<Sept 30, 1861>5
The public spirit is beginning to quail under
the depressing influence of our prolonged inaction. Our people are weary of being
kept always and every where upon the defensive. The ardent spirit of our young men
is checked and mortified because no scope is given to their enterprising
boldness. We absolutely need some dashing expeditions — some victories, great
or small, to stimulate the zeal of the Country, and, as I think, to keep up the
credit of the Government.
I hear, on pretty good authority, that the enemy is so posted
at several points along the Potomac, as to command, at pleasure, the navigation
of that river.
Why is this allowed? Is it from sheer weakness on our part? It
compromises our safety at home, and degrades our honor abroad. It isolates the Capital
by closing its only outlet to the ocean, and
thus makes the impression upon both parties to the contest, and
especially upon foreigners, that we are both weak and timid.
Are we to encounter no risk? Can war be conducted without any
danger? I care not how cautious our commanders may be in securing certain important
points (such as this city) which must, on no account, be put to hazard. But some
gallant enterprizes are necessary to establish the prestige of the army and thus
increase its positive strength. And I have no doubt that a few such enterprises
— even at the hazard of some Regiments — some Brigades — would contribute largely
to the general result, and accelerate our final success.6
It were easy to indicate several inviting theatres for such enterprises;
and our army, both officers and men are eager for such active service.
I do trust that the naval expedition to the southern coast,
will not be delayed much longer.
The whole coast, from Hat[t]eras to Fernandina,7 with
the exception of some 2 or 3 points, lies absolutely, at our mercy. We should scour
that coast—look into every bay and river — thread the passages among the islands,
and make every planter along the coast feel that he is in our power.
The well-armed, light-draft, quick-moving steamers (of which
we must by this time have a good supply) will be able to perform all this good service;
while the larger ships can carry whatever troops may be needed to garrison the few
places which we may desire to take and hold, and to make incursions into the country,
when desirable, and at the same time may dominate the open sea.
I am credibly informed that along the coast — on the islands
and on the main — between Charleston and Fernandina, there are from 3 to 4 millions
dollars worth of Sea Island Cotton, now in course of harvest. To say nothing of
the Rice plantations, which abound on the coast of Georgia — all this cotton is
easily within our reach. There are very few
white people along that coast, but large plantations and many negro[e]s. The cotton
already picked and ginned, is merchandize [sic], ready to our hand — and as to that
still in the fields, there are plenty of negro[e]s there to pick and gin it for
our use — and, with a little management by way of increased bonus for over work
— they will do it quicker for us than for their masters.
I suppose it would not be hard for us to seise one or more of
the Cotton Ports; and, in that case, we could easily get out enough cotton to make
a full supply for home consumption, and some for
Europe.
A fair success in such an enterprise would, I think be
attended by immediate and great results[.]
1. It would, at least
harras [sic] and alarm the enemy, weakening his resources, while it necessitates
increased and more extensive action on his part.
2. It would call back,
for home defence, a large number of troops, now engaged at distant points, in
aggressive operations against us.
3. It would revive the
spirit of the north, already beginning to droop under the depressing influence
of our non action. That spirit will rise high, as soon as we shew that we have taken
the affirmative, and mean henceforth to do
something, and we have heretofore suffered
all things.
4. It Will restore and
strengthen the public credit[.]
5. It will satisfy foreign
nations that we are in earnest, and willing and able to win success — and then,
we will have little trouble about Blockade[.]8
___________
5 This whole entry was written on a double and a
single letter sheet and inserted into the diary, with the date added later in pencil.
6 Bates, like Lincoln, had an early comprehension
of the political side of military strategy.
7 i.e., from North Carolina to the northern boundary
of Florida.
8 Bates, again like Lincoln, realized fully the
importance of victories to the securing of
European confidence in Northern success and hence to the
prevention of aid for the
South.
SOURCE: Howard K. Beale, Editor, The Diary of Edward
Bates, published in The Annual Report Of The American
Historical Association For The Year 1930 Volume 4, p. 194-195
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