[CONFIDENTIAL.]
HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,
February 23, 1865.
General
R. E. LEE,
Commanding,
&c.:
GENERAL:
Your letter
of yesterday is received. I think you did not understand my letter
of the 14th instant. My effort was to express my conviction that Sherman's
move was aimed at Richmond, and that Grant's concentration here would force us
to do the same thing, and that we might be able to do so it was necessary that
we should get gold by impressment to purchase our provisions with. I think that
it is not too late yet. We can surely get the gold by sending the impressing
officers with guards to the vaults in which it is stored.
I
understand that there are 1,200 men in Lynchburg – locals and detailed men – already
organized, and that we may get 8,000 or 10,000 men from Richmond by taking
everybody who is able to bear arms. The staff officers about Richmond would be
nearly enough to officer this force. If such a force can be raised and put in
my lines it can hold them, I think, and my corps can run down to the relief of
General Beauregard, or it may be moved over to our right, and hold Grant in
check, so that Sherman will be obliged to unite with him, or seek a base at New
Berne or Wilmington. This would give Beauregard and Bragg time to unite their
forces to meet Sherman and Schofield here, or wherever they may appear. I am of
the opinion that there is not much fight in Grant's army, and there can't be a
great deal in Sherman's after his long march. I believe, therefore, that we can
beat either back, by a little skillful handling of our men. We shall lose more
men by a move than by a battle. It is true that we might be compelled to move
after the battle, but I think not. If we fight Sherman as I suggest, we shall
surely drive him to the water for fresh supplies, even if we are not otherwise
successful. Then we shall have time to concentrate as soon as Grant, and to
reopen our line of communication with the south.
The
local and other troops that we may get from Richmond and Lynchburg will have
tolerably comfortable huts, and there will be enough old soldiers amongst them
to teach them picket duty. There are also some cavalrymen who can aid them.
I should
think that Grant, if he moves, can only make a partial move, Similar to his
last, and that would not injure us very materially.
In
preparing to take the field, in view of the abandonment of Richmond, is it your
desire to keep our wagons about our camps, that we may move at once? Our wagons
are out all the time gathering supplies, and at times at some distance, so that
a very sudden move would leave them behind. Shall we continue to send them, or
keep them with us?
My ideas
are given rather hastily upon so grave a matter, as I only received your letter
this afternoon. I will write again to-morrow, if I find that I can give you any
aid. I am firm in the belief that if Sherman is trying to reach the Roanoke, at
Weldon, and then get around our right, he cannot hurt us greatly, if we can get
Beauregard's army up.
I remain
very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General.
SOURCES: The
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 46, Part 2 (Serial No. 96), p.
1253-4; James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 644-5
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