RAPPAHANNOCK BRIDGE,
March 15, 1862 – 10.40 a.m.
Brigadier-General WHITING:
MY DEAR GENERAL: I have just received the dispatches by
Captain Randolph, duplicates of which were delivered yesterday by a courier,
who bore a brief reply to General Holmes.
The depot at Fredericksburg, unless very small, should be
broken up. A point well in rear should be chosen.
It was my intention in falling back to take a line on which
the two bodies of troops could readily unite against the body of the enemy
operating against either. The Government wishes us to be within reach, also, of
the troops on the east and southeast of Richmond. The large force in the valley
and the good roads hence to Culpeper Court-House and Gordonsville make it not
impossible that McClellan, who seems not to value time especially, may repair
this railroad and advance upon both routes, uniting the valley troops with his
own. On every account we must be within supporting distance of each other. I
can't understand why you should fight with the Rappahannock in your rear. You
should, it seems to me, be on its south side. I cannot join you on the north
side without crossing at Fredericksburg.
Stuart reported last night the enemy in heavy force at Cedar
Run, 12 miles from here. He has made no report this morning. I am waiting for
one. Should have moved to-day towards the Rapidan but for the necessity of
sustaining him and avoiding the appearance to the men of falling back from the
enemy.
I shall cross and be in condition to co-operate with you as
soon as this railroad – worse than that at Harper's Ferry – will get off our
stores.
Tell General H. not to have a depot at Fredericksburg.
Depots should never be on a defensible frontier. Let him attend to that
immediately.
Yours, truly,
J. E. JOHNSTON.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
5 (Serial No. 5), p. 1101-2
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