HEADQUARTERS FIRST
CORPS,
February 25, 1865.
General R. E. LEE,
Commanding:
GENERAL: I have just heard from General Ewell indirectly
that he can raise force enough at Richmond to hold the lines on this side, so
that my corps may be withdrawn temporarily to your right – that is, if you can
put a part of the Second Corps in place of Pickett's division. This arrangement
will give you force enough to meet any move that the enemy may make upon your
right. If he makes no move, then you can, when the proper moment arrives,
detach a force to the aid of General Beauregard; and if the enemy should then
press you, you can abandon Petersburg and hold your line here and take up the
line of the Appomattox. But I think that the enemy will be forced to move a
force south the moment that he finds that you are re-enforcing against Sherman,
else he will encounter the risk of losing Sherman as well as Richmond. There is
some hazard in the plan, but nothing can be accomplished in war without risk.
The other important question is provisions. We are doing tolerably well by
hauling from the country and paying market prices in Confederate money. If you
would give us gold, I have reason to believe that we could get an abundant
supply for four months, and by that time we ought to be able to reopen our
communication with the south. The gold is here, and we should take it. We have
been impressing food and all the necessaries of life from women and children,
and have been the means of driving thousands from their homes in destitute
condition. Should we hesitate, then, about putting a few who have made immense
fortunes at our expense to a little inconvenience by impressing their gold? It
is necessary for us, and I do not think that we should let our capital fall
into, the enemy's hands for fear of injuring the feelings or interests of a few
individuals. We have expended too much of blood and treasure in holding it for
the last four years to allow it to go now by default. I think that it may be
saved. If it can we should not leave any possible contingency unimproved I
think, however, that the enemy's positions are so well selected and fortified
that we must either wait for an opportunity to draw him off from here or await
his attack, for even a successful assault would probably cripple us so much
that we could get no advantage commensurate with our loss.
I remain, with respect,
and truly your obedient servant,
J. LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General.
SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
46, Part 2 (Serial No. 96), p. 1259; James Longstreet, From
Manassas to Appomattox, p. 646-7 which dates this letter as February 26, 1865.
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