevent them from wishing to cross the Rio Bravo with their slaves, and so of course the people to pass the laws on the subject to slavery, being all non-slaveholders, will prohibit it. Why is it the interest of the slaveholder to keep away? On account of incompatibility of soil, climate, productions, danger of loss by facilities for escape, and on account of the region being now by the laws of Mexico free. Every one of these reasons will still affect the interest of the slaveholder to the same extent if my amendment should be adopted. It may be said that one of those reasons, viz: that drawn from the fact that the territory is now by law free and a slave going there would become free on touching the soil, would not apply if slave owners were “permitted” to take their slaves and hold them as such in the territory. Practically it is all the same. I submit that a prudent slaveholder will be as shy of putting himself and his slaves in the power of Mexican laws to be made, as of those already made. Very well. The good sense of Northern Democracy can as easily see this as the other. and the prospect of carrying Ky., N. C., and Md., with the principle, and of losing S. C. and all that she can influence, without it, will make the scales fall from their eyes in a trice. One thing is never to be forgotten, that committed as the party is, it cannot in its wildest dreams hope for the vote of an abolitionist, and further, that the action of the abolitionists as a party as to keeping embodied or subsiding into Whiggery will depend upon what the Whigs do and not upon anything that we can do, unless we undo all that we have done. In such a case ought we not to follow the dictates of ordinary prudence?

If the war continues we ought to proclaim some such principle as that embodied in the first resolution. If we elect our man with that as one of bur battle cries, be sure Mexico won't waste minutes before she will come with a decent proposition for peace. And I think the sooner the thing is done the better. Let it have time [to] feel its way into grace and favor and for the Whigs to commit themselves against it. However, as to “grace and favor”, there is no fear that it will need friends. True, we shall continue to hear the dog-in-the-manger growl of the Charleston Mercury. He has been so long only showing his teeth that we have come to believe that is all they were made for. All North it will out run the Cholera, as Prince John said to Jesse.¹ Bye the bye, I have just seen the N. Y. Herald's account of the Utica convention. The address is able, not so well written as that of the Albany convention. There is one good thing in it, the declaration that they don't make W. Provisoism a test, a sine qua non. This being so, it has occurred to me that our Baltimore convention could not by any possibility have evidence enough presented to it to decide which to admit, Hunkers or Barnburners, nor the heart to risk making martyrs of the innocent, to the triumph of the guilty, and that therefore it would be obliged as a matter of sheer conscience not to be at home to New York but still to do a good part by her all the same as if she were admitted inside. That is, nominate some man staunch, staunch as Chimborazo, on all the test questions, the sine qua nons, so that both divisions of the democracy may be gratified. Howell, I am death for Equity. Now, equality is equity. By presenting such a candidate the two wings will “spread” themselves in rivalry to speed the common body. What do you think of this. Bright, ain't it.

Well, this is the hand which I want to deal you at Baltimore. I am bound to say that there are some good cards in it. And anybody can play it. Genl. Cass is a good old man, Dallas is a gentleman, Buchanan is touched with the tariff, a man of vigor, tho’, very great, sufficient doubtless to bear letting that drop out of his veins. I care not so much for the player as the cards.

Yes, the grand thing for success is harmony, unanimity in the principles and measures to be sent before the country in the address and resolutions respecting the war question and the territory question, chiefly the last. You Democrats in the House have nothing to do, being a minority, except to ascertain this common ground, compare notes, yield a little, and it will be yielded unto you. Keep the slavery question out of the way of any public discussion in the convention. What the convention does ought to be done without delay, without fuss, with perfect unity and perfect unanimity. Let its work instantly spring forth complete in every part, like Minerva from the head of Jupiter. If there is a will there is a way. There are Democrats in Congress from nearly every State, and what they can all agree upon be sure they can get their several state delegations to Baltimore to agree upon. And then, out of abundance of caution, let one member of Congress, if possible, from each state go down to Baltimore as a lobby member, an organ of assimilation. You know we shall all be strangers to one another. Why can't we organize victory. I see I have written reams. It shows at least that I take interest in the cause and that I am disposed to accomplish the object of your letter, that is (ain't it?) to enable you fellows at Washington to find out which way the wind blows. Write to me again. Speak out. Condemn what I have proposed if it ought to be done, tell me what's better — above all tell me the probable “platform” as well as the man. Dix and Shunk I forgot about. Either will do well, so far as I am at present advised.

P. S. — Tell Iverson I will answer his in a day or two, and show him this. I don't care who sees it.

Send me the address and resolutions of our last convention at Baltimore, if you can do it easily.

[Resolutions enclosed with the foregoing.]

Resolved: That the United States have the intelligence and the virtue and the power to administer with safety, with justice and with equity any quantity of territory which they may honorably acquire from any foreign nation.

Resolved: That true policy requires the government of the United States to strengthen its political and commercial relations upon this continent by the annexation of such continuous territory as may conduce to that end and can be justly obtained, and that neither in such acquisition nor in the territorial organization thereof can any conditions be constitutionally Imposed or institutions be provided for or established inconsistent with the right of the people thereof to form a free sovereign state with the powers and privileges of the original members of the confederacy.

Resolved: That in organizing a territorial government for territory acquired by common blood and common treasure, and conferring in its achievement common glory, the principles of self government will be best promoted, the spirit and meaning of the Constitution best observed, the sentiments of justice of equality and of magnanimity best consulted, the self sacrificing love for the Union best maintained and strengthened, and the shining examples of mutual forbearance and compromise set us by our fathers in every dark day of our past career best emulated, by leaving all questions which concern the Domestic policy of such territory to the unrestrained Legislation of the people thereof, and until such legislation forbid, by permitting the citizens of every state to settle therein and to hold as property there whatever they may have held as property in the states from which they came.

_______________

* A lawyer of Columbus, Ga., previously a college chum of Howell Cobb's, and always a keen student of public affairs; associate-justice of the supreme court of Georgia, 18531861; brigadier-general in the Confederate army.

¹”Prince John” Van Buren, to Jesse Hoyt.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 97-103

Diary of Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes: Tuesday, March 24, 1863

Rain all night and this A. M.! Army movements very slow. Vicksburg the great point of interest for a month past. Things looking like fight in Rosecrans' vicinity; Charleston also a point of attack.

In the North a reaction favorable to the war is taking place. The peace men, sympathizers with the Rebels, called Copperheads or Butternuts, are mostly of the Democratic party. They gained strength last fall by an adroit handling of the draft, the tax-law arrests, the policy favorable to the negro, and the mistakes and lack of vigor in prosecuting the war. This led to overconfidence, and a more open hostility to the war itself. The soldiers in the field considered this a "fire in the rear," and "giving aid and comfort to the enemy." They accordingly by addresses and resolutions made known their sentiments. Loyal Democrats like John Van Buren [and] James T. Brady begin to speak out in the same strain. A considerable reaction is observable. The late acts of Congress, the conscription, the financial measures, and [the] Habeas Corpus Act, give the Government great power and the country more confidence. If the conscription is wisely and energetically administered, there is much reason to hope for good results.

In the meantime the Rebels are certainly distressed for want of provisions. The negro policy doesn't seem to accomplish much. A few negro troops give rise to disturbances where they come in contact with our men and do not as yet worry the enemy a great deal.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 397

Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner, September 19, 1849

Philadelphia, Sep. 19, 1849.

My Dear Sumner, I thank you heartily for your prompt compliance with my request for information of the doings of your Convention. I have read its proceedings with great interest, and the Address with particular attention. The proceedings are worthy of the Free Democracy of old Massachusetts — earnest, poetical, principled — and tending, I hope, to great results. Would to God that you could carry the State this Fall. What a triumph it would be and what an impetus it would give to our cause in every quarter? Can it not be done? Can you not, all of you, buckle on your armor, and rousing the people by an eloquence suited to the crisis, achieve a victory for Freedom, which will prove that the world is not wholly given over to reaction, — that will compensate, in some measure, for our defeats in Vermont and Hungary?  One great difficulty we labor under is that our opponents can so palpably demonstrate our numerical weakness by pointing to the fact that we have, as yet, carried no State. This is a great discouragement to some who want to live somewhat by sight as well as by faith.

Of the Address I need only say that I think it altogether worthy of you. Not as I regard it as being so polished and perfect a composition as some which have emanated from your pen; but as replete with just sentiment, correct views and sound principles. It is, as you say, a Liberty Address, and urges the same topics which I have several times, in such papers, discussed. I cannot express how earnestly I desire that you may gather under the banner you unfurl a majority of the voters. For my own part, I mean to abide on the platform, which the Address presents, whether with few or many.

The union of the Hunkers and Barnburners of New York struck me unpleasantly as it did you. It seemed to me that our friends had gone too far, in their anxiety to secure united support of a single ticket. It seemed to me that if they had taken your Massachusetts ground, and contented themselves with proving their Democracy, not by pedigree but by works, and had appealed to the People to support them, independently of old party ties, they would have done better. When the Hunkers refused to adopt the platform, I would say, that the time for union had passed. Although, however, these views seem to me most reasonable, I do not at all distrust the sincere devotion to our principles and cause of our friends who thought and acted differently. They supposed that the entire body of the democracy, with insignificant exceptions, could be brought by the Union upon our platform, and made to take ground with us against the support of national candidates not openly and avowedly committed to our principles. If this expectation of theirs should be proved to have been warranted, by events, their movement will be sanctioned by its results. I hope it may be. Meanwhile it behooves all friends of Freedom to heed well what they are doing, and to take care that they do not become so entangled in party meshes, that they cannot withdraw themselves, in a powerful and united body, whenever (if ever) the Party shall prove false to Freedom.

For me, I think I may say, that you may depend on me. I have no senatorial or legislative experience and some qualities which will be sadly in my way; but I will be faithful to the Free Soil Cause, and, according to the measure of my discretion and ability, will labor to advance it. I shall not forget your admonition to remember what is expected of me; and though, I cannot hope, if there be such expectation as your words imply, to satisfy it, I do hope to be able (to) shew that I am not undeserving of the confidence of Freedom's Friends.

Poussin¹ came to Phila. (en route for Washington) by the same train of cars which brought me. I had some conversation with him. He appeared a good deal excited by the doings and sayings at Washington. He said that he did not know what were the grounds of offence taken by our Government — that if he had expressed himself incautiously or offensively he was quite willing to modify or retract, as propriety might require; and he seemed especially sensitive on the score that being himself an American, and ardently devoted to American Institutions, he should be thought capable of wilfully doing or saying anything injurious to the American People.

I see by this morning's papers (most of the above was written yesterday) that the Republic gives a full account of the matter. The expressions of Poussin were certainly indiscreet, but hardly justify, under all the circumstances, his abrupt dismissal. I suppose, however, it cannot be recalled. What influence will they have upon the reception of Rives? And how far has this course been adopted in view of the probable reception of Rives?

I expect to leave Phila. for Washington tomorrow — Saturday morning — and to remain there until Wednesday evening. Write me if you have time. Tell me what John Van Buren and Butler say to you. Glad that Palfrey withdraws withdrawal.

Affectionately and faithfully yours,

[Salmon P. Chase.]

Can't help thinking though that you could fill his place and be elected if he did not.

_______________

¹ Guillaume Tell Lavallée Poussin was the minister of the second French Republic, 1848-49, to the United States. He was dismissed Sept. 15, 1849, for discourtesy, the French Government having declined to recall him. See the art. in the N. Y. Courier & Enquirer for Sept. 19, reprinted in the N. Y. Tribune Sept. 20, 1849. The incident created considerable excitement and caused a fall in stocks owing to the apprehensions in regard to its consequences.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 185-8

Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner, September 15, 1849

New Haven, Sep. 15, 1849.

My Dear Sumner: I wish I could have an opportunity to commune with you, and hear of all your doings at your Convention, and what was the spirit that animated the Free Democracy there assembled. I find no man so congenial to me as yourself; though I do not pretend to be up to your theories in all respects. I fear that this world is not to be redeemed from its ten thousand self inflicted curses so easily as we flatter ourselves at the outset of any reform enterprise, and, especially, before brought much in contact with the machinery behind the scenes, by which the movements in view are regulated.

Still shall we do nothing because we can not do best, or by directest means? I think otherwise. Let us do what our hands find to do, and by such means as we can, ever caring that they be honest so that our consciences reproach us not.

I want to see your Address. I am sure it must be worthy of you; though you labored under so many disadvantages in the composition of it. I could hardly pardon myself if I could imagine that your kind compliance with my wishes has abated anything of its force or persuasiveness.

For this is a time when we need our strongest utterances and most animating exhortations. It is the day of reaction the world over, I fear. And we must take onto ourselves the whole armor of Freedom if we would withstand the assaults of the adversary.

I am in doubt about the course of our friends in New York. On the one hand, the fact that John Van Buren, who has so fully and thoroughly committed himself with us, not only last fall but this Summer at Cleveland, advised the union inspires me with hope that he and his friends mean to bring the Democracy of New York unreservedly upon our platform, and have assured ground for believing that they can do it; on the other hand, I know so well how difficult a task it is that they have undertaken, and how easily, if adhesion to the antislavery articles of our platform be not made a test, men can creep into office and into Congress who will betray the people of the Free States as they have been betrayed over and over again, that I feel very, very uneasy about the issue. I know no better way now however than to put the best face possible on the matter, fight the battle through with the Whigs this fall, and prepare the old Liberty men and the Antislavery Whigs, and the Antislavery Democrats who constitute the life and soul of the Free Democracy, to rally anew on the Buffalo Platform, and break up the union, if the union shall be found to necessitate an abandonment or essential sacrifice of our Antislavery Positions.

Next winter will determine much. We shall know each other and how we stand and where we stand. For one I'll not budge an inch from my old positions. Nothing less than the Divorce of the General Government from slavery will satisfy me. I originated this expression in 1841 in the first Liberty Address published in Ohio, or west of the Mountains; and I mean to be faithful to its entire import. I have full confidence that at least two men in the House will stand firmly on the same ground.

But we are not to have Palfrey. At least so would it seem from the results of the last trial. Has he reconsidered his determination not to stand again? He ought not to think a moment of declining. If he adheres to that resolution, however, it does seem to me that nothing can be done half so well as to have you just move into the district, and take the nomination in his place. Every man who votes for him would vote for you, and none of that spirit of persistence in wrongdoing which is so active against him could be brought to operate against you. I do hope, if Palfrey absolutely declines, that this will be thought of him.

Please write me at Philadelphia, care of C. D. Cleveland, 3 Clinton St. and send me a weekly Republican containing the report of your Convention and anything else you may think of interest to me. I expect to be in Philadelphia, Wednesday morning, and to remain there two or three days.

Ever faithfully your friend,

[SALMON P. CHASE.]

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 183-5

Salmon P. Chase to Benjamin F. Butler,* July 26, 1849

Cincinnati, July 26, 1849.

My Dear Sir — The Free democracy of Ohio naturally regard with a good deal of solicitude the movement now made in New York with a view to Union between the Free democracy and supporters of General Cass: and as one of their number I have thought it best to state frankly to you the light in which the matter appears to me, and to ask in return an equally frank expression of your own thoughts upon it. Union between the different sections of the Democratic party is undoubtedly much to be desired: but it must be a union upon principle. The Buffalo Convention promulgated a Platform of Democratic Doctrines & Measures which those who composed that body pledged themselves in the most solemn manner to maintain and defend, until victory should crown the efforts of the free Democracy. That platform we adopted, as the National Platform of Freedom in opposition to the sectional Platform of Slavery. I have never met a Democrat of the Free States who did not admit that every resolution adopted by the Convention embodied sound democratic opinion. The resolution least likely to meet such general approval was that in relation to the Tariff and this resolution, as you are well aware, was the least palatable to me. Still it is unquestionable that this resolution expresses quite as distinctly the doctrine of a Tariff for Revenue, in contradistinction from a tariff for Protection, as the resolutions generally adopted on that subject in Democratic Conventions. The Buffalo Platform then is the Democratic Platform on which we are pledged to stand, at least until in National Convention the Free Democracy shall see fit to modify it, in harmony with the progress of Opinion. I see that the Pennsylvanian suggests as the basis of Union in New York general forgiveness on the part of the Cass Democrats to the Barnburners for the crime of supporting Martin Van Buren, and, in consideration thereof, the abandonment on the part of the Barnburners of the Buffalo Platform. I have no fear that any terms so degrading will be acceeded to by the generous spirits with whom you & I fought last year the most important political battle which this country has ever witnessed. But I have feared that a desire for union and the hope of a speedy triumph over their ancient antagonists the Whigs might lead them to take somewhat lower grounds on the subject of slavery than was taken at Buffalo. I should regard this as a deplorable mistake, to say no worse. I do not think that the Democracy could be reunited by such a step. You would leave out of the party formed by such a compromise, the entire body of the old liberty men and nearly all the Progressive Whigs who united with us last fall mainly on the Anti Slavery grounds: but those principles and views on political questions generally are so little whiggish, in the conservative sense of that term, that we may fairly assert them to be as Democratic in the main as our own. Besides this loss of numerical force, there would be the loss, still more to be deprecated, of moral power. The surrender or modification of Anti Slavery principle for the sake of Hunker affiliation and support would provoke and justify the contemptuous sarcasm of the entire Whig press, giving it a vantage of attack, which it would be prompt to avail itself of: Under these circumstances where would the Democracy be in future struggles, in nearly every one of the Free States? Borne down, I think, by a tide of opinion setting against it as untrue to its own principles & retrograded from its own position, much better it seems to me, will it be for the Free Democracy to maintain its own organization firmly and resolutely, and trust for growth for individual accessions and the junctions of small bodies in counties and towns, than to form any union upon the ground of compromised principle. There is no occasion for haste. The campaign of 1852 will not be opened for more than a year. The Free Democracy is daily gaining strength. The people approve our views and measures. The Old hunkers cannot go into the Battle of '52, without uniting with us on our own platform, except to meet inevitable and disastrous defeat. Not many of them have any such love for the maxims of Hunkerism as will make them covet political martyrdom. They must therefore advance to our platform however reluctantly or gradually. Better wait for them where we are than in our haste to rush to their embraces, leave our principles behind us.

I was much pleased by the remarks of John Van Buren at Cleveland.¹ He took the true ground “No more Slave States: No Slave Territory No encouragement But rather discouragement of Slavery by the General Government, and no support of any candidate for the Presidency who is not with us upon the platform” of course I don't give his language, but his views only. The last is the test clause. There are enough who will shout forth the three first propositions: but shrink from their practical application by the fourth, and agreement in the application must necessarily be the only secure basis of Union: for no other union will stand the trial of a nomination for the Presidency if that nomination would fall on a candidate of proslavery or doubtful principles. I hope that John Van Buren's sentiments truly reflect the opinions of the Free Democracy of New York. If they do whatever may become of the proposed union between the Free Democrats and hunkers in your state, the union of the Free Democracy of the union — far more important to the country and the cause of human freedom & Progress in general — is safe and its ultimate triumph as certain as the truth of its glorious principles. I enclose to you a communication to the Toledo Republican written, I suppose, by Mr. Hamlin the President of our Board of Public Works, which will still further shew you the views which prevail among us — I shall be glad to hear from you as soon as your leisure will permit and meanwhile remain

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* From letter-book 6, pp. 113 and 194-195. Benjamin Franklin Butler, 1795-1858; Attorney General of the United States 1833-1838; Acting Secretary of War October, 1836-March, 1837. Mr. Butler had presented Van Buren's name at the Buffalo convention in 1848.

¹ Probably at the Northwest Ordinance Convention, July 12. Cf. T. C.Smith Liberty and Free Soil Parties, 177.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 180-2

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: December 17, 1862

A dispatch from Gen. G. W. Smith, last night, says we have repulsed the enemy from Kinston, N. C., but a dispatch this morning says a cavalry force has cut the railroad near Goldsborough, broken down the wires, and burnt the bridge. We had no letters from beyond that point this morning.

Last night large quantities of ammunition and some more regiments were sent to North Carolina. This is done because Richmond is relieved by the defeat and retreat of Burnside. But suppose it should not be relieved, and a force should be sent suddenly up the. James and York Rivers?

We have not a word from Fredericksburg, and it is probable Burnside's batteries still command the town. Lee is content and has no idea of crossing the river.

There are two notable rumors in the streets: first, that we have gained a great battle in Tennessee; and, second, that the government at Washington has arrested John Van Buren and many other Democratic leaders in the North, which has resulted in a riot, wherein 1000 have fallen, making the gutters in New York run with blood!

Gen. Lee's official report says our loss in the battle of the 13th in killed and wounded did not exceed 1200, whereas our papers said 2050 wounded have already been brought to this city.

Well, our government must have spies at Washington as an offset to Federal spies here among Gen. Winder's policemen; for we knew exactly when the enemy would begin operations in North Carolina, and ordered the cotton east of the Weldon Railroad to be burnt on the 16th inst., yesterday, and yesterday the road was cut by the enemy. I have not heard of the cotton being burnt — and I don't believe it was destroyed. Nor do I believe Gen. Smith knew that Burnside would be defeated in time to send troops from here to North Carolina.

Elwood Fisher died recently in Georgia, and his pen, so highly prized by the South for its able vindication of her rights, was forgotten by the politicians who have power in the Confederate Government. All Mr. Memminger would offer him was a lowest class clerkship. He died of a broken heart. He was more deserving, but less fortunate, than Mr. M.

It was Mr. Memminger, it seems, who refused to contribute anything to supply the soldiers with shoes, and the press is indignant. They say he is not only not a native South Carolinian, but Hessian born.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 215-6

Diary of Gideon Welles: Tuesday, October 14, 1862

The Secretary of State sends me an important dispatch from Stuart, British Chargé d'Affaires during the absence of Lord Lyons, in which he undertakes to object, unofficially, to the purchase by the Government of the steamer Bermuda, a prize captured last April, until the judgment of the court shall have been pronounced. Seward gives in, cringes under these supercilious and arrogant claims and assumptions. It sometimes appears to me there is a scheme among some of the legations to see how far they can impose upon our Secretary of State by flattery and pretension. I have written a reply which will be likely, I think, to settle Mr. Stuart, and possibly annoy Mr. Seward, who, since the affair of the Trent, when at first he took high and untenable ground, has lost heart and courage, and is provokingly submissive to British exactions. I hope he will let Stuart have my letter. It touches on some points which I wish to force on the attention of the English Government.

Stanton read a dispatch from General Pope, stating that the Indians in the Northwest had surrendered and he was anxious to execute a number of them. The Winnebagoes, who have not been in the fight, are with him, and he proposes to ration them at public expense through the winter. He has, Stanton says, destroyed the crops of the Indians, etc. I was disgusted with the whole thing; the tone and opinions of the dispatch are discreditable. It was not the production of a good man or a great one. The Indian outrages have, I doubt not, been horrible; what may have been the provocation we are not told. The Sioux and Ojibbeways are bad, but the Winnebagoes have good land which white men want and mean to have.

The evening papers contain a partisan speech from John Van Buren,¹ in which he introduces a letter of General Scott, dated the 3d of March, 1861, addressed to Seward. It was familiar. I have heard it read twice by General S. himself, the first time, directly after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, in the War Department, but I had the impression it was addressed to the President instead of Seward. For what reason it was placed in the hands of John Van Buren I do not understand. The General thought much of this letter, and wrote it, as I supposed, to influence the then incoming administration, but it was wholly inconclusive when decision was wanted. He was in those days listened to by both the President and Secretary of State, and his indecisive policy had probably an effect on them as well as others. I have since come to the conclusion that the General's own course was shaped by Seward, and that, after Seward put him aside, took Meigs into his confidence, and got up the military expedition to Pickens without his knowledge, General Scott, in justification of himself and to show his own views independent of the Secretary of State, was decidedly for the Union.

His influence in the early months of the Administration was, in some respects, unfortunate. It was a maze of uncertainty and indecision. He was sincerely devoted to the Union and anxious that the Rebellion should be extinguished, yet shrank from fighting. Seward had brought him into his policy of meeting aggression with concession. Blockade some of the worst cities, or shut up their ports, guard them closely, collect duties on shipboard, or “let the wayward sisters go in peace.”² His object seemed to be to avoid hostilities, but to throw the labor of the conflict on the Navy if there was to be war. He still strove, however, as did Seward, to compromise difficulties by a national convention to remodel the Constitution, though aware the Democrats would assent to nothing. General Scott inaugurated the system of frontiers, and did not favor the advance of our armies into the rebellious States. The time for decisive action, he thought, had passed, and those who were for prompt, energetic measures, which, just entering on administrative duties, they desired, were checked by the General-in-Chief.

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¹ A son of Martin Van Buren and a lawyer of ability. The speech was made in the Cooper Institute, New York, at a meeting to ratify the nomination of Horatio Seymour as Governor of New York by the Democrats.

² General Scott's expression as given in the letter referred to was, "Wayward sisters, depart in peace."

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 170-2

George William Curtis to Charles Eliot Norton, February 6, 1863

February 6, 1863.

Why should Dr. Holmes trouble himself about the base of McClellan's brain? McClellan has nothing to do with all this McClellanization of the public mind. The reaction requires a small Democrat with great military prestige for its presidential candidate. The new programme, you know, is a new conservative party of Republicans and Democrats, and all mankind except Abolitionists. It will work, I think, for as a party we have broken down. I blame nobody. It was inevitable. The “Tribune,” through the well-meaning mistakes of Greeley, has been forced to take (in the public mind, which is the point) the position of W. Phillips, — the Union if possible, emancipation anyhow. As a practical political position that is not tenable. If, by any hocus-pocus, the war order of emancipation should be withdrawn, we should be lost forever, beyond McClellan's power, assisted by John Van Buren, the “Boston Courier” and “Post” and the “New York Herald,” to save us. There's nothing for us but to go forward and save all we can.

SOURCE: Edward Cary, George William Curtis, p. 161