[Stono] River, S. C,
April 10,1863.
MY DEAR SIR:
I went yesterday morning to Charleston Harbor to deliver to
Admiral Dupont the despatches with which the Navy Department had charged me. I found
the Admiral on board the “Ironsides,” which, with the rest of the Monitor
fleet, was lying inside the bar, at the point where they had anchored after the
engagement of Tuesday. I delivered my despatches, and, while he was reading
them, I had some conversation with Capt. Rodgers, fleet captain of the [South Atlantic
Blockade] Squadron. He said that although the attack had been unsuccessful and
the failure would of course produce a most unhappy effect upon the country,
which had so far trusted implicitly in the invincibility of the Monitors, all
the officers of the Navy, without exception, united in the belief that what
they had attempted was impossible, and that we had reason for congratulation
that what is merely a failure had not been converted into a terrible disaster.
The matter has now been fairly tried. With favoring circumstances, with good
officers, with good management, the experiment has completely failed. We sailed
into the harbor not sanguine of victory. We fought only about forty minutes,
and the unanimous conclusion of the officers of the Navy is that an hour of
that fire would have destroyed us. We had reached and touched the obstructions.
To have remained there long enough to have removed them would have ensured the destruction
of some of the vessels. If the others had gone by the fort they would still
have been the target of the encircling batteries. There was no sufficient land
force to have taken possession of the city. There was no means of supplying
them with ammunition and provision, for no wooden ship could live ten minutes
in that fire. The only issue would have been the capture of the surviving and
the raising of the sunken vessels. This would have lost us the command of the
coast, an irremediable disaster. So the Admiral took the responsibility of
avoiding the greater evil by saving the fleet, and abandoning an enterprise
which we think has been fairly proved impossible.
The Admiral, who. had been listening and assenting to the
latter portion of what Rodgers had been saying, added: — “And as if we were to
have a visible sign that an Almighty hand was over us for our good, the orders
you have given me show how vast was the importance of my preserving this fleet,
whose power and prestige are still great and valuable, for the work which I
agree with the President in thinking most momentous, the opening of the control
of the Mississippi River. After a fight of forty minutes we had lost the use of
seven guns. I might have pushed some of the vessels past Fort Sumter, but in
that case we ran the enormous risk of giving them to the enemy, and thus losing
the control of the coast. I could not answer for that to my conscience.”
The perfect approval of their own consciences which these
officers evidently felt, did not prevent their feeling the deepest grief and
sorrow for the unhappy results of the enterprise. Their whole conversation was
as solemn as a scene of death. At one time I spoke of the estimation in which
they were held by the government and the country, which, in my opinion,
rendered it impossible that blame should be attached to them, and their eyes
suddenly filled with tears. A first repulse is a terrible thing to brave and
conscientious men accustomed only to victory.
I was several times struck by the identity of opinion and
sentiment between Admiral Dupont and yourself. You had repeatedly uttered,
during my last week in Washington, predictions which have become history.
When I left the harbor, they were preparing the torpedo raft
for the destruction of the sunken Keokuk.
I have taken the liberty of writing thus at length, as I
thought you should know the sentiments of these experienced officers in regard
to this unfortunate matter. I hope, however, the news may be received that due
honor may be given to those who fought with such bravery and discretion the
losing fight.
Yours very
respectfully,
[JOHN HAY.]
SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and
Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 75-8; Michael Burlingame,
Editor, At Lincoln’s Side: John Hay’s Civil War Correspondence and
Selected Writings, p. 34-6 where the entire letter appears.
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