WAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmond, Va.,
November 24, 1861.
Brigadier-General LORING, Greenbrier River:
SIR: I inclose you herewith a copy of a letter* just
received from General Jackson, which explains itself.
I have for several weeks been impressed with the conviction
that a sudden and well-concealed movement of your entire command up the valley
towards Romney, combined with a movement of General Jackson from Winchester,
would result in the entire destruction, and perhaps capture, of the enemy's
whole force at Romney, and that a continuation of the movement westward,
threatening the Cheat River Bridge and the depot at Grafton, would cause a
general retreat of the whole forces of the enemy from the Greenbrier region to
avoid being cut off from their supplies; or if the farther movement west was
found. impracticable, a severe blow might be dealt by the seizure of
Cumberland. The objection to this plan is obvious: It throws open the passes to
the enemy in your front, and gives him free access to Monterey and Staunton.
But it is believed, and I share the conviction, that he cannot possibly cross
his army at this season and remove so far from his base of supply. He would
starve if dependent on supplies to be drawn from the valley or on supplies to
be hauled across the mountains. It is quite too late in the season for him to
move over to Staunton and then go back across the mountain, and it appears to
me that General Jackson is right in saying that his crossing to Staunton would
render his destruction more certain.
In opposition to all this we have the views of General Lee
and yourself, impliedly given in the recommendation to guard the passes through
the winter. We do not desire, under such a state of things, to direct the
movement above described without leaving you a discretion, and the President
wishes you to exercise that discretion. If, upon full consideration, you think
the proposed movement objectionable and too hazardous, you will decline to make
it, and so inform the Department. If, on the contrary, you approve it, then
proceed to execute it as promptly and secretly as possible, disguising your
purpose as well as you can, and forwarding to me by express an explanation of
your proposed action, to be communicated to General Jackson.
The enemy at Romney is not supposed to exceed 4,000 or
5,000, very imperfectly fortified, and wholly unsuspicious of such a movement.
General Jackson's forces I suppose to be about 4,500 disciplined troops and
2,000 militia, the latter very good militia. Of course, if you make the
movement, it will be necessary to leave behind you, in charge of a good
officer, a few troops of cavalry to protect the country against any mere
marauding or foraging parties that might be thrown forward when the enemy ascertain
that your army has been withdrawn.
In arriving at a conclusion on the subject you will not, of
course, forget the extreme difficulty of keeping open your communications in
the coming winter if you adhere to the plan of guarding the passes, and thus wintering
some 6,000 or 7,000 men in the severe climate of that mountain region.
I am, your obedient
servant,
J. P. BENJAMIN,
Secretary of War.
_______________
SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 5 (Serial
No. 5), p. 968-9; Mary Anna Jackson, Life and Letters of General
Thomas J. Jackson (Stonewall Jackson), p. 221
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