HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF
THE POTOMAC,
Harrison's Bar,
James River, July 4, 1862.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch
of the 2d instant.
I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my
men the repose they so much require.
After sending my communication on Tuesday the enemy attacked
the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night. They
were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their attack succeeded the consequences
would have been disastrous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting, which
had continued from the afternoon of the 26th ultimo in a daily series of
engagements wholly unparalleled on this continent for determination and
slaughter on both sides. The mutual loss in killed and wounded is enormous;
that of the enemy certainly greatest.
On Tuesday morning, the 1st, our army commenced its movement
from Haxall’s to this point, our line of defense there being too extended to be
maintained by our weakened forces. Our train was immense, and about 4 a.m. on
the 2d a heavy storm of rain began, which continued during the entire day and
until the forenoon of yesterday. The roads became horrible. Troops, artillery,
and wagons moved on steadily, and our whole army, men and material, was finally
brought safe into this camp. The last of the wagons reached here at noon
yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but the army preserved its morale,
and would have repelled any attack which the enemy was in condition to
make.
We now occupy a line of heights about 2 miles from the
James, a plain extending from there to the river. Our front is about 3 miles
long. These heights command our whole position, and must be maintained. The
gunboats can render valuable support upon both flanks. If the enemy attack us
in front we must hold our ground as we best may, and at whatever cost. Our
positions can be carried only by overwhelming numbers. The spirit of the army
is excellent. Stragglers are finding their regiments, and the soldiers exhibit
the best results of discipline. Our position is by no means impregnable,
especially as a morass extends on this side of the high ground from our center
to the James on our right. The enemy may attack in vast numbers, and if so, our
front will be the scene of a desperate battle, which, if lost, will be
decisive. Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded, and prisoners. I
cannot now approximate to any statement of our losses, but we were not beaten
in any conflict. The enemy were unable by their utmost efforts to drive us from
any field.
Never did such a change of base, involving a retrogade
movement, and under incessant attacks from a most determined and vastly more
numerous foe, partake so little of disorder. We have lost no guns except
twenty-five on the field of battle, twenty-one of which were lost by the giving
way of McCall's division under the onset of superior numbers.
Our communications by the James River are not secure. There
are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musketry and
command the river, and where it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them
out. In case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will still make every
effort to preserve at least the personnel of the army, and the events of
the last few days leave no question that the troops will do all that their
country can ask. Send such re-enforcements as you can. I will do what I can. We
are shipping our wounded and sick and landing supplies. The Navy Department
should co-operate with us to the extent of its resources. Captain Rogers is
doing all in his power in the kindest and most efficient manner.
When all the circumstances of the case are known it will be
acknowledged by all competent judges that the movement just completed by this
army is unparalleled in the annals of war. Under the most difficult
circumstances we have preserved our trains, our guns, our material, and, above
all, our honor.
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
11, Part 1 (Serial No. 12), p. 71-2
1 comment:
I find curious McClellan's emphasis on the word personnel, given Lincoln's misspelling of the word in his dispatch of the 2nd, I can only extrapolate that Major General McClellan was demonstrating his superior intellect over that of President Lincoln. In short to me, it seems McClellan is being awfully cocky.
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