From the outer edge
of the bar to Sumpter through the swash channel it is four miles in a straight
line, with no shoal spots less than nine feet at high water. The batteries of
the enemy on Morris and Sullivan Islands are one and one third of a mile distant
from each other, between which the reinforcements must pass.
I proposed to anchor
three small men of war at the entrance of the swash channel to afford a safe
base of operations. The soldiers and provisions to be taken down in a large
steamer, having on board boats for the whole, with three hundred sailors, and
accompanied with three steam tugs having a draft of only six feet of water. The
entrance to be effected at night with the tugs or boats as circumstances might
dictate.
Rough weather would
render the attempt impossible in boats but favorable for tugs. Whereas a fine
clear night would be more favorable for the smaller objects — boats. This plan
was brought to the Prests notice early in March and its
practicability assured by his own convictions and concurrent naval testimony.
The military
authorities seemed to think it impossible to pass their batteries, but assured
the Prest that if reinforcements and provisions were thrown
in the fort it could not be taken.
I visited Major
Anderson on the 21st of March under an open order from the War Dpt, which was
shown to Govr Pickens who gave me a pass, without restriction, and I confined
my conversation with Major Anderson entirely to objects embraced in that order.
Notwithstanding the earnest desire of the Prest to reinforce and
provision Fort Sumpter, Mr. Seward seems to have been under obligations to
oppose the attempt, and his great influence over Genl Scott, brought the
military power against the plan.
As Major Anderson's
supplies would be utterly exhausted on the 15th of April every effort was made
by some strong hand to delay the expedition until its supporters must give it
up. The last card was to send for a Union man from the Virginia Convention and
say to him that Sumpter would be evacuated at once if the Union people, who were in a majority in the
Convention, would adjourn it. This Union man declined the proposition and made
so many preposterous demands that the
Prest decided the expedition should go forward. The order was given
to me late the night of April 4th. The 5th was consumed in getting to N. York,
and I sailed the 8th, leaving only three days to get up and dispatch the
expedition. Most of those who had favored the expedition and in whom I depended
for assistance to fit it out, abandoned it at this period as too late.
Unwilling to mention
to the Prest the misgivings of those around me I determined to go
forward alone.
Instead of the 300
sailors I asked for on board the steamer, the Sec'y of the Navy proposed to
send down the Powhatan stm'r of war with that number of men, which was
satisfactory to me. Therefore I sailed in the Baltic the 8th inst. without the
sailors. The Powhatan having sailed the 6th. The revenue cutter H. Lane, the
8th, the Pawnee the 9th and the Pocahontas the 10th. The Baltic and Pawnee
arrived off Charleston the 12th inst. after hostilities had commenced. The H.
Lane the evening previous, and the Pocahontas the 13th at the surrender of
Sumpter. The passage to Charleston and the day and night of our arrival was
severe weather, preventing the tugs reaching the rendezvous. The next day, the
13th inst, seeing no part of my proposed means of effecting an entrance had
arrived, a schooner loaded with ice was captured and means undertaken to effect
an entrance in her the following night, but at 8 A.M. the wood work of the fort
was set on fire by hot shot and by 3
P.M. the place was rendered untenable, and consequently it was surrendered.
The defects of the
fort, and its injuries, such as were never anticipated by the engineers, are
such, that had the place been provisioned and reinforced, the final result
would have been delayed but a few days. The Powhatan, with her sailors, was the
whole strength of my proposed plan because both tugs and boats were to be
manned by these sailors. Yet the Powhatan sailed from N. York the 6th two days
before I did, with an officer who bore an order from the Prest of
the U. S. to carry her directly to Pensacola. Her regular Captn having the
orders of the Navy Dept to cooperate with me at Charleston. This order of the
Prest was unknown to the war or navy departments and was signed by
him in ignorance that the Powhatan was one of my vessels. She was sent off on an
expedition got up by the Sec'y of State who thus interfered with the other depts
as the last hope of preventing the reinforcing of Sumpter. And it did prevent
it, and I had the mortification of witnessing the surrender of the Fort with no
part of my proposed plan arrived, in fact deprived by treachery of all power of
accomplishing it, and losing reputation with the general public for the failure
because I cannot state the facts at this crisis of our affairs without injury
to the Govt.
The Charleston
people assumed that the merchant vessels detained outside of their bar were the
various expeditions which had sailed from N. York about the period of our
departure and therefore they concentrated a large force on the islands and
abused us for not landing and attacking the batteries. But they were vessels
detained by the bombardment. Our military force consisted of 200 recruits of no
earthly use to Fort Sumpter in such an emergency because they were undrilled.
The S. C. authorities had 13,000. I believe every officer of the army or navy
present were entirely satisfied of the feasibility of either of my plans.
In fact their fire
upon Sumpter was precipitated because they intercepted my plan and were assured
by their best naval authority that it was perfectly practicable.
G. V. Fox.
SOURCE: Robert Means
Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval
Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus
Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 38-41
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