HEADQUARTERS MILITARY
DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field,
Savannah, Ga., December 24, 1864.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff, Washington City,
D.C.:
GENERAL: I had the pleasure to receive your two letters of
the
16th and
18th instant to-day, and I feel more than usually flattered by the
high encomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, which is now complete by
the occupation of Savannah. I am also very glad that General Grant has changed
his mind about embarking my troops for James River, leaving me free to make the
broad swath you describe through South and North Carolina, and still more
gratified at the news from Thomas in Tennessee, because it fulfills my plan,
which contemplated his being fully able to dispose of Hood in case he ventured
north of the Tennessee River; so I think, on the whole, I can chuckle over
Jeff. Davis' disappointment in not turning my Atlanta campaign into a Moscow
disaster. I have just finished a long letter to General Grant, and have
explained to him that we are engaged in shifting our base from the Ogeechee
over to the Savannah River, dismantling all the forts made by the enemy to bear
upon the salt-water channels, and transferring the heavy ordnance, &c., to
Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, and in remodelling the enemy's interior lines to
suit our future plans and purposes. I have also laid down the programme of a
campaign which I can make this winter, and put me in the spring on the Roanoke,
in direct communication with him on the James River. In general terms, my plan
is to turn over to General Foster the city of Savannah, and to sally forth,
with my army resupplied, cross the Savannah, feign on Charleston and Augusta,
but strike between, breaking
en route the Charleston and Augusta
Railroad, also a large part of that front Branchville and Camden toward North
Carolina, and then rapidly moving to some point of the railroad from Charleston
to Wilmington, between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers; then, communicating
with the fleet in the neighborhood of Georgetown, I would turn upon Wilmington
or Charleston according to the importance of either. I rather prefer
Wilmington, as a live place, over Charleston, which is dead and unimportant
when its railroad communications are broken. I take it for granted the present
movement on Wilmington will fail, because I know that gun-boats cannot take a
fort, and Butler has not the force or the ability to take it. If I should
determine to take Charleston I would turn across the country, which I have
hunted over many a time, from Santee to Mount Pleasant, throwing one wing on
the peninsula between Ashley and Cooper. After accomplishing one or other of
these ends I would make a bee-line for Raleigh, or Weldon, when Lee would be
forced to come out of Richmond or acknowledge himself beaten. He would, I
think, by the use of the Danville railroad, throw himself rapidly between me
and Grant, leaving Richmond in the hands of the latter. This would not alarm
me, for I have an army which I think can maneuver, and I would force him to
attack me at a disadvantage, always under the supposition that Grant would be
on his heels; and if the worst came to the worst I could fight my way down to
Albemarle Sound or New Berne.
I think the time has come now when we should attempt the
boldest moves, and my experience is that they are easier of execution than more
timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them—as for instance, my
recent campaign. I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain point,
as the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can be brought to
bear in any one battle; and I don't believe any one general can handle more
than 60,000 men in battle. I think my campaign of the last month, as well as
every step I take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon
Lee's army as though I were operating within the mound of his artillery. I am
very anxious that Thomas should follow up his successes to the very uttermost
point. My orders to him before I left Kingston were, after beating Hood, to
follow him as far as Columbus, Miss., or Selma, Ala., both of which lie in
districts of country which I know to be rich in corn and meat. I attach more
importance to these deep incisions into the enemy's country, because this war
differs from European wars in this particular. We are not only fighting hostile
armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel
the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that this
recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this
respect. Thousands who had been deceived by their lying papers into the belief
that we were being whipped all the time, realized the truth, and have no
appetite for a repetition of the same experience. To be sure, Jeff. Davis has
his people under a pretty good state of discipline, but I think faith in him is
much shaken in Georgia; and I think before we are done, South Carolina will not
be quite so tempestuous. I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and
don't think salt will be necessary. When I move the Fifteenth Corps will be on
the right of the Right Wing, and their position will bring them, naturally,
into Charleston first; and if you have watched the history of that corps you
will have remarked that they generally do their work up pretty well. The truth
is the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon
South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all
that seems in store for her. Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we
did not go to South Carolina, and when I answered that I was en route
for that State the invariable reply was, “Well, if you will make those people
feel the severities of war, we will pardon you for your desolation of Georgia.”
I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if we shall
spare the public buildings there, as we did at Milledgeville. I have been so
busy lately that I have not yet made my official report, and think I had better
wait until I get my subordinate reports before attempting it, as I am anxious
to explain clearly, not only the reasons for every step, but the amount of
execution done, and this I cannot do until I get the subordinate reports; for
we marched the whole distance in tour or more columns, and, of course, I could
only be present with one, and generally that one engaged in destroying
railroads. This work of destruction was performed better than usual, because I
had an engineer regiment provided with claws to twist the bars after being
heated. Such bars can never be used again, and the only way in which a railroad
line can be reconstructed across Georgia will be to make a new road from
Fairburn Station, twenty-four miles southwest of Atlanta, to Madison, a distance
of 100 miles; and before that can be done I propose to be on the road from
Augusta to Charleston, which is a continuation of the same. I felt somewhat
disappointed at Hardee's escape from me, but really am not to blame. I moved as
quick as possible to close up the “Union Causeway,” but intervening obstacles
were such that before I could get my troops on the road Hardee had slipped out.
Still, I know that the men that were in Savannah will be lost, in a measure, to
Jeff. Davis; for the Georgia troops, under G. W. Smith, declared they would not
fight in South Carolina, and have gone north en route for Augusta, and I
have reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone to Wilmington—in
other words, they are scattered. I have reason to believe that Beauregard was
present in Savannah at the time of its evacuation, and I think he and Hardee
are now in Charleston, doubtless making preparations for what they know will be
my next step.
Please say to the President that I received his kind message
through Colonel Markland, and feel thankful for his high favor. If I disappoint
him in the future, it shall not be from want of zeal or love to the cause. Of
you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for the future, which may
enable me to correct errors before it is too late. I do not wish to be rash,
but want to give my rebel friends no chance to accuse us of want of enterprise
or courage.
Assuring you of my
high personal respect, I remain, as ever, your friend,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
[Indorsement.]
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff of the Army:
GENERAL: This letter was brought by Lieutenant Dunn, of my
staff, with the request that I would open and read it, as it contained one or
two points which his letter addressed to me does not contain.
Respectfully,
U.S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
44 (Serial No. 92), p. 798-800
