To the Electors of
Adams County.
fellow-citizens,
— It is known to you generally that I have been nominated, by a public meeting
of citizens of this county, one of the candidates to represent you in the
convention. I believed that a long residence among you, together with the
public stations I have held, had made my character and political principles so
well known to most of you, as to render a public communication of this kind
unnecessary! I was anxious that the people should be left to the quiet exercise
of their own good sense and judgment in the selection of members of the
convention, and had determined to confine my agency to verbal discussions and
arguments.
Some recent occurrences, the example of most of the
candidates, and misrepresentations of my opinions, have induced me to change my
course, and to appear, at this late period, before the public in a circular,
for the imperfection of which I must ask all the indulgence to which great
haste and limited time may entitle me.
A most important crisis is near at hand. We are about to
remodel our organic law. The people of this state are called upon to appoint
representatives to alter, revise, and amend their frame of government. This
work will require the wisest and most experienced heads, for upon it will
depend mainly, not only the character of our state, both political and moral,
but the happiness and prosperity of our citizens.
The slightest defect in this work will create discontent,
and may produce incalculable misery. Upon its provisions must rest our most
sacred rights, the free enjoyment of our lives, our personal security and
private property. It is not, therefore, surprising that the objects of the
proposed convention should be matters of the deepest interest to every citizen.
The organization of the judiciary, and the mode of
appointing judges, are prominent subjects of inquiry. There are those among us
who are disposed to try a new experiment in this department. Believing as I do,
that this experiment would be dangerous in the extreme, would tend to
corruption, and strike a fatal blow at the independence of the judiciary, I
will stop and examine it briefly.
Every argument that I have seen or heard, in favor of the
election of judges by the people, has been commenced with old and stale maxims,
such as, “The people are the source of all political power;” “We should not
delegate any power which we can conveniently exercise ourselves.” Maxims which
nobody now denies, which are so generally acknowledged that the repetition of
them can only be intended to create the impression that others dispute them. A
disposition is, also, evinced by some aspiring men to flatter and tickle our
ears with praises of our virtue and intelligence. We are represented as the
most perfect people on earth — all of us saints and philosophers! Do you
suppose our flatterers believe what they assert? If they did, fellow-citizens,
they would not dare to utter such fulsome adulations in our ears. When a man
flatters us we should take it for granted he has an indifferent opinion
of our sense and judgment. We are treated like spoiled children, who must be
bribed by sweetmeats to love the giver. I have too good an opinion of those
among whom my lot is cast to court your favor by flattery and praise. I will
address myself to you as men — full grown — sensible men, who will act from
judgment and principle, and will approbate candor though it may appear in a
rough dress.
We all agree that we have the right and are capable
of electing our judges if we think fit. The question is solely one of
policy, whether it will be to our interest that we should choose them by
popular suffrage; if not, it would be madness to exercise the right. We
have a right to burn down our houses, but surely, before we do so, we will
reckon the advantage to be derived from such an act. If we direct any of our
public servants to appoint judges, we exercise as much power as if we chose
them ourselves. Be not deceived, then, with the idea that a right which you
possess is in danger. Allow your reason and your judgment, with the aid of your
experience, coolly and calmly to investigate the subject. If you then find that
popular elections would not be so likely to place upon the bench upright,
talented, and independent judges, do not permit the false idea of a contest for
rights to prejudice your interests. A constitution is intended not merely to
establish a frame of government, but also principally to define and limit the
powers of the several departments, and to protect the private citizen in his
reserved rights. It is thus intended for the benefit of the minority, to
protect them against the action of the majority; to protect the weak against
the strong, the poor and infirm against the rich and powerful. The judicial
department is to apply these restraints. Is it not therefore improper, in the
very threshold, to place this department strictly and immediately under the influence
and control of those who are to be restrained? If the judicial department is to
be completely under the influence and control of the mere majority, that
majority might as well govern without any restrictions, and a limitation of
powers would be absurd. Let it not be said that the majority will never do
wrong. I admit that in times of quiet, when men's minds are left to the
influence of sober reflection, it is not probable that the many will unjustly
oppress the few. I grant farther, that, when this does occur, they will
eventually correct their errors. But the history of nations, of our sister
states, of our own infant state, shows that, in times of violent excitement,
the many have abused their powers, and attempted to oppress and tyrannize over
the minority. I refer you to the excitements in Kentucky, which produced the
occupying claimant-laws and the relief projects. Look to the intense feeling
produced in Georgia by the Yazoo claims, to the agitation which pervaded
Alabama on the subject of usurious interest. Majorities were, in all these
cases, ready to break down all constitutional restrictions, and invade the
sacred rights of their fellow-citizens. A firm, intelligent, and independent
judiciary was found to check the mad career of grasping interest and ambition.
Suppose, in these cases, that the judicial departments had been placed directly
under the influence and control of the interested majority, constitutional
restrictions would have been but ropes of sand, and the judges would have lent
their aid to trample under foot the lives, liberties, and property of the weak
and defenseless. But not so. A well-organized judiciary has always been found
the friend of the poor and the ark of safety to the oppressed. We should, then,
as we regard our liberties as citizens, sustain and support an independent
judiciary. By independent, I do not mean irresponsible. No. I
would make them most rigidly amenable to some impartial tribunal for a proper
and virtuous discharge of their important duties. I know, too, that the
constitutional expression of the will of the majority is, and must be, the rule
of action. Constitutional restrictions are not intended to defeat that will,
but to restrain it until it can be ascertained to be the result of solemn and
mature reflection. Every man of observation must have perceived that all our
public officers, however appointed, feel their dependence upon public sentiment.
Most men, from a principle of timidity, are actuated more by that feeling than
by their own judgment. I am, therefore, inclined to think that there is no
necessity for increasing this sense of dependence. A greater portion of it
would not make our public servants more honest, but might have a tendency to
render them, like the courtiers of a despot, more subservient and sycophantic.
My time admonishes me to pass rapidly over the many strong
arguments against popular elections. I will briefly touch upon some, and leave
the good sense and experience of my readers to supply what is wanting. We all
admit that no human tribunal and no mode of appointment can be perfect. If we
could call down from heaven superior intelligences to apply the laws, and to
decide controversies between man and man, we might expect perfection. We are
compelled to place upon the bench human nature with all its infirmities. It is
all-important, then, that we should remove it, as far as practicable, from all
influences that can operate upon the weakness to which all men are liable.
Partiality is not neces sarily the
result of a corrupt heart. It may arise from weakness or timidity. Its
possessor may be ignorant of its existence. Impartiality rarely exists where
the feelings are excited. Can we, then, expect this quality in a man who has
just come from a hot electioneering canvass, in which he has succeeded, after a
hard-fought battle, who sees before him, on the one side, friends who have
risked every thing for his promotion, and, on the other hand, opponents who
have waged a war against his public and private character, propagated calumnies
against his reputation, and now sullenly mutter threats of revenge? These
friends and opponents have controversies before this judge involving their
fortunes or their characters. I leave the answer to every man's breast, whether
strict impartiality can be expected from a judge under such circumstances. But,
suppose the judge should rise superior to frail human nature and should even
decide impartially, will the suitors be satisfied? If the decision be in favor
of his friend, will no voice be raised to impugn his motives? I fear that the
whispers of suspicion would drive every honest man, jealous of his reputation,
from a station of such difficulty and danger.
The advocates of popular elections of judges have reversed
the rules of logic, and attempted to place the burden of proof upon us. Firmly
convinced of the truth of our cause, we have made no opposition to this course,
though unfair in principle. They propose a new experiment. Let them prove its
advantages. Have they shown that one benefit would result from it? Have they
shown that objections to the present mode may not be remedied without resorting
to untried theories?
I appeal to the candor of every man to justify me, when I
say that their addresses have been more directed to the feelings and prejudices
than to the judgment. We are accused of holding doctrines absurd in the
extreme. You have been told that we, who are opposed to popular elections of
judges, assert that the people are not to be “trusted” with the election of their
judges; that “guardians should be appointed over them; that they are incapable
of forming a correct opinion of the qualifications of a judge;' that the
community in which we live 'is weak or dishonest enough to vote
for a partial judge;” I need scarcely say that such nonsense has never dropped
from my lips, nor have I ever heard such arguments from a sensible man. Is it,
then, fair — is it candid for our opponents to attempt to prejudice the public
mind by such misrepresentations of our opinions? The weakness of a position is
always displayed when its friends attempt to warp the judgment by appeals to
the passions. We have no objections to fair arguments. Though we honestly
believe that our principles are best calculated to promote the happiness and
prosperity of the people, we may be wrong, and our opponents may be right. We
are disposed to submit to the discrimination and good sense of our
fellow-citizens, without exciting their prejudices or their partialities.
An argument has been used in favor of popular elections,
which, I am free to confess, appears plausible, but will not bear the test of
close scrutiny. It is this, that as public sentiment will be likely to fix upon
the individual best qualified for the station, popular elections will afford
the best indications of that public sentiment. I am perfectly aware that some
of the arguments which I may make use of may be said to be equally applicable
to elections for political stations. This would only show that there is perfection
in no system. The action of a judge is private, and not general; his duties are
essentially and radically different from those of political officers who act
upon the community as a mass. Upon this distinction arc, in fact, founded the
principal reasons for appointing them differently from most other officers. I
may, therefore, be permitted to apply an argument to this case which might not
be justified in the case of other public servants. Besides, the reasoning of
our opponents is calculated to mislead, unless we apply the practical test of experience.
Admitting that, where there was a unanimity, or even a majority of votes in the
selection of a judge, it would be the strongest evidence of public sentiment
and of his fitness for the station, I say, without the fear of contradiction,
that, in nine cases out of ten, the opinion of the people of the qualifications
of a candidate for judge can not be obtained by any mode of popular election
which is practicable. If a majority of the whole number of votes be required,
we would be for check of the Senate. The governor will seek to comply with the
wishes of the people. It is his interest so to do. He is responsible to them
for the propriety of the appointment, whereas the voter is responsible to no
human power. I have never known an executive appointment of a judge in this
state which was not acceptable to the people over whom he was to act. An
obnoxious appointment will never be made. The powerful principle of
self-interest, and the elevated station of the executive forbid such an idea.
Now, fellow-citizens, one word more upon this subject. We
are a new state; most of our citizens are recent immigrants. We have many men
of talents, but few who, from their capacity, age, and experience, stand
preeminent and distinguished. Let us not be the first, upon slight grounds, to
try a rash experiment. There is no state in the Union, no country upon earth,
in which the judges are elected by votes of the people. The southern sun, that
warms the blood and quickens the pulse, while it produces the most generous
emotions of the heart, has the same tendency to excite the fancy and to
stimulate the passions, and renders us less fit to make an experiment of this
new-fangled political theory. Prudence dictates that we should leave it to be
tried by others first. If it should succeed well, we will follow the example.
The moment I am persuaded that it is for the good of the country, for the
protection and happiness of the private and humble citizen, I too will become
one of its warmest advocates and supporters. An anxious desire to preserve the
judicial department in its purity, to protect the equal rights of all, has
brought my mind to the conclusion that the appointment of judges by the
governor, by and with the consent of the Senate, for a limited period of time,
is the best and most democratic mode. This is not an experiment; it has been
practiced upon and approved by some of the oldest of our sister states, and has
given birth to the most distinguished judges. The tenure of office should be
such as to avoid too great a sense of dependence on the part of the judge, and
at the same time to protect the public from the possible effects of weakness,
imbecility, and decay of mind. When nominating a judge for the Supreme Court,
the governor represents the whole state. When acting for a district, he is the
representative of that district alone. Biennial elections of that officer will
insure the most rigid responsibility on his part. To secure the integrity of
the judge, having full confidence in the trial by jury, I am quite willing that
for corruption in office he should also be liable to presentment, trial, and
conviction, before the regular courts of the country.
A misrepresentation of my sentiments upon some subjects
appears to require from me a formal contradiction. It has been said, ignorantly
or designedly I know not, that I am opposed to universal suffrage, that I favor
a representation of property, and that I had declared, in a speech at
Washington, that mechanics had no concern with politics. The last is so absurd
as scarcely to deserve serious notice. Many of those who heard my remarks at
Washington were of that respectable class of citizens, and I know will do me
the justice to give this ridiculous report a flat contradiction. I have ever
considered entire indifference to the political concerns of the country
blamable in any man, whatever his situation and circumstances might be.
The right of universal suffrage is inseparably connected
with our republican institutions. Restrictions of this right must eventually
end in discontent and revolution. I consider it the sheet-anchor of a free
government, and would be the last man to surrender it. Its abandonment would be
a virtual recognition of the principle that we can not govern ourselves.
Positive political power should be distributed as equally as possible
throughout the state. An attempt on our part to obtain an undue advantage, by
taking more than we ought to possess, would certainly be visited upon us at
some future period. Principles and policy both demand that we should be content
with our just proportion. Men should be represented, and not property
or territory. I am, therefore, in favor of that basis which will
secure equal rights and equal representation throughout the state. While,
however, we admit the right of equal representation, it is no less important
that we should protect ourselves against partial and unequal taxation. Because
we live within twenty miles of the Mississippi River, we should not be required
to pay more taxes in proportion to the clear value of our property than our
fellow-citizens in other sections of the state. One district of country or one
set of men should not be compelled to bear a greater portion of the public
burdens than another quite as wealthy. It is, therefore, all important that the
rights of the minority should be protected, and that some constitutional
provisions should be adopted to prevent partial and unjust taxation. This, in
my opinion, may be readily effected by placing some restrictions on the taxing
power, or by requiring that all revenue bills should be based upon the ad
valorem principle of taxing every citizen according to the value of his
property. The tax upon sales of merchandise is, in my opinion, partial and
unjust, and the exercise of such a power should be restrained.
The leading principle of my political creed is, that a state
should not control its citizens in their opinions, their conduct, their labor, their
property, any farther than is necessary to preserve the social tie, to punish
offenses against society, and to sustain the powers of government.
I am opposed to all property qualifications whatever for
members of either house of the General Assembly. Experience has shown that they
are entirely useless.
A recent attempt has been made to affect my public standing
by the charge of entertaining obnoxious political principles. I have met these
charges publicly, and in the spirit of candor. The result is known to the
public. I desire of those who would judge me but a candid investigation.
Believing that I have as much confidence in the virtue and intelligence of my
fellow-citizens as those who flatter them more, I will cheerfully submit to
their verdict.
John A. Quitman.
SOURCES: John F. H. Quitman, Life and Correspondence
of John A. Quitman, Volume 1, p. 116-26
