Diary of Gideon Welles, Sunday, August 10, 1862

The last two days have been excessively warm. Thermometer on the north porch at 100 on each day. A slight breeze from the west makes this day somewhat more comfortable. News unimportant from the army, and but little from the Navy. Shall have something exciting within a few days. Sensation items are the favorite ones of the press. Alarming predictions delight their readers. Am sorry that better progress is not made in the war upon the Rebels. Our squadrons are paralyzed everywhere by the inactive and dilatory movements of the army. Vicksburg should have been taken by the first of June, but no adequate coöperating military force was furnished, and as a consequence our largest squadron in the Gulf and our flotilla in the Mississippi have been detained and injured. The most disreputable naval affair of the War was the descent of the steam ram Arkansas through both squadrons till she hauled in under the batteries of Vicksburg, and there the two flag officers abandoned the place and the ironclad ram, Farragut and his force going down to New Orleans, and Davis proceeding with his flotilla up the river. I have written them both, briefly but expressively, on the subject of the ram Arkansas. I do not blame them in regard to Vicksburg, though had Farragut obeyed his original orders and gone up the river at once after the capture of New Orleans, I think things might have been different. Butler would not, I presume, give sufficient support from the army, for he has proved prompt as well as fearless.

We have sensation articles in yesterday's New York papers that the steamer Fingal at Savannah has been clad with iron and threatens our army and vessels. Have no word from Admiral Du Pont, who is watchful but slow to express apprehension. Am inclined to believe there is truth in the rumor that the boat has been clad with armor, but have my doubts if there is any immediate intention to attempt to pass outside. She is probably designed for river defense of the city against our gunboats; but may, if there is opportunity, assume the offensive. In the mean time the sensationalists will get up exciting alarms and terrify the public into distrust and denunciation of the Navy Department.

We have similar sensations every few days in regard to Merrimac No. 2, an armored boat at Richmond. As yet she has made no attempt to pass below the obstructions, though two or three times a week we are assured they are in sight, - "Smoke from half a dozen steam-stacks visible." Wilkes writes he is fully prepared for her and her associates at any time, and Rodgers 1 writes to the same 1 Captain, afterwards Rear-Admiral, John Rodgers.

effect. But in a day or two some changes will take place that may affect operations on James River.

Have had to write Wilkes pretty decisively. He is very exacting towards others, but is not himself as obedient as he should be. Interposes his own authority to interrupt the execution of the orders of the Department. Wrote him that this was not permissible, that I expected his command to obey him, and it was no less imperative that he should obey the orders of the Department. He wrote for permission to dismiss from service a class of officers if they did not suit him, and as he thought them inefficient. I told him the suggestion could not be entertained, that the Department must retain the administrative control of the Navy. I have not heard from him in reply, or explanation. It is pretty evident that he will be likely to cause trouble to the Department. He has abilities but not good judgment in all respects. Will be likely to rashly assume authority, and do things that may involve himself and the country in difficulty, and hence I was glad that not I but the President and Secretary of State suggested him for that command. It is the first time that either has proposed a candidate for a command, since taking Stringham from the office of detail in 1861 to go to Pensacola. Seward's intrigue. It was almost a necessity that something should be done for Wilkes. His act, in taking Mason and Slidell from the Trent, had given him éclat, - it was popular with the country, was considered right by the people, even if rash and irregular; but when and how to dispose of Wilkes was an embarrassment to me, until the command of the James River Flotilla was suggested. He was, however, unwilling to report to Goldsborough, and to have done so would have caused delay. But giving him an independent command caused Goldsborough to take offense, and he asked to resign the command of the squadron. To this I had no objection, for he was proving himself inefficient, - had done nothing effective since the frigates were sunk by the Merrimac, nor of himself much before.

The State Department is in constant trepidation, fearing our naval officers do not know their duties, or that they will transcend them. Both points are marked weaknesses in the management of our foreign affairs. We are insulted, wronged, and badly treated by the British authorities, especially at Nassau, and I have called the attention of the Secretary of State repeatedly to the facts, but he fears to meet them. After degrading ourselves, we shall be compelled to meet them. I am for no rash means, but I am clearly and decidedly for maintaining our rights. Almost all the aid which the Rebels have received in arms, munitions, and articles contraband have gone to them through the professedly neutral British port of Nassau. From them the Rebels have derived constant encouragement and support, from the commencement of hostilities. Our officers and people are treated with superciliousness and contempt by the authorities and inhabitants, and scarcely a favor or courtesy is extended to them while they are showered upon the Rebels. It is there that vessels are prepared to run the blockade and violate our laws, by the connivance and with the knowledge of the Colonial, and, I apprehend, the parent, government.

In reorganizing the Department there are some difficulties. I am assailed for continuing Lenthall as Naval Constructor at the head of the bureau. He has not much pliability or affability, but, though attacked and denounced as corrupt and dishonest, I have never detected any obliquity or wrong in him. His sternness and uprightness disappointed the jobbers and the corrupt, and his unaffected manner has offended others. There is an intrigue to prevent his confirmation, in which very great rogues and some honest and good men are strangely mixed up, the last being the dupes, almost the willing victims, of the former.

Admiral Foote reported for duty on Thursday, but his rooms were not prepared, and I advised him, as he was yet lame and on crutches, to delay active duty for a month or so.

It is some forty years since we were school-boys together in the quiet town of Cheshire, and it has been a pleasant opportunity to me to bring out the qualities of my early friend. He left yesterday for a few weeks.

Mr. Faxon, Chief Clerk, is absent, and I am somewhat embarrassed in relation to the true disposition of the clerical force. It seems not to have occurred to Admiral Foote that he could not appoint whom he pleased in his bureau, regardless of the claims and capabilities of older and more experienced clerks on less pay. I told him I wished him to have the selection of his chief or at least one confidential clerk, but that I could not displace old and worthy employees. This he said he did not wish, though he was, I think, a little disappointed.

Davis continues in command of the flotilla on the Mississippi. Had he captured the Arkansas, I would have had him come on immediately and take charge of the Bureau of Navigation.

In reorganizing the Navy under the late act, there were nine admirals to be appointed on the retired list. The names of nine were presented, but the Senate failed to confirm or act upon them. After the adjournment of Congress, commissions were sent them under executive appointment. Of course the men superseded were dissatisfied. Aulick was the first who called, complaining that injustice was done, and desiring to know wherein his record was defective and why he had been set aside. I told him that had it been the intention of Congress that the nine senior officers should be the admirals, the act would doubtless have so stated; that as regarded himself, while, personally, our relations had been pleasant if not intimate, he had not made himself known or felt by the Department or the Government in the hour of peril; that he had, just as the Rebellion commenced, applied for six months' leave to visit Europe, on account of alleged illness of his daughter; that he left about the time of the assault on Sumter; that he remained abroad until notified that his leave would not be extended, and never had made a suggestion for the country, or expressed any sympathy for the cause. Under these circumstances I had felt justified in advising the President to omit his name. He said he had supposed it was other influences than mine which had done him this injustice, that we had been long and well acquainted. I told him I shunned no responsibility in the case, and yet it was due to candor to say that I never had heard a word in his behalf from any one.

Commodore Mervine writes me of his disappointment, feels hurt and slighted. By the advice of Paulding, chiefly, I gave the command of the Gulf Squadron to Mervine in the spring of 1861; but he proved an utter failure. He is not wanting in patriotism, but in executive and administrative ability; is quite as great on little things as on great ones. He was long in getting out to his station, and accomplished nothing after he got there. When I detached him and appointed McKean, he was indignant and applied for a court of inquiry; but I replied that we had not the time nor men to spare, that I had called him to promote the public interest, and recalled him for the same purpose. He is a man of correct deportment and habits, and in ordinary times would float along the stream with others, but such periods as these bring out the stronger points of an officer, if he has them. I had no personal, or political, or general, feeling against him, but as there were other officers of mark and merit superior to him, they were selected. Yet I felt there could not be otherwise than a sense of slight that must be felt by himself and friends, which I could not but regret. Yet any person with whom I consulted commended the course I pursued in regard to him.

Commodore Samuel Breese was a more marked case than Mervine's, but of much the same character. Nothing good, nothing bad, in him as an officer. A gentleman of some scholarly pretensions, some literary acquirements, but not of much vigor of mind. Paulding was his junior, and the slight, as he conceived it, almost broke poor Breese's heart. He came immediately to Washington, accompanied by his wife, a pleasant woman, and called on me, sad and heartsore, his pride wounded, his vanity humiliated to the dust. For three nights he assured me he had not closed his eyes; morning and evening the flag of Paulding was always before him. He said Read would not live long and implored that he might have the place.

Charles Stewart, first on the list and the oldest officer in the service, wrote, requesting the permission of the President to decline the appointment. It is a singular letter, and required a singular answer, which I sent him, leaving the subject in his hands.

The Advisory Board, which had to pass on subordinate active appointments, have completed their labors the past week. I am not altogether satisfied with their action, and perhaps should not be with any board, when so much was to be done, and so many men to pass under revision. The omission of Selfridge and Porter (W. D.) were perhaps the most marked cases, and the promotion of Fleming and Poor the most objectionable.

In the action of this board I have taken no part, but scrupulously abstained from any conversation with its members, directly or indirectly. I did say to Assistant Secretary Fox that I regretted the action in the case of the elder Selfridge and Walke, and I think he must have intimated these views in regard to W., for the action of the board was subsequently reversed. But I know not how this may have been.

Had a letter last evening from Lieutenant Budd, stating that he presented me with a chair rumored to have belonged to General Washington, which was captured on the Steamer Memphis, and asking me to accept it. Admiral Paulding had written me there was such a chair, which he had carried to his house, and asking what should be done with it. The chair was private property and sent by a lady to some one abroad, for friendly feeling to the Rebels.

I sent word to Admiral P. that the captors could donate it or it might be sold with the other parts of the cargo. It is, I apprehend, of little intrinsic value. If it really belonged to Washington, it seemed to me impolitic to sell it at auction as a Rebel capture; if not Washington's, there should be no humbug. My impressions were that it might be given to Admiral P. or to the Commandant's House at the navy yard, and I am inclined to think I will let it take the latter course, at least for the present.

Governor Buckingham was here last week, and among other matters had in view the selection of Collectors and Assessors for our State. There was great competition. The State ticket was headed by Howard, and the Congress ticket headed by Goodman. While personally friendly to all, my convictions were for the State ticket, which was moreover much the ablest. The Secretary of the Treasury gave it the preference but made three alterations.

I met Senator Dixon the next day at the Executive Mansion, he having come on to Washington with express reference to these appointments. He has written me several letters indicating much caution, but I saw at once that he was strongly committed and exceedingly disappointed. He promised to see me again, but left that P.M. to get counter support.

Intelligence reaches us this evening that the Rebel ironclad ram Arkansas has been destroyed. We have also news of a fight yesterday on the Rapidan by forces under General Pope, the Rebels commanded by Stonewall Jackson.

Was told confidentially to-day that a treaty had been brought about between Thurlow Weed and Bennett of the Herald, after a bitterness of twenty years. A letter was read to me giving the particulars. Weed had word conveyed to Bennett that he would like to make up. Bennett thereupon invited Weed to Fort Washington. Weed was shy; sent word that he was engaged the evening named, which was untrue. Bennett then sent a second invitation, which was accepted; and Weed dined and stayed for the night at Fort Washington, and the Herald directly changed its tune.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 71-9

Diary of Edward Bates, Monday, February 24, 1862

Late last night, Mr. Newton⁴ came in to tell me that the Prest had just reed, a telegram to the effect that Columbus was evacuated.⁵ This morning the story is contradicted by another telegram. And now Gen McDowell⁶ tells me that Com[modor]e. Foote⁷ has made a reconnoisance [sic] in one of his boats, and finds a very strong fort there. Still, McDowell says that our affairs look bright and well — No certain news today from Nashville⁸ or Savanna[h] .⁹

I am anxious about Norfolk. The rumor is that we are about to attack Craney Island¹⁰ — may be so, but I think if the attack is made at all, it will be a feint, to draw attention while we assail Suffolk.¹¹ Possibly it may be good policy to risk something in assailing Norfolk before the Merrimack is ready to make a desperate effort to escape.

This afternoon, tho' very unwell, attended the funeral of Willie Lincoln — Note. The Depts. closed today on a/c of the funeral.

The morning was gusty, with several rain storms — cleared off in the afternoon, with very high wind. Note. Stepping out of my own door to speak to Klopfer,¹² with my loose gown on, I was laterally, blown away! Seised by the gust, I had to run before it, for fear of falling, till I caught hold of the boxing of a tree — then came my servant Tom¹³ and helped me in.

_______________

⁴ See supra, Jan. 5, 1862, note 12.

⁵ Columbus, Kentucky, was a Confederate stronghold and railroad terminus on the Mississippi, twelve miles below Cairo. The capture of Fort Henry on February 6 and of Fort Donelson on February 16 forced the evacuation of Columbus.

⁶ Supra, Nov. 16, 1861, note 53.

⁷ Supra, Feb. 17, 1862, note 77.

⁸ Nashville fell February 26, 1862.

⁹ Supra, Feb. 17, 1862, note 83.

¹⁰ Near the mouth of the James River.

¹¹ A town «about eighteen miles southwest of Norfolk on the Nansemond River. It controlled Norfolk's rail connections with the Confederacy.

¹² Henry A. Klopfer, head messenger in the Attorney-General's Office.

¹³ Tom Hare who had come from Missouri with Mr. Bates.

SOURCE: Howard K. Beale, Editor, Annual Report of The American Historical Association For The Year 1930, Vol. 4, The Diary Of Edward Bates, p. 236

Diary of Dr. Alfred L. Castleman, October 11, 1861

Sent off ambulances to-day to commence bringing forward the sick of my regiment, and whilst they were gone, after having put my hospital in good order for their reception, I stepped over again to Commodore Jones' house to see how the guards stationed there had succeeded in carrying out their orders. Till I entered the house, I thought I had seen evidences of extreme vandalism, but the wanton destruction here beggars everything I have before witnessed. Furniture broken; feather beds opened, and their contents emptied over house and yard; even those beautiful family pictures were ground to atoms and thrown to the winds. But I need not describe here, for the impression is deeply stamped in memory, more durable and more accurate than words and letters can ever make. Everything destructable was destroyed.*

In handling over the papers I picked up the Commodore's "Journal of a cruise in the U. S. ship Relief-bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Jones-Thos. A. Downer, Esq., Commander," which I have preserved, and also a letter from a son of Commodore Tatnall (late of the rebel Merrimac) to Commodore Jones, written from the Meditterranean, asking to be relieved from duty there, and to be permitted to return to America.†

As it will be a matter of interest to me, in future, to study my predictions as to the course and conduct of this war-to rejoice and be vain over those which prove correct, and to laugh at or be ashamed of those which prove false, I shall continue to record them as I have begun; and here I enter one in which I hope to take interest a long time hence. As I have constantly predicted, we have had no fight here nor shall we have; and I now very much doubt whether we shall have a fight even at Manassas, and for this reason: "After all the feints of the enemy here to draw Gen. Banks from Harper's Ferry had failed, they, seeing that we have got foot-hold in North Carolina, will fall back on their fortifications at Centerville and Manassas, and then presenting a bold front with a small body, will cover the withdrawal of the larger part of their force, which they will distribute in Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee and Western Virginia, and I very much doubt whether they will retain enough at Manassas to make a respectable fight. Kentucky and Tennessee are to become the theatre of war; and if I am not greatly mistaken, Kentucky will have trying times between this and the first of January. I hope that Gen. McClellan is taking the same view of things, and is preparing to meet it." What I have here marked as a quotation is a copied from a letter this day written to a friend on the prospects of the war.

_______________

* It is worthy of remark here, that thus whilst this wanton destruction was going on, a half a mile away, everything on the place of Mr. Johnson, (a loyalist, whose house and garden were in the very midst of the encampments,) though unguarded was unmolested; every article he had to dispose of was bought and paid for, at high prices, by the soldiers. Even thus early could we read the soldier's aversion to guarding, or having guarded the property of rebels.

† This letter I handed to a lady connection of the Tatnall family, who was with me at the time, and she found means of restoring it to them.

SOURCE: Alfred L. Castleman, The Army of the Potomac. Behind the Scenes. A Diary of Unwritten History; From the Organization of the Army, by General George B. McClellan, to the close of the Campaign in Virginia about the First Day January, 1863, p. 42-3

Diary of Private William S. White, March 9, 1862

Left Petersburg this morning for Suffolk. Was quite ill on the train, and when I reached Suffolk, had to take my bed. Heard to-day of the actions of the Merrimac—all honor to the noble Buchanan, for he has added new glories to the Southern cause.

SOURCE: William S. White, A Diary of the War; or What I Saw of It, p. 112

Diary of Corporal Lawrence Van Alstyne: November 15, 1862

WE are nearly out of sight of land. Wild ducks and geese cover the water. The sun is just coming up, and seems to me I never saw such a lovely morning. Besides the ducks and geese on the water, the air is full of them, some alighting on the water and others rising from it. They are so tame they only get out of the way of the boat, and if shooting was allowed, hundreds could be shot from where I stand. I am sore and stiff from my run to catch the boat, but I am thankful to be here and take in these new sights on this glorious morning. Chaplain Parker is on board and is pointing out places and vessels, and helping us to enjoy it all.

11 a. m. We are sailing over the spot where the Monitor and Merrimac fought. An eye-witness who is on board has been giving a vivid description of it, to which I listened with the deepest interest.

Noon. We have landed at Newport News; so they call it, but there are only a few shanties in sight, and beside each one is a huge pile of oyster shells. The boys are here, having been brought off from the Arago, which lies off shore. Oysters are plenty and cheap, and I am full of them, the best I ever tasted, fresh from the water, and so large many of them make two good mouthfuls. The Monitor, which saved the day when the Merrimac came out of the James River, lies near by, and the wrecks of the Cumberland and Congress which were sunk, show above the water. The Arago lies just outside and at 2 P. M. we go on board. The only white men I have seen are soldiers. The negroes and their shanties are all I can see of Newport News.

SOURCE:  Lawrence Van Alstyne, Diary of an Enlisted Man, p. 61-2

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: May 13, 1864

Cloudy and showery all day.

Last night my youngest son Thomas came in, furloughed (unsolicited) by his officers, who perceived his exhaustion.

The enemy disappeared in the night. We suffered most in the several engagements with him near the city. I suppose some sympathizer had furnished him with a copy of our photograph map of the fortifications and country in the vicinity.

But the joy of many, and chagrin of some at his escape so easily, was soon followed by the startling intelligence that a raid from Gen. Butler's army had cut the Danville Road! All communication with the country from which provisions are derived is now completely at an end! And if supplies are withheld that long, this community, as well as the army, must be without food in ten days! Col. Northrop told me to-day that unless the railroads were retaken and repaired, he could not feed the troops ten days longer. And he blamed Gen. Lee for the loss of over 200,000 pounds of bacon at Beaver Dam. He says Gen. Lee ordered it there, instead of keeping it at Charlottesville or Gordonsville. Could Lee make such a blunder?

Most of the members of Congress, when not in session, hang about the door and hall of the War Department, eager for news, Mr. Hunter being the most prominent, if not the most anxious among them. But the wires are cut in all directions, and we must rely on couriers.

The wildest rumors float through the air. Every successive hour gives birth to some new tidings, and one must be near the Secretary's table indeed to escape being misled by false reports.

For two days no dispatch has been received from Gen. Lee, although one hears of a dispatch just received from him at every corner of the streets. A courier arrived to-day from the vicinity of our army. He saw a gentleman who saw Gen. Lee's son Robert yesterday, and was informed by him that our army was five miles nearer Fredericksburg, having driven the enemy farther down the river.

Our iron-clads—Virginia, Richmond, and Fredericksburg—I understood from Lieut. Minor, this morning, will not go out until in readiness to cope successfully with the enemy's fleet of gun-boats and monitors. How long that will be he did not say. It may be to-day. And while I write (4½ P.M.) I can distinctly hear the roar of artillery down the river. It may be an engagement by land or by water, or by both; and it may be only the customary shelling of the woods by the enemy's gun-boats. But it is very rapid sometimes.

A courier reports the raid on the Danville Road as not formidable. They are said, however, to have blown up the coal-pits. They cannot blow coal higher than our own extortionate people have done.

I directed my wife to lay out all the money about the house in provisions. She got a bushel of meal and five pounds of bacon for about $100. If we must endure another turn of the screw of famine, it is well to provide for it as well as possible. We cannot starve now, in a month; and by that time, Gens. Lee and Beauregard may come to our relief. Few others are looked to hopefully. The functionaries here might have had a six-months' supply, by wise and energetic measures.

The President has had the Secretary of War closeted with him nearly all day. It is too late now for the evacuation of Richmond, and a desperate defense will be made. If the city falls, the consequences will be ruinous to the present government. And how could any of its members escape? Only in disguise. This is the time to try the nerves of the President and his counselors!

Gen. Bragg is very distasteful to many officers of the army; and the croakers and politicians would almost be willing to see the government go to pieces, to get rid of the President and his cabinet. Some of the members of Congress are anxious to get away, and the Examiner twits them for their cowardice. They will stay, probably.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 2, p. 207-9

Flag Officer Samuel F. Dupont to Gustavus V. Fox, June 1, 1862

Private

Wabash 1. June. 62 

My Dear Friend 

I must have a slight growl. You ought not to take the 'Flag' from me. I nursed her, planned her repairs, she is important off Charleston to catch all these fellows coming. Keystone and Flambeau are the only steamers that have much of heels—she has both heels and long guns. Do send her. The Merrimac is dead and I don't believe her ghost will rise. 

Aff. 

S. F. D.P. 

Make Goldsboro take care of Wilmington, the four Steamers we caught were all going there if foiled at Charleston. 

Please forward the enclosed to Davis. We call him Flag offr. I suppose you will make him one.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 125-6

Gustavus V. Fox to Flag Officer Samuel F. Dupont, April 3, 1862

Navy Department 

April 3, 1862 

My dear Commodore, 

The deficiency of coal is entirely Lenthall's fault, for on the impression gathered from your notes I have spoken to him daily for sixty days. We will make some different arrangements about sending it. In the meantime Lenthall is ordered to hire steamers to carry coal to Port Royal, and the Bienville will be loaded full and sent off, and you can return her for more, or for docking, if she requires it.

The Kensington at Port Royal is most serious to Farragut. Now that operations are closed inside of Hatteras so soon as the Merrimac is disposed of and the movement which McClellan asks for performed by Goldsborough, we shall be able to send you a dozen vessels.

Our summer's work must be Charleston by the navy. We can give you the Monitor and Galena, iron vessels, the former can go up to Charleston and return in perfect safety. The other is simply an ordinary formed vessel clad with iron. What do you say to it, and what should you require besides these vessels? I should like your views, and be enabled to give to you the crowning act of retribution.

The running of the blockade to Nassau and Havana, and the escape of the Nashville both ways has caused petitions to be started in Boston, New York and Philadelphia, for the removal of Mr. Welles. Uncle Abram has no idea of giving way to these people, so you may feel no anxiety. Stringham has made a strong push to get recommended for a vote of thanks, urging that you received it for an action previous to the passage of the law. So we sent in your name again to quiet him. There is no chance for him. Davis is here smiling and happy. Think over Charleston, and see if we can do it about June. We have about $25000000 for iron vessels, thanks to our disaster at Old Point. Can't you send me half a dozen secesh swords of the commonest kinds, for distribution? The rage here for trophies beats the Mediterranean antiques. With my best wishes for all your plans—so wise and successful.

Most truly yours

G. V. Fox. 

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 114-5

Flag Officer Samuel F. Dupont to Gustavus V. Fox, April 3, 1862

Private & Confidential 

‘Wabash’ Port Royal 

April 3. 62. 

My Dear Sir

Since writing to the Department for more force Genl Hunter informs me that he considers the Army here too much spread, and he contemplates withdrawing the troops from North Edisto and Jacksonville!

We have many contraband at the former and its occupation was a thorn in the flank of Charleston, though the force naval and military was much too small. At the latter place the people committed to the Union movement will be checked, if not maltreated, and we shall lose Florida politically if not otherwise. The gun boats cannot hold Jacksonville without troops, and will have to be drawn down to the mouth of the St. Johns for a simple inside blockade of that river, losing all the moral effect of the splendid reconnaissance up it, for more than one hundred and fifty miles by Stevens.

The Henry Andrew the only vessel I could get into Mosquito inlet, to prevent the further ingress of Enfield rifles from Nassau and to guard the Live Oak, is seriously threatened by the rebels and will be driven out. A Regiment for a few days would scatter these wretches to the four winds—but of course I cannot now expect one, and we shall lose two hundred thousand dollars worth of live oak and pine.

Do not understand me as wishing to criticise the new order of things. Genl Hunter has good military reasons for his intentions, but they run counter to what we have been doing, and to your urgent pressure on me to take more ports. We had better have left Florida and the lower coast of Georgia alone, than to show an inability to keep what we have captured. We are informed that the Rebel order to evacuate Florida has been rescinded, and Genl Wright is threatened at Jacksonville by 2500 men.

I have not yet told you, that we have a ram as well as yourself to haunt our imaginations. Some swear to one as getting ready under Fort Jackson, others doubt. I get a new sketch of it every few days from Wall's Cut. Our friends in the batteries are greatly exercised thereby, and I cannot get away my light draft vessels to send and help my own people elsewhere. By the Charleston paper of the 25" ulto Tattnall passed through with his two sons to assume the command of the Merrimac.

Yesterday seventeen stupid volunteers and a Lieutenant, were captured by the rebels on Wilmington island, and of course I was called upon for assistance to prevent a recurrence. It is apprehended the enemy may extract from them the preparations on Tybee for the bombardment of Pulaski, which will now have to be accelerated—carriages or no carriages. When all patience was exhausted, they were looked for by the Atlantic but she came without them. Hamilton Chf. of Artill[er]y thinks it will be reduced in three days when they once commence. I fear mischief in the mean time.

Now my Dear Sir, there is an easy solution to all these difficulties and complications. Five thousand troops should be dispatched at once and give me the gun boats and Tugs I have asked for.

General Sherman leaves us in the morning. I have asked Eldridge to pass near us on going out that we may give him three hearty cheers from the Wabash. His position has never been understood by the Government or the people—he was required to make bricks without straw. All think well of having made a Military Department and sending a Major General, but why could not Sherman have remained in command of the Division? A more arduous, onerous and responsible but thankless work, no public officer ever went through, and none ever brought to such a task more true and unselfish devotion. It seems hard when such labors are about to bear fruit, that he who ploughed, harrowed, and sowed, should not be allowed even to participate in the gathering of the harvest.

He is a true friend to the Navy, and when I compare his noble endorsement of us fellows for the Port Royal affair with the meagre, stinty approval given by others on similar occasions, so properly commented on by Mr. Grimes in the Senate, I feel still more for Sherman.

Last not least—Stevens with this ships boats and the prize Steamer Darlington & Ellen has raised the America and brought her to Jacksonville. He had made one fruitless search; but a carpet bag was found containing a letter which gave the precise spot where she had been sunk, 147 miles up the St. Johns River; the letter closing with one of those refined rebel phrases, “They had so fixed her that all the Yankees outside of hell could not get her up.” She is not much injured but without sails or ground tackling. As you have heard doubtless, she was purchased by the Rebel Government to carry Mason and Slidell to England.

It occurred to me that so historical a craft, so curiously restored to us and to the North where she could only have been built, might be with a happy moral effect presented to the Governor of the State of New York, if the Department will allow me to do it. I would of course fit her up nicely, put an officer on board send her home and have it all done secundum artem.

Please remember this is a confidential letter. With best regards to Mr Welles

Yours faithfully,

S. F. DUPONT 

G. V. Fox Esq
    Ass. Sec. Navy,
        Washington.

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 115-8

Gustavus V. Fox to Flag Officer Samuel F. Dupont, May 12, 1862

Navy Department 

May 12 1862 

Flag Officer S. F. Dupont
Port Royal.

My Dear Sir:

Now things are breaking up entirely in Virginia we are ready to give you a force for Charleston. I wrote you a note about it some time since. If we give you the Galena and Monitor, don't you think we can go squarely at it by the Channel, so as to make it purely navy? Any other plan we shall play second. Port Royal and New Orleans suit me. Please write early as possible. Davis has commenced well out West. I am glad he has had a chance. 

Govt are to have a weekly list of steamers down the coast for the mails. I have not written you lately, that confounded Merrimac has set like a nightmare upon our Dept. If you can finish Charleston with the Navy, the Country will rejoice above all other victories. 

Everything looks well and goes well. With warm regards to Rodgers, 

Most sincerely yours, 

G. V. Fox. 

SOURCE: Robert Means Thompson & Richard Wainwright, Editors, Publications of the Naval Historical Society, Volume 9: Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865, Volume 1, p. 119-20

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant Luman Harris Tenney: Saturday, August 6, 1864

A very pleasant ride down the James. Rounded Lighthouse Point. Soon passed Harrison's Landing, then Fort Powhatan and Wilcox's Landing. Here danger from reb guns ceased. The old Jamestown site on left bank, a few chimneys still standing. Newport near where the Merrimac fight came off, Cumberland and Congress sunk. Sewall's Point across, eight miles down Fortress Monroe. Went ashore. Everything carried on in the finest style. Splendid fort, having an armament of over 200 guns and “The Union” monster gun which fired a shot from Fort Monroe to Sewall's Point, 8 miles. Ripraps still progressing. A splendid fort built in center of stream on the shoals, Gov't prisoners at work on it. Through Hampton Roads into the Chesapeake and Atlantic. Passing Old Point Comfort, the bay is very wide. Saw an American and English frigate and a French gunboat. An English cutter manned by 8 or 10 fellows in white came ashore. Reached Point Lookout about sundown, the ironclad Roanoke lying off the point. Up the river, 12 miles, and anchored for the night. A most pleasant trip. Stormed enough to roughen the bay a little. Good fare upon the boat. Pass hundreds of boats, most of them making their way to City Point, I suppose. Phosphorus.

SOURCE: Frances Andrews Tenney, War Diary Of Luman Harris Tenney, p. 126-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, December 26, 1863

The Dictator, turret vessel, was launched this A.M. in New York. This is one of a class of vessels that has become famous. She is of greatly increased dimensions to any hitherto constructed. I have full confidence that she will be a formidable fighting craft, but am not prepared to indorse her, or the Puritan, which is not yet launched, as cruisers. There are differences among naval men on this subject, but the turret vessels are steadily gaining friends among them, and early friends are becoming enthusiastic. Fox, himself a good sailor, and others give them unqualified approval. Fox is ready, he says, to cross the Atlantic or double Cape Horn with either. For harbor or coast defense these vessels are, I think, invaluable, and almost invulnerable. The fight with the Merrimac made for them rapid converts. When the first turret vessel, the Monitor, was building, many naval men and men in the shipping interest sneered at her as a humbug, and at me as no sailor or judge, until she vindicated her power and worth in that first remarkable conflict. Then I was abused by party men because I had not made preparations for and built more.

There is constant caprice in regard to the Navy. Those who know least clamor most. It is difficult to decide what course to pursue, and yet I must prescribe a policy and be held accountable for it. If I go forward and build large and expensive vessels, I shall be blamed for extravagance, particularly if peace takes place. On the other hand, if I should not build, and we have, not only continued hostilities, but war with England or France, I shall be denounced for being unprepared. Yet it is patent that powerful, and expensive because powerful, structures are conducive to peace. A few strong, powerful vessels will conduce to economy because they will deter commercial nations from troubling us, and if not troubled, we need no large and expensive navy.

During the whole of this civil war, I have been beset and annoyed by interested patriots who had old steamers to sell which no one would buy. The agents of these parties crowded the Department, got Members of Congress to besiege it, and, because I did not think their crafts adapted to our wants, they, and in some instances the press and certain Members of Congress, engaged in abuse of me.

What we needed for this war and the blockade of our extensive coast was many vessels of light draft and good speed, not large, expensive ships, for we had no navy to encounter but illicit traders to capture. I acted accordingly and I have no doubt correctly, though much abused for it. A war with one or more of the large maritime powers would require an entirely different class of vessels.

In naval matters, as in financial, those who are most ignorant complain loudest. The wisest policy receives the severest condemnation. My best measures have been the most harshly criticized. I have been blamed for procuring so many small vessels from the merchant service. But those vessels were not only the cheapest and the most available, but the most effective. In no other way could we have established an effective blockade of our extended coast. We wanted not heavy navy-built ships but such vessels as had speed and could capture neutral unarmed blockade-runners. There was no navy, no fighting craft, to encounter. Half a dozen small vessels required no more men and were not more expensive than one first-class ship, yet either one of the six small craft of light draught which were swift was more effective than the big ship for this particular duty. It was claimed the small light vessels could not lie off the coast in winter and do blockade service. Experience has shown the contrary. The grumblers have said our small naval-built gunboats have not great speed. Small propellers of light draught on duty for months cannot carry sufficient fuel and have great speed.

There is no little censure because fast vessels are not sent off after the Alabama, and yet it would be an act of folly to detach vessels from the blockade and send them off scouring the ocean for this roving wolf, which has no country, no home, no resting-place but such as neutral England and France may give her. When I sometimes ask the faultfinders to tell me where the Alabama is or can be found, assuring them I will send a force of several vessels at once to take her on being satisfactorily informed, they are silenced. Whilst these men blame me for not sending a fleet after the marauders, they and others would blame me more were I to weaken the blockade in an uncertain pursuit. Unreasonable and captious men will blame me, take what course I may. I must, therefore, follow my own convictions.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 495-7

Edwin M. Stanton to Reverend Heman Dyer, May 18, 1862

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1862.

Rev. HEMAN DYER:

MY DEAR FRIEND: Yours of the 16th is welcomed as an evidence of the continued regard of one whose esteem I have always been anxious to possess. I have been very well aware of the calumnies busily circulated against me in New York and elsewhere respecting my relations to General McClellan, but am compelled, from public considerations, to withhold the proofs that would stamp the falsehood of the accusations and the base motives of the accusers, who belong to two classes:

1st. Plunderers, who have been driven from the Department, where they were gorging millions.

2d. Scheming politicians, whose designs are endangered by an earnest, resolute, uncompromising prosecution of this war, as a war against rebels and traitors.

A brief statement of facts — an official record — which I can make to you confidentially, will be sufficient to satisfy yourself that your confidence in me has not been misplaced.

1. When I entered the Cabinet I was, and for months had been, the sincere and devoted friend of General McClellan, and to support him, and, so far as I might, aid and assist him in bringing the war to a close, was a chief inducement for me to sacrifice my personal happiness to a sense of public duty. I had studied him earnestly, with an anxious desire to discover the military and patriotic virtue that might save the country; and if in any degree disappointed, I hoped on, and waited for time to develop. I went into the Cabinet about the 20th of January. On the 27th, the President made his War Order, No. 1, requiring the Army of the Potomac to move. It is not necessary, or perhaps proper, to state all the causes that led to that order, but it is enough to know that the Government was on the verge of bankruptcy, and, at the rate of expenditure, the armies must move or the Government perish. The 22d of February was the day fixed for movement, and when it arrived there was no more sign of movement on the Potomac than there had been for three months before. Many, very many, earnest conversations I had held with General McClellan, to impress him with the absolute necessity of active operations, or that the Government would fail because of foreign intervention and enormous debt.

Between the 22d of February and the 8th of March, the President had again interfered, and a movement on Winchester and to clear the blockade of the Potomac was promised, commenced, and abandoned. The circumstances cannot at present be revealed.

On the 6th of March, the President again interfered, ordered the Army of the Potomac to be organized into army corps, and that operations should commence immediately.

Two lines of operations were open. First. One moving directly on the enemy by Manassas, and forcing him back on Richmond, beating and destroying him by superior force, and all the time keeping the capital secure by being between it and the enemy. This was the plan favored by the President. Second. The other plan was to transfer the troops by water to some point on the Lower Chesapeake, and thence advance on Richmond. This was General McClellan's plan. The President reluctantly yielded his own views, although they were supported by some of the best military men in the country, and consented that the general should pursue his own plan. But, by a written order, he imposed the special condition that the army should not be moved without leaving a sufficient force in and around Washington to make the capital perfectly secure against all danger, and that the force required should be determined by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps.

In order to enable General McClellan to devote his whole energy to the movement of his own army (which was quite enough to tax the ability of the ablest commander in the world), he was relieved from the charge of the other military departments, it being supposed that their respective commanders were competent to direct the operations in their own departments. To enable General McClellan to transport his force, every means and power of the Government was placed at his disposal and unsparingly used.

When a large part of his force had been transferred to Fortress Monroe, and the whole of it about to go in a few days, information was given to me by various persons that there was great reason to fear that no adequate force had been left to defend the capital in case of a sudden attack; that the enemy might detach a large force, and seize it at a time when it would be impossible for General McClellan to render any assistance. Serious alarm was expressed by many persons, and many warnings given me, which I could not neglect. I ordered a report of the force left to defend Washington. It was reported by the commander to be less than 20,000 raw recruits, with not a single organized brigade! A dash, like that made a short time before at Winchester, would at any time take the capital of the nation. The report of the force left to defend Washington, and the order of the President, were referred to Major-General Hitchcock and Adjutant-General Thomas to report—

1st. Whether the President's orders had been complied with.

2d. Whether the force left to defend this city was sufficient.

They reported in the negative on both points. These reports were submitted to the President, who also consulted General Totten, General Taylor, General Meigs, and General Ripley. They agreed in opinion that the capital was not safe.

The President then, by written order, directed me to retain one of the army corps for the defense of Washington, either Sumner's or McDowell's. As part of Sumner's corps had already embarked, I directed McDowell to remain with his command, and the reasons were approved by the President.

Down to this period there had never been a shadow of difference between General McClellan and myself. It is true that I thought his plan of operations objectionable, as the most expensive, the most hazardous, and most protracted that could have been chosen, but I was not a military man, and, while he was in command, I would not interfere with his plan, and gave him every aid to execute it. But when the case assumed the form it had done by his disregard of the President's order, and by leaving the capital exposed to seizure by the enemy, I was bound to act, even if I had not been required by the specific written order of the President. Will any man question that such was my duty?

When this order was communicated to General McClellan, it of course provoked his wrath, and the wrath of his friends was directed upon me because I was the agent of its execution. If the force had gone forward, as he had designed, I believe that Washington would this day be in the hands of the rebels. Down to this point, moreover, there was never the slightest difference between the President and myself. But the entreaties of General McClellan induced the President to modify his order to the extent that Franklin's division (being part of McDowell's corps that had been retained) was detached and sent forward by boat to McClellan. This was against my judgment, because I thought the whole force of McDowell should be kept together and sent forward by land on the shortest route to Richmond, thus aiding McClellan, but at the same time covering and protecting Washington by keeping between it and the enemy. In this opinion Major-General Hitchcock, General Meigs, and Adjutant-General Thomas agreed. But the President was so anxious that General McClellan should have no cause of complaint, that he ordered the force to be sent by water, although that route was then threatened by the Merrimac. I yielded my opinion to the President's order; but between him and me there has never been the slightest shadow since I entered the Cabinet. And excepting the retention of the force under McDowell by the President's order, for the reasons mentioned, General McClellan had never made a request or expressed a wish that had not been promptly complied with, if in the power of the Government. To me personally he has repeatedly expressed his confidence and his thanks in the dispatches sent me.

Now, one word as to political motives. What motive can I have to thwart General McClellan? I am not now, never have been, and never will be a candidate for any office. I hold my present post at the request of a President who knew me personally, but to whom I had not spoken from the 4th of March, 1861, until the day he handed me my commission. I knew that everything I cherished and held dear would be sacrificed by accepting office. But I thought I might help to save the country, and for that I was willing to perish. If I wanted to be a politician or a candidate for any office, would I stand between the Treasury and the robbers that are howling around me? Would I provoke and stand against the whole newspaper gang in this country, of every party, who, to sell news, would imperil a battle? I was never taken for a fool, but there could be no greater madness than for a man to encounter what I do for anything else than motives that overleap time and look forward to eternity. I believe that God Almighty founded this Government, and for my acts in the effort to maintain it I expect to stand before Him in judgment.

You will pardon this long explanation, which has been made to no one else. It is due to you, who was my friend when I was a poor boy at school, and had no claim upon your confidence or kindness. It cannot be made public for obvious reasons. General McClellan is at the head of our chief army; he must have every confidence and support; and I am willing that the whole world should revile me rather than diminish one grain of the strength needed to conquer the rebels. In a struggle like this, justice or credit to individuals is but dust in the balance. Desiring no office nor honor, and anxious only for the peace and quiet of my home, I suffer no inconvenience beyond that which arises from the trouble and anxiety suffered by worthy friends like yourself, who are naturally disturbed by the clamors and calumny of those whose interest or feeling is hostile to me.

The official records will, at the proper time, fully prove—

1st. That I have employed the whole power of the Government un-sparingly to support General McClellan's operations in preference to every other general.

2d. That I have not interfered with or thwarted them in any particular.

3d. That the force retained from his expedition was not needed, and could not have been employed by him; that it was retained by express orders of the President, upon military investigation, and upon the best military advice in the country; that its retention was required to save the capital from the danger to which it was exposed by a disregard of the President's positive order of the 6th of March.

4th. That between the President and myself there has never been any, the slightest, shadow of difference upon any point, save the detachment of Franklin's force, and that was a point of no significance, but in which I was sustained by Generals Hitchcock, Meigs, Thomas, and Ripley, while the President yielded only to an anxious desire to avoid complaint, declaring at the same time his belief that the force was not needed by General McClellan.

You will, of course, regard this explanation as being in the strictest confidence, designed only for your information upon matters wherein you express concern for me. The confidence of yourself, and men like you, is more than a full equivalent for all the railing that has been or can be expressed against me, and in the magnitude of the cause all merely individual questions are swallowed up.

I shall always rejoice to hear from you, and am, as ever, truly yours,

EDWIN M. STANTON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 19, Part 2 (Serial No. 28), p. 725-8

1st Lieutenant Charles Wright Wills: April 16, 1862

On Steamer Henry Clay, off New Madrid, Mo.,

April 16, 1862.

I finished my last in a great hurry, helped strike and load our tents and equipage and started for the levee, confident that we would be off for Memphis, Orleans and intermediate landings, before the world would gain 12 hours at farthest in age. That day over 30 steamers arrived, received their loads of soldiers and departed, all down stream, preceded by six or eight gunboats and 16 mortarboats. Word came at nightfall that there were not enough boats for all and the cavalry would have to wait the morrow and more transports. We lay on the river banks that night, and the next day alt the cavalry got off except our brigade of two regiments. Another night on the banks without tents, managed to get transportation for two battalions, one from each regiment. They started down yesterday at about 10 a. m. and more boats coming we loaded two more battalions, but at 9 p. m. a dispatch boat came up with orders for us to stop loading and await further orders. The same boat turned back all the cavalry of our brigade that had started and landed them at Tiptonsville; we are at 6 this p. m. lying around loose on the bank here awaiting orders. That boat brought up word that our fleet was at Fort Pillow, and the Rebels were going to make a stand there, but that nothing had occurred when she left but some gunboats skirmishing. What the devil we are going to do is more than three men like me can guess. It's awful confounded dull here. Nothing even half interesting. Saw a cuss, trying to drown himself yesterday, and saw a fellow's leg taken off last night. These are better than no show at all, but still there's not much fun about either case. I'm bored considerably by some of my Canton friends wanting me to help them get their niggers out of camp. Now, I don't care a damn for the darkies, and know that they are better off with their masters 50 times over than with us, but of course you know I couldn't help to send a runaway nigger back. I'm blamed if I could. I honestly believe that this army has taken 500 niggers away with them. Many men have lost from 15 to 30 each. The owners were pretty well contented while the army stayed here, for all the generals assured them that when we left the negroes would not be allowed to go with us, and they could easily get them back; but they have found out that was a “gull” and they are some bitter on us now. There will be two Indiana regiments left here to guard the country from Island 10 to Tiptonsville, and if you don't hear of some fun from this quarter after the army all leaves but them, I'm mistaken. They'll have their hands full if not fuller. We have not been paid yet but probably will be this week. I tell you I can spend money faster here than anywhere I ever was in my life, but of course I don't do it. Am trying to save up for rainy weather, and the time, if it should come, when I'll have only one leg to go on or one arm to work with. That Pittsburg battle was one awful affair, but it don't hurt us any. Grant will whip them the next time completely. Poor John Wallace is gone. He was a much better boy than he had credit for being. We all liked him in the old mess very much. Ike Simonson, of same company, I notice was wounded. He was also in my mess; was from Farmington. There are no rumors in camp to-day. Yesterday it was reported and believed that the Monitor had sunk the Merrimac, that Yorktown was taken, and that another big fight had taken place at Corinth and we held the town. That was very bully but it lacks confirmation. Think it will for sometime yet, but Pope says we'll come out all right through all three of those trials. It's just what's wanted to nip this rebellion up root and all. That's a rather dubious victory up to date, that Pittsburg affair, but guess it's all right.

SOURCE: Charles Wright Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, p. 82-4

Diary of John Hay: After March 11, 1862

On the 27th of January the President issued his General War Order No. 1, to those whose direction it was to be. He wrote it without any consultation, and read it to the Cabinet, not for their sanction but for their information. From that time he influenced actively the operations of the campaign. He stopped going to McClellan’s, and sent for the General to come to him. Everything grew busy and animated after this Order. It was not fully carried out in its details. Some of the Corps anticipated, others delayed action. Fort Henry and Fort Donaldson showed that Halleck was doing his share. The Army of the Potomac still was sluggish. His next Order was issued after a consultation with all the Generals of the Potomac Army in which, as Stanton told me next morning, “we saw ten Generals afraid to fight.” The fighting Generals were McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman and Keys, and Banks. These were placed next day at the head of the Army Corps.

So things began to look vigorous. Sunday morning, the 9th of March, the news of the Merrimac's frolic came here. Stanton was fearfully stampeded. He said they would capture our fleet, take Fort Monroe, be in Washington before night. The Tycoon thought it was a great bore, but blew less than Stanton. As the day went on, the news grew better. And at four o'clock the telegraph was completed, and we heard of the splendid performance of the Monitor. That evening we heard also of the evacuation of the Potomac batteries, the luckiest of all possible chances, as the worst thing about the Merrimac's damages was the fact that they would impede the enterprise of taking those batteries. This was McDowell’s explanation to me when I told him of it.

At evening came the news of Manassas being evacuated; this came through contrabands. McClellan started instantly over the river. The next day the news was confirmed and the next night Manassas was occupied. People said a great deal about it, and thought a great deal more.

On the evening of the 11th of March, the President requested me to call together the heads of the Departments of War, State and Treasury. Seward came first. The President read to him General Order No. 3. He approved it thoroughly. He agreed with the President when the Pres^t said that though the duty of relieving General McClellan was a most painful one, he yet thought he was doing Gen. McC. a very great kindness in permitting him to retain command of the Army of the Potomac, and giving him an opportunity to retrieve his errors. Seward spoke very bitterly of the imbecility which had characterised the General's operations on the upper Potomac. The Secretary of State urged that the War Order go out in the name of Stanton. He said it would strengthen the hands of the Secretary, and he needed public confidence. While he was urging this, Stanton came in, and at once insisted that it go in the President's name. He said that a row had grown up between him and McC.’s friends, and he feared it would be thought to spring from personal feeling. The President decided to take the responsibility.

Blair was not consulted. The President knew that he would object to the disposition of Frémont, and preferred to have no words about it.  Blair and the President continued on very good terms in spite of the publication of Blair’s letter to Frémont. Blair came to explain it to the President, but he told him that he was too busy to quarrel with him. If he (Blair) didn't show him the letter, he would probably never see it. He retained his old status in Cabinet councils. . . .

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 53-6; Tyler Dennett, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay, p. 36-8.

Diary of Gideon Welles: Monday, January 5, 1863

Commander Bankhead arrived this morning and brings particulars of the loss of the Monitor. Its weakness was in herself, where we had apprehended, and not in an antagonist. This has been in some degree remedied in the new boats we are now constructing.

For months I have been berated and abused because I had not more vessels of the Monitor class under contract. Her success with the Merrimac when she was under the trial as an experiment made men wild, and they censured me for not having built a fleet when she was constructed. Now that she is lost, the same persons will be likely to assail me for expending money on such a craft.

There is a set of factious fools who think it is wise to be censorious, and it is almost as amusing as it is vexatious to hear and read the remarks of these Solomons. One or two of these officious blockheads make themselves conspicuous in the New York Chamber of Commerce, and none more so than Mr. Charles H. Marshall, who attempts to show off his nautical knowledge by constantly attacking and slandering the Secretary of the Navy. Marshall was formerly a shipmaster and it was his often expressed opinion that no man should be Secretary of the Navy who has not had command of, and the sailing of, a ship. Like many others as simple if not as egotistical, he would have the Secretary who administers the department a sailor and for the same reasons he should be an engineer, naval constructor, etc. On every occasion of disaster, no matter from what cause, this man Marshall imputes it to the fact that the Secretary of the Navy has never commanded a ship, and he never admits that any credit is due the Navy Department for intelligent and correct administration, or the Secretary of the Navy for any success of any kind, whether of a squadron or single ship, because he is not and never was a sea-captain. Marshall has had his prejudices sharpened by others and particularly by Moses H. Grinnell, who thinks a shipping merchant would make a good Secretary of the Navy. Both are disappointed men, and each wants to be at the head of the Navy Department.

Thus far the British pirate named Alabama sailing under Rebel colors has escaped capture. As a consequence there are marvelous accounts of her wonderful speed, and equally marvelous ones of the want of speed of our cruisers. Of course there is no controverting these fables; she will be a myth, a “skimmer of the seas,” till taken, and our own vessels, of better speed and power, will be slandered by the Marshalls and Grinnells as destitute of all speed. There are men of better sense in the Chamber of Commerce, but one of these has been an extensive ship-owner, the other a shipmaster; both are good and well-meaning men, have been successful business men, but are egotistical and vainly weak. Neither is competent to administer the Navy Department.

The loss of the Monitor and the report of Admiral Lee and others of the draft of water at the inlet is unfavorable for a naval attack on the battery at Cape Fear, and the army object to move on Wilmington except in conjunction with the Navy. It is best, therefore, to push on to Charleston and strengthen Du Pont. The War Department promised to send forward to South Carolina an additional military force of ten thousand under General Hunter. Halleck is heavy-headed; wants sagacity, readiness, courage, and heart. I am not an admirer of the man. He may have some talent as a writer and critic; in all military matters he seems destitute of resources, skill, or capacity. He is more tardy and irresolute than McClellan and is deficient in the higher qualities which the latter possessed.

We have further cheering news from Tennessee of the success of Rosecrans at Murfreesborough; also hopeful news from Vicksburg. I do not see that the least credit is due to Halleck in either of these cases, unless for not embarrassing the officers in command.

It was arranged and directed by the President that General McClernand should command the forces which were to cooperate with the Navy at the opening of the navigation of the Mississippi and the capture of Vicksburg. But McClernand has scarcely been heard of. He is not of the Regular Army, and is no favorite, I perceive, with Halleck, though the President entertains a good opinion of him. Blair alluded two or three weeks since to the fact that McClernand was crowded aside; said there was a combination to prevent his having that command. The President started from his chair when the remark was made and said it should not be so. Stanton declared it was not so, that he and Halleck had arranged the matter that day. The President looked surprised and said he supposed it had been done long ago.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 215-7

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, January 3, 1863

We have, yesterday and to-day, broken accounts of a great fight for three days — and not yet terminated — at Murfreesborough, Tennessee. All statements say we have the best, that we shall beat the Rebels, that we have pierced their centre, that we are driving them through M., etc. I hope to hear we have done instead of we “shall” do. None of our army fights have been finished, but are drawn battles, — worrying, exhausting, but never completed. Of Rosecrans I have thought better and hope a good account of his work, but the best sometimes fail, and he may not be best.

A word by telegraph that the Monitor has foundered and over twenty of her crew, including some officers, are lost. The fate of this vessel affects me in other respects. She is a primary representative of a class identified with my administration of the Navy. Her novel construction and qualities I adopted and she was built amidst obloquy and ridicule. Such a change in the character of a fighting vessel few naval men, or any Secretary under their influence, would have taken the responsibility of adopting. But Admiral Smith and finally all the Board which I appointed seconded my views, and were willing, Davis somewhat reluctantly, to recommend the experiment if I would assume the risk and responsibility. Her success with the Merrimac directly after she went into commission relieved me of odium and anxiety, and men who were preparing to ridicule were left to admire.

When Bushnell of New Haven brought me the first model and plan, I was favorably impressed. I was then in Hartford, proposing to remove my family, but sent him at once to Washington, following myself within a day or two. Understanding that Ericsson, the inventor, was sensitive in consequence of supposed slight and neglect by the Navy Department or this Government some years ago, I made it a point to speak to Admiral Smith, Chairman of the Board, and specially request that he should be treated tenderly, and opportunity given him for full and deliberate hearing. I found Admiral Smith well disposed. The plan was adopted, and the test of her fighting and resisting power was by an arrangement between Admiral Smith and myself, without communication with any other, that she should, when completed, go at once up Elizabeth River to Norfolk Navy Yard, and destroy the Merrimac while in the dry dock, and the dock itself. Had she been completed within the contract time, one hundred days, this purpose would have been accomplished, but there was delay and disappointment, and her prowess was exhibited in a conflict with her huge antagonist under much more formidable circumstances. Her career since the time she first entered Hampton Roads is public history, but her origin, and everything in relation to her, from the inception, have been since her success designedly misrepresented.

Admiral Smith beyond any other person is deserving of credit, if credit be due any one connected with the Navy Department for this vessel. Had she been a failure, he, more than any one but the Secretary, would have been blamed, and [he] was fully aware that he would have to share with me the odium and the responsibility. Let him, therefore, have the credit which is justly his.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 213-5

Diary of Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes: Monday, May 12, 1862

Camp at north of East River near line between Giles and Mercer Counties, eleven miles from Giles Courthouse. — We moved here to a strong position. The whole brigade as now organized is with us. This is the First Brigade of the Army of the District of Kanawha — General Cox. It consists of [the] Twelfth, Twenty-third, and Thirtieth Ohio Regiments, McMullen's Battery (two brass six-pounders and four howitzers), and four companies [of] Paxton's or Bowles' Second Virginia Cavalry; with Captain Gilmore's Cavalry for the present. Brigade commanded by Colonel Scammon.

Colonel White of [the] Twelfth a clever gentleman. Lieutenant-Colonel Hines, ditto, but a great talker and a great memory for persons and places.

Fine weather since Sunday the 4th. Out of grub, out of mess furniture. Rumors of the defeat of Milroy and of overwhelming forces threatening us. Great news by telegraph: The capture of Norfolk, blowing up the Merrimac, and the like! Corinth being abandoned. York peninsula falling into McClellan's hands. If all that this indicates comes to pass, the Rebellion is, indeed, on its last legs.

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 268

Diary of Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle: Friday, June 19, 1863

I embarked at 10 A.M. on board a small steamer to visit Drewry's Bluff on the James River, the scene of the repulse of the ironclads Monitor and Galena. The stream exactly opposite Richmond is very shallow and rocky, but it becomes navigable about a mile below the city. Drewry's Bluff is about eight miles distant, and, before reaching it, we had to pass through two bridges — one of boats, and the other a wooden bridge. I was shown over the fortifications by Captain Chatard, Confederate States navy, who was in command during the absence of Captain Lee. A flotilla of Confederate gunboats was lying just above the obstructions, and nearly opposite to the bluff. Amongst them was the Yorktown, alias Patrick Henry, which, under the command of my friend Captain Tucker, figured in the memorable Merrimac attack. There was also an ironclad called the Richmond, and two or three smaller craft. Beyond Drewry's Bluff, on the opposite side of the river, is Chaffin's Bluff, which mounts heavy guns, and forms the extreme right of the Richmond defences on that side of the river.

At the time of the attack by the two Federal ironclads, assisted by several wooden gunboats, there were only three guns mounted on Drewry's Bluff, which is from 80 to 90 feet high. These had been hastily removed from the Yorktown, and dragged up there by Captain Tucker on the previous day. They were either smooth-bore 32-pounders or 8-inch guns, I forget which. During the contest the Monitor, notwithstanding her recent exploits with the Merrimac, kept herself out of much danger, partly concealed behind the bend of the river; but her consort, the ironclad Galena, approached boldly to within 500 yards of the bluff. The wooden gunboats remained a considerable distance down the river. After the fight had lasted about four hours the Galena withdrew much crippled, and has never, I believe, been known to fame since. The result of the contest goes to confirm the opinion expressed to me by General Beauregard — viz., that ironclads cannot resist the plunging fire of forts, even though that latter can only boast of the old smoothbore guns.

A Captain Maury took me on board the Richmond ironclad, in which vessel I saw a 7-inch treble-banded Brook gun, weighing, they told me, 21,000 lb., and capable of standing a charge of 25 lb. of powder. Amongst my fellow-passengers from Richmond I had observed a very Hibernian-looking prisoner in charge of one soldier. Captain Maury informed me that this individual was being taken to Chaffin's Bluff, where he is to be shot at 12 noon to-morrow for desertion.

Major Norris and I bathed in James River at 7 P.M. from a rocky and very pretty island in the centre of the stream.

I spent another very agreeable evening at Mrs S——’s, and met General Randolph, Mr Butler King, and Mr Conrad there; also Colonel Johnston, aide-de-camp to the President, who told me that they had been forced, in order to stop Bumside's executions in Kentucky, to select two Federal captains, and put them under orders for death. General Randolph looks in weak health. He had for some time filled the post of Secretary of War; but it is supposed that he and the President did not quite hit it off together. Mr Conrad as well as Mr King is a member of Congress, and he explained to me that, at the beginning of the war, each State was most desirous of being put (without the slightest necessity) under military law, which they thought was quite the correct remedy for all evil; but so sick did they soon become of this regime that at the last session Congress had refused the President the power of putting any place under military law, which is just as absurd in the other direction.

I hear every one complaining dreadfully of General Johnston's inactivity in Mississippi, and all now despair of saving Vicksburg. They deplore its loss, more on account of the effect its conquest may have in prolonging the war, than for any other reason. No one seems to fear that its possession, together with Port Hudson, will really enable the Yankees to navigate the Mississippi; nor do they fear that the latter will be able to prevent communication with the trans-Mississippi country.

Many of the Richmond papers seem to me scarcely more respectable than the New York ones. Party spirit runs high. Liberty of the press is carried to its fullest extent.

SOURCE: Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States: April-June, 1863, p. 221-4

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: May 8, 1862

Norfolk and Portsmouth are evacuated! Our army falling back! The Merrimac is to be, or has been, blown up!

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 123