A letter appears in the Richmond Enquirer from a gentleman
just arrived there from Europe, apparently one of the numerous secession
emissaries, which contains some interesting statements. Although evidently desiring to put the best
appearance on the prospects of the confederacy, he frankly acknowledges the
defeat of its expectations of foreign aid thus far. He says:
“When I left Richmond in June last there was a very general
expectation that the manufacturing necessities of England and France would
force them to a speedy recognition and interference with the federal blockade. There was, too, an equally confident
impression that the commercial enterprise of England would spring at once to
the enjoyment of the high prices the blockade established by sending forward
cargoes of arms, munitions, medicines and other stores most needed in the
confederacy. The first thing I learned
after my arrival was the great error of these expectations. – Immediately on
getting to London I endeavored to start some shipments to the confederate
states that had been suggested by certain parties from whom I carried messages,
but soon I found it up hill work. When I
told of hundred per cent profits, they said ‘ten per cent without risk, or even
five, and we are your men but no range of profits however high, will tempt us
to risk uncertainties.” Those who came
back some months ago know what untiring efforts we made for this purpose, but I
am sorry to say without the success we confidently anticipated. This matter however, shows signs of continual
improvement, and I hope the channels of trade will soon be opened. The fallacy of popular expectations in
reference to speedy recognition and interference with the blockade was even more
strongly apparent, and should in my opinion, be taken into account in simple
justice to the confederate commissioners in Europe. The difficulties in the way of a speedy
interference on the part of England and France, I consider among other things
to have been – First – The fact that both of those governments are eminently
conservative, which, coupled with the fact of both possessing important
colonial possessions made them naturally cautious in encouraging innovations on
the existing status of nations, and of encouraging a disposition to revolution
that might be turned against them in some day of future trials of their
own. Second – A prevalent impression
among nearly all classes that the differences between the South and North would
be speedily settled, either by a peaceful division of the Union or a peaceful
reconstruction. Third – A very general
fear among those particularly friendly to the South that she would be over run
and conquered, in which case they said we should find a difficulty on our hands
from interference, which would be anything but advantageous or agreeable. Fourth – The influence of the old national
party of England, especially to encourage within her own borders an independence
in the monopoly of manufacturing stables.
Fifth – And the last, in this hurried letter is the abolition element of
England and her people. It is not to be
distinguished that abolitionism at the outset of the war was the prevailing
sentiment of the British nation. This
sentiment, planted by the labors of Wilberforce and Clarkson, and of late years
by the active fanaticism of many of her most powerful writers, preachers and
politicians, stimulated by the artful and insinuating fictions of writers of
the Harriet Beecher Stowe order, and total ignorance of the mitigating features
which have made America the greatest possible boon to the African, had grown
not only the general, but the active and determined sentiment of the
people. It is true that many of the
strongest abolitionists have been pitching into the Lincoln government, but it
was from anything but a friendly motive to the South and constituted an
influence from which nothing advantageous to her cause could be expected.
– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye,
Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, February 8, 1862, p. 2
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