EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, January 13,
1862.
Brigadier-General BUELL:
MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatch of yesterday is received, in
which you say, "I have received your letter and General McClellan's, and
will at once devote all my efforts to your views and his." In the midst of
my many cares I have not seen nor asked to see General McClellan's letter to
you. For my own views, I have not offered, and do not now offer them, as
orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame
you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put
them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand
your duty in regard to them better than I do.
With this preliminary I state my general idea of this war to
be that we have the greater numbers and the enemy hits the greater facility of
concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can
find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can
only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the
same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no change; and
if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened
one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much.
To illustrate: Suppose last summer, when Winchester ran away
to reenforce Manassas, we had foreborne to attack Manassas, but had seized and
held Winchester. I mention this to illustrate and not to criticise. I did not
lose confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Patterson than some
others seem to. In application of the general rule I am suggesting every
particular case will have its modifying circumstances, among which the most
constantly present and most difficult to meet will be the want of perfect
knowledge of the enemy's movements. This
had its part in the Bull Run case; but worse in that case was the expiration of
the terms of the three-months' men.
Applying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck
shall menace Columbus and "down-river" generally, while you menace
Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green
do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either, but seize
Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentration at
Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety to me, and one which I am
sure you will not overlook, that the East Tennessee line is so long and over so
bad a road.
Yours, very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
[Indorsement]
JANUARY 13, 1862.
Having to-day written General Buell a letter, it occurs to
me to send General Halleck a copy of it.
A. LINCOLN.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
7 (Serial No. 7), p. 928-9
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