Navy Department
15" March 1861
Sir:
In answer to your enquiry of this date, I take it for granted that Fort
Sumter cannot be provisioned except by force, and assuming that it is possible
to be done by force, is it wise to make the attempt?
The question has two aspects, one military, the other political. The
military gentlemen who have been consulted, as well as the officers at the
Fort, represent that it would be unwise to attempt to succor the garrison under
existing circumstances, and I am not disposed to controvert their opinions.
But a plan has been submitted by a gentleman of undoubted courage and
intelligence – not of the army or navy – to run in supplies by steam tugs, to
be chartered in New York It is admitted to be a hazardous scheme which, if
successful, is likely to be attended with some loss of life and the total destruction
of the boats. The force which would constitute the expedition, if undertaken,
as well as the officer in command would not, if I rightly understand the
proposition, be of the army or navy. It is proposed to aid and carry out the
enterprise by an armed ship at the mouth of the harbor and beyond the range of
the shore batteries, which is to drive in the armed boats of the enemy beyond
Fort Sumter. But, suppose these armed boats of the enemy refuse to go into the
inner harbor, as I think they will refuse, and shall station themselves between
Sumter and the ship for the express purpose of intercepting your boats – how
can you prevent them from taking that station and capturing the tugs? There can
be but one way, and that is by opening a fire upon them from Sumter, or the
ship, and perhaps both. If this is done, will it not be claimed that aggressive
war has been commenced by us upon the state and its citizens in their own
harbor? It may be possible to provision Fort Sumter by the volunteer expedition,
aided by the guns of Sumter and the ship – the military gentlemen admit its
possibility, but they question the wisdom of the enterprise in its military
aspect and I would not impeach their conclusion.
In a political view, I entertain doubts of the wisdom of the measure,
when the condition of the public mind in different sections of the country and
the peculiar exigency of affairs are considered. Notwithstanding the hostile
attitude of South Carolina and her long and expensive preparations, there is a
prevailing belief that there will be no actual collision. An impression has
gone abroad that Sumter is to be evacuated and the shock caused by that
announcement has done its work. The public mind is becoming tranquilized under
it and will become fully reconciled to it when the causes which have led to
that necessity shall have been made public and are rightly understood. They are
attributable to no act of those who now administer the government.
By sending or attempting to send provisions into Sumter, will not war
be precipitated? It may be impossible to escape it under any course of policy
that may be pursued, but I am not prepared to advise a course that would
provoke hostilities. It does not appear to me that the dignity, strength or
character of the government will be promoted by an attempt to provision Sumter
in the manner proposed, even should it succeed, while a failure would be
attended with untold disaster.
I do not therefore, under all the circumstances, think it wise to
attempt to provision Fort Sumter.
I am, very
respectfully,
Gideon Welles
The President
Of the United States
SOURCE: Abraham Lincoln Papers
at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
No comments:
Post a Comment