HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field,
Savannah, Ga., December 24, 1864.
Maj. Gen. H. W.
HALLECK,
Chief of Staff, Washington City,
D.C.:
GENERAL: I had the
pleasure to receive your two letters of the 16th and 18th instant to-day, and I
feel more than usually flattered by the high encomiums you have passed on our
recent campaign, which is now complete by the occupation of Savannah. I am also
very glad that General Grant has changed his mind about embarking my troops for
James River, leaving me free to make the broad swath you describe through South
and North Carolina, and still more gratified at the news from Thomas in
Tennessee, because it fulfills my plan, which contemplated his being fully able
to dispose of Hood in case he ventured north of the Tennessee River; so I
think, on the whole, I can chuckle over Jeff. Davis' disappointment in not
turning my Atlanta campaign into a Moscow disaster. I have just finished a long
letter to General Grant, and have explained to him that we are engaged in
shifting our base from the Ogeechee over to the Savannah River, dismantling all
the forts made by the enemy to bear upon the salt-water channels, and
transferring the heavy ordnance, &c., to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, and
in remodelling the enemy's interior lines to suit our future plans and
purposes. I have also laid down the programme of a campaign which I can make
this winter, and put me in the spring on the Roanoke, in direct communication
with him on the James River. In general terms, my plan is to turn over to
General Foster the city of Savannah, and to sally forth, with my army
resupplied, cross the Savannah, feign on Charleston and Augusta, but strike
between, breaking en route the Charleston and Augusta Railroad, also a
large part of that front Branchville and Camden toward North Carolina, and then
rapidly moving to some point of the railroad from Charleston to Wilmington,
between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers; then, communicating with the fleet in
the neighborhood of Georgetown, I would turn upon Wilmington or Charleston
according to the importance of either. I rather prefer Wilmington, as a live
place, over Charleston, which is dead and unimportant when its railroad
communications are broken. I take it for granted the present movement on
Wilmington will fail, because I know that gun-boats cannot take a fort, and
Butler has not the force or the ability to take it. If I should determine to
take Charleston I would turn across the country, which I have hunted over many
a time, from Santee to Mount Pleasant, throwing one wing on the peninsula
between Ashley and Cooper. After accomplishing one or other of these ends I
would make a bee-line for Raleigh, or Weldon, when Lee would be forced to come
out of Richmond or acknowledge himself beaten. He would, I think, by the use of
the Danville railroad, throw himself rapidly between me and Grant, leaving
Richmond in the hands of the latter. This would not alarm me, for I have an
army which I think can maneuver, and I would force him to attack me at a
disadvantage, always under the supposition that Grant would be on his heels;
and if the worst came to the worst I could fight my way down to Albemarle Sound
or New Berne.
I think the time
has come now when we should attempt the boldest moves, and my experience is
that they are easier of execution than more timid ones, because the enemy is
disconcerted by them — as for instance, my recent campaign. I also doubt the
wisdom of concentration beyond a certain point, as the roads of this country
limit the amount of men that can be brought to bear in any one battle; and I
don't believe any one general can handle more than 60,000 men in battle. I
think my campaign of the last month, as well as every step I take from this
point northward, is as much a direct attack upon Lee's army as though I were operating
within the mound of his artillery. I am very anxious that Thomas should follow
up his successes to the very uttermost point. My orders to him before I left
Kingston were, after beating Hood, to follow him as far as Columbus, Miss., or
Selma, Ala., both of which lie in districts of country which I know to be rich
in corn and meat. I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the
enemy's country, because this war differs from European wars in this
particular. We are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and
must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as
their organized armies. I know that this recent movement of mine through
Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this respect. Thousands who had been
deceived by their lying papers into the belief that we were being whipped all
the time, realized the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the same
experience. To be sure, Jeff. Davis has his people under a pretty good state of
discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken in Georgia; and I think
before we are done, South Carolina will not be quite so tempestuous. I will
bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and don't think salt will be
necessary. When I move the Fifteenth Corps will be on the right of the Right
Wing, and their position will bring them, naturally, into Charleston first; and
if you have watched the history of that corps you will have remarked that they
generally do their work up pretty well. The truth is the whole army is burning
with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost
tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for
her. Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go to South
Carolina, and when I answered that I was en route for that State the
invariable reply was, “Well, if you will make those people feel the severities
of war, we will pardon you for your desolation of Georgia.” I look upon
Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if we shall spare the
public buildings there, as we did at Milledgeville. I have been so busy lately
that I have not yet made my official report, and think I had better wait until
I get my subordinate reports before attempting it, as I am anxious to explain
clearly, not only the reasons for every step, but the amount of execution done,
and this I cannot do until I get the subordinate reports; for we marched the
whole distance in tour or more columns, and, of course, I could only be present
with one, and generally that one engaged in destroying railroads. This work of
destruction was performed better than usual, because I had an engineer regiment
provided with claws to twist the bars after being heated. Such bars can never
be used again, and the only way in which a railroad line can be reconstructed
across Georgia will be to make a new road from Fairburn Station, twenty-four
miles southwest of Atlanta, to Madison, a distance of 100 miles; and before
that can be done I propose to be on the road from Augusta to Charleston, which
is a continuation of the same. I felt somewhat disappointed at Hardee's escape
from me, but really am not to blame. I moved as quick as possible to close up
the “Union Causeway,” but intervening obstacles were such that before I could
get my troops on the road Hardee had slipped out. Still, I know that the men
that were in Savannah will be lost, in a measure, to Jeff. Davis; for the
Georgia troops, under G. W. Smith, declared they would not fight in South
Carolina, and have gone north en route for Augusta, and I have reason to
believe the North Carolina troops have gone to Wilmington — in other words,
they are scattered. I have reason to believe that Beauregard was present in
Savannah at the time of its evacuation, and I think he and Hardee are now in
Charleston, doubtless making preparations for what they know will be my next
step.
Please say to the
President that I received his kind message through Colonel Markland, and feel
thankful for his high favor. If I disappoint him in the future, it shall not be
from want of zeal or love to the cause. Of you I expect a full and frank
criticism of my plans for the future, which may enable me to correct errors
before it is too late. I do not wish to be rash, but want to give my rebel
friends no chance to accuse us of want of enterprise or courage.
Assuring you of my high personal respect, I
remain, as ever, your friend,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
[Indorsement.]
Maj. Gen. H. W.
HALLECK,
Chief of Staff of the Army:
GENERAL: This
letter was brought by Lieutenant Dunn, of my staff, with the request that I
would open and read it, as it contained one or two points which his letter
addressed to me does not contain.
Respectfully,
U.S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
44 (Serial No. 92), p. 798-800
