Boston, 20 December, 1861.
Nothing from you lately. You will be glad to hear that our people
here are within the control of the government in regard to the difficulty with
England, and unless the demands are made in such a spirit and manner as to make
it seem that war is intended sooner or later, we can tide over the present
trouble. If our government or people are made to feel that the Trent affair is
merely a pretext, and that after making disagreeable concessions there, we
shall only be called upon the sooner to "eat dirt" in some other
case, we shall of course fight at first, coûte qu’il coûte.
This I do not anticipate, but I hope you statesmen will look
ahead beyond the immediate horizon and try to treat this case so that it shall
not further embitter the feelings of the two nations, and thus lay the
foundations of a future war, whether of tariffs or cannon!
It will be unfortunate, for instance, if you make stringent
demands for reparation of a wrong which to our common people, and to the common
sense of the world, will in so large a matter between nations look like a
technical or legal quibble.
You cannot convince our people that you are justified in
humiliating us in this our extremity upon the ground that our frigate exercised
an admitted right in a wrong manner, the wrong growing out of a generous motive
toward your ship or your nation.
I know it is an important principle that no naval officer
should take the office of a judge, and I shall be glad to see our officers and
yours put upon their responsibility to conform, in manner and in substance
both, to the Law of Nations, — but you ought not to push the legal advantage,
if you have one, too far, where the substantial equity will seem to be with us!
If you do, it will be considered like striking us while we are down, and will
be remembered and resented long after this generation has passed away.
One cannot yet fairly judge how far our government and
people may be pushed in the way of concession. If we do give way much beyond
what seems to us fair, you may put it down to our inveterate earnestness to
whip our domestic enemy.
I hope and believe we shall get over this near danger of
collision with you, but I want to see the future guarded too.
If, for instance, you propose to leave the whole question to
arbitration of parties as nearly disinterested as the case admits of, I think
it will be received as an earnest of a better state of feeling. The king of
Italy and the Czar, though opposed to republican institutions, would, I think,
be accepted as fair referees, of course after proper argument being heard from
your jurists and ours.
On the other hand, to insist upon your own interpretation of
the international law, or upon referring it solely to Louis Napoleon, will,
even if we concede it, leave a sting that will rankle for half a century! It
will confirm all our worst fears that your rulers are ready to catch at any
pretext, and risk any amount of suffering to your own people if they can only
thus make sure of the failure of republican institutions. The prevailing
opinion is that such is the disposition of your government, and I daily hear
men of property and of general worldly prudence advocate the necessity of
absolute resistance to any demand for concession. They reason that it would break
down the spirit of our people and create internal divisions to a degree that is
worse than foreign war! Their policy would be to let the foreign demands
intensify our efforts against the rebels, and the moment it is ascertained that
actual war will result, let loose the blacks, cut the dikes which confine the
Mississippi, and deluge New Orleans and the whole of the flat country on its
banks; an easy task!
A spark may thus ignite all the elements of war, while
public opinion is so nearly balanced that it is only to-day that one can speak
for! To-day peace is probable — to-morrow it may be impossible.
SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and
Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 260-3
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