Diary of Gideon Welles, Friday, June 22, 1866

When I went to Cabinet-meeting only Seward was there with the President. I was prompt to time; Seward was in advance. Directly on entering, the President handed me a message which he had prepared, with an accompanying letter from Seward, relative to the proposed Constitutional changes which Congress had requested him to forward to the State Executives. The whole was very well done. As Seward had sent off authenticated copies to the Governors, the ready, officious act was very well gotten over by a declaration in the message that it was a ministerial act which was not to be understood as giving the sanction of the Executive or of the Cabinet to the proceeding.

I made a complimentary remark on the message, with my regret that there had not been more time and consideration in sending off copies to the States. Seward was annoyed by the remark and said he had followed the precedent of 1865, but the President was, I saw, not at all displeased with my criticism.

Subsequently, when all the Cabinet were present except Stanton and Speed, the message and papers were read. McCulloch expressed his approval of the message and said he should have been glad to have had it more full and explicit. In this I concurred.

Dennison took exception, which served to show that he had been consulted by the Radicals and had advised or consented to the course previously adopted. He and Seward each made some remarks, and Dennison showed much indignation because Seward had used the word "trick" on the part of Congress in sending this resolution to the President. Seward disclaimed the word and denied he had used it. I was not aware he had done so.

Dennison proceeded to say that Bingham had introduced, or been the means of introducing, the resolution; had consulted with him; that his object was pure; that he approved it; that although the proposed Amendment was not in the precise shape he wished, he, nevertheless, gave it his support; that it had been approved by the Republicans of Ohio, and were he at home in October, he should vote for candidates who favored it.

I assured him that therein he and I differed, for that I would not vote for the Amendment, nor knowingly vote for any man who supported it.

Seward said he had no doubt that the Republicans of the Auburn district would oppose it very generally, and that if he was at home in November he expected to vote for men who would oppose it.

I took higher ground. I cared not what parties favored or what parties opposed it, my convictions and opinions were in my own keeping, and I would vote for no man of any party who favored that Amendment.

Dennison said that with the explanations of Mr. Seward he took no exceptions, but he expected to act with the Union Party of Ohio.

Harlan said he thought the views of each would be reconciled. I doubted if we were a unit. Party seemed to have a stronger hold than country.

When the others had left, the President told McCulloch and myself that he had struck from the message the concurrence of his Cabinet. This I regretted, but he said Dennison's assent, even with his explanation, was not full and gave him an opportunity to evade, if convenient hereafter; he, therefore, chose to stand uncommitted, or trammeled by others. Before sending off the message, which he had done while we were there, he had erased the words referred to.

Dennison has evidently been tampered with and has made up his mind to go with his party, though aware that the party organization is being committed against measures of the Administration. He certainly does not yet anticipate leaving the Cabinet on that account, but will soon come to it. How the President is to get along with such a Cabinet I do not see. McCulloch spoke of it and said there were four in opposition. "Yes," said the President, "from what we now see of Dennison, and if we count Stanton after his patched-up speech; but it is uncertain where he wishes to place himself." There is no uncertainty on the part of any but the President. Speed and Harlan should, from a sense of propriety and decent self-respect, resign. This the President has repeated to me many times. Why he should cling to Stanton, who is working insidiously against him, and to Seward, who works with and shields Stanton, either doing more against him than the two feeble men of whom he speaks so freely, I do not understand. Stanton he knows is not in accord with him, though he does not avow it, and if Seward is presumably friendly, the fact that all the influence which he can exercise is dumb or hostile is notorious.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 535-8

Diary of Gideon Welles, Tuesday, June 26, 1866

We had not a protracted Cabinet meeting nor any specially interesting topic. I had thought the subject of the call for the convention, which appeared in this morning's paper, might be alluded to either before or after the business session, but it was as studiously avoided as if we had been in a Quaker meeting. There is no free interchange nor concurrence of views. Stanton is insincere, more false than Seward, who relies on expedients. Blair tells me he likes the call and thinks it will be effective. This inspires me with more confidence, for I had doubted whether he and men of his traits and views would acquiesce in it, particularly in its omissions. He does not apprehend the difficulty from Seward and Weed which has troubled me, for he says the President will cast Seward off and Stanton also. I had long seen that this was a necessity, but continued delay has disheartened expectation. Whether Blair has any fact to authorize his assertion, I know not. I can suppose it certain as an alternative. Stanton is unfaithful and acting secretly with the Radicals. He has gone. Either Seward must be discarded or the people will discard both him and the President. The latter does not realize that he is the victim of a double game, adapted to New York intrigues.

The papers state that the Senate of Connecticut adopted the Constitutional Amendment at midnight yesterday. This does not surprise me, yet had the President showed his hand earlier, the result might have been different in that State. But Seward, Weed, Raymond, and company are satisfied with this Radical Amendment. The latter voted for it. Weed has given it a quasi indorsement, and I do not remember to have heard Seward say a word against it. He hastened off a notice to Connecticut and the other States as the Radicals wished, without consulting the President or any member of the Cabinet. There has not been in Connecticut, or elsewhere, any deliberate, enlightened, intelligent, or comprehensive discussion of this measure, but a paltry, narrow, superficial talk or rant, all of the shallowest and meanest partisan character.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 541-2

Diary of Gideon Welles, Monday, June 18, 1866

Senator Doolittle brought me last evening the rough draft of a proposed call for a national Union convention which he had prepared. Some of the points were well put, but there was too much restriction, too much fear that we should have men we did not care to fellowship with, although we might agree on present issues. To this I excepted, but my strongest point was the omission to meet and present the real issue, our objections to the proposed change of the Constitution which has passed the two houses of Congress.

"What," said I, "are the reasons for calling a convention at this time? Is it not because the faction in Congress, assisted by schemers out of Congress, have concocted a scheme under party excitement and by party machinery to change the Constitution in important particulars, and that by a snap judgment Governor Curtin has addressed a circular letter to the Governors of the several States, inviting an immediate convening of the State legislatures to adopt the proposed change, before the people can have an opportunity to express an opinion? An alarm should be sounded, warning the people of the movements that are being made to alter the organic law, and insidiously change the government."

These and other suggestions I saw made an impression on Doolittle, but still he hesitated and was embarrassed. Pressing him on this point, he admitted he wanted Raymond to sign the call, he being Chairman of the National Republican Committee, and Doolittle wanted others of that committee also to sign it. This I thought of less importance than to have a proper call; certainly I would not suppress the great essential for such a trimming, unreliable man as Raymond. As I urged the matter, he admitted that Raymond had seen the call and approved it; further that the President had read it, and I have no doubt that Seward had also seen it, although that was not distinctly stated. The call, if not the convention itself, is, I think, perverted to an intrigue in behalf of the old Whig Party, on which Weed and Seward rely.

I proposed that we should go and see Mr. McCulloch. It was raining intensely hard, but he at once accorded. He had been to Silver Spring and submitted the document to Mr. Blair and his son, who, he said, approved it.

Mr. McCulloch was not at home, and we parted, but the paper which D. presented, the convention, and the aspect of affairs gave me infinite concern. There is no doubt that Seward and Stanton have a personal understanding to act together. Stanton is in concert with the Radicals, and, at the same time, Seward is prompting Doolittle. The public is ripe for a convention, but this call is an artful contrivance to weaken it. The President is being subordinated by the intriguers, and the design is obviously to weaken the Administration and give the Radical Party the ascendant. Seward, beguiled by Stanton, expects to control the convention by the aid of Weed and Raymond. The fruition of seven months' intrigue means that and nothing else. They intend to rule the President, and I fear he will let them.

I stopped early this morning at Judge Blair's and inquired what he thought of the call. He said he had not been in any mood or mind to think of anything, having been without sleep the previous night, but it had appeared to him to have a too narrow basis. I then told him my view and the conversation Doolittle and myself had. Blair most earnestly agreed with me, said my views corresponded with his own, and promised to see the President if he could.

I called on McCulloch, who agreed to come to my house this evening and go with me to the President. When he called, I detailed the conversation with Doolittle, told him of my apprehensions, and dwelt emphatically on the subject of the Constitutional changes as the true basis of action, and our sounding the bugle-note of warning to arouse the people. My earnestness and the facts excited him, and we went to the President.

We spent an hour in a free and unrestricted conversation with the President. McCulloch, full of the views which I had urged, advised that the President should at once issue a proclamation after the manner of Jackson in regard to nullification, appealing to the people.

I inquired of the President if he had seen Doolittle since Sunday, and told him what I thought of the proposed form of call, and that the just alarm on the proposed change of the Constitution ought not on any account to be omitted. The people ought not to be deluded and cheated by trash. He concurred with me. I inquired if he had noticed that important omission in the proposed call. He did not answer direct, but said the call was too much in detail.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 529-31

Diary of Gideon Welles, Tuesday, June 19, 1866

After current business at the Cabinet was closed, I inquired of Seward if it was true that he had sent out a special official certificate of the Constitutional Amendment to Governor Hawley of Connecticut. I saw notice to this effect in the papers. Seward said yes, and his manner indicated that he wished I had not put to him the question.

Stanton at this moment, without any design perhaps, drew off the President's attention and they went to one of the windows, conversing audibly. In the mean time Seward and myself got into an animated conversation on the subject of these proposed changes, or, as they are called, amendments of the Constitution. I thought the President should pass upon them. At all events, that they should not have been sent out officially by the Secretary of State, obviously to be used for electioneering purposes, without the knowledge of the President. McCulloch agreed with me most decidedly. Seward said that had not always been the practice. Dennison made some undecisive remarks, evincing indifference. But all this time Stanton and the President were engaged on other matters, and as the President himself had proposed last evening to bring up this subject in Cabinet, I was surprised that he remained away during the conversation, the purport of which he must have known. I became painfully impressed with the apprehension that Seward had an influence which he should not have, and that under that influence the President did not care to be engaged in our conversation.

On leaving the council chamber I went into the Secretary's room adjoining. McCulloch was already there, and we had a free talk with Colonel Cooper, the Private Secretary of the President and his special confidant in relation to public matters, about the necessity there was for prompt and decisive action on the part of the President. Colonel C. fully agreed with us.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 531-2

Diary of Gideon Welles, Wednesday, June 20, 1866

Went with G. W. Blunt to see the President this morning. Blunt wants to be Naval Officer and has been a true and earnest friend of the Navy Department during the War and boldly met our opponents when friends were needed. Of course I feel a personal regard for him and have two or three times told the President that, personally, Blunt was my choice. If other than personal consideration governed I had nothing to say.

After Blunt left, the President and myself had a little conversation. I expressed my apprehension that there were some persons acting in bad faith with him. Some men of position were declaring that he and Congress were assimilating and especially on the Constitutional change. He interrupted me to repeat what he said to McCulloch and me,—that he was opposed to them and opposed to any change while any portion of the States were excluded. I assured him I well knew his views, but that others near and who professed to speak for him held out other opinions. I instanced the New York Times, the well-known organ of a particular set, which was constantly giving out that the President and Congress were almost agreed, and that the Republican Party must and would be united. The fact that every Republican Representative had voted for the changes, that the State Department had hastened off authenticated copies to the State Executives before submitting to him, the idea promulgated that special sessions of the legislatures in the States were to be called to immediately ratify the amendments, or innovations, showed concert and energy of action in a particular direction, but that it was not on the road which he was traveling.

He answered by referring to yesterday's conversation with Seward; said he had sent early yesterday morning to stop action at the State Department, but found the circulars had been sent off. He seemed not aware that there was design in this hasty, surreptitious movement.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 532-3

Governor Rutherford B. Hayes to Sardis Birchard, January 13, 1868

COLUMBUS, OHIO, January 13, 1868.

I now send you another copy of the inaugural containing a fourth idea. I found our Democrats foolish. enough to be repealing Ohio's assent to the Fourteenth Amendment. So I put in some words on that head. — All well.

Yours,

R. B. HAYES.

S. BIRCHARD.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 3, p. 50

Senator John Sherman to Lieutenant-General William T. Sherman, November 1, 1867

MANSFIELD, OHIO, Nov. 1, 1867.

Dear Brother:

I see no real occasion for trouble with Johnson. The great error of his life was in not acquiescing in and supporting the 14th Amendment of the Constitution in the Thirty-ninth Congress. This he could easily have carried. It referred the suffrage question to each State, and if adopted long ago the whole controversy would have culminated; or if further opposed by the extreme Radicals, they would have been easily beaten. Now I see nothing short of universal suffrage and universal amnesty as the basis. When you come on, I suggest that you give out that you go on to make your annual report and settle Indian affairs. Give us notice when you will be on, and come directly to my house, where we will make you one of the family.

Grant, I think, is inevitably a candidate. He allows himself to drift into a position where he can't decline if he would, and I feel sure he don't want to decline. My judgment is that Chase is better for the country and for Grant himself, but I will not quarrel with what I cannot control.

JOHN SHERMAN.

SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, p. 299

Senator John Sherman to Lieutenant-General William T. Sherman, December 27, 1866

UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER,        

WASHINGTON, Dec. 27, 1866.

Dear Brother:

*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *

On the whole I am not sorry that your mission failed, since the French are leaving; my sympathies are rather with Maximilian. The usual factions of Ortega and Juarez will divide the native population, while Maximilian can have the support of the clergy and property. They are a miserable set, and we ought to keep away from them. Here political strife is hushed, and the South have two months more in which to accept the constitutional amendment.¹ What folly they exhibit! To me Johnson and the old encrusted politicians who view everything in the light of thirty years ago seem like blind guides. After the 4th of March they will rally to the amendment, and it will then be too late.

Very truly yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

_______________

¹ The 14th amendment, then pending before the State Legislatures.

SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, p. 286