We have received some information of interest respecting the battle of Pea Ridge, derived from gentlemen of this State who have recently returned from a visit on business to Louisiana. On their way they passed through the confederate Camp, at Van Buren, Arkansas, and remained there for several days. They were well acquainted with many officers and privates, and conversed freely in reference to the prominent events of the late battle at Pea Ridge, and their information is considered entirely reliable.
Generals McCulloch, McIntosh and McRae, and Col. Rives of this State are certainly dead. General Slack was not dead, and hopes of his recovery are entertained. In General Price’s division the number of dead was between 125 and 150 – the wounded between four and five hundred – and a number missing. In the other division no report was know to have been made, and probably never will be. That of Gen. McCulloch had dispersed, leaving no one to report, whilst those of McIntosh and Pike seem to have been overlooked or lost sight of. The army Argus, after a while, will probably contain the names and other particulars in General Price’s division, which will be promptly published on its receipt.
They confirm the desperation of the battle – its long continuance and extremely doubtful result – the superior numbers of the Confederate army, and its final defeat and retreat to Van Buren. Being friends of Gen. Price, they speak in the most delicate manner of his mortification at the result, but the fact of the admitted defeat and retreat is not concealed. All the stories of a second battle, so industriously circulated, are contradicted. None such occurred.
Much conversation was going on in the army in reference to the plan of attack, and events during the battle. Manu of the Friends of Gen. Price allege his non-concurrence, and attribute the defeat a failure to carry out his views. – Great pains had been taken to ascertain the exact size of Gen. Curtis’ column, the number being put down at 15,970 men. That of the Confederates being about 25,000. Gen. Van Dorn considered it an easy matter to practically surround and capture the entire army. The battle as is known, was fought on that theory, and lost.
Gen. Price, it would seem, lacked confidence in the columns of McCulloch and McIntosh, and for that or some other reason desired his Division to bring on and sustain the fight. He stated, it is alleged, that they would stand – stand and shoot until he ordered them to retreat, which he would never do.
The divisions of McCulloch and McIntosh he desired in his rear as a reserve, this line to be opened, at a proper time, for them to charge thro and upon the Federal troops with a huzzah and a yell. A charge of that kind, well directed by fresh troops, upon hard fought and weary men, he insisted, would break their lines and demoralize and destroy them. And whether true or false, this theory is presented in commendation of Gen. Price, and to the prejudice of Gen. Van Dorn as a military commander.
General Rains, it is said, became furious on learning of an order to retreat. He questioned Gen. Van Dorn, and upon receiving an affirmative reply, told him flatly if he was whipped he was the only man in the entire army in that state of mind. Van Dorn required of him to retract which being declined, his sword was demanded and surrendered. But some of the men have a different version of the affair, and they say the real difficulty is deeper than mere words; that Rains had captured a barrel of Van Dorn’s best whisky, and the difference about the retreat was a pretext to enable him to furnish a much more substantial offense. The facts we hope, will come out before a court martial.
General Price received a painful wound in the arm, and was slightly cut by a ball passing along the point of the abdomen. His army numbered only some eight or ten thousand, but he was expecting large reinforcements, and expressed the determination of marching to and occupying the Missouri river. But before General Curtis and his brave and increasing army, he might have some hope of accomplishing this purpose. As it is, his next move will be South – his fate, annihilation of himself and army. – {Mo. Republican.
– Published in the Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, April 12, 1862
Generals McCulloch, McIntosh and McRae, and Col. Rives of this State are certainly dead. General Slack was not dead, and hopes of his recovery are entertained. In General Price’s division the number of dead was between 125 and 150 – the wounded between four and five hundred – and a number missing. In the other division no report was know to have been made, and probably never will be. That of Gen. McCulloch had dispersed, leaving no one to report, whilst those of McIntosh and Pike seem to have been overlooked or lost sight of. The army Argus, after a while, will probably contain the names and other particulars in General Price’s division, which will be promptly published on its receipt.
They confirm the desperation of the battle – its long continuance and extremely doubtful result – the superior numbers of the Confederate army, and its final defeat and retreat to Van Buren. Being friends of Gen. Price, they speak in the most delicate manner of his mortification at the result, but the fact of the admitted defeat and retreat is not concealed. All the stories of a second battle, so industriously circulated, are contradicted. None such occurred.
Much conversation was going on in the army in reference to the plan of attack, and events during the battle. Manu of the Friends of Gen. Price allege his non-concurrence, and attribute the defeat a failure to carry out his views. – Great pains had been taken to ascertain the exact size of Gen. Curtis’ column, the number being put down at 15,970 men. That of the Confederates being about 25,000. Gen. Van Dorn considered it an easy matter to practically surround and capture the entire army. The battle as is known, was fought on that theory, and lost.
Gen. Price, it would seem, lacked confidence in the columns of McCulloch and McIntosh, and for that or some other reason desired his Division to bring on and sustain the fight. He stated, it is alleged, that they would stand – stand and shoot until he ordered them to retreat, which he would never do.
The divisions of McCulloch and McIntosh he desired in his rear as a reserve, this line to be opened, at a proper time, for them to charge thro and upon the Federal troops with a huzzah and a yell. A charge of that kind, well directed by fresh troops, upon hard fought and weary men, he insisted, would break their lines and demoralize and destroy them. And whether true or false, this theory is presented in commendation of Gen. Price, and to the prejudice of Gen. Van Dorn as a military commander.
General Rains, it is said, became furious on learning of an order to retreat. He questioned Gen. Van Dorn, and upon receiving an affirmative reply, told him flatly if he was whipped he was the only man in the entire army in that state of mind. Van Dorn required of him to retract which being declined, his sword was demanded and surrendered. But some of the men have a different version of the affair, and they say the real difficulty is deeper than mere words; that Rains had captured a barrel of Van Dorn’s best whisky, and the difference about the retreat was a pretext to enable him to furnish a much more substantial offense. The facts we hope, will come out before a court martial.
General Price received a painful wound in the arm, and was slightly cut by a ball passing along the point of the abdomen. His army numbered only some eight or ten thousand, but he was expecting large reinforcements, and expressed the determination of marching to and occupying the Missouri river. But before General Curtis and his brave and increasing army, he might have some hope of accomplishing this purpose. As it is, his next move will be South – his fate, annihilation of himself and army. – {Mo. Republican.
– Published in the Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, April 12, 1862
