{Correspondence of the Burlington Hawk-Eye}
Sunday morning, April 6th, whilst taking breakfast, we were startled by the rapid firing of cannon in the direction of our advance encampments. There had been a skirmish to our front the day previous, indicating the near presence of the Rebel forces. Yet it was deemed hardly possible that they would venture to attack us in full force. But the continuous roar of artillery, and the heavy vollies of small arms, soon dispelled all doubt, and convinced us that the great battle of the war had commenced. – Directly every camp was busy with the note of preparation. The long roll beat to quarters – ammunition was distributed – the men formed in line of battle, and advanced to support our front. Our camp was nearest the river, and our regiment, the 7th Iowa, was in the 1st Brigade of the 2nd division, (General William L. Wallace commanding,) Col. Tuttle commanded the brigade. When brought to the front, we were placed near the centre. To our left was Gen. Hurlbut’s division, to our right was the division of Gen. McClernand. As we advanced to the front, we were met by stragglers from the regiment that had been driven back, some bare headed – some without guns – some powder begrimed and wounded, and some helping others that were wounded. Army wagons loaded with baggage, and scattered parts of two or three batteries that had occupied a position nearest the advancing forces of the rebels, were mixed up promiscuously with the crowd of flying fugitives. Steadily onward through these advanced the 2d division to the relief of our hard pressed troops in front. We soon reached the point where it had been decided to make a stand. This was at nine o’clock. The fighting was then principally confined to the left wing of our forces. Very soon, however, the enemy attacked our position. To the left was an open field. One of our batteries was placed in position to command this. Gen. Lauman’s brigade, composed of the 31st & 44th Indiana, and the 17th & 25th Kentucky regiments, were ordered to support this, flanking it on the right, constituting also the right of Gen. Hurlbut’s division. The 2nd division occupied ground to the left of this, and was posted in the edge of the woods fronting an open field. These arrangements had hardly been effected before the rebels assailed our forces along nearly the whole extent of the line. The fight was opened by heavy cannonading, which was vigorously replied to by Willard’s Chicago, and Major Cavander’s Missouri batteries. Under cover of this fire, the rebel infantry advanced to the attack. Soon the whole line was one blaze of fire. Our men stood their ground firmly, and repelled four successive attacks. The storm of bullets was terrific. The most desperate charges of the enemy were against the position occupied by Gen. Lauman’s brigade. But not animated by his presence and example, his men behaved like veterans. He rode up and down the lines, perfectly calm, and stopping here and there to address a cheering word to his men. I could not but admire his noble bearing, though momentarily expecting to see him fall. The Major of the 31st Indiana, fell mortally wounded near my side. Assistant Adj’t General H. Schofield, was also disabled by a shot in the thigh. Colonel Crofts was wounded, Lt. Barnes, Aid to General Lauman, your correspondent, and Gen. Lauman himself, successively had our horses shot. But still the fight went on and the rebels were forced to retire. The underbrush in front of our line was literally chopped to pieces by the repeated volleys of rifled musketry, and the ground was covered by the rebel dead. It was now about two o’clock, P. M. The fighting had been heavy all day on both flanks, and now the left began to yield. Gen. Lauman was ordered to move to the support of our retiring troops. This he did; and by the most desperate fighting, and skillful handling of his brigade, saved the left wing from annihilation. But the moving of these troops left a gap in our lines, of which the rebels with their superior forces were not slow to take advantage. About this time the right also began to give way, and the 2d division was soon fairly flanked. The order was finally given for them to fall back, but it came too late to save all. The 8th, 12th and 14th regiments of Iowa volunteers were cut off, surrounded, and after desperate fighting, forced to surrender. – The remains of our army were now driven close to the river, and the prayer of all was, “would that night or Buell would come!”
The rebels were following up their advantages, and seemed on the point of cutting us off altogether. But most fortunately now, General Buell’s advanced forces came up, and ranged themselves in line of battle. Col. Webster, Chief of Gen. Grant’s Staff, had by this time, got some heavy siege guns into position, which began to pour a destructive fire upon the advancing columns of the enemy. They replied vigorously with both artillery and small arms, but were finally compelled to fall back. Night now closed upon the scene, and the forces on both sides slept on their arms.
The Gunboats Tyler & Lexington had taken part in the closing fight and continued to throw shell amongst the rebels at intervals of fifteen minutes during the entire night. The scene was grand, yet sad, for thousands of our brave fellows lay bleeding on the ground, and we knew that the morning’s light would see many more stricken down by the bullets of the enemy. During the night a heavy rain set in which completely drenched our exhausted troops laying out on the naked ground.
Before it was fairly daylight the next morning the battle was renewed by Gen. Nelson’s Division on the left, and Gen. Lew Wallace’ on the right. The rebels soon began to fall back, and were steadily followed up by Buell’s forces who were constantly arriving and immediately sent forward. All through the previous night the transports had been busy ferrying over his forces from Savannah, nine miles below, and also from the opposite side of the river. Gen. Buell everywhere inspired confidence as he rode along the lines and addressed words of cheer to his troops. His superior generalship completely foiled the rebels in all their maneuvres, and whilst he preserved his own line of battle intact, he completely broke theirs, driving them from one position to another until we had regained all the ground lost on the preceding day – captured several batteries, and pursued them far out on the road to Corinth. The troops belonging to Gen. Grant’s army that had fought on the previous day, including Generals McClernand, Sherman, Smith, Hurlbut, and Prentiss’ Division were organized into reserves, and hurried on to the support of Buell’s forces.
The fighting of the second day was principally done by the several divisions under General Buell’s immediate command. All feel that our salvation is due to him alone. He himself arrived at the scene in advance of his troops, and riding up to our men assured them final victory if they could only hold the enemy in check until his troops arrived. At 5 o’clock, p. m., he rode along the lines and said to our jaded and disheartened men, that if they would hold them in check two hours longer, he had men enough to engage them alone in the morning.
IMPRESSIONS OF THE BATTLE
First. That the rebel attack Sunday morning was a complete surprise to our army. We lay with our camps scattered about, perfectly unconscious of danger. The Friday evening previous there had been a skirmish in front of our lines, but it excited little comment, and was supposed to be only a scouting party from the rebel forces at Corinth. No special preparations were made to receive the enemy, and no one seemed to imagine that they were in force close upon our lines. And yet as facts have since shown, they lay camped for several days within striking distance – two miles – of our camp. The rear division of their army had left Corinth on the Monday preceding the battle. The distance from Corinth to Pittsburg Landing is twenty miles. Our camps extended along the main road about four miles from the river. But though they were so near us, and were nearly a week making final preparations for the battle, still the only feeling apparent on the part of our leaders was a fear least they should slip away from Corinth, and decline to give us battle.
Second. That our volunteer cavalry is shamefully inefficient. We have supposed all along that it was the business of the cavalry to keep us posted on the movements of the enemy, and to immediately advise the General Commanding of any change of position. Yet the rebels were allowed to make all their arrangements to attack us with perfect impunity, and in entire secrecy. Moreover, during the battle, they were worse than useless, I have yet to learn of an instance where they either made an attack upon the enemy, or stood a charge from them. As far as my own observation extended they always took special pains to keep out of the way of the enemy’s fire. Whenever a retreat took place they were the first to run, and in two separate instances on Monday and Tuesday, they were the means of creating a shameful panic amongst our troops, and a ludicrous stampede for the steamboat landing. Many of them remained near the river all day Sunday, not venturing out upon the field at all; and others were constantly exciting alarm by circulating reports of the successes of the enemy, and the discomfiture of our own forces. They are regarded here since the battle with a feeling of utter contempt; and if the immense sums of money spent in organizing and equiping [sic] these useless appendages to the army had been employed in fitting out infantry regiments, the result of Sunday’s fighting at least would have been very different in its effects upon the enemy.
Third. I have been more than ever convinced of the importance of discipline and drill in forming an efficient army. Those regiments that had brave and competent officers fought unflinchingly in the face of successive and desperate attacks from the enemy, and when ordered to retire, would do so in good order fighting as they moved back, and forming again into line at the word of command. Others would break and run at the first fire, and could not be rallied by the most strenuous exertions of their officers. One regiment of this sort was met by the 7th Iowa, as it was moving to the front during the fight of Monday. Their officers were incapable of rallying them, seeing which, Maj. E. W. Rice then commanding the 7th, ordered his men to charge bayonets upon the cowardly sneaks. And in this way alone could they be halted and brought into line. – Buell’s force was manifestly well organized and under excellent system of discipline and instruction. They were kept well in hand during the battle, and reflected high credit upon the General commanding. Many of our officers – from Colonels down to Second Lieutenants, openly deserted their posts and fled panic stricken from the field of battle. But notwithstanding all this, through the great mercy of God we were finally delivered from our perilous situation, and enabled to drive back the rebels in utter disorder. This battle is another instance of the vindication of the sanctity of the Sabbath by the Lord of battles and of Providence. The party commencing the attack on the Sabbath were ultimately worsted and failed in all their endeavors.
We expect another battle soon, either here or at Corinth. Gen Halleck has arrived, and is expected to take command in person. But a great deal of rain has fallen since the battle, and the roads are now almost impassible.
Many of the dead still lie unburied. The battle field was one of the most heart rending sights it was ever my lot to witness. For miles the ground was strewn with the mangled remains of the dead, and the dying, and those disabled by their wounds. The loss on each side can only be counted by thousands. The rebels took the most prisoners, but it is probable that their dead and wounded will far exceed ours. The fire of our artillery was terribly destructive to their ranks.
They fought as though the issue of the whole war depended upon their endeavors, and our men fought as knowing that defeat was captivity or death. Enclosed I send a list of the killed and wounded of the Iowa 7th.
C.
– Published in the Burlington Daily Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Friday, April 18, 1862 & also in the Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, April 19, 1862
Sunday morning, April 6th, whilst taking breakfast, we were startled by the rapid firing of cannon in the direction of our advance encampments. There had been a skirmish to our front the day previous, indicating the near presence of the Rebel forces. Yet it was deemed hardly possible that they would venture to attack us in full force. But the continuous roar of artillery, and the heavy vollies of small arms, soon dispelled all doubt, and convinced us that the great battle of the war had commenced. – Directly every camp was busy with the note of preparation. The long roll beat to quarters – ammunition was distributed – the men formed in line of battle, and advanced to support our front. Our camp was nearest the river, and our regiment, the 7th Iowa, was in the 1st Brigade of the 2nd division, (General William L. Wallace commanding,) Col. Tuttle commanded the brigade. When brought to the front, we were placed near the centre. To our left was Gen. Hurlbut’s division, to our right was the division of Gen. McClernand. As we advanced to the front, we were met by stragglers from the regiment that had been driven back, some bare headed – some without guns – some powder begrimed and wounded, and some helping others that were wounded. Army wagons loaded with baggage, and scattered parts of two or three batteries that had occupied a position nearest the advancing forces of the rebels, were mixed up promiscuously with the crowd of flying fugitives. Steadily onward through these advanced the 2d division to the relief of our hard pressed troops in front. We soon reached the point where it had been decided to make a stand. This was at nine o’clock. The fighting was then principally confined to the left wing of our forces. Very soon, however, the enemy attacked our position. To the left was an open field. One of our batteries was placed in position to command this. Gen. Lauman’s brigade, composed of the 31st & 44th Indiana, and the 17th & 25th Kentucky regiments, were ordered to support this, flanking it on the right, constituting also the right of Gen. Hurlbut’s division. The 2nd division occupied ground to the left of this, and was posted in the edge of the woods fronting an open field. These arrangements had hardly been effected before the rebels assailed our forces along nearly the whole extent of the line. The fight was opened by heavy cannonading, which was vigorously replied to by Willard’s Chicago, and Major Cavander’s Missouri batteries. Under cover of this fire, the rebel infantry advanced to the attack. Soon the whole line was one blaze of fire. Our men stood their ground firmly, and repelled four successive attacks. The storm of bullets was terrific. The most desperate charges of the enemy were against the position occupied by Gen. Lauman’s brigade. But not animated by his presence and example, his men behaved like veterans. He rode up and down the lines, perfectly calm, and stopping here and there to address a cheering word to his men. I could not but admire his noble bearing, though momentarily expecting to see him fall. The Major of the 31st Indiana, fell mortally wounded near my side. Assistant Adj’t General H. Schofield, was also disabled by a shot in the thigh. Colonel Crofts was wounded, Lt. Barnes, Aid to General Lauman, your correspondent, and Gen. Lauman himself, successively had our horses shot. But still the fight went on and the rebels were forced to retire. The underbrush in front of our line was literally chopped to pieces by the repeated volleys of rifled musketry, and the ground was covered by the rebel dead. It was now about two o’clock, P. M. The fighting had been heavy all day on both flanks, and now the left began to yield. Gen. Lauman was ordered to move to the support of our retiring troops. This he did; and by the most desperate fighting, and skillful handling of his brigade, saved the left wing from annihilation. But the moving of these troops left a gap in our lines, of which the rebels with their superior forces were not slow to take advantage. About this time the right also began to give way, and the 2d division was soon fairly flanked. The order was finally given for them to fall back, but it came too late to save all. The 8th, 12th and 14th regiments of Iowa volunteers were cut off, surrounded, and after desperate fighting, forced to surrender. – The remains of our army were now driven close to the river, and the prayer of all was, “would that night or Buell would come!”
The rebels were following up their advantages, and seemed on the point of cutting us off altogether. But most fortunately now, General Buell’s advanced forces came up, and ranged themselves in line of battle. Col. Webster, Chief of Gen. Grant’s Staff, had by this time, got some heavy siege guns into position, which began to pour a destructive fire upon the advancing columns of the enemy. They replied vigorously with both artillery and small arms, but were finally compelled to fall back. Night now closed upon the scene, and the forces on both sides slept on their arms.
The Gunboats Tyler & Lexington had taken part in the closing fight and continued to throw shell amongst the rebels at intervals of fifteen minutes during the entire night. The scene was grand, yet sad, for thousands of our brave fellows lay bleeding on the ground, and we knew that the morning’s light would see many more stricken down by the bullets of the enemy. During the night a heavy rain set in which completely drenched our exhausted troops laying out on the naked ground.
Before it was fairly daylight the next morning the battle was renewed by Gen. Nelson’s Division on the left, and Gen. Lew Wallace’ on the right. The rebels soon began to fall back, and were steadily followed up by Buell’s forces who were constantly arriving and immediately sent forward. All through the previous night the transports had been busy ferrying over his forces from Savannah, nine miles below, and also from the opposite side of the river. Gen. Buell everywhere inspired confidence as he rode along the lines and addressed words of cheer to his troops. His superior generalship completely foiled the rebels in all their maneuvres, and whilst he preserved his own line of battle intact, he completely broke theirs, driving them from one position to another until we had regained all the ground lost on the preceding day – captured several batteries, and pursued them far out on the road to Corinth. The troops belonging to Gen. Grant’s army that had fought on the previous day, including Generals McClernand, Sherman, Smith, Hurlbut, and Prentiss’ Division were organized into reserves, and hurried on to the support of Buell’s forces.
The fighting of the second day was principally done by the several divisions under General Buell’s immediate command. All feel that our salvation is due to him alone. He himself arrived at the scene in advance of his troops, and riding up to our men assured them final victory if they could only hold the enemy in check until his troops arrived. At 5 o’clock, p. m., he rode along the lines and said to our jaded and disheartened men, that if they would hold them in check two hours longer, he had men enough to engage them alone in the morning.
IMPRESSIONS OF THE BATTLE
First. That the rebel attack Sunday morning was a complete surprise to our army. We lay with our camps scattered about, perfectly unconscious of danger. The Friday evening previous there had been a skirmish in front of our lines, but it excited little comment, and was supposed to be only a scouting party from the rebel forces at Corinth. No special preparations were made to receive the enemy, and no one seemed to imagine that they were in force close upon our lines. And yet as facts have since shown, they lay camped for several days within striking distance – two miles – of our camp. The rear division of their army had left Corinth on the Monday preceding the battle. The distance from Corinth to Pittsburg Landing is twenty miles. Our camps extended along the main road about four miles from the river. But though they were so near us, and were nearly a week making final preparations for the battle, still the only feeling apparent on the part of our leaders was a fear least they should slip away from Corinth, and decline to give us battle.
Second. That our volunteer cavalry is shamefully inefficient. We have supposed all along that it was the business of the cavalry to keep us posted on the movements of the enemy, and to immediately advise the General Commanding of any change of position. Yet the rebels were allowed to make all their arrangements to attack us with perfect impunity, and in entire secrecy. Moreover, during the battle, they were worse than useless, I have yet to learn of an instance where they either made an attack upon the enemy, or stood a charge from them. As far as my own observation extended they always took special pains to keep out of the way of the enemy’s fire. Whenever a retreat took place they were the first to run, and in two separate instances on Monday and Tuesday, they were the means of creating a shameful panic amongst our troops, and a ludicrous stampede for the steamboat landing. Many of them remained near the river all day Sunday, not venturing out upon the field at all; and others were constantly exciting alarm by circulating reports of the successes of the enemy, and the discomfiture of our own forces. They are regarded here since the battle with a feeling of utter contempt; and if the immense sums of money spent in organizing and equiping [sic] these useless appendages to the army had been employed in fitting out infantry regiments, the result of Sunday’s fighting at least would have been very different in its effects upon the enemy.
Third. I have been more than ever convinced of the importance of discipline and drill in forming an efficient army. Those regiments that had brave and competent officers fought unflinchingly in the face of successive and desperate attacks from the enemy, and when ordered to retire, would do so in good order fighting as they moved back, and forming again into line at the word of command. Others would break and run at the first fire, and could not be rallied by the most strenuous exertions of their officers. One regiment of this sort was met by the 7th Iowa, as it was moving to the front during the fight of Monday. Their officers were incapable of rallying them, seeing which, Maj. E. W. Rice then commanding the 7th, ordered his men to charge bayonets upon the cowardly sneaks. And in this way alone could they be halted and brought into line. – Buell’s force was manifestly well organized and under excellent system of discipline and instruction. They were kept well in hand during the battle, and reflected high credit upon the General commanding. Many of our officers – from Colonels down to Second Lieutenants, openly deserted their posts and fled panic stricken from the field of battle. But notwithstanding all this, through the great mercy of God we were finally delivered from our perilous situation, and enabled to drive back the rebels in utter disorder. This battle is another instance of the vindication of the sanctity of the Sabbath by the Lord of battles and of Providence. The party commencing the attack on the Sabbath were ultimately worsted and failed in all their endeavors.
We expect another battle soon, either here or at Corinth. Gen Halleck has arrived, and is expected to take command in person. But a great deal of rain has fallen since the battle, and the roads are now almost impassible.
Many of the dead still lie unburied. The battle field was one of the most heart rending sights it was ever my lot to witness. For miles the ground was strewn with the mangled remains of the dead, and the dying, and those disabled by their wounds. The loss on each side can only be counted by thousands. The rebels took the most prisoners, but it is probable that their dead and wounded will far exceed ours. The fire of our artillery was terribly destructive to their ranks.
They fought as though the issue of the whole war depended upon their endeavors, and our men fought as knowing that defeat was captivity or death. Enclosed I send a list of the killed and wounded of the Iowa 7th.
C.
– Published in the Burlington Daily Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Friday, April 18, 1862 & also in the Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, April 19, 1862
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