Flag Officer, Commanding James River Squadron:
CAPTAIN: Your letter
of the 23d instant is received, and in compliance with your request I will give
you my views as to the service I deem important to be rendered by the navy in
the present posture of affairs. In my opinion the enemy is already as near Richmond
as he can be allowed to come with safety, and it is certain that the defense of
the city would be easier did our lines extend lower down the river, and becomes
more difficult the farther we are compelled to retire. If the enemy succeeds in
throwing a force to the south bank in rear of General Pickett's lines, it will
necessitate not only the withdrawal of General P.'s forces, but also the
abandonment of Petersburg and its railroad connections, throwing the whole army
back to the defenses of Richmond. I should regard this as a great disaster and
as seriously endangering the safety of the city. We should not only lose a
large section of country, from which our position around Petersburg enables us
to draw supplies, but the enemy would be brought nearer to the only remaining
line of railway communication between Richmond and the south, upon which the
whole army, as well as the population of the city would have to depend mainly
for support. It would make the tenure of the city depend upon our ability to hold
this long line of communication against the largely superior forces of the
enemy, and I think would greatly diminish our prospects of successful defense.
It is, therefore, in my judgment, a matter of the first moment to prevent such
a movement on the part of the enemy, and I do not know what emergency can arise
in the future defense of the city, which will more require all the efforts of
the army and navy than that which now exists. I fully appreciate the importance
of preserving our fleet, and deprecate any unnecessary exposure of it. But you
will perceive the magnitude of the service which it is thought you can render,
and determine whether it is sufficient to justify the risk. It is true that the
enemy might place torpedoes in your rear while the vessels are on guard down
the river at night, but if you retire, it is much easier for him to place them
in the river below you, so as to prevent your going down altogether, no matter
how great the necessity for your presence below might become. It is, therefore,
very desirable to guard the river as effectually as we can, and I think it can
be done so as greatly to diminish the chance of the enemy laying torpedoes, if
our iron-clads can go down as far as Bishop's every night and picket in their
rear with small boats and some of the light gun-boats. Our pickets on the north
bank extend about half a mile below the lowest battery, and will be able to
afford some assistance, as will also those on the south bank. A system of
signals should be agreed upon between them and the fleet, to give timely notice
of any attempt of the enemy to approach the river or launch boats. We have not
sufficient force to picket the banks more effectually. Our batteries on the
south side would also tend to deter the enemy from making the attempt you
apprehend, and could afford assistance to the fleet. You, of course, can best
judge of your ability to render the service desired. I can only express my
views of its importance, and I trust that if the Department can increase your force
of men, or in any other way contribute to render you able to perform this
important duty it will be done. As I said before, I can foresee no state of
circumstances in which the fleet can render more important aid than in the
defense of Richmond than at present by guarding the river below Chaffin's
Bluff.
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