Brigadier-General John A. Rawlins to Mary Emeline Hurlburt Rawlins, January 25, 1864

Nashville, Jan. 25, 1864.

. . . After writing you yesterday I had the satisfaction of seeing orders issued for troops to be moved from Chattanooga to Knoxville under General Thomas in person, with directions that on reaching the latter place he assume command of our entire forces there and give Longstreet battle. This is as it should be, and unless orders are changed, which I don't think will be the case, a bloody fight may be expected soon, or East Tennessee will be evacuated by the enemy.

We left Chattanoga about a quarter after six P. M. and arrived here a few minutes before seven this morning, General Grant going directly on to St. Louis and leaving matters here to be attended to by Colonel Bowers and myself. The first thing that met my eye was a despatch from General Foster stating that the enemy had ceased to press him vigorously, that he had no idea they would attack Knoxville, that he had secured the drove of 4,800 hogs he had feared were in danger, but his troops needed rest and he had ordered them into winter quarters.

So you see the difference in the despatches of yesterday and to-day. One was most alarming and the other allays the alarm previously caused. In this manner has the news alternated from that quarter ever since my return, and yet General Foster is said to be a brave man and perhaps is.

The next was a despatch from General Halleck relating to the condition of affairs in East Tennessee, the security of our present line on the Tennessee River, and future operations. And as the General was absent, and Thomas's orders to go to the relief of Knoxville depended somewhat upon information he might receive from Foster, I determined under cover of sending a copy of General Halleck's letter to him, to make his orders positive, and depend upon nothing less than the result we hoped to accomplish by his going there. Accordingly I directed him “to relax no energy and spare no exertion in his preparations for moving into East Tennessee, no matter what news he might have from Foster, short of the enemy's retreat from the State.” So you see that if Longstreet is not driven out of the State, it will not be because I have not in the General's absence made the orders ring with fight.

The Secretary of War has authorized a change of the superintendent of railroads, and if the changes are not made it will be the General's fault, for the moment the despatches came I telegraphed an order for the officer to report here by whom the present superintendent will probably be relieved, and repeated the Secretary's despatch to Louisville, where I have no doubt the General will get it. I also advised him of the action I had taken in the matter. It is now time, but no reply has yet been received. I spoke yesterday of going to Huntsville, but instead I sent the orders to Logan. On the General's return, however, I expect to go down to that place, if not before. . . .

SOURCE: James H. Wilson, The Life of John A. Rawlins, p. 391-2

Brigadier-General John A. Rawlins to Mary Emeline Hurlburt Rawlins, January 24, 1864

Chattanooga, Jan. 24, 1864.

. . . The excitement in the vicinity of Knoxville that seemed to be allayed is just renewed. A despatch from General Foster says Longstreet is pressing heavily on that place; that he has received considerable reinforcements, but not enough, he apprehends, to warrant him in again besieging it; that through the cowardice of the drovers a drove of three hundred cattle had already been captured by the enemy and that he feared the loss also of a drove of two hundred hogs, but had sent out active parties to try to save it, and that he is drawing his forces into Knoxville and looking to the security of his communications with Chattanooga. Now this all sounds, to say the least, badly. With a force equal in numbers to Longstreet's, instead of falling back he should have taken up a strong position and given Longstreet battle. If successful it would have been the end of Longstreet in East Tennessee, and if unsuccessful he could still have fallen back with safety to within the defences of Knoxville and there have awaited a siege if it had been the disposition of the enemy to make it. The talk about the cowardice of drovers as the cause of the loss of the cattle is not a sufficient answer for their loss. With an army so destitute and dependent for supplies from afar, it was clearly his duty to have had the drove under the protection of a strong, armed escort, thus insuring it against attack from the enemy. Situated as we are here, it will be with the greatest difficulty we can relieve him. The great number of the troops that have reenlisted (and gone home on furlough) have so reduced the army here as to leave barely a sufficiency for local purposes. It is really provoking when an army of sufficient force is from some unexplained cause unable to help itself and another has to be ordered to succor it. Somebody is to blame certain; time will show who. Had General Grant's order been carried out this cloud, so threatening disaster in East Tennessee, would never have gathered.

We leave here about 6 o'clock P. M. for Nashville. It may be that I will have to go by Huntsville with orders and instructions for General Logan. If so it will be several days before I reach Nashville.  . . . General Grant has had a severe attack of sick headache since our arrival here, but is now over it. He is himself in all respects. He laughs at my writing you daily, wonders how you manage to read my writing, and says he don't think I will hold out so constant and frequent a correspondent as I have begun. . . .

SOURCE: James H. Wilson, The Life of John A. Rawlins, p. 390-1